Dowd v. Astrue

Filing 15

ORDER, re 3 SOCIAL SECURITY COMPLAINT filed by Kelli Dowd, affirming decision of Commissioner. Signed on 3/26/2013 by Magistrate Judge Matt J. Whitworth. (Bode, Kay)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHERN DIVISION

KELLI DOWD,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner,
Social Security Administration,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)

No. 11-3518-SSA-CV-S-MJW

)
)
)
)
ORDER

Plaintiff Kelli Dowd seeks judicial review1 of a final administrative decision denying her
disability benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. '' 401 et seq. Section
205(g) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. ' 405(g), provides for judicial review of a final decision of the
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration under Title II. The parties= briefs are fully
submitted, and an oral argument was held on February 14, 2013. The complete facts and
arguments are presented in the parties= briefs and will not be repeated here.
Standard of Review
The Eighth Circuit has set forth the standard for the federal courts’ judicial review of
denial of benefits, as follows:
Our role on review is to determine whether the Commissioner’s findings are supported by
substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Substantial evidence is less than a
preponderance, but is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support
the Commissioner’s conclusion. In determining whether existing evidence is substantial,
we consider evidence that detracts from the Commissioner’s decision as well as evidence
that supports it. As long as substantial evidence in the record supports the
Commissioner’s decision, we may not reverse it because substantial evidence exists in
the record that would have supported a contrary outcome or because we would have
decided the case differently.
Baker v. Barnhart, 457 F.3d 882, 892 (8th Cir. 2006).
1

With the consent of the parties, this case was assigned to the United States Magistrate
Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. ' 636(c).

The claimant has the initial burden of establishing the existence of a disability as defined
by 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1). See Roth v. Shalala, 45 F.3d 279, 282 (8th Cir. 1995). To meet the
statutory definition, "the claimant must show (1) that he has a medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which will either last for at least twelve months or result in death, (2) that he
is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity, and (3) that this inability is the result of
his impairment." McMillian v. Schweiker, 697 F.2d 215, 220 (8th Cir. 1983).
When reviewing the record to determine if there is substantial evidence to support the
administrative decision, the court considers the educational background, work history and
present age of the claimant; subjective complaints of pain or other impairments; claimant’s
description of physical activities and capabilities; the medical opinions given by treating and
examining physicians; the corroboration by third parties of claimant’s impairments; and the
testimony of vocational experts when based upon proper hypothetical questions that fairly set
forth the claimant’s impairments. McMillian, 697 F.2d at 221.
Discussion
Plaintiff Kelli Kristine Dowd was born in 1988 and was 20 years of age on November 13,
2008, the onset date of her alleged disability. Plaintiff alleges disability mainly due to
endometriosis, anxiety, and bipolar disorder.
After reviewing this case in its entirety and considering the arguments of the parties
presented at oral argument, this Court finds there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole
to support the decision of the administrative law judge (ALJ) that plaintiff is not disabled as
defined by the Social Security Act.
Specifically, the ALJ did not err in determining plaintiff’s allegations of disabling
symptoms were not credible based upon lack of objective medical evidence and questionable
motivations. See Baldwin v. Barnhart, 349 F.3d 549, 558 (8th Cir. 2003) (credibility questions
concerning claimant=s subjective complaints are primarily for the ALJ to decide, and not the
reviewing court). The ALJ properly cited to substantial evidence in the record showing drug
seeking behavior by plaintiff, including continued and repeated emergency room visits with no
objective findings of problems. The ALJ did not err in determining plaintiff suffered from
polysubstance dependence. The ALJ’s drug and alcohol analysis, which determined plaintiff’s

2

substance abuse was a material factor contributing to her disability and that plaintiff would not
be disabled if she was sober, is supported by the record as a whole and is not error.2
IT IS, THEREFORE ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner is affirmed.
Dated this 26th day of March, 2013, at Jefferson City, Missouri.

/s/

Matt J. Whitworth

MATT J. WHITWORTH
United States Magistrate Judge

2

Plaintiff’s arguments in support of this appeal were carefully and fully considered. Any
arguments that are not specifically discussed in this order have been considered and determined
to be without merit. This Court finds there is substantial evidence in the record to support the
decision of the ALJ.
3