Sparks v. Doe et al

Filing 37

ORDER DISMISSING CASE. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jeremiah C. Lynch on 11/10/2016. Mailed to Sparks. (TAG, )

FILED
NOV 10 2016
Clef!<, l! S District Court
. IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT c~tMontana
VU lMl\soula
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
BUTTE DIVISION

CV-15-00038-BU-JCL

RICHARD WAYNE SP ARKS,
Plaintiff,

ORDER

vs.
JOHN DOE (RECLASS OFFICER),
SGT. LACIE WILLIAMS, CDO MARK
JOHNSON, SHERIFF ED LESTER,
SGT. WALTER JOHNSON, ANDY
THATCHER, and T.J. CARTER,
Defendants.

On October 14, 2016, this Court issued an Order granting Defendants'
Motion to Compel Plaintiff Richard Sparks to comply with Sections I(A) and
I(B)(l) of the Court's July 22, 2016 Scheduling Order. (Doc. 34.) The Court gave
Sparks until October 28, 2016 to file his disclosure statement and provide
Defendants with copies of all documents, electronically stored information, and
tangible things that may be used in proving or denying any party's claims or
defenses. (Doc. 34; Sch. Ord., Doc. 27 at ~,r(A), I(B)(l)). Sparks was
specifically advised that failure to comply with the Court's Order would result in

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the dismissal of this action with prejudice. (Doc. 34.) See Fed.R. Civ.P. 41 (b);

Malone v. US. Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128 (9th Cir. 1987)(a court may dismiss
an action, with prejudice, for failure to obey a court order).
Based upon Sparks's failure to comply with the Court's July 22, 2016
Scheduling Order (Doc. 27) and the Court's October 14, 2016 Order (Doc. 34),
this matter will be dismissed pursuant to Rule 4l(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
The Court has the inherent power to sua sponte dismiss a case for lack of
prosecution or failure to comply with a court order. Henderson v. Duncan, 779
F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 4l(b); Ferdikv. Bonzelet,
963 F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir. 1992). Dismissal, however, is a harsh penalty and
should be imposed as a sanction only in extreme circumstances. Henderson, 779
F.2d at 1423.
The following factors must be considered before dismissal is imposed as a
sanction for failure to prosecute or failure to comply with a court order: (1) the
public's interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court's need to
manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants/respondents; (4) the
availability of less drastic alternatives; and ( 5) the public policy favoring
disposition of cases on their merits. Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F .3d 639 (9th Cir.
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2002) (citing Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1260-61).
"The public's interest in expeditious resolution of litigation always favors
dismissal." Yourish v. California Amplifier, 191F.3d983, 990 (9th Cir. 1999).
This case was filed over a year ago. It is at a critical stage in that it is the
beginning of the discovery process and Sparks has failed to comply with Court
imposed discovery obligations. This factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
For much the same reasons, the second factor supports dismissal. The Ninth
Circuit has noted that "[i]t is incumbent upon us to preserve the district courts'
power to manage their docket without being subject to the endless vexatious
noncompliance of litigants .... " Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1261. "The trial judge is in
the best position to determine whether the delay in a particular case interferes with
docket management and the public interest." Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d 639 (citing

Yourish, 191F.3d983). The Court must be able to manage its docket. It cannot
do so if Sparks refuses to comply with Court imposed deadlines and discovery
obligations. Therefore, this factor favors dismissal.
The third factor requires the Court to weigh the risk of prejudice to the
Defendants. "To prove prejudice, a defendant must establish that plaintiffs
actions impaired defendant's ability to proceed to trial or threatened to interfere
with the rightful decision of the case." Malone v. United States Postal Service,
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833 F.2d 128, 131 (9th Cir. 1987). Sparks's refusal to litigate this matter makes
prejudice a foregone conclusion. The longer this matter sits, the more prejudice to
Defendants.
The Court has considered and provided less drastic alternatives.
Alternatives may include "allowing further amended complaints, allowing
additional time, or insisting that appellant associate experienced counsel." Nevijel
v. North Coast Life Insurance Co., 651F.2d671, 674 (9th Cir. 1981). Although
less drastic alternatives to dismissal should be considered, the court is not required
to exhaust all such alternatives prior to dismissal. Id. Sparks was made aware of
his disclosure obligations in the Court's July 22, 2016 Scheduling Order. (Doc.
27.) The Court gave Sparks additional time to comply with his disclosure
obligations and warned him about the consequences of not complying with his
disclosure obligations in its Order dated October 14, 2016. Sparks did not
respond. The Court can envision no further alternatives to dismissal.
The last factor weighs against dismissal because public policy favors the
disposition of cases on their merits. Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d 639 (citing Hernandez
v. City ofEl Monte, 138 F.3d 393, 399 (9th Cir. 1998)). But in light of the other
four factors favoring dismissal, the Court finds that this matter should be
dismissed for failure to prosecute and failure to comply with the Court's order.
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Based upon the foregoing, the Court issues the following:

ORDER
1. This matter is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to Rule
41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Clerk of Court shall close this
matter, enter judgment pursuant to Rule 58 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and terminate all pending motions.
2. The Clerk of Court should be directed to have the docket reflect that the
Court certifies pursuant to Rule 24(a)(3)(A) of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure that any appeal of this decision would not be taken in good faith.
DATED this 10th day ofNove

J r miah C. Lynch
ited States Magistrate Judge

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