Lucus v. Berryhill

Filing 23

ORDER re 3 SOCIAL SECURITY COMPLAINT filed by Eric A. Lucus, affirming the decision of the ALJ. Signed on 9/25/2018 by District Judge Roseann Ketchmark. (Martin, Elizabeth)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHERN DIVISION

ERIC A. LUCUS,
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant.

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No. 6:17-03247-CV-RK

ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s appeal brought under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking review of
Defendant Commissioner of Social Security Administration’s (“SSA”) denial of disability benefits
as rendered in a decision by the administrative law judge (“ALJ”). For the reasons below, the
decision of the ALJ is AFFIRMED.
Standard of Review
The Court’s review of the ALJ’s decision to deny disability benefits is limited to
determining if the decision “complies with the relevant legal requirements and is supported by
substantial evidence in the record as a whole.”

Halverson v. Astrue, 600 F.3d 922, 929

(8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ford v. Astrue, 518 F.3d 979, 981 (8th Cir. 2008)). “Substantial evidence
is less than a preponderance of the evidence, but is ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
would find adequate to support the [ALJ’s] conclusion.’” Grable v. Colvin, 770 F.3d 1196, 1201
(8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Davis v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 962, 966 (8th Cir. 2001)). In determining
whether existing evidence is substantial, the Court takes into account “evidence that detracts from
the [ALJ’s] decision as well as evidence that supports it.” Cline v. Colvin, 771 F.3d 1098, 1102
(8th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). “If the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, [the
Court] may not reverse even if substantial evidence would support the opposite outcome or [the
Court] would have decided differently.” Smith v. Colvin, 756 F.3d 621, 625 (8th Cir. 2014) (citing
Davis v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 962, 966 (8th Cir. 2001)). The Court does not “re-weigh the evidence
presented to the ALJ.” Guilliams v. Barnhart, 393 F.3d 798, 801 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing Baldwin v.

Barnhart, 349 F.3d 549, 555 (8th Cir. 2003)). The Court must “defer heavily to the findings and
conclusions of the [ALJ].” Hurd v. Astrue, 621 F.3d 734, 738 (8th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).
Discussion
In determining whether Plaintiff was disabled, the ALJ undertook the five-step evaluation
process established by Social Security Administration. At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff
has not engaged in any substantial gainful activity since his disability onset date. At step two, the
ALJ determined that Plaintiff suffered from the following severe medical impairments:
degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, hernia, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease
(“COPD”), anxiety disorder, depressive disorder, and history of alcohol and substance abuse. At
step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s impairments, whether considered alone or in combination,
did not meet or medically equal any of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1
(“Listing”). Next, the ALJ found that despite his limitations, Plaintiff retained the residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform a range of light work. Although the ALJ found that
Plaintiff is unable to perform any past relevant work, the ALJ found that considering Plaintiff’s
age, education, work experience, and RFC, Plaintiff can perform jobs that exist in significant
numbers in the national economy. Based on that finding, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not
disabled as defined by SSA.
On appeal, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to properly weigh the opinion of his
treating psychiatrist, Dr. Monika Goyal. Social Security Administration regulations in effect at
the time of the ALJ’s decision provide that treating source opinions are entitled to controlling
weight so long as the opinion is “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory
diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [a claimant’s]
case record[.]”

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2).1

Even when not entitled to

controlling weight, treating source opinions are still entitled to deference. See Vossen v. Astrue,
612 F.3d 1011, 1017 (8th Cir. 2010). In such cases, the ALJ must apply certain factors to
determine the weight to give a treating source opinion, namely—the length of the treatment
relationship and frequency of examination, the nature and extent of the treatment relationship,
supportability of the opinion, consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole, and the
specialization of the treating source. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2).
These regulations apply for claims, like Plaintiffs, filed before March 27, 2017, whereas
the rules in §§ 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c) apply for claims filed on or after March 27, 2017.
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2

Whether the ALJ accords a treating source opinion great or little weight, the ALJ must
“always give good reasons” for the particular weight given. Id.; see Anderson v. Astrue, 696 F.3d
790, 793 (8th Cir. 2012). According to Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96-2p,2 the regulations
require that whenever an ALJ denies benefits, the decision:
must contain specific reasons for the weight given to the treating source’s medical
opinion, supported by the evidence in the case record, and must be sufficiently
specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave
to the treating source’s medical opinion and the reasons for that weight.
Titles II & XVI: Giving Controlling Weight to Treating Source Med. Opinions, SSR 96-2P (S.S.A.
July 2, 1996); see 20 C.F.R. § 402.35(b)(1) (SSRs “are binding on all components of the Social
Security Administration” and “represent precedent final opinions and orders and statements of
policy and interpretations that we have adopted.”).
Here, Dr. Goyal’s opinions are set out in a completed mental RFC form dated
February 27, 2017, which asked that she rate Plaintiff’s “mental abilities to function on a sustained
basis, 8 hours per day, five days per week, in a regular, competitive work setting.” (Tr. 626.)
Dr. Goyal saw Plaintiff on ten occasions over a period of eighteen months. It is undisputed that
Dr. Goyal is a treating source and that she treated Plaintiff during the relevant time period for
purposes of Plaintiff’s disability application.
The ALJ assigned Dr. Goyal’s opinion “partial weight.” (Tr. 17.) As for the reasons for
according partial weight, the ALJ first assessed that Dr. Goyal’s opinion was internally
inconsistent. Specifically, Dr. Goyal remarks under the prompt “[p]lease indicate the basis for
your above assessment” that Plaintiff “gets nervous in crowds” and “unfamiliar places” and is
“unable to remember long term.” (Tr. 17.) The ALJ assessed that these statements are inconsistent
with the part of Dr. Goyal’s opinion that Plaintiff “was better able to maintain socially appropriate
behavior, adhere to basic standards of cleanliness, travel in unfamiliar places, use public
transportation, make simple work-related decisions and sustain an ordinary routine without special
supervision.”3 (Tr. 17, 627-28.) The ALJ does not provide any discussion or elaboration regarding
this purported internal inconsistency.

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SSR 96-2p was rescinded effective March 27, 2017, but was applicable on the date of the
ALJ’s decision, March 20, 2017.
3

The ALJ uses the phrase—“better able to”—to indicate Dr. Goyal’s opinion that
Plaintiff’s performance of these activities would be precluded for 0% or 5% of an eight-hour
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The ALJ also assessed that Dr. Goyal’s opinion was not supported by her own treatment
notes or by the medical record as a whole. (Tr. 17.) The ALJ again pointed to Dr. Goyal’s remarks
that Plaintiff “gets nervous in crowds” and “unfamiliar places,” indicating that these statements
are inconsistent with Dr. Goyal’s opinion that Plaintiff “could maintain socially appropriate
behavior, went bowling with a group of friends, goes to church, travel [sic] in unfamiliar places,
and use [sic] public transportation.” The ALJ provides no discussion and cites only generally to
Dr. Goyal’s treatment notes and her mental RFC form.
Without more, the basis for the ALJ giving Dr. Goyal’s opinion only partial weight is
unclear. It is not clear how Dr. Goyal’s opinions that Plaintiff “gets nervous in crowds” and
“unfamiliar places” and is “unable to remember long term” are inconsistent with her other opinions
or her treatment notes. Although the ALJ asserts that Dr. Goyal’s opinion is not supported by the
medical record as a whole, the only portions of the record cited in support of this conclusion are
Dr. Goyal’s RFC form and treatment notes. Even then, the citations to Dr. Goyal’s RFC form and
treatment notes have no pincites. The ALJ’s decision also lacks discussion of all the factors listed
in SSA regulation when determining the weight to give a treating source who is not entitled to
controlling weight.
Contrary to Defendant SSA’s arguments, the existence of substantial evidence in the record
for the ALJ to discount Dr. Goyal’s opinion does not excuse the violation of the reason-giving
requirement. Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 544-46 (6th Cir. 2004) (rejecting the
same argument when discussing former 20 C.F.R. § 1527(d)(2), now § 404.1527(c)(2), because
“[t]o hold otherwise, and to recognize substantial evidence as a defense to non-compliance [of the
reason-giving requirement], would afford the [ALJ] the ability [to] violate the regulation with
impunity and render the protections promised therein illusory.”)

workday, as compared to Plaintiff’s performance of other activities that Dr. Goyal opined would
be precluded for 10% or 20% of an eight-hour workday. (Tr. 626.)

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However, even if the ALJ failed to give “good reasons” for discounting Dr. Goyal’s
opinion, the ALJ assessed significant limitations in Plaintiff’s mental RFC. Specifically, the ALJ
found that Plaintiff:
can perform tasks learned in thirty days or less involving no more than simple,
work-related-decisions requiring little to no judgment with only occasional work
place changes. The claimant should have no interaction with the public and no
more than occasional interaction with co-workers or supervisors. He cannot work
at a production rate pace, further defined as no fast-paced work such as on an
assembly line.”
(Tr. 14-15.) Plaintiff states that the most significant set of limitations opined by Dr. Goyal was
that the he was precluded 20% of an eight hour work day from maintaining attention and
concentration for extended periods, performing activities within a schedule, maintaining regular
attendance, and being punctual within customary tolerances, and working in coordination with or
in proximity to others without being distracted by them. (Doc. 17.) Although Plaintiff argues that
Dr. Goyal’s opinion should have been accorded controlling weight, Plaintiff points to no greater
limitations that could have been found had this opinion been given greater weight. Consequently,
any non-compliance with the reason-giving requirement is harmless error. See Wilson, 378 F.3d
at 547 (failure to give good reasons for weighing treating source opinion may be harmless error if
the ALJ makes findings consistent with the opinion of the treating source).
Conclusion
Having carefully reviewed the record before the Court and the parties’ submissions on
appeal, the decision of the ALJ is AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Roseann A. Ketchmark
ROSEANN A. KETCHMARK, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DATED: September 25, 2018

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