Green v. Berryhill

Filing 13

ORDER Affirming the ALJ's Decision re 3 Social Security Complaint. Signed on 3/29/2019 by District Judge Roseann Ketchmark. (Phillips, Caleb)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHERN DIVISION

TRACY JO GREEN,
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Defendant.

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No. 6:18-03080-CV-RK

ORDER AFFIRMING THE ALJ’S DECISION
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s appeal brought under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking review of
Defendant Commissioner of Social Security Administration’s (“SSA’s”) denial of disability
benefits as rendered in a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). For the reasons below,
the decision of the ALJ is AFFIRMED.
Standard of Review
The Court’s review of the ALJ’s decision to deny disability benefits is limited to
determining if the decision “complies with the relevant legal requirements and is supported by
substantial evidence in the record as a whole.”

Halverson v. Astrue, 600 F.3d 922, 929

(8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ford v. Astrue, 518 F.3d 979, 981 (8th Cir. 2008)). “Substantial evidence
is less than a preponderance of the evidence, but is ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
would find adequate to support the [ALJ’s] conclusion.’” Grable v. Colvin, 770 F.3d 1196, 1201
(8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Davis v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 962, 966 (8th Cir. 2001)). In determining
whether existing evidence is substantial, the Court takes into account “evidence that detracts from
the [ALJ’s] decision as well as evidence that supports it.” Cline v. Colvin, 771 F.3d 1098, 1102
(8th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). “If the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, [the
Court] may not reverse even if substantial evidence would support the opposite outcome or [the
Court] would have decided differently.” Smith v. Colvin, 756 F.3d 621, 625 (8th Cir. 2014) (citing
Davis v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 962, 966 (8th Cir. 2001)). The Court does not “re-weigh the evidence
presented to the ALJ.” Guilliams v. Barnhart, 393 F.3d 798, 801 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing Baldwin v.

Barnhart, 349 F.3d 549, 555 (8th Cir. 2003)). The Court must “defer heavily to the findings and
conclusions of the [ALJ].” Hurd v. Astrue, 621 F.3d 734, 738 (8th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).
Discussion
By way of overview, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the following severe impairments:
“bipolar mood disorder, rule out cognitive disorder; obesity; and degenerative disc disease of the
cervical and lumbar spines.” The ALJ found that none of Plaintiff’s impairments, whether
considered alone or in combination, meet or medically equal the criteria of one of the listed
impairments in 20 CFR Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 (“Listing”). Additionally, the ALJ found that
despite Plaintiff’s limitations, she retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform
light work1 limited to simple tasks for two hours at a time with occasional, incidental contact with
others, and avoiding irritant exposure. The ALJ found that, considering Plaintiff’s age, education,
work experience, and RFC, she can perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
economy, such as the jobs of marker and routing clerk. Consequently, the ALJ concluded that
Plaintiff was not disabled.
On appeal, Plaintiff argues that (1) the ALJ failed to properly assess Plaintiff’s credibility
and (2) the ALJ erred by not ordering physical and mental consultative examinations.
I.

Credibility
In her first point, Plaintiff agrues that the ALJ failed to properly assess her credibility.

When evaluating a plaintiff’s subjective complaints, an ALJ “must give full consideration to all of
the evidence presented relating to subjective complaints . . . [including]: (1) the claimant’s daily
activities; (2) the duration, frequency and intensity of pain; (3) precipitating and aggravating
factors; (4) dosage, effectiveness and side effects of medication; and (5) functional restrictions.”
Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1984). “The ALJ is not required to discuss
methodically each Polaski consideration, so long as he acknowledges and examines those
considerations before discounting the [plaintiff’s] subjective complaints.” McDade v. Astrue, 720

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“Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of
objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted may be very little, a job is in this category
when it requires a good deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with some
pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls. To be considered capable of performing a full or wide range of
light work, you must have the ability to do substantially all of these activities. If someone can do light work,
we determine that he or she can also do sedentary work, unless there are additional limiting factors such as
loss of fine dexterity or inability to sit for long periods of time.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(b).

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F.3d 994, 998 (8th Cir. 2013) (cleaned up). The ALJ may discredit subjective complaints of pain
if they are “inconsistent with the evidence on the record as a whole” but must “make an express
credibility determination detailing his reasons for discrediting the testimony.” Delrosa v. Sullivan,
922 F.2d 480, 485 (8th Cir. 1991). In reviewing the ALJ’s decision, this Court “will not substitute
its opinion for the ALJ’s, who is in the better position to gauge credibility and resolve conflicts in
the evidence.” Travis v. Astrue, 477 F.3d 1037, 1042 (8th Cir. 2007).
Here, the ALJ followed the above rules, and his findings are supported by substantial
evidence. The ALJ cited as his guidepost 20 C.F.R § 416.929, which tracks the Polaski factors.
(Doc. 3-2 at 9.) He then gave three reasons for finding that “claimant’s statements concerning the
intensity, persistence and limiting effects of [her] symptoms are not entirely consistent with the
medical evidence and other evidence in the record.” (Doc. 3-2 at 11.)
First, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s allegations of chronic back pain were not consistent
with records that showed she has “a largely normal gait and range of motion with only tenderness
to palpation of the spine.” (Id.) Plaintiff reported no problems with bending, twisting, or squatting.
(Tr. 320.) Despite tenderness, medication seemed to reduce her pain, and her gait was considered
“somewhat slow . . . but even” and “normal.” (Tr. 375, 423, 514, 519, 524, 533.)
Second, regarding Plaintiff’s allegations of mental health symptoms, the ALJ found no
history of psychiatric hospitalization or counseling and no documented side effects from
medications. (Doc. 3-2 at 11.) See Moore v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 524, 525 (8th Cir. 2009) (legitimate
for an ALJ to consider a plaintiff’s limited and conservative treatment in the credibility analysis).
Plaintiff does not cite any record of psychiatric hospitalization or counseling, and the Court sees
only a single reference to “therapy” from approximately 25 years ago.2 (Tr. 458.)
Third, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s allegations of chronic pain and mental health
symptoms were inconsistent with her activities of daily living. (Doc. 3-2 at 11.) Plaintiff selfreported that she helps take care of pets, makes meals, does housework, shops for groceries (with
help), and has no problems with personal care. (Tr. 246-48, 316-17, 319.) See Vance v. Berryhill,
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While the record does indicate Plaintiff experienced side effects from her medications, despite the
ALJ’s statement to the contrary, the Court is not persuaded that the side effects would have impacted the
ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. The SSA does not contest that the ALJ was incorrect
in making this finding, given that a physician’s note shows Plaintiff complained of weight gain from one
medication. (Tr. 339, 466.) She also reported sleepiness and aggression. (Tr. 368, 379, 419.) However,
Plaintiff’s physicians changed her medications and dosages, which seemed to alleviate the problems.
(Tr. 66, 379, 402-03, 415, 468-71, 502.)

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860 F.3d 1114, 1121 (8th Cir. 2017) (“The inconsistency between [the claimant’s] subjective
complaints and evidence regarding her activities of daily living also raised legitimate concerns
about her credibility.”). Accordingly, the ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints is
supported by substantial evidence.
II.

Development of the Record
Second, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to fully develop the record because he did not

order psychological and physical consultative examinations. The ALJ has an independent duty to
“neutrally develop the facts” but need not “seek additional clarifying statements from a treating
physician unless a crucial issue is undeveloped.” Stormo v. Barnhart, 377 F.3d 801, 806
(8th Cir. 2004).
Here, the record already contains a report from a psychological consultative examination
conducted on July 15, 2015. (Tr. 338-44.) Plaintiff argues the report is outdated but points to no
evidence that her mental state has deteriorated since that time. Furthermore, recent treatment
records suggest normal functioning with controlled bipolar symptoms. (Tr. 458, 461-71, 504-05,
514.)
The record also contains substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s evaluation of Plaintiff’s
physical capabilities without a physical consultative examination. Treatment records show some
reports of pain and limits on range of motion but normal muscle strength, gait, station, and posture.
(Tr. 465, 512, 514, 519, 524.) Plaintiff’s activities of daily living also demonstrate her physical
abilities. See Barrett v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 1019, 1023 (8th Cir. 1994) (“The ALJ is required to order
medical examinations and tests only if the medical records presented to him do not give sufficient
medical evidence to determine whether the claimant is disabled.”). Accordingly, the ALJ did not
have a duty to further develop the record.3

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Plaintiff argues in a third point on appeal that “if the ALJ’s decision denying benefits was not
supported by substantial evidence, the case must be reversed and remanded.” (Doc. 7 at 12.) To the extent
this general statement of law can be construed as an argument that the ALJ’s decision overall is not
supported by substantial evidence, the Court disagrees for the reasons already stated.

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Conclusion
Having carefully reviewed the record before the Court and the parties’ submissions on
appeal, the decision of the ALJ is AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Roseann A. Ketchmark
ROSEANN A. KETCHMARK, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DATED: April 29, 2019

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