Patterson v. Astrue

Filing 12

ORDER affirming decision of the ALJ. (Schroeppel, Kerry)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHERN DIVISION
OMER PATTERSON,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

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Case No. 11-3156-CV-S-RED

ORDER
Plaintiff Omer Patterson (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review of the Commissioner’s denial of
his request for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits under Title II and for
supplemental security income under Title XVI. Plaintiff has exhausted all of his administrative
remedies, and judicial review is now appropriate. After carefully reviewing the record, the Court
hereby AFFIRMS the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (the “ALJ”).1
BACKGROUND
The parties present complete facts and arguments in their briefs. The ALJ’s decision also
sets forth comprehensive findings of fact and conclusions of law. The parties’ facts and arguments
and the ALJ’s findings and conclusions are repeated herein only as necessary to explain the Court’s
decision.
LEGAL STANDARD
The Court’s review is limited to determining whether the Commissioner applied the correct

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Because the Court finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision and that the
ALJ applied the correct standard of law, the Court adopts much of Defendant’s brief without
quotation or citation.

standard of law and whether the Commissioner’s findings of fact are supported by substantial
evidence on the record as a whole. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3); Warburton v. Apfel,
188 F.3d 1047, 1050 (8th Cir. 1999). Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable
mind would accept as sufficient to support the Commissioner’s conclusion. See Warburton, 188
F.3d at 1050. In making this determination, the Court considers evidence that detracts from the
Commissioner’s decision as well as evidence that supports it. See id. The Court may not reverse
the Commissioner’s decision merely because substantial evidence supports a different result. See
Pierce v. Apfel, 173 F.3d 704, 706 (8th Cir. 1999). This is true even if the Court might have
weighed the evidence differently and reached a different result if a de novo review were applied.
Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1219 (8th Cir. 2001).
To receive disability benefits a claimant must show: (1) a medically determinable physical
or mental impairment that has lasted, or can be expected to last, for not less than twelve months; (2)
an inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity; and (3) the inability results from the
impairment. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423 (d)(1)(A), (d)(2); see also Timmerman v. Weinberger, 510 F.2d
439, 442 (8th Cir. 1975). The Court reviews the ALJ’s decision to determine whether the ALJ
followed the Commissioner’s implementing regulations, which set out a five-step, burden-shifting
process for determining whether the claimant has a “disability” within the meaning of the Social
Security Act.
The five steps are: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaging in “substantial gainful
activity,” (2) whether the claimant is severely impaired, (3) whether the severe impairment is, or is
comparable to, a listed impairment precluding substantial gainful activity as a matter of law, (4)
whether the claimant, with her current Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) can meet the demands

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of her past work, and if not; (5) whether the claimant retains the capacity to perform any other work
that exists in significant numbers in the economy. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; Bowen v.
Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987) (discussing the five-step analysis). In the first four steps, the
burden is on the claimant to prove that she is disabled. If the claimant is not able to perform her past
work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove that there are jobs in the national economy that
the claimant can perform, although the ultimate burden of persuasion remains with the claimant.
See Harris v. Barnhart, 356 F.3d 926, 931 n.2 (8th Cir. 2004); see also Barnhart v. Thomas, 540
U.S. 20, 24, 28 (2003) (noting that the existence of jobs in the national economy must be proved
only at step five).
LEGAL ANALYSIS
Plaintiff raises four main challenges to the ALJ’s determination that he is not disabled.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in analyzing the impact of his drug and alcohol abuse on his
impairments, by failing to give controlling weight to his treating psychologist, by improperly
determining his RFC, and in assessing his credibility.
I. The ALJ did not err in conducting his drug and alcohol analysis or in weighing the
opinion offered by Plaintiff’s treating psychologist
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred because he did not conduct a proper analysis of the impact
his substance abuse has on his impairments. Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ did not indicate what
evidence he relied upon to determine “that without substance abuse, [his] mental capabilities would
substantially improve.” (Plaintiff’s Brief Doc. 7 p. 15). Plaintiff further alleges that the record
contains “voluminous evidence” about his attempts to deal with his substance abuse without any
indication that his substance abuse was material to his mental limitations.
The Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument for several reasons. First, the Court notes that it is
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Plaintiff’s burden, not the ALJ’s burden, to show that substance abuse is not material to an ALJ’s
disability determination. Kluesner v. Astrue, 607 F.3d 533, 537 (8th Cir. 2010). Second, the Court
notes that Plaintiff’s contention that the ALJ did not indicate what evidence he relied upon in
making his decision is wholly without merit. In support of the proposition that Plaintiff’s mental
impairments improved when he stopped abusing drugs and alcohol, the ALJ noted that the Plaintiff
has not been truthful about his drug use. (Tr. 454). The ALJ also noted that although Plaintiff had
many instances of decompensation, such instances were related to his drug/alcohol abuse and would
subside when he was given medication to help with his addiction and/or received treatment. (Tr.
247-48; 337-339; 346-; 400-01; 412; 528). Thus, contrary to Plaintiff’s contention, there are
medical records supporting the ALJ’s decision.
Plaintiff also notes that Alwyn Whitehead, Plaintiff’s treating psychologist, opined that
Plaintiff’s bipolar disorder and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”) “contributed greatly to his
inability to maintain sobriety.” (Tr. 669). However, as the Commissioner notes, the ALJ
specifically considered Whitehead’s opinion and noted that his opinion was provided more than
three and one-half years after he had last seen Plaintiff as a patient. The ALJ also noted that
Whitehead’s opinion was not consistent with the other medical records, discussed above, which
indicate that Plaintiff’s drug use impacts his mental impairments and that Plaintiff’s symptoms
improve once his addictions are treated. See Ellis v. Barnhart, 392 F.3d 988, 994 (8th Cir. 2005)
(noting that a treating physician’s opinion is not entitled to controlling weight if it “inconsistent with
the other substantial evidence in the record”) (internal citation and quotations omitted). Thus, the
Court agrees that Whitehead’s opinion was not entitled to controlling weight and does not assist
Plaintiff’s burden in proving his substance abuse is not material.

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II. The ALJ did not err in assessing Plaintiff’s RFC
Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ erred in assessing his RFC. Plaintiff first challenges the
ALJ’s RFC determination with respect to his physical limitations by stating that there are no medical
opinions that discuss Plaintiff’s physical ability in the workplace. However, Plaintiff overlooks the
fact that two doctors offered opinions on Plaintiff’s physical limitations and his ability to work. See
(Tr. 691-96; 707). Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s reliance on Dr. Charles Ash’s opinion is improper
because Dr. Ash only relied on objective findings and specifically noted that Plaintiff has more
limitations based on his subjective complaints, but Plaintiff’s argument overlooks the fact that the
ALJ found Plaintiff not entirely credible, and Plaintiff also fails to cite to any authority
demonstrating that the ALJ erred on relying on Dr. Ash’s opinion. As such, the Court rejects
Plaintiff’s argument.
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred in determining Plaintiff’s RFC with respect to his
mental impairments. However, Plaintiff’s argument presupposes that his mental impairments are
severe absent his substance abuse, and his argument also assumes that his psychologists’ opinions
should have been given more weight by the ALJ. As discussed above, the ALJ made no error in his
analysis and the Court therefore finds Plaintiff’s argument to be without merit.
III. The ALJ did not err in assessing Plaintiff’s credibility
Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in assessing his credibility. In assessing
Plaintiff’s credibility, the ALJ discussed that Plaintiff had been involved in physical fights, which
is inconsistent with someone complaining of disabling back pain, Plaintiff quit his last job after
fighting with his boss, his subjective complaints were inconsistent with objective findings, and he
admitted at an examination that his biggest problem preventing him from working is his boredom.

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Even if Plaintiff disagrees with the ALJ’s assessment of his credibility, an ALJ’s credibility
determination, if it is supported by the record, is entitled to deference. Gates v. Astrue, 627 F.3d
1080, 1082 (8th Cir. 2011). The ALJ did not misquote the record and as such, the Court rejects
Plaintiff’s credibility argument.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the ALJ.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:

July 24, 2012

/s/ Richard E. Dorr
RICHARD E. DORR, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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