Sandknop v. Missouri Department of Corrections et al

Filing 27

ORDER granting in part 16 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, denying as moot 24 Plaintiff's Motion for Appointment of Counsel, and dismissing the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Court directs the Clerk of the Court to mail a copy of this Order to Plaintiff Christopher Sandknop via regular mail. Signed on 7/16/2018 by District Judge Roseann Ketchmark. (Phillips, Caleb)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHERN DIVISION
CHRISTOPHER SANDKNOP,
Plaintiff,
v.
MO. DEPT. OF CORRS., et al,
Defendants.

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Case No. 17-03265-CV-S-RK-P

ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS AND
DISMISSING THE CASE FOR LACK OF SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION
In this pro se § 1983 action for money damages brought by a state inmate against prison
officials, before the Court are the remaining Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (doc. 16) and
Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel (doc. 24). For the reasons stated below, the Motion
to Dismiss will be GRANTED IN PART, the Motion for Appointment of Counsel will be
DENIED as moot, and the case will be DISMISSED for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Background1
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants wrongly incarcerated him for approximately eight months
longer than he should have been held. On July 12, 2013, Plaintiff pleaded guilty to one count of
driving while intoxicated as a “chronic offender.” On the same day, the state circuit court judge
sentenced him to 10 years’ imprisonment as a chronic offender under § 577.023.2 Section
577.023.6(4) provided at all relevant times that “[n]o chronic offender shall be eligible for parole
or probation until he or she has served a minimum of two years imprisonment.”3 The judge then
suspended execution of the 10-year sentence and ordered Plaintiff to complete Missouri’s “Long
Term Treatment Program for offenders with serious substance abuse addictions” under § 217.362,
which states as follows:

1
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court may consider “public records and materials embraced
by the complaint.” A.H. ex rel. Hubbard v. Midwest Bus Sales, Inc., 823 F.3d 448, 453 (8th Cir. 2016)
(quotation marks and citations omitted). Here, the Court will draw background facts from the allegations
in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (doc. 10), the state circuit court judge’s orders in the underlying criminal
case, State v. Sandknop, No. 12SL-CR12196-01, and the parties’ briefs in Plaintiff’s writ proceedings
before the Missouri Court of Appeals, Sandknop v. Goldman, No. ED101967.
2
Statutory citations are to RSMo Supp. 2012 except where otherwise indicated.
3
This requirement has been recodified at § 577.010.6(5), RSMo Supp. 2017.

[T]he court may sentence a person to the program which shall consist of
institutional drug or alcohol treatment for a period of at least twelve and no more
than twenty-four months, as well as a term of incarceration. The department [of
corrections] shall determine the nature, intensity, duration, and completion criteria
of the education, treatment, and aftercare portions of any program services
provided. Execution of the offender’s term of incarceration shall be suspended
pending completion of said program. . . .
Upon successful completion of the program, the board of probation and
parole shall advise the sentencing court of an offender’s probationary release date
thirty days prior to release. If the court determines that probation is not appropriate
the court may order the execution of the offender’s sentence.
Section 217.362.2, .3.
On March 26, 2014, the judge issued an “Order for Release” stating that Plaintiff would
“be placed on probation for a period of 3 years beginning 7-11-15” and that Plaintiff was “to be
released on/about 7-11-15”—approximately two years after the date of sentencing. Plaintiff
completed the Ozark Correctional Center’s (“OCC’s”) Long Term Treatment Program on May 1,
2014. On July 14, 2014, the judge issued an “Amended Order of Probation Pursuant to Section
559.115 RSMo” stating that Plaintiff would be placed on five years of probation and “released
from the Department of Corrections to begin said probation on/about December 20, 2014, or as
soon thereafter as may be practicable.” According to the briefs filed by the Missouri Attorney
General and Plaintiff’s counsel in the Missouri Court of Appeals, the judge revised the release date
to give Plaintiff jail time credit toward the two-year incarceration requirement for chronic
offenders.4
Plaintiff then sought a writ of mandamus in the Missouri Court of Appeals, claiming he
should have been released when he competed the Long Term Treatment Program. The court of
appeals granted a writ in favor of Plaintiff and declared that, under its previous decision in State
ex rel. Salm v. Mennemeyer, 423 S.W.3d 319 (Mo. App. E.D. 2014), the circuit court judge was
required to “either release the defendant on probation or execute the defendant’s sentence if the
court determines that probation is not appropriate.” Sandknop v. Goldman, 450 S.W.3d 499,

4
Specifically, the Missouri Attorney General’s Suggestions in Opposition to the Petition for Writ
of Mandamus stated at page 2: “With jail time credit of two hundred four days, the sentence start date is
December 20, 2012. . . . The circuit court’s order of probation orders Sandknop’s release on December 20,
2014, a date that complies with § 577.023.6(4).” Plaintiff’s counsel’s brief stated at page 10: “[A]s stated
in Respondent’s answer, Respondent backdated the release date to coincide with the date when Mr.
Sandknop will have spent two years in prison.” “[A] court can appropriately treat statements in briefs as
binding judicial admissions of fact.” Holman v. Kemna, 212 F.3d 413, 418 (8th Cir. 2000).

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502-03 (Mo. App. E.D. 2014). The court of appeals “decline[d] to reach the question” of whether
there was a conflict between § 217.362 (the statute authorizing the Long Term Treatment Program)
and § 577.023 (the chronic-offender statute) because, “under the terms of the Amended Order, [the
judge] did not act under either statute.” Id. at 502 n.2. Instead, the court of appeals held that the
amended order was “contrary to law” because it was improperly based on § 559.115. Id. at 503 &
n.3. The court of appeals then ordered the circuit court, on remand, to “comply with the limited
authority granted by § 217.362.” Id. at 503.
On remand, the circuit court judge issued the following order: “Pursuant to 74.06(a) the
Court amends its Order of 7-14-14 to delete the words Section 559.115 and substitutes in its place
Sections 217.362 & 577.023 RSMo. The Order remains the same with these additions.” The judge
then ordered Plaintiff’s immediate release, subject to five years of probation. Ultimately, however,
Plaintiff’s probation was revoked, and he is now re-incarcerated.
Plaintiff filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1.) Initially, the Court permitted
Plaintiff an opportunity to amend the Complaint to state his allegations with more specificity.
(Doc. 9.) The Amended Complaint names the following defendants: (1) the Missouri Department
of Corrections; (2) the Missouri Department of Corrections, Board of Probation and Parole;
(3) Aaron Jarrett, the former probation and parole supervisor at OCC; and (4) Brian O’Connell,
the warden of OCC. (Doc. 10.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants had an “obligation to release
[him] after his successful completion of long-term treatment.” (Id. at 4.) He also claims that
“sometime in late March 2014,” Mr. Jarett “contacted Judge Goldman by phone and mislead [sic]
him into believing that OCC had a 2 year treatment and that they had jurisdiction for 2 years.” (Id.
at 4-5.) Plaintiff argues that Defendants violated his due process right to liberty during the period
of allegedly wrongful incarceration, and he seeks damages for the time he spent in prison between
May 1, 2014 and December 18, 2014. (Id. at 3-4, 8-9.) The Amended Complaint also alleges
state-law claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and false imprisonment. (Id. at 4.)
The Court previously dismissed the Department of Corrections and the Board of Probation
and Parole from the case, and only Jarrett and O’Connell remain as defendants. (Doc. 9.) They
have moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim (doc. 16), and Plaintiff has filed suggestions in
opposition (doc. 18) and a motion for appointment of counsel (doc. 24).
Legal Standard
To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil
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Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must provide “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible
if “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(citation omitted). The Court “accept[s] the allegations contained in the complaint as true and
draw[s] all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Cole v. Homier Dist. Co., 599
F.3d 856, 861 (8th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Although the Court liberally
construes a pro se complaint, it “still must allege sufficient facts to support the claims advanced.”
Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004). The Court will not “‘supply additional facts’”
or “‘construct a legal theory for plaintiff that assumes facts that have not been pleaded.’” Id.
(citation omitted).
Discussion
The Amended Complaint fails to state a § 1983 due process claim. Defendants are immune
from liability under the doctrine of quasi-judicial absolute immunity because they were following
facially valid court orders, and they are shielded by qualified immunity because they did not violate
Plaintiff’s “clearly established” rights. Given only state-law claims remain, the Court will decline
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the case.
I.

Quasi-Judicial Absolute Immunity
“[O]fficers are protected by quasi[-]judicial absolute immunity when they enforce a court

order.” Rose v. Flairty, 772 F.3d 552, 554 (8th Cir. 2014). Although the order must be “facially
valid,” this determination is distinct from whether the order was merely “unlawful.” Penn v.
United States, 335 F.3d 786, 790 (8th Cir. 2003). “[T]o subject police officers to suit for serving
or executing a facially valid court order that is later held to be unlawful would require them to ‘act
as pseudo-appellate courts.’” Id. at 789 (citation omitted). An order is facially invalid only if “it
was issued in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction’”—for example, “‘[i]f a probate judge . . . should
try a criminal case,’” but not “‘if a judge of a criminal court should convict a defendant of a
nonexistent crime.’” Id. at 789-90 (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 & n.7
(1978)). The Eighth Circuit has held that quasi-judicial absolute immunity extends to “prison
wardens” and “‘police and other court officers for purely ministerial acts where they do nothing
other than perform orders issuing from a court.’” Id. at 789 (citations omitted).
Here, quasi-judicial absolute immunity bars Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants had an
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“obligation to release [him] after his successful completion of long-term treatment” on
May 1, 2014. (Doc. 10 at 4.) The judge’s orders required a later release date—first July 11, 2015,
and then December 20, 2014, to give credit for jail time served toward the two-year incarceration
requirement for chronic offenders. Although the Missouri Court of Appeals later determined that
the state circuit court judge’s amended order was “contrary to law,” it was not in “clear absence of
all jurisdiction.” The order specified Plaintiff’s release date, and the judge who issued it was the
same judge who imposed Plaintiff’s sentence and ordered him to complete the Long Term
Treatment Program. Defendants cannot be liable for following such an order. This claim is,
therefore, barred by quasi-judicial absolute immunity. See Rose, 772 F.3d at 554; Penn, 335 F.3d
at 789-90.
II.

Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity also bars Plaintiff’s claims, including his allegation that “sometime in

late March 2014,” Mr. Jarett “contacted Judge Goldman by phone and mislead [sic] him into
believing that OCC had a 2 year treatment and that they had jurisdiction for 2 years.” (Doc. 10 at
4-5.)

Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity against claims for damages unless

“(1) [the] plaintiff’s constitutional rights have been violated, and (2) those rights were so clearly
established at the time of the violation that a reasonable officer would have known that his actions
were unlawful.” Ulrich v. Pope Cnty., 715 F.3d 1054, 1058 (8th Cir. 2013). Qualified immunity
is the proper subject of a motion to dismiss “when the immunity is established on the face of the
complaint.” Id. at 1058 (quotation marks and citations omitted). The “face of the complaint”
includes public records. A.H. ex rel. Hubbard, 823 F.3d at 453 (quotation marks and citations
omitted).
Here, Plaintiff did not have a “clearly established” right to be released prior to completing
two years’ imprisonment. To overcome qualified immunity, “‘[t]he contours of the right must be
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that
right.’” King v. Beavers, 148 F.3d 1031, 1034 (8th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). Plaintiff argues
that Defendants knew about and violated the Missouri Court of Appeals’ decision in Salm, which
stated that the Department of Corrections’ “court report investigations should no longer advise
that section 217.362 allows trial courts to retain jurisdiction up to twenty-four months.” State ex
rel. Salm, 423 S.W.3d at 321 n.4. However, the court in Salm did not address the two-year
incarceration requirement for chronic offenders set out in § 577.023.6(4). See id. at 319-22. The
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Supreme Court of Missouri has now squarely held that “the plain language of section 217.362.3
does not require the circuit court to immediately release a chronic offender prior to serving the two
years of imprisonment required by section 577.023.6(4).” State ex rel. Hodges v. Asel, 460 S.W.3d
926, 929 (Mo. banc 2015). Accordingly, Defendants did not violate a “clearly established” right
of Plaintiff by holding him until he was incarcerated for two years or by advising the circuit court
judge they had authority to do so. Defendants are, therefore, entitled to qualified immunity.
III.

Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must

dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Here, the Court has original subject-matter
jurisdiction only over Plaintiff’s § 1983 due process claim, which “aris[es] under” federal law. 28
U.S.C. § 1331. However, there is no basis for original subject-matter jurisdiction, such as diversity
of citizenship, over Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims of intentional infliction of emotional
distress and false imprisonment. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Accordingly, the Court need not exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over these claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). “‘[I]n the usual case in which
all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the
pendent jurisdiction doctrine—judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity—will point
toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.’” Keating v.
Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 660 F.3d 1014, 1019 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ.
v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988)). After careful consideration of these factors, the Court
declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (doc. 16) is GRANTED
IN PART, Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel (doc. 24) is DENIED as moot, and the
case is DISMISSED for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
NOTICE CONCERNING $505 APPEAL FILING FEE
Plaintiff is advised that if he appeals this dismissal, in addition to the $350 filing fee, federal
law now “‘makes prisoners responsible for [appellate filing fee of $505] the moment the prisoner
. . . files an appeal.’” Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 483 (8th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).
Pursuant to Henderson, Plaintiff is notified as follows:
(a) the filing of a notice of appeal by the prisoner makes the prisoner
liable for payment of the full . . . appellate filing fees regardless of
the outcome of the appeal; (b) by filing a notice of appeal the
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prisoner consents to the deduction of the initial partial filing fee and
the remaining installments from the prisoner’s prison account by
prison officials; (c) the prisoner must submit to the clerk of the
district court a certified copy of the prisoner’s prison account for the
last six months within 30 days of filing the notice of appeal; and (d)
failure to file the prison account information will result in the
assessment of an initial appellate partial fee of $35 or such other
amount that is reasonable, based on whatever information the court
has about the prisoner’s finances.
Id. at 484.
The Court directs the Clerk of the Court to mail a copy of this Order to Plaintiff Christopher
Sandknop via regular mail.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Roseann A. Ketchmark
ROSEANN A. KETCHMARK, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Dated: July 16, 2018

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