Slight v. Noonkester

Filing 25

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: Signed by Judge Susan P. Watters on 1/24/2014. (LCR)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
BILLINGS DIVISION

DAVID SLIGHT,
CV 13-158-BLG-SPW
Petitioner,
vs.

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
and ORDER

INGRID NOONKESTER f/k/a
INGRID VAIVADAITE,
Respondent.

This matter came before the Court for an evidentiary hearing on Petitioner
David Slight’s (“David”) Verified Petition for Return of Child and Petition for
Immediate Issuance of Show Cause Order to Respondent (“Petition”) on January
21, 2014. This Petition was filed pursuant to The Convention on the Civil Aspects
of International Child Abduction, done at The Hague on October 25, 1980, T.I.A.S.
No. 11,670 at 1, 2254 U.N.T.S. at 98, reprinted in 51 Fed. Reg. 10494 (1986)
(“Hague Convention” or “Convention”). At the hearing, Slight was represented by
Shane Coleman and Jamie Iguchi of Holland & Hart, LLP. Respondent Ingrid
Noonkester (“Ingrid”) was represented by William Gilbert of High Plains Law,
PLLC. At the hearing, both parties presented evidence and argument to the Court.
From the evidence received at the hearing, the Court enters the following:

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FINDINGS OF FACT
Background
1. David is an Irish citizen who has resided in Dublin all of his life. Ingrid
is a Lithuanian citizen who at some point moved to Dublin. In June
2004, David and Ingrid met and began a relationship. Although they
never married, David and Ingrid lived together until their separation in
January of 2010.
2. In November of 2005, David and Ingrid’s son, L.S., was born. (Ex. 501).
3. After their separation, David and Ingrid shared responsibilities as to L.S.’
upbringing. Ingrid exercised custody the majority of the time. At the
time, Ingrid worked three jobs, and David watched over L.S. when Ingrid
was working. In addition, David would periodically have L.S. over for
sleepovers and would occasionally drop off and pick up L.S. at school.
4. At some point in May 2012, the parties arranged for Ingrid to leave L.S.
in David’s custody on May 25, 2012. However, Ingrid never arrived at
the designated location with L.S. Instead, on May 25, 2012, Ingrid and
L.S. boarded a plane and flew to the United States, with their ultimate
destination being Brady, Montana. The purpose of traveling to Montana
was to move in with Alan Noonkester (“Alan”). Alan and Ingrid decided
to live together after meeting on the internet.
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5. Ingrid only decided to move L.S. out of Ireland after consulting materials
provided by Treoir, which is an Irish organization that supplies
information to unmarried parents. (Ex. 517). The materials informed
Ingrid that under Irish law, the mother is the sole guardian of a child born
unto unmarried parents. Accordingly, unless the father petitions a court
for joint guardianship, the mother can remove the child from Ireland
without the father’s permission.
6. David had no knowledge of Ingrid’s plans, nor did he ever consent to
L.S.’ departure from Ireland. In addition, at no time prior to L.S.’
departure did David ever apply to an Irish court for guardianship,
custody, or access.
David’s attempts to bring L.S. back to Ireland
7. In the morning of May 25, 2012, after waiting in vain for Ingrid’s arrival,
David sent Ingrid a text message. Ingrid did not respond, so David sent
another text that afternoon. That evening, Ingrid responded and falsely
told Slight that she was in Lithuania and had moved in with her mother.
Ingrid acknowledges that she lied to David, but explains that she was
afraid of David’s reaction and only lied to buy some time.
8. On May 26, 2012, David informed the Irish police that Ingrid had
removed L.S. from Ireland without his permission. (Ex. F). About eight
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weeks later, in late July 2012, the police informed David that Ingrid had
not gone to Lithuania, but rather gone to Montana. The police also gave
David the street address where Ingrid and L.S. were living.
9. Although not exactly clear when, at some point in 2012, David filed a
petition for L.S.’ return with the Irish Government. David claims that
this petition was denied due to the fact that David was not a guardian of
L.S. at the time of the abduction.
10. On June 5, 2012, David applied to the Dublin Metropolitan District
Court (“Dublin Court”) for both sole custody of L.S. and to be named his
guardian. (Exs. C-3 and C-4). While it is unclear whether Ingrid was
served with these documents, she did know about the pending action.
Ingrid never made a formal appearance before the Dublin Court, and the
only action she took was writing a letter to the Dublin Court explaining
her circumstances.
11. On September 11, 2012, the Dublin Court appointed David as both joint
custodian and joint guardian of L.S. (Exs. C-1 and C-2). In the order
appointing David joint custodian, the Court stated that:
Provided that the party to whom custody/access of the
said child(ren) is hereby given shall not remove the said
child(ren) from the jurisdiction of this Court without
having first obtained in writing of the other party or the
leave of this Court or of any other Court of competent
jurisdiction.
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(Ex. C-2 at 2).
12. Ingrid never saw the Dublin Court’s orders until she was served with the
Petition on December 31, 2013. However, she likely knew that the
Dublin Court had issued such orders.
13.On November 9, 2012, David completed an Authorization to Release
Case Information to allow the U.S. Department of State to discuss his
case with prospective attorneys in the U.S. (Ex. H).
14. On April 15, 2013, David filed an application for access under the
Hague Convention with the Ireland Department of Justice and Equality.
(Ex. D). In that application, David authorized the Central Authority for
the United States of America to represent him and act on his behalf. Id.
at 6. On June 10, 2013, the Ireland Department of Justice and Equality
forwarded David’s application to the U.S. Department of State. (Ex. G).
In the accompanying letter, the Irish Department representative noted that
David previously applied for David’s return, which was denied as he was
not a guardian at the time of removal. Id. at 1.
15. On September 13, 2013, the U.S. Department of State arranged a phone
call between David and his present counsel. This was the first contact
David had with an American attorney.

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L.S.’ Adjustment to the United States
16. After their arrival in the United States, Ingrid and L.S. moved to Brady,
Montana, to move in with Alan. Ingrid and Alan married in August of
2012.
17. While in Brady, L.S. attended school in the Dutton/Brady School
District from August 2012 until February 2013.
18. After his arrival in Montana, L.S. developed a close relationship with
Alan. L.S. and Alan have good relationship, with the two participating in
typical father-son activities. L.S. has also developed close and
meaningful relationships with Alan’s two children from a prior
relationship. In particular, L.S. is close with his step brother, Liam, who
is two years older. Although Liam lives primarily with his mother in Fort
Benton, Liam visits over the summer and on holidays. L.S. also has
developed close ties with his step-grandparents. His step-grandmother,
Laurie Campbell, lives in Brady and made a point to introduce L.S. to
other children in his neighborhood. L.S. continues to speak regularly
with Ms. Campbell.
19. In February 2013, Alan, Ingrid, and L.S. moved to Worden, Montana, so
that Alan could take a job at the Signal Peak coal mine. In the fall of
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2013, L.S. enrolled at the Huntley Project Elementary School. L.S. has
done well at school and has obtained good grades. (Ex. 506). He is
rightfully proud of the fact that despite being in second grade, he reads
eighth grade-level chapter books.
20. After his move to Worden, L.S. developed more close ties to family
members. He became close with his step-grandfather Grant Noonkester,
who lives in Shepherd. L.S. also has a close friendship with his cousin,
Valentine. Valentine lives in nearby Huntley, and he and L.S. play
multiple times a week.
21. Ingrid and L.S. do not face an immediate threat of deportation. Ingrid
and Alan visited the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Field
Office in Helena, where they receive assurances that Ingrid is in the
country legally. She does face several restrictions, such as being unable
to work and if she leaves the U.S., she will not be allowed to return.
Therefore, Ingrid does not hold employment and is a homemaker. Ingrid
is in the process of applying for status as a permanent resident for herself
and L.S.
22. L.S. and David have had regular contact. Ingrid allows them to talk on
the phone Saturday and Sunday mornings (Mountain time) while L.S. is
in school and more frequently over the holidays. David has also sent
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money for L.S. to spend as he wants; however, he has prohibited Ingrid
from using this money as child support.
23. The Court met with L.S. in chambers and on the record. L.S. is bright,
articulate, and seems mature for an eight year old. L.S. expressed his
desire to remain in Montana. L.S. stated that he wants to maintain a
relationship with David, including possible visits to Ireland. However,
L.S. is comfortable in Worden and wishes to remain with Ingrid and
Alan.
Procedural History
24. David filed the Petition and commenced the instant action on December
27, 2013. This Court set an evidentiary hearing for January 21, 2014.
25. On January 21, 2014, prior to the start of the hearing, Ingrid filed a Rule
12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, arguing that under Irish law, L.S.’ removal
could not have been unlawful as David did not have any custodial rights.
David conceded that Ingrid did not wrongfully remove L.S. from Ireland,
but responded that Ingrid wrongfully retained L.S. after the Dublin Court
named David as a joint custodian and joint guardian. The Court took the
motion under advisement.
26. To the extent that any of the foregoing findings are deemed to be
conclusions of law, they shall be so treated.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I.

Jurisdiction, Venue, and Service
27. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action. 42
U.S.C. § 11603(a).
28. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Ingrid, as Ingrid resides in
Montana and has not objected to personal jurisdiction.
29. Venue is proper in the District of Montana and in the Billings Division
because Ingrid resides in Yellowstone County and has not objected to
venue.
30. Ingrid received proper notice of this hearing. 42 U.S.C. § 11603(c).
David served Ingrid with copies of the Summons and Petition on
December 31, 2013 (Doc. #4) and the Court’s Order setting the hearing
on January 6, 2014 (Doc. #6).

II.

Background of the Hague Convention
31. The Hague Convention was adopted in response to a rise in international
child abductions occurring during domestic disputes. Abbott v. Abbott,
560 U.S. 1, 8 (2010). The Convention’s stated purpose is “to secure the
prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in any
Contracting State; and to ensure that rights of custody and of access
under the law of one Contracting State are effectively respected in the
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other Contracting States.” Hague Convention, Art. 1. Stated another
way, “[t]he central purpose of the Convention is to prevent forum
shopping in custody battles.” Valenzuela v. Michel, 736 F.3d 1173, 1176
(9th Cir. 2013). Both Ireland and the U.S. are Contracting States to the
Hague Convention.
32. Article 3 of the Hague Convention defines wrongful removal and
retention, and provides:
The removal or the retention of a child is to be
considered wrongful where –
(a) it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a
person, an institution or any other body, either
jointly or alone, under the law of the State in
which the child was habitually resident
immediately before the removal or retention; and
(b) at the time of removal or retention those rights
were actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or
would have been so exercised but for the removal
or retention.
The rights of custody mentioned in sub-paragraph a)
above, may arise in particular by operation of law or by
reason of a judicial or administrative decision, or by
reason of an agreement having legal effect under the law
of that State.
Upon a finding of a wrongful removal or retention, the judicial or
administrative agency must order the return of the child if less than a year
has elapsed since the removal. Id., Art. 12. If more than a year has
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elapsed since the wrongful removal or retention, the court shall still order
the return of the child “unless it is demonstrated that the child is now
settled in its new environment.” Id. When determining whether to return
a child, the court cannot consider the merits of the underlying custody
dispute. Art. 19; Holder v. Holder, 392 F.3d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 2004).
33. In considering a petition under the Hague convention, the Court must
answer the following four questions:
(1) When did the removal or retention at issue take
place? (2) Immediately prior to the removal or retention,
in which state was the child habitually resident? (3) Did
the removal or retention breach the rights of custody
attributed to the petitioner under the law of the habitual
residence? (4) Was the petitioner exercising those rights
at the time of the removal or retention?
Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1070 (9th Cir. 2001). The petitioner
initially has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence
that the child has been wrongfully removed. 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(1). If
the petitioner meets that burden, then the burden shifts to the respondent
to establish an exception established by the Hague Convention. 42
U.S.C. § 11603(e)(2). If the petitioner prevails on his claim and the
respondent does not establish a defense, the child must be promptly
returned. 42 U.S.C. § 11601(a)(4). In addition, to help interpret the
Hague Convention, courts give deference to the Explanatory Report by
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Elisa Perez–Vera, the official Hague Conference reporter (the “Perez–
Vera Report”) (found at
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=publications.details&pid=2779).
Shalit v. Coppe, 182 F.3d 1124, 1127 (9th Cir. 1999).
III.

Wrongful Retention

34. Without considering the other elements established by Mozes, this Court
finds that David’s claim fails because Ingrid has not retained L.S. in
violation of David’s rights of custody.
35. David concedes that Ingrid did not wrongfully remove L.S. when she left
Ireland on May 25, 2012. When determining a party’s custody rights in
the child’s prior habitual residence, the Court must look to that country’s
law. Hague Convention, Art. 14; see also Whallon v. Lynn, 230 F.3d
450, 456 (1st Cir. 2000). In Ireland, if a child is born to unmarried
parents, only the mother is the guardian of the child. Guardianship of
Infants Act, 1964, Part II, § 6(4) (Act No. 7/1964) (Ir.), available at
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1964/en/act/pub/0007/index.html. The
unmarried father may petition a court to be appointed guardian and
secure custody rights. Id., Part II, § 11; see also Redmond v. Redmond,
724 F.3d 729, 732 (7th Cir. 2013). Accordingly, if an unmarried Irish
father fails to apply for an order granting him custody prior to his child’s
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departure from Ireland, than that removal is not unlawful. J. McB. v.
L.E., [2010] IESC 48, ¶ 32 (Ir.). Since David did not apply to be named a
guardian over L.S. prior to May 25, 2012, Ingrid’s removal of L.S. was
not wrongful.
36. David thus relies on a wrongful retention theory. David argues that
while Ingrid’s removal of L.S. was not wrongful, the September 11, 2012
Dublin Court orders appointing him joint guardian made Ingrid’s
retention of L.S. in the U.S. wrongful and in violation of Irish law. This
Court is not persuaded by David’s argument.
37. This is not a typical wrongful retention claim. The Perez-Vera Report
states that the term “‘wrongfully detained’ is meant to cover those cases
where the child, with the consent of the person who normally has
custody, is in a place other than its place of habitual residence and is not
returned by the person with whom it was staying.” Perez-Vera Report, ¶
57. The normal wrongful detention cases usually happen when one
custodial parent grants the other parent permission to temporarily visit
another country with their children, only to have that parent decide to not
return and keep the children in the new country. See Mozes; Silverman v.
Silverman, 338 F.3d 886, 890 (8th Cir. 2003); and Baxter v. Baxter, 423
F.3d 363, 366 (3d Cir. 2005).
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38. When a party applies for custody after the other parent leaves the
country, the subsequent order is referred to as a “chasing order.” Courts
typically do not give deference to chasing orders. See Feder v. EvansFeder, 63 F.3d 217, 231 n. 3 (3d Cir. 1995) (where neither the trial or
appellate court considered an order granting custody that the father
obtained from an Australian court after the mother and child had left for
the U.S.). “[C]ourts have repeatedly assumed rights of custody for
purposes of Article 3 of the Convention means rights of custody at the
time of removal.” White v. White, 718 F.3d 300, 307 (4th Cir. 2013).
39. In White, a Swiss court granted a mother sole custody of the child. The
mother subsequently left for the U.S. After the mother’s departure, the
father obtained an emergency ruling from a Swiss court prohibiting the
mother from leaving Switzerland. Later, with the mother still in the U.S.,
a Swiss court altered the custody order and granted the father sole
custody of the child. Id. at 302-303. In affirming the denial of the
father’s petition under the Hague Convention, the Fourth Circuit did not
give credence to the Swiss order granting the father sole custody. Id. at
306. Because the Court had not previously addressed how a custody
determination after removal affects a Hague Convention case, the Court
looked to the how other signatories to the Hague Convention have
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decided. Id. at 307. As it turns out, courts in other Contracting States
“agree that orders claiming to adjust custody arrangements after removal
or retention do not typically affect rights under Article 3 of the
Convention.” Id. (collecting decisions from Canada, England, and
Scotland). Giving deference to a chasing order may produce the absurd
result of allowing a country that a child has not lived in for years to “at
any time modify a previous custody determination, in the absence of the
child and the parent who took the child abroad, and thereby potentially
justify a return remedy.” Id. While White specifically dealt with a
wrongful removal claim, it is clear that the logic of its holding continues
into wrongful retention cases. Indeed, one case cited by White stated
that:
There is nothing in the Convention requiring the
recognition of an ex post facto custody order of foreign
jurisdictions. And there are several statements in the
supplementary material to support the view that
‘wrongful retention’ under the Hague Convention does
not contemplate a retention becoming wrongful only after
the issuance of a ‘chasing order.’
Thomson v. Thomson, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 551 (Can.)
40. In Redmond, a factually similar case dealing with unmarried parents in
Ireland, the Seventh Circuit did not give weight to an Irish court’s order
granting the father joint guardianship after the mother and child had
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moved to the U.S. 724 F.3d at 742. The Court specifically rejected the
father’s contention that the mother wrongfully retained the child in the
U.S. after the father obtained the Irish court order naming him guardian
over the child. Id. at 739. The Court noted that the “Hague Convention
is an anti-abduction treaty; it is not a treaty on the recognition and
enforcement of [foreign] decisions on custody.” Id. (internal citations
omitted). Enforcing chasing orders is beyond the Hague Convention’s
concept of wrongful retention. Id. at 740.
41. Applying those principles here, the Dublin Court’s issuance of its Sept.
11, 2012 orders did not render Ingrid’s retention of L.S. wrongful. It is
uncontroverted that when Ingrid and L.S. left the U.S. on May 25, 2012,
she did not violate David’s custody rights, as none existed. When David
subsequently applied for and received guardianship over L.S., this did not
mean that Ingrid’s retention breached David’s rights of custody. Such
chasing orders do not create a wrongful retention under Art. 3 of the
Convention. This is because this Court must look to the custody rights
existing at the time of removal. White, 718 F.3d at 307. Since David did
not have any custody rights when Ingrid left Ireland, her retention of L.S.
in the U.S. is not wrongful.

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IV.

The “Settled” Defense and Equitable Tolling

42. Even assuming that Ingrid has wrongfully retained L.S., she would still
prevail, as she established Art. 12’s “settled” defense.
43. As discussed above, Art. 12 of the Convention provides that if the child
was wrongfully removed and has resided in the new country for less than
a year, the Court must return the child. However, if more than a year has
elapsed from the date of the wrongful removal or retention, the Court
must order the return of the child “unless it is demonstrated that the child
is now settled in its new environment.” Hague Convention, Art. 12. The
“settled” defense acknowledges that while a wrongful removal could
traumatize a child, it would be just as harmful to uproot a child after he
has become settled into his new environment. In re Robinson, 983 F.
Supp. 1339, 1345 (D. Colo. 1997). There are two parts to the “settled”
defense: (1) procedurally, more than a year must pass; and (2)
substantively, the child must be “settled.”
Procedurally
44. In just looking at the dates, it appears that the “settled” defense is
available to Ingrid. Even adopting David’s proposed wrongful retention
date of September 11, 2012, David did not file the Petition until
December 27, 2013. However, David argues that the time from the
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wrongful retention to the filing of the Petition should be equitably tolled.
The basis of this argument is the fact that he sought the return of L.S.
through the Ireland Department of Justice and Equality and the U.S.
Department of State, but he got hung up on bureaucratic delays.
45. Equitable tolling stays the running of Art. 12’s one year timeline for the
“settled” defense. Furnes v. Reeves, 362 F.3d 702, 723 (11th Cir. 2004).
It applies when “circumstances suggest that the abducting parent took
steps to conceal the whereabouts of the child from the parent seeking
return and such concealment delayed the filing of the petition for return.
Duarte v. Bardales, 526 F.3d 563, 570 (9th Cir. 2008). Only the Fifth,
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits allow equitable tolling in Hague Convention
cases. Lozano v. Alvarez, 697 F.3d 41, 55 (2d Cir. 2012). Every other
common law country refuses to apply equitable tolling. Federal Judicial
Center, J. Garbolino, The 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects
of International Child Abduction: A Guide for Judges 73 (2012). The
Supreme Court has granted certiorari to consider whether to allow
equitable tolling in Hague Convention cases. Lozano v. Alvarez, 133 S.
Ct. 2851 (2013). That case is fully briefed and was argued on December
11, 2013. Thus, it is very possible that the Supreme Court will soon issue

18

an opinion denying equitable tolling and render this entire discussion
moot.
46. David seeks to expand equitable tolling beyond cases of active
concealment and include situations where the petitioner actively sought
the return of the child but was thwarted by bureaucratic delays. In
support, David cites district court opinions from outside the Ninth
Circuit. See Mendez Lynch v. Mendez Lynch, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1347,
1363 (M.D. Florida 2002) and In re Ahumada Cabrera, 323 F. Supp. 2d
1303, 1313 (S.D. Florida 2004). Without considering the actual holdings
of those cases, this Court will not expand equitable tolling beyond active
concealment as the Ninth Circuit has refused to do so.
47. When the Ninth Circuit initially adopted equitable tolling, it stated that it
applied when the abducting parent hides the child’s location from the
other parent. Duarte, 526 F.3d at 570. The Court later refused to expand
Duarte’s limitation on equitable tolling into other circumstances. In re B.
Del C.S.B., 559 F.3d 999, 1014 (9th Cir. 2009). Equitable tolling only
applies “where two related conditions are met: (1) the abducting parent
concealed the child and (2) that concealment caused the petitioning
parent's filing delay.” Id. Equitable tolling does not apply if the
petitioner knew of the child’s location. Id. at 1015.
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48. Here, David knew of L.S.’ location in late July 2012. With the
exception of a three week period in February 2013 following their move
to Worden, David has known of L.S.’ whereabouts. David has even had
regular contact with L.S. Since Ingrid did not take steps to actively
conceal L.S.’ location after David learned of his address in Montana,
equitable tolling does not apply.
Substantively
49. The Court must now consider whether L.S. is “settled” here in the U.S.
Ingrid has the burden of proving this by a preponderance of the evidence.
42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(2)(B).
50. To determine whether a child is “settled,” the following factors must be
considered:
(1) the child's age; (2) the stability and duration of the child's
residence in the new environment; (3) whether the child attends
school or day care consistently; (4) whether the child has
friends and relatives in the new area; (5) the child's
participation in community or extracurricular school activities,
such as team sports, youth groups, or school clubs; and (6) the
respondent's employment and financial stability.
B. Del C.S.B., 559 F.3d at 1009. In addition, the child’s
immigration status may only be relevant “if there is an immediate,
concrete threat of deportation.” Id.

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51. In addition, this Court may also consider the child’s wishes if he has
“attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take
account of its views.” Hague Convention, Art. 13.
52. In applying the factors, this Court concludes that L.S. is settled in
Montana. At eight years old, he is old enough to become settled into life
in the U.S. L.S. has a stable and caring family. He and Alan have
formed a loving and caring relationship. Also, L.S. has formed close and
meaning full bonds with numerous members of his stepfamily. With the
exception of Spring 2013, L.S. has consistently attended school and has
performed well. His close friend, Valentine, lives in the area and they
see each other on a regular basis. As a homemaker, Ingrid provides a
stable home for L.S. Alan has provided financial stability through his
employment at the Signal Peak coal mine. Finally, while L.S.’
immigration status is uncertain, he is not facing the immediate threat of
deportation.
53. Additionally, L.S. has obtained the level of maturity where this Court
can consider his viewpoints. L.S. clearly told this Court that he wants to
stay in Montana. L.S. would like to maintain a relationship with David,
but he does not want to be returned to Ireland. L.S. has expressed a

21

desire to someday visit David in Ireland. This can be worked out among
the parties or through a court of competent jurisdiction.
54. In sum, L.S. is settled here in Montana. Therefore, Ingrid has
successfully invoked Art. 12’s “settled” defense.
ORDER
Therefore, it is hereby ordered that:
1. David’s request for the return of L.S. is DENIED;
2. Any appropriate custody determination, if necessary, shall be made by
a court of competent jurisdiction in the United States;
3. Until such time as a court of competent jurisdiction in the United
States enters a formal adjudication of custody, David shall not remove
L.S. from Yellowstone County; and
4. David shall surrender to Ingrid any passport or other travel documents
he has obtained with regard to L.S.
It is further ordered that Ingrid’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED AS MOOT, as
she prevailed on the merits.

DATED this 24th day of January 2014.

SUSAN P. WATTERS
United States District Judge
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