Brodzki v. Montana State Patrol

Filing 29

ORDER ADOPTING FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 26 in full. 19 Motion for TRO filed by Anthony Brodzki is DENIED; 17 Motion for Summary Judgment, filed by Montana State Patrol is GRANTED. Any appeal of this decision would not be taken in good faith. Signed by Judge Richard F. Cebull on 5/19/2011. Mailed to Brodzki. (TAG, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FI LE
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FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTAM rIA!r'

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BILLINGS DIVISION
ANTHONY J. BRODZKI,
Plaintiff,
vs.

MONTANA STATE PATROL,
et al.,
Defendants.

CV-I0-I04...BLG-~UTY C R~;

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ORDER ADOPTING FINDINGS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

------------------------)
On April 11, 2011, United States Magistrate Judge Carolyn Ostby entered
Findings and Recommendation. Magistrate Judge Ostby recommends Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgnlent be granted, and Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order be denied.
Upon service of a magistrate judge's findings and recommendation, a party
has 14 days to file written objections. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(I). Plaintiffhas filed
timely objections and Defendant responded. Accordingly, the Court must make a
de novo determination of those portions of the Findings and Recommendations to

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which objection is made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(I). For the following reasons,
Plaintiff s objections are overruled.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A party is entitled to summary judgment if it can demonstrate "that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). That is, summary judgment is
warranted if the documentary evidence permits only one conclusion. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251 (1986).

The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing
the Court of the basis of its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, it believes demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of
material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
Where the moving party has met its initial burden with a properly supported
motion, the party opposing the motion "must produce at least some 'significant
probative evidence tending to support the complaint. '" T. W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v.
Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass 'n, 809 F .2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting First

Nat'l Bank v. Cities Servo Co., 391 U.S. 253,290 (1968)). The non-moving party
may do this by use of affidavits (including his own), depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Only disputes over
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facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law are
"material" and will properly preclude entry of summary judgment. Id.
BACKGROUND FACTS

On September 6, 2008, at 7:56 a.m., Montana Highway Patrol (MHP)
Trooper Glenn Quinnell conducted a traffic stop on a silver Dodge Avenger
traveling eastbound at Exit 215 on 1-94. (Court Doc. 23-1: Quinnell Affidavit, ,-r
2). The vehicle was stopped because the license plate of the vehicle was obscured
by mud and it could not be determined whether the vehicle was legally registered.
(Court Doc. 23-2: Second Quinnell Affidavit, ,-r,-r 4-5).

The driver of the vehicle was Plaintiff Anthony Brodzki. (Court Doc. 23-1:
First Quinnell Affidavit, ,-r 4). The vehicle was owned by Alamo Rent a Car.
(Court Doc. 23-1: First Quinnell Affidavit, ,-r 5).

Trooper Quinnell asked Brodzki for his driver's license, registration, and
insurance information. (Court Doc. 23-1: First Quinnell Affidavit, ,-r5). Brodzki
produced a valid driver's license and an Alamo Rental Agreement. Trooper
Quinnell determined that the rental agreement had expired on August 26, 2008.
Brodzki asserts the contract had an option for 23 additional days. (Court Doc. 25:
Brodzki's Response, p. 2). The rental agreement stated the vehicle had been rented

at the Fargo, North Dakota airport. (Court Doc. 23-1: First Quinnell Affidavit, ,-r

6).
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Trooper Quinnell called Alamo, identified himself, and notified Alamo that
he had stopped the vehicle and Brodzki had an expired rental agreement. Trooper
Quinnell was infonned that the rental agreement had been extended until
September 5, 2008 at 5 p.m.
Since the extension had expired, Trooper Quinnell then called the Alamo
location at the Fargo Airport to ask their position concerning the vehicle. Trooper
Quinnell was instructed by an Alamo representative to take possession of the
vehicle. (Court Doc. 23-1 at 2,

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10).

Trooper Quinnell then gave Brodzki a ride to the Glendive bus station,
MHP impounded the vehicle, and turned it over to Alamo. Id. at 3, ~~ 12, 13. No
criminal charges were brought against Brodzki.
Brodzki alleges that according to his conversations with Alamo in late
September and early October 2008, the car was reported abandoned by the
Montana State Patrol. He asserts this can be proven by getting his phone records.

(Court Doc. 25, p. 2; Court Doc. 22, p. 2). Brodzki contends he called Alamo to
alert them several times and they told him it was okay to drive the car back to Las
Vegas, that he didn't need to call everyday, and that he had an option. (Court

Doc. 20, p. 2). Brodzki also alleges the State Patrol is harassing him with
disorientation equipment. (Court Doc. 20, p. 2).

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ANALYSIS

The Montana State Patrol is protected from monetary damages by immunity
under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Eleventh
Amendment states that "[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of
any Foreign State." U.S.Const. Amend. XI. The United States Supreme Court has
interpreted this amendment to mean that absent waiver, neither a State nor an
agency of the State acting under its control may "be subj ect to suit in federal
court." Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506
U.S. 139, 144, 113 S.Ct. 684, 121 L.Ed.2d 605 (1993). The one exception to the
general prohibition of the Eleventh Amendment is that it does not bar suits for
prospective declaratory or injunctive relief against state officials in their official
capacity. See Idaho v. Couer d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 117 S.Ct. 2028,2034,
138 L.Ed.2d 438 (1997); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S.
89, 102-106, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984); Doe v. Lawrence Livermore
Nat 'I Lab., 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997); Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d
1019, 1025 (9th Cir. 1997) cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 2340 (1998).
The allegations against the Montana State Patrol address an incident
occurred three years ago and Plaintiff has stated no plausible claim for injunctive
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relief against the Montana State Patrol. His claim for injunctive relief must be
dismissed.
Additionally, Plaintiff has named John Doe Defendants, but has never
identified those individuals. Plaintiff was advised by the Court that naming the
John Doe Defendants was necessary and Plaintiff had adequate time to identify
those Defendants. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure include no provision
"permitting the use of fictitious defendants." McMillan v. Department ofInterior,
907 F.Supp. 322, 328 (D. Nev. 1995), affd, 87 F.3d 1320 (9th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 519 U.S. 1132, 117 S.Ct. 995, 136 L.Ed.2d 875 (1997). As such, the only
named defendant in this case is the Montana State Patrol, which for the reasons set
forth above should be dismissed. Therefore, this entire matter should be
disnlissed.
However, even if Plaintiff had properly named the individual Highway
Patrol officers, dismissal would still be appropriate. "The central purpose of
affording public officials qualified immunity from suit is to protect them 'from
undue interference with their duties and from potentially disabling threats of
liability.'" Elder v. Holloway, 114 S.Ct. 1019, 1022 (1994) (quoting Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982)). In deciding whether qualified immunity
exists the Court must consider two questions: (1) whether the facts plaintiff has
shown make out a constitutional violation; and, if so, (2) whether the right was
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clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct. Pearson v. Callahan,
129 S.Ct. 808, 815-16 (2009).
In deciding if a right is clearly established, the Court must ask, "whether it
would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the
situation he confronted." Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001». Here, the
undisputed testimony is that Trooper Quinnell was told by Alamo to take
possession of the car. Alamo was the owner of the vehicle and a reasonable
officer would believe that the seizure of the rental vehicle in these circumstances
was lawful.
After an extensive review of the record and applicable law, this Court finds
Magistrate Judge Ostby's Findings and Recommendation are well grounded in law
and fact and adopts them in their entirety.
Plaintiff seeks a restraining order against the Montana State Patrol and the
"police community" to stop harassing him electronically. Given the Court's
decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Defendants, there is no need for a
restraining order.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
1.

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Court Doc. 17)

is GRANTED.
2.

Plaintiffs Motion for Restraining Order (Court Doc. 19) is DENIED.
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3.

The Clerk of Court is directed to enter Judgment in this matter in

favor of Defendants and close this matter accordingly_
4.

The Clerk of Court is directed to have the docket reflect that the

Court certifies pursuant to Fed.R.App.P. 24(a)(3)(A) that any appeal of this
decision would not be taken in good faith. The record makes plain that Brodzki' s
claims are frivolous.
The Clerk of CO~I!~I notify the parties of the entry of this Order.
DATED the

/Oil day ofMay, 20 II.

H­

/F

~fUU{DF.CEBULL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDG

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