Barker v. Colvin

Filing 14

ORDER entered by Judge Ortrie D. Smith. The Commissioner's decision is affirmed. (Matthes, Renea)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHERN DIVISION
DONALD BARKER,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
)
Acting Commissioner of Social Security, )
)
Defendant.
)

Case No. 13-3149-CV-S-ODS

ORDER AND OPINION AFFIRMING
COMMISSIONER’S FINAL DECISION DENYING BENEFITS
Pending is Plaintiff's appeal of the Commissioner of Social Security=s final
decision denying his application for disability benefits. The Commissioner's decision is
affirmed.

I. BACKGROUND

The issues raised in this case make it unnecessary to chronicle the entirety of
Plaintiff’s medical history. Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ’s findings regarding his
medical history, limitations, or residual functional capacity. Plaintiff’s only argument is
that the ALJ erred in finding Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) allowed
Plaintiff to perform his past work as an auto detailer. The following summary will suffice.
Plaintiff was born in December 1952 and completed the eighth grade; he alleged
he became disabled on November 1, 2009, due to a combination of diabetes,
hypertension, a history of nasal polyps, and pain in his upper arm and leg. His
application sought disability benefits pursuant to Title II, and his insured status under
this program expired on June 30, 2012. The ALJ found, inter alia, that there was no
basis for finding Plaintiff suffered from pain or limitations in his upper and lower
extremities, and as stated Plaintiff does not appeal this ruling. This is particularly

significant given Plaintiff’s testimony that the reason he could not return to his past work
was because of his leg and arm. R. at 30. The ALJ’s unchallenged finding that
Plaintiff’s leg and arm did not limit him severely undercuts Plaintiff’s claim. The ALJ
also found Plaintiff retains the RFC to perform light work except he is limited to
occasional kneeling and frequent crouching, reaching and stooping; again, Plaintiff does
not appeal this ruling.
Plaintiff testified that his duties required him to get into cars while carrying
cleaning equipment. R. at 31-32. He was also sometimes required to use a highpressure hose. R. at 33-34. The Record also includes forms completed by Plaintiff that
documented his duties as an auto detailer. R. at 143-44. These forms reflect that
during a typical day Plaintiff had to walk, stand, sit, stoop, kneel, crouch and reach –
but do not reflect the frequency or amount of time these tasks had to be performed.
A vocational expert (“VE”) testified (very briefly) and submitted a work summary.
The combination of the VE’s testimony and her work summary establish that Plaintiff’s
job as a detailer is normally performed at the medium level of exertion but was actually
performed by Plaintiff at the light level of exertion. His duties required occasional
kneeling and frequent stooping, reaching, crouching, and handling. R. at 35-36, 189.
Based on the comparison of Plaintiff’s RFC to the VE’s testimony, the ALJ found
Plaintiff was not disabled because he could perform his past work as an auto detailer as
he actually performed the job.

II. DISCUSSION

“[R]eview of the Secretary=s decision [is limited] to a determination whether the
decision is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Substantial
evidence is evidence which reasonable minds would accept as adequate to support the
Secretary=s conclusion. [The Court] will not reverse a decision simply because some
evidence may support the opposite conclusion.” Mitchell v. Shalala, 25 F.3d 712, 714
(8th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). Though advantageous to the Commissioner, this
standard also requires that the Court consider evidence that fairly detracts from the final
decision. Forsythe v. Sullivan, 926 F.2d 774, 775 (8th Cir. 1991) (citing Hutsell v.
2

Sullivan, 892 F.2d 747, 749 (8th Cir. 1989)). Substantial evidence means “more than a
mere scintilla” of evidence; rather, it is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Gragg v. Astrue, 615 F.3d 932, 938 (8th
Cir. 2010).
Plaintiff’s argument distills to the following: (1) Plaintiff’s RFC includes limitations
on his ability to kneel, crouch, reach and stoop; (2) his detailing job required kneeling,
crouching, reaching and stooping; therefore (3) Plaintiff cannot work as a car detailer.
Plaintiff’s argument invites the Court to engage in fact-finding to determine (or “redetermine”) whether Plaintiff can engage in enough kneeling, crouching, reaching and
stopping to perform his past work, but this is not the Court’s role. This is the ALJ’s role,
and the ALJ determined Plaintiff’s limitations do not preclude him from performing his
past work. The mere fact that Plaintiff has some limitations in these functions does not
mean he lacks the RFC to perform these functions sufficiently for the job.
Plaintiff’s written description of his job duties does not undermine the ALJ’s
decision. The forms indicate he spent the entirety of each day engaged in some
combination of walking, standing, sitting, stooping, kneeling, crouching,
handling/grasping, and reaching, but he obviously did not spend the entirety of each day
doing all of them and nothing in the Record suggests the exertional demands of
Plaintiff’s job exceed his RFC. The ALJ could have elicited more information from the
VE, but the Court concludes the Record nonetheless contains substantial evidence
supporting the ALJ’s ultimate conclusion.1

III. CONCLUSION

The Commissioner’s final decision is affirmed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Ortrie D. Smith
ORTRIE D. SMITH, SENIOR JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DATE: January 28, 2014

1

As an aside, the Court observes that even if Plaintiff could not perform his past
job, his RFC – which stands unchallenged – would almost certainly permit him to
perform other work in the national economy.
3