Brown v. Sanders

Filing 9

ORDER: ORDERED that the petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied, and this case is dismissed with prejudice. Signed on July 23, 2014 by Chief District Judge Greg Kays. (Thoennes, Cindy)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHERN DIVISION
STACEY LADON BROWN,
Petitioner,
vs.
LINDA SANDERS,
Respondent.

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Case No. 14-3160-CV-S-DGK-P

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Petitioner filed this federal petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to
challenge the authority of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (FBOP) to raise his court-ordered schedule of
payment amount for his criminal fines and assessments pertaining to his federal criminal case.
Petitioner was convicted and sentenced in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Arkansas in United States v. Brown, Case No. 2:07-CR-20005-001 (W.D. Ark. 2011), and was ordered
to pay a felony assessment of $10,000.00 and a fine in the amount of $3,000.00 to be paid immediately
and, if unable to pay immediately, “any unpaid financial penalty imposed shall be paid during the period
of incarceration at a rate of not less than $25.00 quarterly, or 10% of the defendant’s quarterly earnings,
whichever is greater.” Petitioner’s Exhibit 1.
After he began serving his sentence, petitioner chose to enroll in the Inmate Financial
Responsibility Program (IFRP) established pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 5380.08, which is a voluntary
program that evaluates and determines the amount of an inmate’s monthly payments based on the
amount in his trust fund account for the past six months. Petitioner’s monthly payments originally were
calculated to be $25.00 per quarter, but were recalculated by his Unit Team at the United States Medical
Center for Federal Prisoners (USMCFP) in Springfield, Missouri, in August 2013 to be $105.00

monthly. Although petitioner continues to make his IFRP payments, he argues that the FBOP does not
have the authority to set his payment schedule because the court-ordered schedule of payments for fines
should not be altered by the FBOP and cites to United States v. Coates, 178 F. 3d 681, 685 (3d Cir.
1999), and United States v. McGlothlin, 249 F. 3d 783 (8th Cir. 2001); that money he receives from
family for commissary should not be considered part of his earnings; and that he was coerced into
signing the IFRP contract because he may be denied consideration for certain programs and privileges if
he refuses to participate in the IFRP. Doc. Nos. 1 and 2.
Respondent admits that petitioner has exhausted the FBOP administrative remedies in this
matter, but argues that, because participation in the IFRP is voluntary and because the “penalties” for not
participating in the IFRP do not rise to constitutional proportions, the FBOP has not violated petitioner’s
constitutional rights. See Gaines v. Castillo, Case No. 11-3113-CV-S-RED, 2011 WL 5546865, at *2
(W.D. Mo. Oct. 17, 2011). Respondent also argues that Coates and McGlothlin do not apply to
petitioner’s case because they both involved inmates who were required to pay restitution under the
Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, which vested sole authority to set restitution payment
schedules in the district courts. Petitioner was ordered to pay a felony assessment and a fine, not
restitution; therefore, respondent argues that Matheny v. Morrison, 307 F. 3d 709, 712 (8th Cir. 2002),
applies to petitioner’s situation when the sentencing court has ordered immediate payment of a courtimposed fine and when the IFRP plan merely facilitates petitioner’s compliance with the sentencing
court’s order. Doc. No. 6, pp. 3-6. Moreover, FBOP regulations and policy permit payments to be
“made from institution resources and non-institution (community) resources.” 28 C.F.R. § 545.11(b).
Therefore, the IFRP payments which were based on deposits in petitioner’s inmate account, applicable
law, and FBOP policy were appropriate and are not a dramatic departure from the basic condition of his
sentence as required by Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 487 (1995). Doc. No. 6, pp. 5-8.
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Petitioner replies that, under Matheny, FBOP staff may change the scheduled rate of payment
only in the absence of a court-ordered installment payment and cites to Montano-Figuero v. Crabtree,
162 F. 3d 548, 550 (9th Cir. 1998), for the proposition that, where the judgment sets only the amount of
the fine and not the method of payment, a defendant’s fine is due immediately under 18 U.S.C. §
3572(d). Petitioner also cites to 28 C.F.R. § 545.11 for the proposition that FBOP staff are required to
uphold a court-ordered payment schedule for fines and restitution. Doc. No. 8, pp. 2, 3.
As previously discussed, the Eighth Circuit has held that it is within the FBOP’s discretion to
place an inmate in the IFRP payment plan when the inmate’s monetary penalties were ordered to be due
immediately as in petitioner’s case. Moreover, 28 U.S.C. § 545.11(b) permits the FBOP staff to
unilaterally accelerate or increase an inmate’s payments under the IFRP and to consider funds obtained
from outside sources as available resources in determining the appropriate payment. See McGhee v.
Clark, 166 F. 3d 884, 886-887 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that, when a sentencing court imposed a fine and
special assessment due “in full immediately,” the FBOP’s payment schedule pursuant to the IFRP did
not conflict with the sentencing court’s immediate payment order).
Because petitioner’s case does not involve the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act and because
the sentencing court ordered petitioner to pay a fine, not restitution, Coates and McGlothlin do not apply
to prevent the FBOP from deducting payments through the IFRP for petitioner’s court-ordered fines and
assessment. In fact, the sentencing court’s Judgment and Commitment Order merely sets a minimum
amount of money that petitioner is required to pay (10% of petitioner’s quarterly earnings) and
specifically anticipates that payments likely will be made through the IFRP during petitioner’s
imprisonment in the event that the fine and assessment cannot be paid immediately. Further, this Court
does not interpret the language in petitioner’s Judgment and Commitment Order stating that “[a]ll
criminal monetary penalties, except those payments made through the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Inmate
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Financial Responsibility Program, are made to the clerk of the court” to be an express delegation of
payment terms to the FBOP. Thus, the FBOP did not lack authority to place him on a payment
schedule. See Frauendorfer v. Fondren, 374 Fed. Appx. 676, 2010 WL 1780214, at *6 (8th Cir. May 5,
2010).
Moreover, the IFRP does not deprive petitioner of his due process rights by applying possible
“penalties” for not participating in the IFRP. When petitioner signed the IFRP contract setting the
amount of payment he would make, he was provided information regarding the potential consequences
of a refusal to participate in the IFRP plan, so he received adequate notice of the consequences of not
participating. None of the benefits or privileges at issue trigger due process protection under Sandin.
See Gaines v. Castillo, supra; Cervantes v. Cruz, 2009 WL 76685, at * 4-5 (D. Minn. Jan. 8, 2009);
James v. Quilan, 866 F. 2d 627, 630-31 (3d Cir. 1989). Finally, the record indicates that petitioner
reasonably can make the $105.00 monthly payment based on his community resources and deposits into
his inmate account.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied, and this case
is dismissed with prejudice.

/s/ Greg Kays
GREG KAYS
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Kansas City, Missouri,
Dated: July 23, 2014.

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