Reyco Granning LLC v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local Union No. 245

Filing 22

ORDER and OPINION denying 12 Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment; granting 14 Defendant's motion for summary judgment and confirming Arbitrator's decision and award. Signed on 12/06/2012 by District Judge Ortrie D. Smith. (Will-Fees, Eva)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHERN DIVISION
REYCO GRANNING LLC,
Plaintiff,
vs.
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD
OF TEAMSTERS, LOCAL UNION
NO. 245,
Defendant.

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Case No. 12-3247-CV-S-ODS

ORDER AND OPINION (1) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT, (2) GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND (3) CONFIRMING ARBITRATOR’S DECISION AND AWARD

This case involves judicial review of an Arbitrator’s decision and award, and
pending are cross-motions for relief. Plaintiff seeks an order setting aside the
Arbitrator’s decision, while Defendant seeks an order confirming the decision. For the
following reasons, Plaintiff’s motion (Doc. # 12) is denied, Defendant’s motion (Doc. # 14)
is granted, and the Arbitrator’s decision is confirmed.

I. BACKGROUND

The parties are signatories to a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”). At issue
is the interpretation of Article XII, section 3, which addresses eligibility for holiday pay.
This provision states as follows:
To be eligible for holiday pay, an employee . . . must have worked a
minimum of eight (8) hours on the last regularly scheduled workday of the
Company prior to the holiday, and worked a minimum of eight (8) hours on
the first regular scheduled workday of the Company after the holiday.
Exception may be made if an employee is tardy arriving to work less than
sixty (60) minutes, and will be made if an employee is unable to work on
these days due to an illness or injury. Illness or injury must be verified by a
physician.

Tiffini DePalma, an employee in Plaintiff’s paint department, experienced a flat tire
on her last regularly scheduled workday before Christmas in 2011, causing her to arrive to
work forty-five minutes late. As a result, she did not work a full eight hours on that day.
DePalma sought an exception, but Plaintiff refused. In the arbitration, Plaintiff explained
that in its view DePalma’s attendance record did not justify granting an exception.
The parties focus – as they did during the arbitration on the provision that
“[e]xception may be made,” and more particularly on the meaning of the word “may.”
The evidence presented to the Arbitrator included notes from the negotiations that
culminated with the CBA’s execution. With respect to this particular issue, those notes
reflect that Plaintiff was concerned about people leaving work early on the day before a
holiday, while Defendant was concerned about its members losing holiday pay due to
unexpected events, such as late arrivals due to car trouble. Testimony from a member
of Defendant’s bargaining team confirmed these views, and further established that
Defendant would not have agreed to a provision permitting Plaintiff to deny such an
exception based on the employment’s past record. Plaintiff’s representative testified
that the exception provision was not understood to be automatic, but it was his
understanding that an exception would be granted for employees who experienced car
trouble.
The Arbitrator held that the use of the word “may” indicated Defendant “has some
discretion in the granting of an exception for tardiness on the days before and after the
holiday in reaching a decision on the denial of holiday pay” and that the granting of such
an exception is not mandatory. However, this discretion is not unlimited: based on the
parties’ negotiation history, the Arbitrator further found that parties meant for exceptions
to be extended “for vehicle mechanical trouble, oversleeping, or car wrecks.”
Based on the course of negotiations the Arbitrator held that Plaintiff’s discretion
was not completely unfettered. He determined that “an employee who is tardy on the
day before or after a holiday has the burden to provide some evidence of circumstances
beyond his/her control or extenuating circumstances in regard to the tardiness of less
than 60 minutes or else the Company has the discretion to deny holiday pay.” DePalma

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satisfied this burden, so the Arbitrator directed that she be paid for the 2011 Christmas
holiday.

II. DISCUSSION

A moving party is entitled to summary judgment on a claim only if there is a
showing that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." See generally Williams v. City of St. Louis,
783 F.2d 114, 115 (8th Cir. 1986). "[W]hile the materiality determination rests on the
substantive law, it is the substantive law's identification of which facts are critical and
which facts are irrelevant that governs." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986). Thus, A[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit
under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.@
Wierman v. Casey=s Gen. Stores, 638 F.3d 984, 993 (8th Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted). In
applying this standard, the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party, giving that party the benefit of all inferences that may be reasonably
drawn from the evidence. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 588-89 (1986); Tyler v. Harper, 744 F.2d 653, 655 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470
U.S. 1057 (1985). However, a party opposing a motion for summary judgment "may not
rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the . . . pleadings, but

. . . by affidavits or

as otherwise provided in [Rule 56], must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
The court must give “an extraordinary level of deference” to an underlying arbitral
award. Boise Cascade Corp. v. Paper Allied-Indus., Chemical and Energy Workers, 309
F.3d 1075, 1080 (8th Cir. 2002). Specifically, courts are not allowed to reconsider the
merits of an award, “even though the parties may allege that the award rests on errors of
fact or on misinterpretation of the contract.” Bureau of Engraving, Inc. v. Graphic
Communication Int'l Union, 284 F.3d 821, 824 (8th Cir. 2002) (quoting United
Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987)). Therefore, the award
must be upheld so “long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the
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contract and acting within the scope of his authority.” Id. (quoting Misco, 484 U.S. at 38);
see also Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509 (2001).
On the other hand, an arbitrator's authority is not unlimited. Missouri River Servs.,
Inc. v. Omaha Tribe of Nebraska, 267 F.3d 848, 855 (8th Cir. 2001). An award must be
vacated if it is “completely irrational,” Hoffman v. Cargill Inc., 236 F.3d 458, 461 (8th Cir.
2001), and the arbitrator is not permitted to impose his sense of “industrial justice.”
Breckingridge O’Fallon, Inc. v. Teamsters Union Local No. 682, 664 F.3d 1230, 1233-34
(8th Cir. 2012). “An award is ‘irrational where it fails to draw its essence from the
agreement.’ “ Boise Cascade Corp., 309 F.3d at 1080. The award “draws its essence
from the parties' agreement as long as it is derived from the agreement, viewed in light of
its language, its context, and any other indicia of the parties' intention.” Id. (internal
quotations omitted). “The arbitrator may not ignore the plain language of the contract;
but the parties having authorized the arbitrator to give meaning to the language of the
agreement, a court should not reject an award on the ground that the arbitrator misread
the contract.” Misco, 484 U.S. at 38.
Plaintiff argues the Arbitrator correctly ruled that it has the discretion to grant or
deny exceptions to the attendance/holiday pay policy, but then imposed his own sense of
industrial justice (in violation of both the law and the CBA) by establishing guidelines for
Plaintiff’s exercise of discretion. This mischaracterizes the Arbitrator’s decision. In
reality, the Arbitrator held that “may” did not bestow unfettered discretion, but rather that
Plaintiff’s discretion was guided or limited. The Arbitrator did not reach this decision
based on his personal sense of industrial justice. Instead, this decision was based on
the course of negotiations between the parties, and the evidence presented to the
Arbitrator supported his interpretation.
In construing the extent of Plaintiff’s discretion the Arbitrator interpreted the CBA in
light of its language, context, and other indicia of the parties' intent. Therefore, his
decision is drawn from the essence of the CBA, and the Court is not empowered to
second-guess the Arbitrator’s decision.

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III. CONCLUSION

The Arbitrator’s decision is confirmed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Ortrie D. Smith
ORTRIE D. SMITH, SENIOR JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DATE: December 6, 2012

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