Deputee v. Lodge Grass Public Schools, Districts 2 and 27 et al
Filing
17
OPINION AND ORDER- DENIED AS MOOT 7 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART 13 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. READ ORDER FOR DETAILS. Signed by Judge Susan P. Watters on 2/18/2016. (AMC, )
FILED
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
BILLINGS DIVISION
FEB 1 6 2016
Clerk, U.S. District Court
District Of Montana
Billings
KENNETH DEPUTEE, SR,
CV 15-82-BLG-SPW
Plaintiff,
OPINION and ORDER
vs.
LODGE GRASS PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
DISTRICTS 2 & 27,
Defendants.
Plaintiff Kenneth Deputee, Sr. brings this action against his former employer
Defendants Lodge Grass Public Schools, Districts 2 & 27 ("School District"). The
School District moves to dismiss Deputee's Amended Complaint pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). For the following reasons, the School District's motion is
granted in part and denied in part.
I. Background
A. Factual Background 1
The School District hired Deputee as an elementary school principal in
1997. Deputee performed well by reaching his annual standards and goals and
otherwise meeting his professional duties. At the time, John Small was the School
1 The
following facts are taken from Deputee's Amended Complaint and are
assumed true for purposes of this motion. Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063,
1067 (9th Cir. 2009).
1
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District's superintendent. With the School District's approval and despite
Deputee's distinguished service, Small demoted Deputee from his position as
elementary school principal to the position of dean of students in 2011.
In Deputee's place, the School District hired Trivian Rides the Bear as
elementary school principal. Rides the Bear is female, about 20 years younger
than Deputee, and did not have a valid administrator's license. Deputee had more
experience and professional success as both a classroom teacher and an
administrator than Rides the Bear. Rides the Bear is also Small's niece and was
related to several other members of the School District's board.
From 2011 through 2013, Small subjected Deputee to "harassment and
disparate treatment." (Doc. 12 at 3.) Specifically, Small assigned Deputee to a
cramped office with insufficient space to perform his job duties effectively and
repeatedly shifted him among different classrooms, offices, and facilities. Deputee
was also assigned duties outside the dean of student's job description, such as
monitoring lunch periods and busing, as well as preparing a Title IX compliance
program. Rides the Bear and other administrators were not assigned these duties.
Small regularly criticized, threatened, and harassed Deputee. In one specific
instance, Small summoned Deputee into his office and verbally attacked him.
Small threatened Deputee with termination but did not state a reason why. Small
continued these verbal attacks though June 2013. Despite this treatment,
2
Deputee's evaluations with the School District were uniformly positive and no
disciplinary proceeding or investigation was ever initiated against Deputee.
Meanwhile, Rides the Bear failed to achieve many of her professional goals in
2012. During all this, Deputee earned substantially less than Rides the Bear.
In 2013, the School District instituted a reduction in force ("RIF") plan to
identify which employees would be terminated. In March 2013, Small
recommended that the School District not renew Deputee's employment. Small
stated that Deputee's non-renewal was needed to reduce salary and overhead. The
School District's board held a meeting on May 14, 2013, and Deputee appeared to
challenge Small's recommendation. The board members did not give Deputee's
arguments any significant consideration and Deputee was "ignored and belittled."
(Doc. 12 at 5.) The School District's board approved the RIF plan proposed by
Small.
On June 30, 2013, the School District terminated Deputee's employment.
Pursuant to the RIF, all terminated employees were to be notified of future job
openings. In 2014, Rides the Bear resigned as the elementary school principal,
which created the need for a new principal. Deputee never received notification of
the job opening. Instead, Small assumed the position of elementary school
principal and received a substantial increase in pay.
3
B. Procedural History
On December 30, 2013, Deputee filed a charge of discrimination against the
School District before both the United States Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC") and the Montana Department of Labor, Human Rights
Bureau. Specifically, Deputee claimed that the School District terminated his
employment due to his gender, age, and lack of familial relationship to Small and
the School District's board members. (Doc. 14-2 at 4.)
On May 28, 2015, the EEOC issued Deputee a right-to-sue letter. (Doc. 141.) Deputee filed the instant action on August 26, 2015. (Doc. 1.) In his first
Complaint, Deputee included both the School District and Small as defendants.
(Id.) Also, the Complaint's only cause of action was under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id.
at 6-7.) Small moved to dismiss the Complaint as to the allegations against him.
(Doc. 3.) Deputee did not respond, and this Court summarily granted the motion.
(Doc. 6.)
The School District also moved for dismissal. (Doc. 7.) Deputee responded
by filing an Amended Complaint on December 3, 2015. (Doc. 12.) The Amended
Complaint has the same factual allegations as the first Complaint and it contains
three causes of action. In Count 1, Deputee asserts a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and alleges that the School District violated "the right no [sic] to be discriminated
against, the right to fair and equal treatment in the workplace, including the right to
4
a fundamentally fair process regarding the continuation and resumption of his
employment, and the right not to be subjected to harassment and discrimination in
the terms and conditions of his employment." (Doc. 12 at 6-7.) In Count 2,
Deputee asserts a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. (Doc. 12 at 7-8.) In Count 3, Deputee asserts
claims under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. §
2000e, et seq. (Doc. 12 at 8-9.) Specifically, Deputee alleges gender and race
discrimination. (Id. at 9.) Included in his prayer for relief is a request for punitive
damages. (Id.)
The School District now moves to dismiss the Amended Complaint under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The School District provides several arguments in
support of its motion. As to Count 1, the School District argues that § 1983 does
not provide employees with a separate remedy for gender and age discrimination.
The School District also argues that Deputee has not pied sufficient facts to support
a procedural due process claim. As to Counts 2 and 3, the School District argues
that Deputee's claims of age and gender discrimination are time-barred. The
School District also contends that Deputee failed to administratively exhaust his
race discrimination claim. Finally, the School District argues that punitive
damages are unavailable. The Court will address each argument separately.
5
II. Legal Standard
A defendant may move to dismiss a complaint if it fails "to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). "To survive a motion
to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (internal quotation omitted). All factual allegations are accepted as true
and all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. Dahlia v.
Rodriguez, 735 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 2013). While a complaint does not need
to contain detailed factual allegations, "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do." Bell At!. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
III. Deputee's Response Brief
As an initial matter, the School District argues that Deputee's response brief
should be stricken. The School District posits that because Deputee's response
was filed more than 14 days after the motion and opening brief were filed, it was
untimely under Local Rule 7 .1. The School District misreads the relevant Local
Rule. L.R. 7.l(d)(l)(B)(i) states that, with emphasis added by the Court,
"Responses to motions to dismiss, for judgment on the pleadings, or for summary
judgment must be filed within 21 days after the motion was filed." Responses to
all other motions are due within 14 days. L.R. 7.l(d)(l)(B)(ii).
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The School District's motion to dismiss was filed on December 17, 2015.
Deputee responded on January 7, 2016, which was exactly 21 days after the motion
was filed. Accordingly, Deputee timely responded to the motion.
IV. Count 1
To paraphrase the allegations in Count 1, Deputee claims that the School
District violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by depriving him of: (1) His right not to be
discriminated against and harassed in the workplace; and (2) his right to procedural
due process regarding the continuation and resumption of his employment. (Doc.
12 at 6-7.) The School District argues that§ 1983 does not provide a separate
remedy for the alleged discrimination, as the ADEA and Title VII foreclose
separate workplace age and gender discrimination claims. The School District also
argues that it could not have violated Deputee's right to due process as it gave him
adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard before terminating his employment.
A. Workplace Discrimination and Harassment
Under§ 1983, a defendant acting under the color of law is liable if it
deprives a plaintiff of any rights secured by the U.S. Constitution or federal law.
42 U.S.C. § 1983. "Section 1983 does not create any substantive rights, but is
instead a vehicle by which plaintiffs can bring federal constitutional and statutory
challenges to actions by state and local officials." Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d
1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006). Liberally construing the Amended Complaint,
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Deputee alleges that the School District violated his constitutional and statutory
rights against age and gender discrimination. 2 The Fourteenth Amendment
sometimes prohibits state actors from discriminating based on gender, Mississippi
Univ.for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-24 (1982), and age, Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501U.S.452, 470-71 (1991). Federal law also prohibits employers from
discriminating based on gender in Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), and age in the
ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a).
However, § 1983 cannot be used to vindicate all federally-created rights.
Congress may specifically foreclose a remedy under§ 1983. Blessing v.
Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 341 (1997). When a separate statute's remedies are
sufficiently comprehensive, "they may suffice to demonstrate congressional intent
to preclude the remedy of suits under§ 1983." Middlesex Cty. Sewerage Auth. v.
Nat'! Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 20 (1981); see also Vinson v. Thomas, 288
F.3d 1145, 1155 (9th Cir. 2002) ("[A] comprehensive remedial scheme for the
enforcement of a statutory right creates a presumption that Congress intended to
foreclose resort to more general remedial schemes to vindicate that right") (internal
quotation omitted).
2
While Deputee does not explicitly allege any specific constitutional rights that
were violated, the Amended Complaint's first paragraph states that the claims are
alternatively brought under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Doc. 12 at 1.)
8
The Ninth Circuit held that the ADEA precludes the assertion of
employment age discrimination claims under § 1983 in Ahlmeyer v. Nevada Sys. of
Higher Educ., 555 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2009). In Ahlmeyer, the plaintiff alleged
that her employer discriminated due to her age. Id. at 1054. The plaintiff brought
a claim under§ 1983 for age discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. Id. The district court dismissed the § 1983 claim, reasoning that the
ADEA provided the exclusive remedy for age discrimination by employers and
precludes similar claims brought under§ 1983. Id.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed and adopted the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in
Zombro v. Baltimore City Police Dept., 868 F.2d 1364 (4th Cir. 1989). Ahlmeyer,
555 F.3d at 1056. The ADEA has a complex enforcement scheme that a party
could bypass by way of a § 1983 action. Id. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the
Fourth Circuit's conclusion that the ADEA's remedies are "sufficiently
comprehensive to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude § 1983 actions in
the area of age discrimination in employment." Id. Congress intended for the
ADEA to serve as the exclusive remedy to pursue employment age discrimination
claims. Id. at 1058. Therefore, "the ADEA precludes the assertion of age
discrimination in employment claims, even those seeking to vindicate
constitutional rights, under§ 1983." Id. at 1057.
9
Identically to the plaintiff in Ahlmeyer, Deputee cannot assert his age
discrimination claim via§ 1983. Instead, his exclusive remedy is with the ADEA,
which he pleads as Count 2 in his Amended Complaint.
However, Title VII does not preclude a separate action under§ 1983 for
gender discrimination. Roberts v. Coll. of the Desert, 870 F.2d 1411, 1415 (9th
Cir. 1988). In Roberts, the plaintiff brought separate actions for gender
discrimination under Title VII and § 1983 against her employer. Id. at 1414. The
Ninth Circuit upheld judgments on both the Title VII and§ 1983 claims and held
that Title VII does not preempt an action under § 1983 for a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 1415.
While Title VII does not preclude a § 1983 claim brought under the
Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff cannot use§ 1983 as a vehicle to vindicate
statutory rights created by Title Vil. Henley v. Brown, 686 F.3d 634, 642 (8th Cir.
2012). In other words, "Title VII provides the exclusive remedy for violations of
its own terms and an employment discrimination plaintiff asserting the deprivation
of rights created by Title VII must comply with the Act's procedural requirements
before seeking judicial review." Id. at 641. In sum, a party cannot use § 1983 to
remedy a violation of Title VII. Id. When the employer's conduct may also
violate rights conferred by an independent source - such as the Fourteenth
10
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Amendment - "Title VII supplements, rather than supplants, existing remedies for
employment discrimination." Id.
Here, Deputee can proceed with his § 1983 claim of gender discrimination
that may allege a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Like in Roberts, Title
VII does not preclude Deputee's separate action under§ 1983 for an alleged
violation of the constitutional protection against gender discrimination. However,
like in Henley, Deputee cannot use§ 1983's remedies to vindicate any rights
conferred by Title VII.
B. Procedural Due Process
The Fifth Amendment prohibits the deprivation "of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." "The fundamental requirement of due process is the
opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (internal citation omitted). Due
process does not require that an administrative body apply the judicial model.
Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 115 (1977). Rather than being "a technical
conception," procedural due process "is flexible and calls for such procedural
protections as the particular situation demands." Gilbert v. Hamar, 520 U.S. 924,
930 (1997) (internal citations omitted).
The School District correctly notes that the essential requirements for due
process "are notice and an opportunity to respond." Cleveland Bd. ofEduc. v.
11
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985). Due process also requires "a fair tribunal."
In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). This requirement applies to both
courts and administrative bodies. Stivers v. Pierce, 71 F.3d 732, 741 (9th Cir.
1995). A plaintiff can establish a procedural due process claim by demonstrating
either actual bias by the adjudicator or that "the adjudicator's pecuniary or personal
interest in the outcome of the proceedings may create an appearance ofpartiality."
Id. (emphasis in original).
The Court finds that Deputee has pied sufficient facts to support his
procedural due process claim. Deputee alleges that despite his satisfactory
performance, the School District demoted him from his principal position and
replaced him with Rides the Bear. (Doc. 12 at 3.) According to Deputee, Rides
the Bear was unqualified for the position, and she was Small's niece and related to
several other members of the School District's board. (Id.) Small later
recommended that the School District not renew Deputee's employment. (Id. at 5.)
While he was afforded the opportunity to appear at a hearing before the School
District's board, the board may have been composed of Rides the Bear's family
members that Deputee alleges to have previously affirmed his demotion in favor of
Rides the Bear. According to Deputee, he was not afforded any meaningful
opportunity to respond, but instead he was "ignored and belittled." (Id.)
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Liberally construing the factual allegations and affording Deputee all
reasonable inferences, the Court cannot say definitively that the School District
acted without either actual or implied bias. The Court finds that the above facts
state a plausible claim that the School District did not afford Deputee a fair
tribunal.
In summary, the Court concludes that Deputee cannot use§ 1983 to assert
claims of age discrimination or statutory violations of Title VII. However,
Deputee can use § 1983 to assert violations of the Fourteenth Amendment's
prohibition on gender discrimination. Deputee can also proceed on his procedural
due process claim.
V. Counts 2 and 3
The School District presents three arguments as to why Counts 2 and 3
should be dismissed. First, the School District argues that Counts 2 and 3 are timebarred since the Amended Complaint was filed more than 90 days after the EEOC
issued its right-to-sue letter. Second, the School District contends that all
allegations of gender discrimination that occurred in excess of 300 days before the
Amended Complaint's filing are time-barred by Title VII. Third, the School
District argues that Deputee did not administratively exhaust his racial
discrimination claim.
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A. The EEOC Letter
A plaintiff has 90 days to file an action under the ADEA and Title VII after
receiving notification that the EEOC will not take further action. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(t)(l). The 90-day period "operates as a limitations period." Payan v.
Aramark Mgmt. Servs. Ltd. P'ship, 495 F.3d 1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 2007). If a
litigant does not file an action within 90 days, then the action is time barred. Id.
The EEOC issued its letter on May 28, 2015. Deputee filed the first
Complaint on August 26, 2015, which was within 90 days of the EEOC's letter.
However, Deputee's only stated cause of action in the first Complaint was under§
1983. Deputee added claims under the ADEA and Title VII when he filed his
Amended Complaint on December 3, 2015. Of course, the Amended Complaint
was filed after the 90-day deadline. The School District argues that since the
ADEA and Title VII claims were added after the 90-day period, they are timebarred.
The Court disagrees and finds that the Amended Complaint's new claims
relate back to the date the original Complaint was filed. Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(c)(1 )(B) provides:
An amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of the original
pleading when:
(B) the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of
the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out--or attempted to
be set out--in the original pleading.
14
"An amended claim arises out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence ifit
will likely be proved by the 'same kind of evidence' offered in support of the
original pleading." ASARCO, LLC v. Union Pac. R. Co., 765 F.3d 999, 1004 (9th
Cir. 2014) (internal quotation omitted). In other words, relation back should be
permitted if the amended claims "share a common core of operative facts" with the
original claims. Williams v. Boeing Co., 517 F.3d 1120, 1133 (9th Cir. 2008).
Rule 15(c)'s relation back doctrine is "liberally applied." ASARCO, 765 F.3d at
1004.
Deputee's factual allegations in the original Complaint and the Amended
Complaint are identical. To support his§ 1983 claims, Deputee alleges that the
School Board illegally discriminated against him due to his age and gender. In the
Amended Complaint, Deputee uses the same allegations to support claims under
the ADEA and Title VII. The alleged facts used to support his § 1983 claims and
his ADEA and Title VII share a "common core of operative facts." Deputee would
use the "same kind of evidence" to prove all of the claims advanced in the
Amended Complaint. Accordingly, the new claims in the Amended Complaint
relate back to the date of the original Complaint and are not barred by the 90-day
deadline.
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B. Title VII's 300-day Period
Under Title VII, a claimant must file a discrimination charge with the EEOC
within 300 days "after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred" if the
claimant also files a corresponding charge with a state agency. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(e). 3 On December 30, 2013, Deputee filed charges before both the EEOC and
the Montana Human Rights Bureau. The School District concedes that Deputee's
termination on June 30, 2013, occurred within the 300-day period. But since
Deputee's demotion from principal to dean of students occurred in 2011, the
School District argues that Deputee cannot claim Title VII damages for that event.
The School District also argues that Deputee cannot include any allegations of
harassment and disparate treatment occurring before March 4, 2013 (which is 300
days before December 30, 2013). The Court agrees that Deputee's demotion is
time barred, but finds that Deputee can assert allegations related to ongoing
harassment and disparate treatment that occurred prior to the 300-day period.
The Supreme Court addressed a similar situation in Nat'! R.R. Passenger
Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002). In Morgan, the plaintiff filed a charge of
discrimination and retaliation with both the EEOC and the relevant state agency.
Id. at 105. The plaintiff alleged that his employer consistently harassed him and
3
If a claimant only files with the EEOC, the charge must be filed within 180 days.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e).
16
disciplined him more harshly due to his race. Id. Some of the alleged
discriminatory acts occurred within the 300-day period immediately preceding the
filing, but many took place prior to that time period. Id. at 106. Similar to the
School District, the employer argued that it could not be held liable for any
conduct occurring prior to the 300-day period. Id.
The Supreme Court held that "discrete discriminatory acts are not actionable
iftime barred, even when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges."
Id. at 113. Discrete acts include termination, failure to promote, or refusal to hire.
Id. at 114. "Each discrete discriminatory act starts a new clock for filing charges
alleging that act." Id. at 113. Even if a discrete act is time barred, it can be used
"as background evidence in support of a timely claim." Id. Therefore, the
employer's discrete discriminatory acts that occurred prior to the 300-day period
were not actionable. Id. at 114-15.
The Court distinguished hostile work environment claims from discrete
discriminatory acts. Id. at 115. A hostile work environment claim involves a
continuing "unlawful employment practice" that does not just happen on any
particular day. Id. "A hostile work environment claim is composed of a series of
separate acts that collectively constitute one 'unlawful employment practice."' Id.
at 117. In determining whether a plaintiff can maintain a hostile work environment
claim under Title VII, courts consider "all the circumstances, including the
17
frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically
threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it
unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance." Id. at 116
(internal quotations omitted).
A hostile work environment claim is timely if any part of the "unlawful
employment practice" occurred within the 180 or 300 days prior to the charge's
filing. Id. at 117. Some of the alleged acts that created a hostile work environment
can be considered even if they fall outside the statutory time period. "Provided
that an act contributing to the claim occurs within the filing period, the entire time
period of the hostile environment may be considered by a court for the purposes of
determining liability." Id. Put differently, for a "charge to be timely, the employee
need only file a charge within 180 or 300 days of any act that is part of the hostile
work environment." Id. at 118. As long as one illegal act that contributed to the
hostile work environment occurred within that time period, "the employer may be
liable for all acts that are part of this single claim." Id.
In Morgan, the employer created a hostile work environment by consistently
making racial jokes and derogatory comments. Id. at 120. Even though many of
the acts occurred prior to the 300-day period, they all constituted part of the
plaintiffs hostile work environment claim. Id. Therefore, the plaintiff could
include all of the alleged acts in his claim. Id.
18
Similar to Morgan, Deputee alleges facts that occurred prior to the 300-day
time period. One such instance was his demotion from principal to dean of
students in 2011. A demotion is similar to a termination or failure to promote,
which the Supreme Court specifically identified as discrete actions. Morgan, 536
U.S. at 114. Thus, the Court finds that the 2011 demotion was a discrete act that
could have been separately actionable. Since the demotion falls outside of the
statutory period, Deputee cannot maintain a Title VII claim for losing his principal
position to Rides the Bear. Deputee can use the demotion as background evidence
in support of timely Title VII claims, such as his termination. Id. at 113.
Also similar to Morgan, Deputee alleges that the School District created a
hostile work environment in violation of Title VII. Deputee claims that Small
subjected him to "harassment and disparate treatment" from 2011 through 2013.
(Doc. 12 at 3.) The harassment included repeatedly providing Deputee inadequate
work spaces and assigning him administrative tasks that other administrators,
including Rides the Bear, were not required to perform. (Id. at 3-4.) Deputee also
alleges that Small repeatedly harassed and attacked him verbally without reason.
(Id. at 4.) This harassing behavior allegedly continued until June 2013. (Id.)
The Court finds that these alleged facts support a claim of a hostile work
environment in violation of Title VII. The latest alleged instance occurred in June
2013, which is within the 300-day period. Since the ongoing harassment, if
19
proven, could collectively constitute one unlawful employment practice, "[i]t does
not matter ... that some of the component acts of the hostile work environment fall
outside the statutory time period." Morgan, 536 U.S. at 117. Deputee can still
assert that the hostile work environment originated in 2011. Several instances of
the alleged harassment occurred within the statutory time period; therefore,
Deputee can rely on instances of continuing harassment and disparate treatment
that occurred outside of the 300-period to support a hostile work environment
claim under Title VII.
C. The Race Discrimination Claim
Deputee did not raise a charge of racial discrimination before the EEOC.
The School District argues that this claim should be dismissed for failure to
exhaust the administrative remedies. Deputee concedes this argument.
Accordingly, Deputee's racial discrimination claim in Count 3 should be
dismissed.
VI. Punitive Damages
The School District moves to dismiss Deputee's request for punitive
damages. Deputee concedes this argument. Accordingly, Deputee's request for
punitive damages should be dismissed.
20
VII. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The School District's initial Motion to Dismiss Claims Against School
District (Doc. 7) is DENIED as moot.
2. The School District's Restated Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint
Against School District (Doc. 13) is GRANTED IN PART as follows:
a. In Count 1, Deputee cannot pursue a claim of age discrimination.
b. In Count 1, Deputee cannot use§ 1983 to remedy a violation of
Title VII.
c. In Count 3, Deputee cannot pursue a claim for his demotion that
occurred in 2011.
d. In Count 3, Deputee's claim of racial discrimination is dismissed.
e. Deputee's request for punitive damages is dismissed.
3. In all other aspects, the motion is DENIED.
~DA TED thi' LJ'day ofFobruacy, 2016.;j
.
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,,SUSANP. WATTERS
United States District Judge
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