DiFrancesco v. Bullock et al

Filing 57

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: Plaintiffs' Amended Motion for Class Certification is DENIED. Signed by Judge Sam E Haddon on 1/9/2019. (HEG)

1/9/2019

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
BUTTE DIVISION

MICHAEL DiFRANCESCO and
ASHLEY DAVIS, on behalf of
himself and others similarly situated,

No. CV 17-66-BU-SEH

Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM AND
ORDER

vs.
TIM FOX, in his official capacity as
Attorney General of Montana; SARAH
GARCIA, in her official capacity as
Administrator of the Motor Vehicle
Division; and MICHELE
SNOWBERGER, in her official
capacity as Bureau Chief of the Driver
Services Bureau,
Defendants.

A status conference and hearing on Plaintiffs Motion to Certify Class was
held on October 16, 2018 .1 The Court determined at the hearing to defer address of

'Doc.18.
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the class certification pending supplementation of the record. An Amended
Complaint2 and an Amended Motion to Certify Class were filed. 3 An additional
hearing was held on January 8, 2019. The issue is ripe for resolution.
Background

Plaintiffs claim that the Montana Motor Vehicle Division ("MVD") is
"running a wealth-based driver's license suspension scheme that traps some of the
state's poorest residents in a cycle ofpoverty." 4 The Complaint asserts, inter alia,
that: (1) the MVD automatically and unlawfully suspends the driver's license of
people who owe court-ordered fines, costs, and restitution even if they simply
cannot afford to pay; (2) the suspensions remain imposed until the fine is paid or
waived; and (3) payment ofa $100.00 reinstatement fee before the license can be
reinstated is required unless the fee is waived. 5
The Amended Complaint pleads, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that the Montana
statutory framework violates: (1) Plaintiffs' right of Equal Protection and Due
Process by discriminating based on wealth; (2) Due Process by infringing on

2

Doc. 42.

3

Doc. 43.

4

Doc. 42 at 2.

5

See Doc. 42 at 7. See also MONT. CODE ANN.§§ 61-5-214(1) and 61-5-218 (2018).
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Plaintiffs' right to intrastate travel; (3) Equal Protection by discriminating based
on wealth without a legitimate state purpose; (4) Equal Protection by employing
"extraordinary collection" practices; and (5) procedural Due Process by not
providing an ability-to-pay hearing prior to suspending driver's licenses. 6
Plaintiffs seek: ( 1) a declaratory judgment that the state's practice of
suspending licenses in accordance with Montana law is illegal and
unconstitutional; (2) a preliminary and permanent injunction against Defendants'
continued enforcement of the challenged statutes; (3) an injunction reinstating
Plaintiffs' drivers licenses; and (4) attorneys' fees and costs. 7
Discussion

Plaintiffs have moved for certification of the following class:
All individuals whose Montana driver's licenses are, or
will be, suspended for nonpayment of a fine, cost, or
restitution under Mont. Code Ann.§ 61-5-214(1)(b) and
who were, or will be, unable to afford to pay the fine,
cost, or restitution at the time of suspension. 8
In the alternative, Plaintiffs seek certification of two
subclasses, defined as:

6

See Doc. 42 at 34-36.

7

See Doc. 42 at 37.

8

Doc. 43 at 2.
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(1)
Current Class Members, who will be members of
the class as of the date of certification: All individuals
whose Montana driver's licenses are currently suspended
for nonpayment of a fine, cost, or restitution under Mont.
Code Ann. § 61-5-214(l)(b) and who were unable to
afford to pay the fine, cost, or restitution at the time of
suspension; and
(2) Future Class Members, who will be added to the
class when their claims become ripe: All individuals
whose Montana driver's licenses will be suspended for
nonpayment of a fine, cost, or restitution under Mont.
Code Ann.§ 61-5-214(l)(b) and who are unable to
afford to pay the fine, cost, or restitution at the time of
suspension. 9
Class action certification is governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, under which
courts are vested with broad discretion in determining whether to certify a
10

proposed class. The inquiry must be performed "rigorous[ly]" to enable the Court
to be fully satisfied the case meets all of the certification prerequisites 11 and to
facilitate the principal purpose of allowing a class action to be maintained to
"advance 'the efficiency and economy oflitigation."' 12
Rule 23(a) first requires the plaintiff show that "(l) the class is so numerous

9

Doc. 43 at 2.

10

See Barber v. Hawai'i, 42 F.3d I 185, 1197 (9th Cir. 1994).

11

Gen. Tel. Co. o_{Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982).

12

Falcon, 457 U.S. at 148 (quoting Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 553

(1974)).

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that joinder of [parties] is impracticable; (2) ... questions of law or fact [are]
common to the class; (3) the claims ... are typical of the claims ... of the class;
and (4) the [plaintiff would] fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class. 13 Rule 23(a) also requires that the case fall within one of the categories
identified in Rule 23(6 ). 14
In this case, plaintiffs seek certification of a declaratory and injunctive class
under 23(6)(2) on grounds "the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act
on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or
corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole." 15
Case law also recognizes that in exercising discretion to certify a class action,
courts may take into account considerations not expressly dealt with in Rule 23. 16
One non-rule factor commonly considered is whether, in the first instance, class
certification in certain cases is necessary. 17 In James v. Ball, the 9th Circuit

13

Fed R. Civ. P. 23(a).

14

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b).

15

Doc. 44 at 25.

16

See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1785.2
(3d ed. 2005) (citing authority).
17

See James v. Ball, 613 F.2d 180, 186 (9th Cir. 1979) rev'd on other ground~, 451 U.S.
355 (1981 ). See also CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL. supra note 16 ("the need requirement now
seems well-accepted as an appropriate consideration when certifying a Rule 23(b)(2) action.")
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addressed an analogous issue in an action challenging the constitutionality of an
Arizona statute that denied the right of.non-landowners to vote in certain
elections. 18 Denial of certification was held to be appropriate and within the
"sound discretion of the district court." 19 The court held that "the [injunctive and
declaratory] relief sought will, as a practical matter, produce the same result as
formal class-wide relief. " 20
Here, as in James, all potential class members in this case would benefit
from an injunction issued on behalf of the individually named plaintiffs. 21 Any
judgment implicating the constitutionality of Montana's driver's license
revocation or reinstatement statutes would be binding on all Defendants and to the
benefit of all potential class members. 22
No useful need or purpose is served by certification of Plaintiffs' proposed

18

James, 613 F.2d at 182.

19

James, 613 F.2d at 186.

0

James, 613 F.2d at 186 (citing Craji v. Memphis Light Gas & Water Div., 534 F.2d
684, 686 (6th Cir. 1976)). See also.
'

21

See, e.g., Snake River Farmers' Ass 'n, Inc. v. US. Dept. of Labor, 1991 WL 539566
(D. Idaho 1991); Arnett v. Strayhorn, 515 F. Supp. 2d 690, 698 (W.D. Tex. 2006), aff'd per
curiam, 508 F.3d 1134 (5th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1005 (2008); Mills v. District of
Columbia, 266 F.R.D. 20 (D.D.C. 2010).
22

Plaintiffs' counsel acknowledged at the January 9, 2019, hearing that the injunctive
relief sought would, if granted, apply to all class members.
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class. The costs and complexities associated with maintaining a class action
outweigh the benefits class certification is intended to provide. Class certification
is inappropriate and unnecessary.
ORDERED:
Plaintiffs' Amended Motion for Class Certification is DENIED.
DATED this

_i_tfray of January, 2019.

~Mf:d'"""'l
United States District Judge

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