Sears v. Colvin

Filing 13

ORDER affirming decision of Commissioner re 3 SOCIAL SECURITY COMPLAINT. Signed on 12/12/2017 by District Judge Roseann Ketchmark. (Stout, Courtney)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHERN DIVISION

VIRGINIA SEARS,

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Plaintiff,
v.

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, ACTING
COMMISSIONER OF SSA;
Defendant.

No. 6:16-03483-CV-RK

ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s appeal seeking judicial review of a final decision of the
Defendant Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying disability benefits. The
decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED.
Standard of Review
The Court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision to deny disability benefits is
limited to determining if the decision “complies with the relevant legal requirements and is
supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.” KKC v. Colvin, 818 F.3d 364,
374 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Ford v. Astrue, 518 F.3d 979, 981 (8th Cir. 2008); see also 42
U.S.C. § 405(g). “Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance, but enough that a
reasonable mind would find it adequate to support the [Commissioner’s] conclusion.” Gann v.
Berryhill, 864 F.3d 947, 950 (8th Cir. 2017). In determining whether existing evidence is
substantial, the Court takes into account “evidence that both supports and detracts from the
ALJ’s decision.” Milam v. Colvin, 794 F.3d 978, 983 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Perkins v.
Asture, 648 F.3d 892, 897 (8thCir. 2011). “If the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial
evidence, [the Court] may not reverse even if substantial evidence would support the opposite
outcome or [the Court] would have decided differently.” Smith v. Colvin, 756 F.3d 621, 625
(8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Davis, 239 F.3d at 966). The Court does not re-weigh the evidence
presented to the ALJ. Reece v. Colvin, 834 F.3d 904, 908 (8th Cir. 2016). The Court should

“defer heavily to the findings and conclusions of the [Commissioner].” Wright v. Colvin, 789
F.3d 847, 852 (8th Cir. 2015) (quotation and citation omitted).
Discussion
By way of overview, the ALJ determined the Plaintiff suffers from the following severe
impairments: degenerative arthritis of the lumbar spine, vertigo, and obesity. The ALJ also
determined the Plaintiff has the following non-severe impairment: chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease (COPD). However, the ALJ found that none of the Plaintiff’s impairments, whether
considered alone or in combination, meet or medically equals the criteria of one of the listed
impairments in 20 CFR Pt. 404. Subpt. P, App. 1 (“Listing”). Additionally, the ALJ found that
despite her limitations, Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform
light work with limitations. The ALJ determined the Plaintiff was able to perform past relevant
work as a cafeteria cashier.
On appeal, Plaintiff alleges errors related to whether the ALJ: (1) properly evaluated the
medical opinions, (2) appropriately concluded that Plaintiff’s subjective complaints of pain were
not fully credible, and (3) properly formulated the Plaintiff’s RFC.
First, substantial evidence exists to support the ALJ’s evaluation of the medical opinions.
The Plaintiff argues the ALJ did not appropriately explain and support his evaluation of the
medical opinions. See Hilgart v. Colvin, 2013 WL 2250877, at *4 (W.D. Mo. May 22, 2013) (an
ALJ is required to justify each conclusion reached; however, an ALJ does not need to cite
specific medical evidence to justify each conclusion). Plaintiff specifically disputes the ALJ’s
evaluation of Dr. Carter and Dr. Scovern’s opinions.1 See Gonzales v. Barnhart, 465 F.3d 890,
895 (8th Cir. 2006) (an ALJ may award less weight to a medical opinion when that opinion
appears to be largely based on the plaintiff’s subjective complaints); Hacker v. Barnhart, 459
F.3d 934, 937 (8th Cir.2006) (a physician’s own inconsistencies may undermine his opinion and
diminish or eliminate the weight given to the physician’s opinion).

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Accordingly, there is

The ALJ afforded Dr. Carter’s opinion little weight because Dr. Carter excessively relied on the
Plaintiff’s subjective complaints; Dr. Carter did not perform any tests regarding the Plaintiff’s complaints
of vertigo yet opined the vertigo was severe; Dr. Carter provided a severe diagnosis of vertigo despite
Plaintiff’s ability to maintain employment for fifteen years with vertigo; and Dr. Carter’s opinion was
inconsistent with the conservative treatment options Dr. Carter and other physicians provided. The ALJ
afforded Dr. Scovern’s opinion significant weight because Dr. Scovern’s opinion was internally
consistent and consistent with the overall medical evidence.

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sufficient evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s evaluation and weighing of the medical
evidence.
Second, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s assessment that Plaintiff’s subjective
complaints were not fully credible. Here, the ALJ appropriately considered Plaintiff’s limited
and conservative medical treatment, Plaintiff’s noncompliance with doctor recommendations,
absence of objective medical evidence supporting Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, daily
activities, work history with relatively low earnings, and the Plaintiff’s application for
unemployment benefits in making the credibility determination.2 See Travis v. Astrue, 477 F.3d
1037, 1042 (8th Cir. 2007) (“A court will not substitute its opinion for the ALJ’s, who is in the
better position to gauge credibility and resolve conflicts in the evidence.”). Accordingly, there is
sufficient evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s credibility was
lacking.
Finally, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC determination.

See Goff v.

Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 793 (8th Cir. 2005) (“The ALJ must assess a claimant’s RFC based on
all relevant, credible, evidence in the record, ‘including medical records, observations of treating
physicians and others, and an individual’s own description of his limitations.’”).

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See Perkins v. Astrue, 648 F.3d 892, 899-900 (8th Cir. 2011) (A history of limited and
conservative treatment undermines allegations of disabling symptoms); Choate v. Barnhart, 457 F.3d
865, 872 (8th Cir. 2006) (“an ALJ may properly consider the claimant’s noncompliance with a treating
physician’s directions . . . including failing to take prescription medications, . . . seek treatment [and] quit
smoking”); Gonzales 465 F.3d at 895 (an ALJ may consider the absence of objective medical evidence
supporting the plaintiff’s subjective complaints in the credibility analysis); Ponder v. Colvin, 770 F.3d
1190, 1195-96 (8th Cir. 2014) (substantial evidence supports the ALJ in finding the claimant was not
disabled where the claimant was not restricted in daily activities including: laundry, light housework,
cooking meals, and grocery shopping); Fredrickson v. Barnhart, 359 F.3d 972, 976 (8th Cir. 2004) (it
was proper for an ALJ to consider the Plaintiff’s sporadic work history and relatively low earnings as a
potential lack of motivation to gain employment); Whitman v. Colvin, 762 F.3d 701, 708 (while applying
for unemployment benefits does not prove, by itself, that the claimant is not disabled, it is compelling
evidence to negate a disability claim because applying for unemployment benefits requires the applicant
to declare herself “ready, willing, and able” to work).

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Conclusion
Having carefully reviewed the record before the Court and the parties’ submissions on
appeal, the Court concludes that substantial evidence on the record as a whole supports the ALJ’s
decision.
IT IS THEREFORE, ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED.

s/ Roseann A. Ketchmark
ROSEANN A. KETCHMARK, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DATED: December 12, 2017

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