Stanfield v. State of Montana

Filing 44

ORDER ADOPTING FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 41 in full. Stanfield's petition 3 for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. A certificate of appealability is DENIED. Signed by Judge Dana L. Christensen on 2/25/2015. (TAG, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
BUTTE DIVISION

KERRY CORNELIUS STANFIELD,

CV 12-45-BU-DLC-CSO

Petitioner,
ORDER

vs.

FILED

MARTIN FRINK; ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF THE STATE OF
MONTANA,

FEB 2 5 2015
Clerk, U.S District Court
District Of Montana
Missoula

Respondents.

Petitioner Kerry Cornelius Stanfield ("Stanfield") filed this action for a writ
of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his 2008 Montana state
conviction for felony sexual assault on a minor. Stanfield previously brought five
claims challenging his conviction and all but one have been denied by the Court
for lack of merit. The remaining claim, based on Stanfield's allegations that a trial
juror in his case was related to the victim, was remanded for further proceedings.
Upon remand, United States Magistrate Judge Carolyn S. Ostby entered her
Findings and Recommendation on October 8, 2014, recommending that
Stanfield's petition be dismissed and a certificate of appealability be denied
because Stanfield's remaining claim was time barred and procedurally defaulted.

1

Stanfield timely filed objections and is therefore entitled to de novo review of the
specified findings and recommendations to which he objects. 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(l). The portions of the Findings and Recommendation not specifically
objected to will be reviewed for clear error. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.

Commodore Bus. Mach., Inc., 656 F.2d 1309, 1313 (9th Cir. 1981). For the
reasons stated below, the Court adopts Judge Ostby's Findings and
Recommendation in full. The parties are familiar with the factual and procedural
background of this case, so it will not be repeated here.

I. Equitable Tolling
Stanfield objects to Judge Ostby's finding that he failed to show a basis for
equitable tolling. Stanfield does not dispute that Judge Ostby correctly found that
his petition for post-conviction relief was untimely, but argues that his
untimeliness should be excused because psychological and cognitive problems
prevented him from timely filing his § 2254 petition. Stanfield further asserts that
"the Magistrate failed to give adequate consideration to this evidence and that he
is entitled to equitable tolling under Bills." (Doc. 42 at 5.) The Court disagrees.
In Bills v. Clark, 628 F .3d 1092, 1099 (9th Cir. 2010), the Ninth Circuit
established that a habeas petitioner is eligible for equitable tolling if the petitioner
can satisfy a two-part test. First, a petitioner seeking equitable tolling due to
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mental impairment must show that the impairment was so severe that: ( 1) the
"petitioner was unable rationally or factually to personally understand the need to
timely file"; or (2) the "petitioner's mental state rendered him unable personally to
prepare a habeas petition and effectuate its filing." Id. at 1099-1100. Second, the
petitioner must show that he pursued the claim diligently "to the extent he could
understand them, but that the mental impairment made it impossible to meet the
filing deadline under the totality of the circumstances." Id. at 1100. Under this
totality of the circumstances analysis, the Court must consider whether Stanfield's
impairment was the "but-for cause" of his delayed filing. Id.
Here, Stanfield fails to show that but for his mental impairment, he would
have timely filed his petition. Stanfield presents no evidence to the Court that his
mental impairment "interfere[d] with the ability to understand the need for
assistance, the ability to secure it, or the ability to cooperate with or monitor
assistance the petitioner does secure." Id. The evidence provided by Stanfield
does, arguably, suggest some level of mental impairment. However, as Judge
Ostby discussed in her Findings and Recommendation, the mere existence of a
mental impairment, by itself, does not warrant equitable tolling. See Id. at

1099-1100. Stanfield must demonstrate how his mental impairment prevented
him from understanding the need to timely file or how his mental impairment
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prevented him from preparing his habeas petition, with or without assistance. Id.
at 1100. Stanfield fails to do so. Additionally, Stanfield does not show that he
pursued his claims diligently during the period preceding the deadline for filing
his petition. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 638 (2010) (citation omitted).
There is no evidence in the record showing that Stanfield's mental impairment
caused his delayed filing.
Stanfield's argument that Judge Ostby failed to give proper consideration to
the evidence provided is not well taken. Judge Ostby throughly discussed
Stanfield's prison intake mental health screening and also reviewed a presentencing psychosexual evaluation conducted by Dr. Michael Scolatti. After
reviewing these records, Judge Ostby rightly concluded that Stanfield failed to
satisfy his burden under Bills.
Moreover, the Court notes that Stanfield does not request a hearing to
further develop the factual record. Even if Stanfield had requested a hearing, the
Court finds that further proceedings are not necessary in this case. When
countervailing evidence "indicates that the petitioner's mental incompetence was
not so severe as to cause the untimely filing of his habeas petition, a district court
is not obligated to hold evidentiary hearings to further develop the factual record."
Roberts v. Marshall, 627 F.3d 768, 773 (9th Cir. 2010), citing Laws v. Lamarque,
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351F.3d919, 924 (9th Cir. 2003) ("[a] petitioner's statement, even if sworn, need
not convince a court that equitable tolling is justified should countervailing
evidence be introduced"). Here, there is ample evidence in the record that
conflicts with Stanfield's assertion that his mental impairment caused his delayed
filing.
First, though Stanfield's prison intake mental health screening suggests that
he has some psychological and cognitive problems, the mental health technician
found that these problems did not warrant further mental health services or
treatment goals. Stanfield's mental status in terms of behavior, consciousness,
memory, and cognition were all found to be within normal range. Stanfield was
further described as "lucid" and "somewhat cooperative." (Doc. 30 at 7.) In fact,
the only "present illness" identified by Stanfield at the time of intake was
"[d]epression since the divorce." (Id. at 3.) Aside from his desire "to understand
himself more," Stanfield reported no complaints to the mental health technician.
(Id.)

Second, the psychological and psychosexual evaluation by Dr. Scolatti also
counters Stanfield's claim that his mental impairment prevented him from timely
filing his § 2254 petition. Like his prison intake screening, the psychological and
psychosexual evaluation reported that Stanfield has some psychological problems.
5

However, Dr. Scolatti emphasized that these problems did not hinder Stanfield's
ability to participate in and understand the legal process:
[Stanfield] is able to protect himself and utilize the legal safeguards
available to him. Overall, Mr. Stanfield does not appear to have any
significant psychological disorders or problems that would
significantly prevent or impair him from participating in his case. He
appears to possess adequate cognitive and emotional abilities to
effectively communicate with his attorney, understand the court
proceedings and appreciate his legal rights and options in his
case ....
(Doc. 9-21 at 21.) Though the prison screening and psychological evaluation took
place prior to the statutory period set for timely filing his § 2254 petition, 1
Stanfield fails to allege any facts that suggest his mental state declined following
these assessments. The findings of these two assessments run counter to
Stanfield's argument that his mental impairment was so severe that it caused his
petition to be untimely filed. Stanfield has failed to show a basis for equitable
tolling.

1

Stanfield's pre-sentence psychological and psychosexual evaluation was issued
Feburary 4, 2008. His prison intake mental health screening was conducted September 30, 2008.
Judge Ostby found, and Stanfield does not dispute, that the statutory period for a timely appeal
was from September 29, 2009, through September 29, 2010. This would mean that only one year
had passed since Stanfield's mental health screening and the start of the period for a timely
appeal. Stanfield alleges no facts suggesting that his psychological condition worsened during
this time period.

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II. Procedural Default

Stanfield next objects to Judge Ostby's finding that he has failed to show
cause for his procedural default. The Court notes that Stanfield does not object to
Judge Ostby's finding that the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception does
not apply to this case because he failed to show that no reasonable juror would
have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in light of the newly discovered
evidence. Instead, Stanfield contends that the exception to procedural default
identified in Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012), should be extended to this
case. The Court disagrees for two reasons.
First, as stated by Judge Ostby, the exception carved out in Martinez for
defaulted claims was squarely aimed at situations where a petitioner asserts a
claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and the claim could not be raised at
an earlier proceeding. Martinez, 13 2 S. Ct. at 1318-1319. Further, other cases
which expand upon the exception identified in Martinez were also directed at
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. See e.g. Nguyen v. Curry, 736 F .3d
1287, 1295 (9th Cir. 2013) (extending the Martinez exception to claims of
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel). Here, Stanfield does not claim
ineffective assistance of counsel. Martinez is inapposite to this case.

7

Second, the Ninth Circuit has rejected a similar argument for extending the
Martinez exception in Hunton v. Sinclair, 732 F.3d 1124, 1126-1127 (9th Cir.
2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1771 (2014). There, a habeas petitioner subject to
procedural default argued that the Martinez exception should be extended to
Brady claims, since both are essential to a fair trial. However, the Ninth Circuit
recognized the limited holding of Martinez and refused to extend the exception to
Brady claims. Like the Ninth Circuit, this Court recognizes the narrow holding of
Martinez and rejects Stanfield's argument that the exception should be extended to
claims of juror bias. As such, Stanfield's claim of juror bias is dismissed as
procedurally defaulted.
Stanfield's arguments with respect to procedural default and timeliness fall
short of "a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. §
2253(a)(2). Accordingly, a certificate of appealability is denied.
There being no clear error in Judge Ostby's remaining Findings and
Recommendation, IT IS ORDERED:
(1) Judge Ostby's Findings and Recommendation (Doc. 41) are ADOPTED
IN FULL.

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(2) Stanfield's petition (Doc. 3) for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.
The Clerk of Court is directed to enter by separate document a judgment in favor
of Respondents and against Stanfield.
(3) A certificate of appealability is DENIED.
DATED this

25./-t,,

day ofFebru

Dana L. Christensen, Chief Juage
United States District Court

9