Kelley v. Billings Clinic et al
Filing
37
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 32 Motion to Compel; Billings Clinic's request for attorneys' fees is denied. Signed by Magistrate Carolyn S Ostby on 4/8/2013. (JDH, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
BILLINGS DIVISION
MARK J. KELLEY,
CV 12-74-BLG-RFC-CSO
Plaintiff,
ORDER ADDRESSING
MOTION TO COMPEL
vs.
BILLINGS CLINIC,
Defendant.
Plaintiff Mark Kelley (“Kelley”) brings this action against
Defendant Billings Clinic (“Billings Clinic”) alleging the following
claims: (1) Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment, (2) Quid Pro
Quo Sexual Harassment, (3) Retaliation, and (4) Tortious Interference.
Second Amend. Cmplt. (Dkt. 31) at 5-8.
Pending is Billings Clinic’s Motion to Compel (ECF 32). Having
considered the parties’ arguments and submissions, the Court rules as
set forth below.
I.
BACKGROUND
On November 26, 2012, Billings Clinic propounded its first set of
interrogatories and requests for production on Kelley. ECF 33-1. After
two requests for extensions, to which Billings Clinic agreed, Kelley’s
responses became due on January 14, 2013. See ECF 33-4, 33-5.
Kelley responded to Billings Clinic’s interrogatories on January 14,
2013. ECF 33-6. Kelley did not provide responses to Billings Clinic’s
requests for production.
The following day, Billings Clinic sent a letter to Kelley
requesting responses to its requests for production, noting that the
responses were overdue. ECF 33-8. Kelley responded by email
indicating that he had already produced the requested documents in
accordance with the rules. ECF 33-9. In a response email, Billings
Clinic reiterated its request for answers to its requests for production,
again noting they were overdue. ECF 33-10.
On January 30, 2013, Billings Clinic sent Kelley a detailed letter
“as attempt to resolve informally issues related to” Kelley’s answers to
the discovery requests, and again requesting answers to the requests
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for production. ECF 33-12. On February 8, 2013, Kelley sent amended
responses to Billings Clinic’s interrogatories, and answers to the
requests for production. ECF 33-15, 33-20.
On February 19, 2013, Billings Clinic filed the pending motion to
compel, seeking more complete answers to its discovery requests.
Billings Clinic also requests an award of its reasonable attorneys’ fees
incurred in pursuing the pending motion pursuant to Rule 37(a)(5),
Fed. R. Civ. P. ECF 33 at 31.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
A party may move to compel discovery responses when the party
disagrees with the objections interposed by the other party and wants
to compel more complete answers. See Moreno Rivera v. DHA Global
Forwarding, 272 F.R.D. 50 (D. P.R. 2011). The Court has broad
discretion to manage discovery. Hunt v. County of Orange, 672 F.3d
606, 616 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted); Jeff D. v. Otter, 643 F.3d 278,
289 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Little v. City of Seattle, 863 F.2d 681, 685 (9th
Cir. 1988)).
If no claim of privilege applies, the production of evidence can be
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compelled regarding any matter that is “relevant to any party’s claim
or defense....” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The Court can limit discovery
requests if it finds that “the burden or expense of the proposed
discovery outweighs its likely benefit, taking into account the needs of
the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the
importance of the issues at stake in the litigation, and the importance
of the proposed discovery in resolving the issues.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(2)(C)(iii).
A party must state objections with specificity. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
33(b)(4); 34(b)(2)(B) and (C). This Court’s Local Rules also require
specific reasons for discovery objections. Local Rules 26.3(a)(2)-(3)
require that an objection “must be followed by a statement of reasons.”
Just stating the bare objection is not sufficient to preserve the
objection. See Covad Communications Co. v. Revonet, Inc., 258 F.R.D.
17, 19 (D. D.C. 2009) (answers to discovery must be “true, explicit,
responsive, complete, and candid”).
The burden lies on the objecting party to show that a discovery
request is improper. Where a party’s objections are themselves vague
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and impermissibly overbroad, and no specifics are given, the objecting
party fails to carry its burden. See McLeod, Alexander, Powel & Apffel,
P.C. V. Quarles, 894 F.2d 1482, 1485 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that the
party resisting discovery must show specifically how each discovery
request is not relevant or how each question is overly broad,
burdensome, or oppressive); Contratto v. Ethicon, Inc., 227 F.R.D. 304,
308-09 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (finding declaration of counsel insufficient to
warrant protection of documents). Even when the required showing is
not made, however, the Court still has the obligation to review the
discovery requests to ensure that they are non-frivolous requests.
Moreno Rivera, 272 F.R.D. at 57.
III. DISCUSSION
A.
Interrogatory # 1
Billings Clinic’s Interrogatory #1 states:
Identify each person who participated, in any way other than in a
purely clerical capacity, in preparing the answers to these
Interrogatories. If more than one person participated, identify
the information that was provided by each person.
ECF 33-1 at 6. Kelley’s initial answer states: “Plaintiff Mark Kelley
and his attorney Daniel G. Gillespie.” ECF 33-6 at 1. Kelley’s
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supplemental answer states:
Plaintiff Mark Kelley and his attorney Daniel G. Gillispie jointly
prepared all responses to these interrogatories and requests for
production. Plaintiff objects to any disclosure of the substance of
any discussions or the nature of the joint participation in the
preparation of these responses pursuant to attorney-client
privilege. See Admiral Ins. Co. v. US Dist Court for Dist of Ariz.,
881 F.2d 1486 (9th Cir. 1989).
ECF 33-15 at 3-4.
Billings Clinic argues that Kelley’s answer is evasive and
incomplete, and the objection in the amended answer is both untimely
and substantively infirm. ECF 33 at 13-15. In response, Kelley argues
that his answer squarely addresses that which is sought by the
interrogatory, and no additional information is to be added or
compelled. ECF 35 at 2-3.
The Court agrees with Billings Clinic that any objections Kelley
made at the time he lodged his amended answers are waived. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 33(b)(2) (“responding party must serve ...any objections
within 30 days after being served with the interrogatories. A shorter or
longer time may be stipulated to...or be ordered by the court”); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 33(b)(4) (“[a]ny ground not stated in a timely objection is
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waived...”). Kelley failed to raise his objection within the time limit as
stipulated, and no motion was made to the Court to excuse this failure.
Despite Kelley’s waiver of his objections to this interrogatory, the
Court concludes that Kelley’s answer is complete. Billings Clinic’s
Interrogatory # 1 seeks disclosure of the persons who assisted in
answering the interrogatories, and what information each person
supplied. Kelley answered this interrogatory by explaining that he and
his attorney jointly prepared all responses. A reasonable inference
from this answer is that Kelley provided the substantive information,
while his counsel supplied the legal format. Billings Clinic is not
entitled to any more detailed response to this interrogatory, therefore
its motion to compel as to Interrogatory # 1 is denied.
B.
Interrogatory # 4
Billings Clinic’s Interrogatory # 4 states:
List in chronological order each job or employment position that
you have held since age 18, except for Defendant, and for each
such job specify the name, address, and telephone number of the
employer, the dates of such employment, your job classification or
position, rate of pay, the duties you performed, and, if applicable,
the reason you left such employment.
ECF 33-1 at 6. Kelley’s initial answer states: “Please see Plaintiff’s
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Resume, produced herewith.” ECF 33-6 at 4. Kelley’s supplemental
answer provides a detailed list of each job Kelley has maintained from
November 2001 through August 2012. ECF 33-15 at 5-7. Each job
description contains dates of employment, employer, employer’s
address, position held, rate of pay, and general description of work
activities. Id. Kelley objects in this amended answer to further
disclosure as beyond the scope of allowable discovery. Id. at 7.
Billings Clinic argues that this answer is incomplete because it
does not provide employment records dating back to Kelley’s 18th
birthday. ECF 33 at 16. Billings Clinic argues that it is not unduly
burdensome for Kelley to compile his employment history, and that
such information is relevant to Kelley’s claims. Finally, Billings Clinic
argues that Kelley’s objection made in his amended response is
untimely and, therefore, waived.
Kelley argues that he has produced his employment history “to
the extent it could possibly be related in time and scope.” ECF 35 at 7.
The disclosure of any further employment history, Kelley argues, would
“only serve to allow [Billings Clinic] to go on a fishing expedition for
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irrelevant but damaging information.” Id.
As discussed above, Kelley was required to provide a complete
answer or proper objection to this interrogatory by January 14, 2013.
Kelley’s failure to timely object to the further disclosure of employment
information results in a waiver of the objection.
Furthermore, employment records and reasons for termination
fall within the scope of permissible discovery. See Levitin v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 2012 WL 6552814 (S.D. Ohio 2012). “Such
records could bear on or could reasonably lead to other matters that
could bear the credibility of Plaintiff’s allegations relating to his
performance, his qualifications, and the legitimacy of Defendant’s
proffered bases for the performance ratings it assigned to Plaintiff.” Id.
The Court concludes that Kelley must provide a complete
response to Billings Clinic’s interrogatory by disclosing the remainder
of his employment information. However, the Court will only require
Kelley to provide the following information on any job held since he was
18 that has not yet been disclosed in his supplemental answer: (1)
name of employer, (2) dates of employment, (3) statement of position
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held and duties performed, and (4) reason for leaving the employment.
The Court will therefore grant Billings Clinic’s motion as to
Interrogatory # 4, limited as set forth above.
C.
Interrogatories # 17, 18, 19
Billings Clinic’s Interrogatories # 17, 18, and 19 ask Kelley to
“Identify each and every conversation which you or someone acting on
your behalf has had with any employee or representative” of: (1) the
Montana Human Rights Bureau; (2) the Montana State Board of
Nursing; and (3) the Montana Nurses Association Local Unit No. 2.
ECF 33-1 at 10-11. Each interrogatory also asks Kelley to “identify
with whom [he] had such conversations, when the conversations
occurred and the substance of the conversations.” Id.
In response to each interrogatory, Kelley provided the name of
each person he spoke with and a brief description of the nature of each
conversation. ECF 33-6 at 9. Kelley supplemented his answers to also
include the date of each contact. ECF 33-15 at 19-20. Specifically as to
Interrogatory # 18, Kelley clarifies that only his attorney talked with a
representative of the Montana State Board of Nursing, and that Kelley
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was not present for any of those discussions. Id. at 19. Kelley then
objects in his supplemental answer to any further disclosure in
response to this interrogatory, citing the attorney work-product
privilege. Id.
Billings Clinic argues that Kelley’s answers are evasive and
incomplete because they do not reveal sufficient detail of the substance
of these conversations. See ECF 33 at 19-25. Billings Clinic also
argues that all of Kelley’s objections are waived as untimely.
Kelley argues that he has answered these three interrogatories in
sufficient detail and therefore Billings Clinic’s motion to compel more
complete answers should be denied. To the extent Billings Clinic seeks
more information, Kelley argues that it would be unreasonable to
require a “word-for-word transcription of the conversation[s]” in his
answers to these interrogatories. ECF 35 at 5.
The Court finds that Kelley has sufficiently answered Billings
Clinic’s Interrogatories # 17-19. “In the written discovery process,
parties are not entitled to each and every detail that could possibly
exist in the universe of facts.” Bashkin v. San Diego County, 2011 WL
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109229 (S.D. Cal. 2011); see also IBP, Inc. v. Mercantile Bank of
Topeka, 179 F.R.D. 316, 321 (D. Kan. 1998) (“Other discovery
procedures, such as depositions and production of documents, better
address whatever need there be for that kind of secondary detail”). As
the Ninth Circuit has explained:
Written interrogatories are rarely, if ever, an adequate substitute
for a deposition when the goal is discovery of a witness’
recollection of conversations...
Only by examining a witness live can a lawyer use the skills of his
trade to plumb the depths of a witness’ recollection, using to
advantage not only what a witness may have admitted in
answering interrogatories, but also any new tidbits that usually
come out in the course of answering carefully framed and
pin-pointed deposition questions. Written interrogatories are not
designed for that purpose; pointed questions at deposition are the
only effective way to discover facts bottled up in a witness’
recollection...
Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1297 (9th Cir. 1993).
In his answers, Kelley provides Billings Clinic with the names of
the individuals with whom he or his attorney spoke, when such
conversations took place, and the general nature of the conversations.
If Billings Clinic seeks more detailed information regarding the
substance of these conversations, the appropriate method to obtain
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such information is through deposition. See Shoen, 5 F.3d at 1297.
As to Interrogatory # 18, because the Court concludes that Kelley
has sufficiently answered the interrogatory, the Court need not reach
the parties’ dispute over the work-product privilege objection.
Based on the foregoing, Billings Clinic’s motion to compel as to
Interrogatories # 17, 18, and 19 is denied.
D.
Interrogatory # 20
Billings Clinic’s Interrogatory # 20 states:
Please state whether you have entered a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere or been convicted of any crime or statutory violation
(other than a traffic offense in which you only were assessed a
fine that was less than $100) since the time of your 18th birthday,
regardless of whether such conviction was subsequently
expunged; if so, please state: the crime or offense for which you
were convicted; whether you pled guilty, not guilty, nolo
contender, or entered any other please in the action, describing
any such plea entered; describe the penalty imposed as a result of
the conviction; and identify all documents that related to the
conviction.
ECF 33-1 at 11. Kelley objected to this interrogatory “as being
irrelevant, not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence, and outside the scope of discovery permitted under
Rule 26, F.R.Civ.P.” ECF 33-6 at 10. Kelley did not supplement this
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response. See ECF 33-15 at 20.
Billings Clinic argues that Kelley’s job performance, workplace
conduct, and credibility as a witness are relevant in this case, and
therefore it should be entitled to discover information regarding
Kelley’s criminal background. ECF 33 at 26. Billings Clinic indicates
that it has no objection to such information being disclosed subject to
the Court’s Protective Order (ECF 27). ECF 33 at 27.
Kelley argues that because the rules of evidence only allow the
introduction of prior felonies to attack a witness’s character for
truthfulness, discovery of his criminal plea and conviction history
should be limited to only those convictions that would be admissible
under Rule 609, Fed. R. Evid. ECF 35 at 7-8.
The scope of discovery is broad and encompasses any matter that
bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear
on, any issue that is or may be in the case. Oregon Precision Indus.,
Inc. v. Int’l Omni-Pac Corp., 160 F.R.D. 592, 594 (D. Or. 1995) (citing
Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978)). Courts
have routinely allowed discovery of a party’s criminal past in
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employment discrimination cases. Jackson v. Coach, Inc., 2008 WL
782635 (D. Kan. 2008); see also Pinnix v. Centaur Bldg. Supply
Services, Inc., 2008 WL 4826306 (E.D. Mo. 2008) (in an employment
discrimination action, “information regarding plaintiff’s criminal past,
if any, could bear directly on his credibility, particularly in regard to
crimes of dishonesty”).
Kelley has failed to meet his burden to show that Billings Clinic’s
Interrogatory # 20 is improper. Because this information is otherwise
discoverable, Billings Clinic’s motion to compel is granted, and Kelley is
directed to provide the information sought in Interrogatory # 20. Such
information is to be disclosed pursuant to the Court’s Protective Order.
See ECF 27.
E.
Request for Production # 9
Billings Clinic’s Request for Production # 9 states:
Please produce any and all federal and/or state income tax
returns, forms W-2, 1040, 1099, or other documents reflecting
income received by you for calendar years 2009, 2010, 2011, and
through the date of trial, and please sign the attached Request for
Copy of Tax Forms.
ECF 33-1 at 18. Kelley produced the tax returns for the years 2009,
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2010, and 2011; however, Kelley did not sign and produce the Request
for Copy of Tax Forms provided by Billings Clinic.
Billings Clinic argues that Kelley’s tax return information is
relevant and discoverable, and it is entitled to obtain the documents
directly from the IRS to verify the information provided by Kelley.
ECF 36 at 13. Kelley argues that because he produced the records
Billings Clinic requests, it would be unnecessarily invasive of his
privacy to require a signed release allowing Billings Clinic direct
contact with the IRS. ECF 35 at 8-9.
Tax returns are generally discoverable where necessary in private
civil litigation. Young v. United States, 149 F.R.D. 199, 201 (S.D. Cal.
1993) (citing St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 208 (1961)).
The Ninth Circuit has found that tax returns and related documents
“do not enjoy an absolute privilege from discovery.” Premium Serv.
Corp. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 511 F.2d 225, 229 (9th Cir.1975)).
“Nevertheless, a public policy against unnecessary public disclosure
arises from the need, if the tax laws are to function properly, to
encourage taxpayers to file complete and accurate returns.” Id. at 229.
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Courts generally apply:
“a two-pronged test to assure a balance between the liberal scope
of discovery and the policy favoring the confidentiality of tax
returns. First, the court must find that the returns are relevant
to the subject matter of the action. Second, the court must find
that there is a compelling need for the returns because the
information contained therein is not otherwise readily
obtainable.”
A. Farber & Partners, Inc. v. Garber, 234 F.R.D. 186, 191 (C.D. Cal.
2006). The party seeking production has the burden of showing
relevancy, and once that burden is met, the burden shifts to the party
opposing production to show that other sources exist from which the
information is readily obtainable. Id.
Billings Clinic is correct in its assertion that Kelley’s tax returns
are relevant and discoverable. See E.E.O.C. v. Ceridian Corp., 610 F.
Supp. 2d 995, 996 (D. Minn. 2008) (In employment discrimination
litigation, “[t]ax returns are evidence of an employee’s earnings, and
therefore, they are relevant...”). Billings Clinic has therefore satisfied
its burden under the test enunciated above. The burden then shifts to
Kelley. While Kelley does not object to the disclosure of his tax return
information, he objects to providing Billings Clinic with the requested
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release. Kelley does not cite any authority supporting his contention
that the production of requested documents obviates the need for a
signed release. Furthermore, to the extent Kelley raises an objection to
Request for Production # 9 in his brief, such objection is untimely and
therefore waived. Kelley has therefore failed to meet his burden of
showing that the information Billings Clinic seeks is otherwise readily
obtainable.
At least one other court has required the production of a signed
release granting access to tax documents in addition to the tax returns
themselves. See Powell v. Merrimack Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 80 F.R.D. 431,
433 (N.D. Ga. 1978). Billings Clinic’s motion to compel as to Request
for Production # 9 is granted. Kelley is directed to produce a signed
release, as provided by Billings Clinic, authorizing Billings Clinic to
obtain his tax return information for the years 2009, 2010, and 2011.
F.
Request for Production # 16
Billings Clinic’s Request for Production # 16 states:
Please execute before a notary public the attached Authorization
for Use or Disclosure of Psychotherapy Notes, Authorization for
Release of Employment and Payroll Records, and Authorization
for Release of Unemployment Benefits Records and Reports, and
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produce the executed authorizations.
ECF 33-1 at 19. Kelley answered this Request for Production as
follows:
Plaintiff hereby produces Authorizations for the Release of
Employment and Payroll records and Authorization for Release of
Unemployment Benefits Records and Reports. Plaintiff has not
received any psychotherapy treatment at any time during or since
his employment with Defendant and as such there are no
psychotherapy notes to be produced or obtained.
ECF 33-20 at 5. Accordingly, Kelley did not produce a release for the
disclosure of his psychotherapy notes.
Billings Clinic argues: (1) to the extent Kelley’s answer to this
request is an objection to the production of the desired release, Kelley’s
objection is untimely and therefore waived, ECF 33 at 29; (2) because
Kelley has asserted a claim for compensatory damages for emotional
distress, his records of psychotherapy are relevant and discoverable,
id.; and (3) although Kelley represents that he did not receive
psychotherapy treatment while working for Billings Clinic, he did
receive such treatment in the past, and Billings Clinic is therefore
entitled to discover his prior psychotherapy notes, id. at 29-30.
Kelley, while acknowledging that his mental condition is at issue
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in this case, argues that past mental health treatment may only be
discoverable to the extent it relates in time. ECF 35 at 8. Kelley
argues that treatment “received approximately 13 years before he
began his employment with Billings Clinic has no bearing on the
emotional distress he has experienced as a result of his termination.”
Id.
Records for psychotherapy treatment are relevant to an
employment discrimination case when the plaintiff asserts claims of
emotional distress. Sanchez v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 202 F.R.D. 131, 135
(E.D. Pa. 2001). In Sanchez, the court stated:
[W]hat the Plaintiffs ask the Court to do is to allow them to make
a claim for emotional and mental distress, but disallow the
Defendant from discovering information about the myriad causes
of their distress. Plaintiffs admit that factors unrelated to this
action were involved in their decision to seek psychotherapy. The
exact nature of these factors is presently unknown, but, their
existence may serve to undercut or extinguish Plaintiffs’ claims
for emotional distress. If the records show that certain stress
factors pre-dated Mr. Sanchez’s termination, or that other factors
unrelated to this litigation occurred after the termination, then
Defendant could show that Plaintiffs’ claims are either baseless,
overblown or insubstantial.
Id. at 136.
Kelley’s answer may be construed as an objection, based on
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relevance, to the production of medical records predating his
employment with Billings Clinic. As with his other objections, Kelley’s
objection to Request for Production # 16 is untimely and, therefore,
waived. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(A) (“party to whom the request [for
production] is directed must respond in writing within 30 days after
being served”). Furthermore “[i]t is not for a party to determine, by a
unilateral review of documentation, whether information is relevant to
the case. At the discovery stage of the litigation, the evidence sought
need only be relevant, and ‘need not be admissible at the trial if the
information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence.’” Sanchez, 202 F.R.D. at 135 (citing
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)). While Kelley’s history of psychotherapy
treatment may or may not be admissible at trial, Kelley has failed to
show why it is not discoverable at this point in the proceedings.
Based on the foregoing, Billings Clinic’s motion to compel with
respect to Request for Production # 16 is granted, and Kelley is directed
to produce an executed authorization for the disclosure of his
psychotherapy notes.
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G.
Attorneys’ Fees
Billings Clinic requests an award of its reasonable attorneys’ fees
incurred in preparing the instant motion and supporting briefing. ECF
33 at 31. Kelley does not respond to Billings Clinic’s request.
When a motion to compel is granted in part and denied in part, as
is the case here, the Court has the discretion to apportion reasonable
expenses. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(C); Switch Communications
Group LLC v. Ballard, 2011 WL 5041231, * 1 (D. Nev. 2011).
The Court, in its discretion, declines to award Billings Clinic its
attorneys’ fees. While Billings Clinic did attempt to resolve its
discovery dispute without court intervention, as evidenced by the
detailed letter it sent to Kelley, it appears Kelley attempted, in good
faith, to fully comply with Billings Clinic’s requests. Furthermore, of
the eight discovery items to which Billings Clinic seeks compelled
responses, four have been granted and four have been denied. This is
not a situation where an award of attorneys’ fees in favor of Billings
Clinic is appropriate. Accordingly, Billings Clinic’s request for fees is
denied.
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IV.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing,
IT IS ORDERED that Billings Clinic’s motion to compel (ECF 32)
is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, as set forth above.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Billings Clinic’s request for
attorneys’ fees is DENIED.
DATED this 8th day of April, 2013.
/s/ Carolyn S. Ostby
United States Magistrate Judge
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