Bayne v. Colvin

Filing 14

ORDER Affirming in part and Remanding decision of Commissioner re 3 SOCIAL SECURITY COMPLAINT. Signed on 1/26/2018 by District Judge Roseann Ketchmark. (Stout, Courtney)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHERN DIVISION

MIKKI BAYNE,
Plaintiff,
v.

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, ACTING
COMMISSIONER OF SSA;
Defendant.

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No. 6:16-03465-CV-RK

ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s appeal seeking judicial review of a final decision of the
Defendant Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying disability benefits. The
decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED in part and REMANDED for further
proceedings.
Standard of Review
The Court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision to deny disability benefits is
limited to determining if the decision “complies with the relevant legal requirements and is
supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.” KKC v. Colvin, 818 F.3d 364,
374 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Ford v. Astrue, 518 F.3d 979, 981 (8th Cir. 2008)); see also 42
U.S.C. § 405(g). “Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance, but enough that a
reasonable mind would find it adequate to support the [Commissioner’s] conclusion.” Gann v.
Berryhill, 864 F.3d 947, 950 (8th Cir. 2017). In determining whether existing evidence is
substantial, the Court takes into account “evidence that both supports and detracts from the
ALJ’s [Administrative Law Judge] decision.” Milam v. Colvin, 794 F.3d 978, 983 (8th Cir.
2015) (quoting Perkins v. Asture, 648 F.3d 892, 897 (8th Cir. 2011)). “If the ALJ’s decision is
supported by substantial evidence, [the Court] may not reverse even if substantial evidence
would support the opposite outcome or [the Court] would have decided differently.” Smith v.
Colvin, 756 F.3d 621, 625 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Davis v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 962, 966 (8th Cir.
2001)). The Court does not re-weigh the evidence presented to the ALJ. Reece v. Colvin, 834

F.3d 904, 908 (8th Cir. 2016).

The Court should “defer heavily to the findings and

conclusions of the [Commissioner].” Wright v. Colvin, 789 F.3d 847, 852 (8th Cir. 2015)
(quotation and citation omitted).
Discussion
By way of overview, the ALJ determined the Plaintiff suffers from the following severe
impairments: cardiomyopathy, atrial flutter, status post cardia ablation, history of congestive
heart failure, severe tricuspid regurgitation, obesity, bipolar disorder with psychotic features, and
social anxiety. However, the ALJ found that none of the Plaintiff’s impairments, whether
considered alone or in combination, meet or medically equals the criteria of one of the listed
impairments in 20 CFR Pt. 404. Subpt. P, App. 1 (“Listing”). Additionally, the ALJ found that
despite the ALJ’s limitations, the Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to
perform a range of light work with limitations. Although the ALJ found the Plaintiff was unable
to perform any past relevant work, the ALJ found the Plaintiff was not disabled, and that
considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, there are jobs that exist in
significant numbers in the national economy the Plaintiff can perform.
On appeal, Plaintiff makes the following arguments in support of reversal of the ALJ’s
decision: (1) whether the ALJ’s evaluation of the medical opinions was proper, and (2) whether
the ALJ properly evaluated Plaintiff’s credibility.
The ALJ erred by omitting marked limitation opinions from medical sources without
explaining why those opinions were not adopted. The Plaintiff was treated by Dr. Heslin, Ms.
Lazzari, and Mr. Stephenson at Burrell Behavioral Health. While the ALJ properly discounted
Dr. Heslin, Ms. Lazzari, and Mr. Stephenson’s opinions of extreme limitations, the ALJ omitted
the opinions’ marked ‘limitations’ from the RFC without explanation. An ALJ is required to
weigh all medical source opinions and “always give good reasons for the weight given to a
treating source’s opinion.” SSR 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188 at *5 (Soc. Sec. Admin. July 2, 1996).
Further, an ALJ must explain why an opinion from a medical source was not adopted. SSR 968p, 1996 WL 374184 at *7 (Soc. Sec. Admin. July 2, 1996) (“The RFC assessment must always
consider and address medical source opinions. If the RFC assessment conflicts with an opinion
from a medical source, the adjudicator must explain why the opinion was not adopted.”). See
Trotter v. Colvin, 2015 WL 5785548, at *3 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 2, 2015) (remand was required when
the ALJ gave the opinion weight but did not provide any explanation for omitting portions of the
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opinion); White v. Astrue, 2012 WL 930840, at *7 (W.D. Mo. March 19, 2012) (the ALJ erred
when the ALJ gave weight to the doctor’s opinion but did not include the doctor’s limitations in
the RFC or explain the omission); Woods v. Astrue, 780 F. Supp. 2d 904, 913-15 (E.D. Mo. Jan.
26, 2011) (remand was required when the ALJ provided weight to the treating physician’s
opinion, but disregarded the physician’s limitations without explanation). Accordingly, the
record does not reflect substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s evaluation of the medical
opinions and the corresponding omission of the marked limitations without explanation.
Turning to Plaintiff’s last argument, the Court finds that substantial evidence supports the
ALJ’s assessment that Plaintiff’s subjective complaints were not fully credible.1 See Travis v.
Astrue, 477 F.3d 1037, 1042 (8th Cir. 2007) (“[A] court will not substitute its opinion for the
ALJ’s, who is in the better position to gauge credibility and resolve conflicts in the evidence.”).
Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to discount the Plaintiff’s credibility utilizing all Polaski factors.
However, the ALJ is not required to discuss each factor used in determining credibility. See
Strongson v. Barnhart, 361 F.3d 1066, 1072 (8th Cir. 2004) (the “ALJ, in determining a
claimant’s credibility in a social security disability benefits case, need not explicitly discuss each
Polaski factor; it is sufficient if he acknowledges and considers those factors before discounting
the claimant’s complaints”); Smith v. Colvin, 756 F.3d 621, 625 (8th Cir. 2014) (“[w]e defer to
the ALJ’s evaluation of [a claimant’s] credibility, provided that such determination is ‘supported
by good reasons and substantial evidence, even if every factor is not discussed in depth.’”)
(quoting Cox v. Barnhart, 471 F.3d 902, 907 (8th Cir. 2006)). Accordingly, substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s credibility determination.
On remand, the ALJ should reevaluate the medical opinions of Dr. Heslin, Ms. Lazzari,
and Mr. Stephenson. If the ALJ determines that the marked limitations should be disregarded,
the ALJ should provide specific, reasoned explanations for that decision.

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See Ponder v. Colvin, 770 F.3d 1190, 1195-96 (8th Cir. 2014) (substantial evidence supports the
ALJ in finding the claimant was not disabled where the claimant was not restricted in daily activities
including: laundry, light housework, cooking meals, and grocery shopping); Davis 239 F.3d at 967)
(subjective complaints of pain may be discredited by performance of daily activities that are inconsistent
with such complaints); Brown v. Astrue, 611 F.3d 941, 955 (8th Cir. 2010) (“[i]f an impairment can be
controlled by treatment or medication, it cannot be considered disabling”); Holley v. Massanari, 253 F.3d
1088, 1092 (8th Cir. 2001) (a plaintiff’s noncompliance with medical treatment is a proper factor to be
considered in a credibility analysis).

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Conclusion
Having carefully reviewed the record before the Court and the parties’ submissions on
appeal, the Court AFFIRMS in part the Commissioner’s decision and REMANDS for further
proceedings.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ Roseann A. Ketchmark
ROSEANN A. KETCHMARK, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DATED: January 26, 2018

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