Roberts v. Lame Deer Public Schools et al

Filing 18

ORDER granting 7 Motion to Dismiss; granting 10 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Second Cause of Action re Wrongful Discharge is Dismissed. All claims against Defendants Daniel Lantis and Judy Ross Dismissed. Signed by Judge Richard F. Cebull on 11/20/2012. (EMA)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
BILLINGS DIVISION

SHERRI R. ROBERTS, aka
SHERRI ROBERTS,

Case No. CV-12-83-BLG-RFC

Plaintiff,
ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO
DISMISS (DOCS. 7 & 10)

vs.
LAME DEER PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
DISTRICT NO. 6; DANIEL W.
LANTIS, and JUDY ROSS,
Defendants.
I.

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Sherri R. Roberts brings this action against her former employer,

the Lame Deer Public School District No. 6, as well as Daniel W. Lantis, the
school Superintendent, and Judy Ross, the Clerk of the School District. Roberts
brings claims for violation of her rights under the Fourteenth Amendment pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for wrongful discharge pursuant to Montana’s Wrongful
Discharge From Employment Act (“WDEA”), Mont. Code Ann. § 39-2-901 et
seq., and for slander. All claims arise out of her termination as the Lame Deer VoAg teacher in the Fall of 2009. Pending before the Court are Rule 12(b)(6)
motions seeking dismissal of the individual Defendants and the WDEA claim. For

the following reasons, the motions must be granted.
II.

ANALYSIS
A claim is subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) Fed.R.Civ.P. if it lacks a

cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.
Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare System, LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1122 (9th Cir. 2008).
With regard to the latter, a claim must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007). A facially plausible claim “pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, courts must
accept as true a complaint’s well-pleaded allegations of material fact and construe
them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Daniels-Hall v.
National Educ. Ass'n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010).
As an initial matter, the School District initially argued it should be
dismissed because it was ineffectively served. Doc. 8, pp. 3-5. But Roberts has
since properly served the School District and the School District has withdrawn its
argument for dismissal for insufficient service of process. Doc. 17, p. 1.
Second, Roberts concedes that her claim under Montana’s Wrongful
Discharge From Employment Act claim must be dismissed pursuant to Mont.

Code Ann. § 39-2-912(2) because she was “an employee covered by a written
collective bargaining agreement …” Doc. 16, p. 2. Roberts claims her WDEA
claim was included to put Defendants on notice that she will seek wrongful
discharge damages as part of her § 1983 claims for denial of substantive and
procedural due process. She further asserts she does not object to the dismissal of
the WDEA claim so long as she can receive wrongful discharge damages through
her § 1983 civil rights claim. Notwithstanding the caveat to Roberts’s concession,
the WDEA claim must be dismissed because it is apparent from the face of the
Complaint that the WDEA’s one-year statute of limitations passed long before this
suit was filed. Mont. Code Ann. § 39-2-911. Moreover, although the two types of
claims award the successful plaintiff different types of damages1, there are a wide
range of damages available to successful § 1983 plaintiffs, including
compensatory damages for losses proximately caused and damages for emotional
distress.
Finally, Plaintiff also agrees that Lantis and Ross may be dismissed from
this action pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. § 2-9-305(5) if the School District agrees
that both Lantis and Ross were acting within the scope of their employment when
1

The WDEA provides for up to four years lost wages and fringe benefits and expressly
excludes damages for pain and suffering, Mont. Code Ann. § 39-2-905, whereas § 1983 damages
are akin to general tort damages intended to compensate the plaintiff for injury caused by the
defendant and include compensation for out-of-pocket loss, as well as damage to reputation and
emotional distress, Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305-06 (1986).

they suspended Roberts. Doc. 16, p. 3. Since the School District does agree they
were acting in the course and scope of their employment and has voted to provide
them with a defense and indemnification, doc. 17, pp. 4-5, they must be
dismissed.
Having so concluded, the Court need not consider whether Lantis and Ross
are also shielded by qualified immunity or whether Roberts states plausible § 1983
and slander claims against them.
IV.

ORDER
For those reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motions to dismiss

(docs. 7 and 10) are GRANTED: Plaintiffs Second Cause of Action, alleging
wrongful discharge, is DISMISSED, as are all claims against Defendants Daniel
W. Lantis and Judy Ross. The only claims remaining in this case are Plaintiff’s
First and Third Causes of Action against Defendant Lame Deer Public Schools,
District No. 6.
Dated this 20th day of November, 2012.
/s/ Richard F. Cebull______
Richard F. Cebull
United States District Judge

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