Cottonwood Environmental Law Center et al v. Edwards et al
Filing
35
ORDER denying 21 Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Signed by Judge Brian Morris on 3/23/2021. (MMS)
Case 2:20-cv-00028-BMM Document 35 Filed 03/23/21 Page 1 of 19
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
BUTTE DIVISION
COTTONWOOD ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW CENTER, MONTANA RIVERS,
and GALLATIN WILDLIFE
ASSOCIATION,
2:20-cv-00028-BU-BMM
ORDER
Plaintiffs,
vs.
RON EDWARDS, in his official
capacity as Manager of the Big Sky Water
and Sewer District; and BIG SKY
WATER AND SEWER DISTRICT,
Defendants.
INTRODUCTION
Cottonwood Environmental Law Center, Montana Rivers, and Gallatin
Wildlife Association (“Plaintiffs”) brought this action against Ron Edwards in his
official capacity as Manager of the Big Sky and Sewer District and Big Sky Water
and Sewer District (collectively, “Big Sky District”). Plaintiffs allege that Big Sky
District violated the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) when they discharged pollutants
into the West Fork of the Gallatin River without a National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) permit. (Doc. 8). Plaintiffs filed a Motion for
Case 2:20-cv-00028-BMM Document 35 Filed 03/23/21 Page 2 of 19
Preliminary Injunction on February 3, 2021. (Doc. 21). The Court held a hearing
on the motion on March 16, 2021. (Doc. 33).
BACKGROUND
Statutory Background
Congress enacted the CWA “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical,
and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). To
accomplish that goal, Congress prohibited the “addition” of any pollutant from a
“point source” to “navigable waters” without a NPDES permit. Id. § 1311(a). The
CWA authorizes the Administrator of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA”) or a delegated state agency to issue a NPDES permit to an entity that
seeks to discharge pollution into navigable waters. See EPA v. California ex rel.
State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 202–03 (1976); Milwaukee v.
Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 310–311 (1981). EPA authorized the Montana Department
of Environmental Quality (“MT DEQ”) to run its own discharge permit system,
known as the Montana Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (“MPDES”).
The CWA discharge prohibition operates primarily through a series of
definitions. The CWA defines “pollutant” broadly to include any solid waste,
sewage, incinerator residue, heat, discarded equipment, sand, as well as industrial,
municipal, and agricultural waste. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6). It further defines a “point
source” as “any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance . . . from which
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pollutants are or may be discharged,” including, for example, any “pipe, ditch,
channel, tunnel, conduit” or “well.” Id. § 1362(14). The CWA defines “discharge
of a pollutant” as “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point
source.” § 1362 (12). Finally, the CWA defines “navigable waters” to encompass
the oft-evasive “waters of the United States.” Id. § 1362(7).
Congress provided citizen plaintiffs with the opportunity to enforce the
CWA. Id. § 1365. CWA citizen plaintiffs must notify defendants and the relevant
federal and state agencies of their intent to sue at least 60 days before filing suit. 33
U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A). “The notice requirement and the 60-day delay are
intended to give government regulators an opportunity to take action, and to give
alleged violators an opportunity to comply with the [CWA].” San Francisco
Baykeeper v. Tosco Corp., 309 F.3d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 2002). A court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction over the citizen suit where a plaintiff fails to provide
adequate notice and must dismiss the action. Nat. Resources Def. Council v. Sw.
Marine, Inc., 236 F.3d 985, 995 (9th Cir. 2000).
Factual Background
Big Sky District provides wastewater and sewer services for the resort
community at Big Sky, Montana. Big Sky District’s service area encompasses over
6,000 acres and includes single-family residences, condominiums and townhouses,
hotels, restaurants, and commercial centers. Big Sky District collects water from
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district water users for treatment at its Water Resources Recovery Facility
(“WRRF”). Big Sky District first constructed a water treatment facility to process
wastewater in the 1970s.
The current WRRF began operations in 1996. The Big Sky community—and
therefore the Big Sky District’s user base—has grown significantly in recent years.
Big Sky District upgraded the WRRF in 2004 to increase its treatment capacity.
MT DEQ noted, however, that the WRRF “is at capacity and does not allow the
District to produce reclaimed effluent of the quality needed for reuse activities.”
(Doc. 23-1 at 3). MT DEQ further opined that the WRRF is “pushed to the limit
during wet-weather and spring run-off conditions . . . resulting in elevated
nitrogen, biological oxygen demand and total suspended solids leaving the
treatment facility.” (Doc. 23-1 at 2–3). Big Sky District recently began the process
to build a new treatment center. That process remains in early stages.
The WRRF treatment process removes debris and grit, treats nitrogen
through aerobic and anaerobic conditioning, filters the water, and finally disinfects
the water. Big Sky District stores the resulting treated effluent in lined holding
ponds at the WRRF. Big Sky District disposes of all its treated effluent through
irrigation—primarily by irrigating the neighboring Meadow Village Golf Course
during the summer months.
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Although wastewater goes through a significant treatment process at the
WRRF, the treated effluent retains many pollutants, including nitrogen. Excess
nitrogen causes algae blooms in rivers and streams that can harm aquatic animal
and plant life. Big Sky District and MT DEQ developed a Nutrient Management
Plan (“NMP”) that governs irrigation of the Meadow Village Golf Course to
ensure that the turf grass and plants along the course take up any nitrogen delivered
through irrigation. (Doc. 22-1 at 11–12, 16, 25). The NMP’s goal remains to
prevent excess nitrogen and other nutrients from leaching into the groundwater and
migrating into surface waters. (Doc. 22-1 at 11, 16, 25). Boyne U.S.A., Inc.
(“Boyne”), the Meadow Village Golf Course owner and operator, is not a party to
the NMP. Rather, Big Sky District solely controls the quality, quantity, and timing
of effluent used in irrigation in compliance with the NMP. Big Sky District also
tracks compliance with the NMP through its operation of lysimeters to monitor
nutrient levels on the Meadow Village Golf Course. (Doc. 22-1 at 19–21).
Plaintiffs allege that Big Sky District over-irrigated the Meadow Valley Golf
Course, and that nitrogen and other pollutants flowed downhill and leached into the
groundwater. This groundwater naturally sits in aquifers beneath Big Sky District’s
lined holding ponds. The groundwater in these aquifers is hydrologically connected
to the West Fork of the Gallatin River. If the groundwater level rises too high, the
groundwater would “float” the holding pond liner. This floating of the holding
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pond liner, in turn, would lead to effluent spillover from the holding pond. Big Sky
District diverts groundwater under its holding ponds into the West Fork of the
Gallatin River using an underdrain pipe system to prevent such spillover.
The West Fork of the Gallatin River flows alongside the WRRF, the treated
effluent holding ponds, and the Meadow Village Golf Course. In 2010, MT DEQ
placed the West Fork of the Gallatin River on its CWA Section 303(d) list of water
quality impaired streams. (Doc. 23-3 at 76 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d))). To
address the water quality issue, in 2010, MT DEQ published a Total Maximum
Daily Load (“TMDL”) and corresponding water quality improvement plan to
clarify the maximum amount of nitrogen that the West Fork of the Gallatin River
could receive and still meet state water quality standards. (Doc. 23-3 at 76–79).
MT DEQ observed that nitrogen levels in the West Fork of the Gallatin River
already exceed that maximum quantity, and that river nitrogen originates from
sources including “improper management of land-applied effluent.” (Doc. 23-3 at
83–86).
Plaintiffs allege that Big Sky District must seek a NPDES permit for the
discharge of nitrogen originating in its holding ponds and entering the West Fork
of the Gallatin River via the underdrain pipe system. The West Fork of the Gallatin
River represents a navigable water. Big Sky District does not currently hold a
NPDES permit to discharge pollutants to the West Fork of the Gallatin River.
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Plaintiffs’ allegations present two questions: whether pollutants originating from
the holding ponds reach the West Fork of the Gallatin River, and whether that path
represents a discharge of pollutants to a navigable water in violation of the CWA.
Legal Standard
The issuance of a preliminary injunction represents an extraordinary remedy
that should not be awarded as a matter of right, but only “upon a clear showing that
the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555
U.S. 7, 22 (2008). A plaintiff who seeks a preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order must establish four elements: 1) that it likely will succeed on the
merits; 2) that it likely will to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary
relief; 3) that the balance of equities tips in its favor; and 4) that an injunction will
serve the public interest. See id. at 20. Courts in the Ninth Circuit apply a sliding
scale approach to preliminary relief. See All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632
F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011).
The reviewing court must balance the elements “so that a stronger showing
of one element may offset a weaker showing of another.” Id. Even “serious
questions going to the merits and a balance of hardships that tips sharply towards
the plaintiff can support issuance of a preliminary injunction, so long as the
plaintiff also shows that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and that the
injunction is in the public interest.” Id. at 1135.
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ANALYSIS
I.
Preliminary Injunction Analysis
Plaintiffs allege that Big Sky District violated the CWA when it discharged
pollutants from its holding ponds via the underdrain pipe system into the West
Fork of the Gallatin River without a NPDES permit. Plaintiffs seeks a preliminary
injunction that would require Big Sky District to take the following actions: 1) stop
connecting any new sewer lines to the district sewer system; 2) cease irrigating the
Meadow Village Golf Course on days not approved by MT DEQ; 3) cease
irrigating the Meadow Village Golf Course with treated effluent that exceeds a
nitrogen concentration of 10 mg/l; and 4) publish daily the nitrogen concentration
of wastewater that is used to irrigate the golf course. (Docs. 22 & 28).
Success on the Merits
Big Sky District argues that Plaintiffs remain unlikely to succeed on the
merits. Big Sky District makes two arguments in particular: 1) that the Court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiffs failed to provide adequate notice of
suit under the CWA; and 2) that Plaintiffs failed to allege a valid CWA violation.
The Court addresses each argument in turn.
Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The CWA requires citizen plaintiffs to notify defendants and the relevant
federal and state agencies of their intent to sue at least 60 days before filing suit. 33
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U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A). “The notice requirement and the 60-day delay are
intended to give government regulators an opportunity to take action, and to give
alleged violators an opportunity to comply with the [CWA].” San Francisco
Baykeeper, 309 F.3d at 1157. A court lacks subject matter jurisdiction where a
plaintiff fails to provide adequate notice to a potential defendant and to the relevant
regulatory bodies. Nat. Resources Def. Council, 236 F.3d at 995.
EPA’s regulations clarify that notice must include “sufficient information to
permit the recipient to identify . . . the activity alleged to constitute a violation.” 40
C.F.R. § 135.3(a). A plaintiff must describe alleged violations of the CWA with
“reasonable specificity.” San Francisco Baykeeper, 309 F.3d at 1158. Proper
notice need not perfectly describe the violation, but rather must adequately provide
“information that allow[s] the defendant to identify and address the alleged
violations, considering defendant’s superior access to information about its own
activities.” Puget Soundkeeper Alliance v. Cruise Terminals of America, 216 F.
Supp. 3d 1198, 1210 n.7 (W.D. Wash. 2015) (quoting Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands
Center v. MacWhorter, 797 F.3d 645, 651 (9th Cir. 2015)).
Plaintiffs sent its notice of intent to sue to Big Sky District, EPA, and MT
DEQ on April 22, 2020. (Doc. 26-2). Plaintiffs’ 60-day notice alleged that the
WWRF holding ponds are “illegally discharging waste water into the West Fork of
the Gallatin River without a permit.” (Doc. 26-2 at 7). The letter included an image
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of the hill face where the Big Sky District’s underdrain pipe system releases
groundwater into the West Fork of the Gallatin River. (Doc. 26-2 at 5). Plaintiffs
sent additionally a supplemental notice of intent to sue on June 9, 2020. (Doc. 26-2
at 11). The supplemental notice included another image of the same underdrain
pipe system, related seepage, results from water quality sample tests, as well as an
indication on a map where Plaintiffs collected those samples. (Doc. 26-2 at 14–18).
Plaintiffs alleged that pollutants from the holding ponds reached the West
Fork of the Gallatin River via the underdrain pipe system. Big Sky District retained
significant knowledge of the hydrology of the area through its development of a
NMP with MT DEQ that specifically centered on the potential seepage of nutrients
from golf course irrigation into the groundwater and the West Fork of the Gallatin
River. (Doc. 22-1 at 11–25). Big Sky District deployed water from its effluent
ponds for irrigation use, controlled the quality and quantity of irrigation water,
tracked nutrient uptake with lysimeters, and controlled and maintained the pipe
diverting groundwater to the West Fork of the Gallatin River pictured in Plaintiffs’
letters. Plaintiffs lacked knowledge of the precise hydrological path of pollutants
from the holding ponds to the underdrain pipe system. Plaintiffs provided adequate
information, however, to put Big Sky District on notice of its alleged violation
based on its superior access to information regarding the hydrology of the area. See
Puget Soundkeeper Alliance, 216 F. Supp. 3d at 1210 n.7 (quoting Klamath
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Siskiyou Wildlands Center, 797 F.3d at 651). Plaintiffs satisfied the CWA notice
requirements. See San Francisco BayKeeper, 309 F.3d at 1158.
Alleged CWA Violation
The CWA prohibits the “addition” of any pollutant from a “point source” to
“navigable waters” without a NPDES permit. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). Plaintiffs
presents several theories in support of its allegation that Big Sky District
discharged pollutants from its holding ponds into the West Fork of the Gallatin
River.
Plaintiffs first argue that the mere movement of the nitrogen and other
pollutants through the underdrain pipe violates the CWA. Plaintiffs cite precedent
indicating that “a point source need not be the original source of the pollutant; it
need only convey the pollutant to ‘navigable waters’” S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v.
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 105 (2004). Plaintiffs fail to recognize,
however, that this precedent requires a showing that such a conveying point source
must connect two otherwise unconnected water bodies. See id. at 112 (remanding
for a finding whether the two water bodies at issue are “meaningfully distinct water
bodies”). The parties agree that the groundwater and the West Fork of the Gallatin
River represent a hydrologically connected water body. It remains unclear from the
factual record that the mere conveyance of pollutants from one part of this
interconnected system to another would violate the CWA.
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Plaintiffs next argue that the groundwater discharged from the pipe itself
constitutes a pollutant. Plaintiffs raise precedent indicating that groundwater itself
constitutes a pollutant. See N. Plains Res. Council v. Fid. Expl. & Dev. Co., 325
F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2003). Plaintiffs fail to recognize, however, that this
precedent relied on the classification of groundwater as a pollutant because the
groundwater constituted “industrial waste”—a useless byproduct of the coal bed
methane extraction process. See id. at 1160–61. It remains unclear from the factual
record that Big Sky District’s diversion of hydrologically connected groundwater
to the West Fork of the Gallatin River to prevent its pond liners from floating
would constitute a similarly useless byproduct of an industrial process.
The U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in Cty. of Maui, Hawaii v. Hawaii
Wildlife Fund provides the most likely legal theory applicable to this case. 140 S.
Ct. 1462 (2020). Plaintiffs argue that Big Sky District discharges pollutants from
its holding ponds into the West Fork of the Gallatin River. The hydrology of the
system at issue does not support a direct discharge theory—rather, the pollutants
allegedly move along the following path: from the ponds, to the golf course, to the
groundwater, and then to the West Fork of the Gallatin River. The Supreme Court
concluded that the CWA prohibits the indirect discharge of pollutants to surface
waters without a NPDES permit if the indirect discharge represents “the functional
equivalent of a direct discharge.” Id. at 1476 (emphasis in original).
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The functional equivalent analysis requires a fact-intensive inquiry of the
discharge at issue. The Supreme Court provided a set of principles for courts
engaging in functional equivalent analysis. See id. at 1477 (comparing such
decisions to the development of common law). The Supreme Court articulated a
non-exclusive list of seven factors for courts to apply in determining whether an
indirect discharge is the “functional equivalent” of a direct discharge:
(1) transit time, (2) distance traveled, (3) the nature of the
material through which the pollutant travels, (4) the extent
to which the pollutant is diluted or chemically changed as
it travels, (5) the amount of pollutant entering the
navigable waters relative to the amount of the pollutant
that leaves the point source, (6) the manner by or area in
which the pollutant enters the navigable waters, (7) the
degree to which the pollution (at that point) has maintained
its specific identity.
Id. at 1476–77. The Supreme Court further advised that “[d]ecisions should not
create serious risks . . . of creating loopholes that undermine the [CWA’s] basic
federal regulatory objectives.” Id. at 1477.
At a basic level, “[w]hether pollutants that arrive at navigable waters after
traveling through groundwater are ‘from’ a point source depends upon how similar
to (or different from) the particular discharge is to a direct discharge.” Id. at 1476.
Plaintiffs’ allegations then raise two questions: whether pollutants originating from
the holding ponds reach the West Fork of the Gallatin River; and whether that path
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represents the functional equivalent of a direct discharge of pollutants to a
navigable water in violation of the CWA.
It appears unlikely that Plaintiffs’ claims will succeed based on the record
presented. The plaintiffs in Maui presented scientific research in the form of tracer
dye studies that showed the path of pollutants from wells used to dispose of treated
effluent, through groundwater, and into the Pacific Ocean. Hawai‘i Wildlife Fund
v. Cty. of Maui, 886 F.3d 737, 742–43 (9th Cir. 2018), vacated and remanded sub
nom. Cty. of Maui, Hawaii v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462, (2020).
Plaintiffs present evidence of elevated nitrogen in the West Fork of the Gallatin
River. The origins of that nitrogen remain unclear from the record presented.
Plaintiffs’ strongest evidence of the hydrological path of pollutants arises
from a combination of the TMDL and NMP. The NMP seeks to prevent excess
nitrogen and other nutrients from leaching into the groundwater and migrating into
surface waters. (Doc. 22-1 at 11, 16, 25). This stated goal and its accompanying
research provides evidence of the hydrological path from the holding ponds, to
irrigation of the golf course, to the groundwater, and finally to the West Fork of the
Gallatin River.
The TMDL presents multiple scientific studies that indicated nitrogen in the
West Fork of the Gallatin River originated from treated effluent. (Doc. 23-3 at
111–12). For example, Montana State University researchers “used land14
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application data (volumes and concentrations of wastewater applied to the golf
course) . . . to model soluble nitrogen [] loading to the subsurface” and the river.
(Doc. 23-3 at 111–12). Researchers using those models estimated that “nitrogen
export from wastewater effluent sources account[] for 61% of instream [nitrogen]
load in the West Fork Gallatin River.” (Doc. 23-3 at 111–12 (citing Kristin K.
Gardner, et al., Quantifying watershed sensitivity to spatially variable N loading
and the relative importance of watershed N retention mechanisms, Water
Resources Research (2011))). In other studies, Montana State University
researchers “utilized isotopic analysis of water quality samples to further evaluate
wastewater loading to the stream.” (Doc. 23-3 at 101). This technique allowed
researchers to distinguish wastewater nitrogen sources from other nitrogen sources.
(Doc. 23-3 at 112). Researchers using those methods estimated that wastewater
nitrogen contributed to 85% of the instream nitrogen load in summer, and 68% of
the nitrogen load in the winter. (Doc. 23-3 at 112 (citing Kristin K. Gardner, et al.,
Seasonality in spatial variability and influence of land use/land cover and
watershed characteristics on stream water nitrate concentrations in a developing
watershed in the Rocky Mountain West, Water Resources Research (2009))).
MT DEQ and Big Sky District implemented the NMP in April 2012 to
prevent nutrients from reaching the West Fork of the Gallatin River. The studies
presented in the TMDL use data from the late 1990s to the mid-2000s—well
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before implementation of the NMP. Plaintiffs have presented samples that show
elevated nitrogen in the West Fork of the Gallatin River and around the alleged
discharge point. Those samples in isolation do not provide evidence for the source
of nitrogen in the groundwater at issue. The samples further fail to provide the kind
of time, distance, and dilution data that the Court would require for its Maui
inquiry. As a result, serious questions remain regarding Plaintiffs’ success on the
merits.
Irreparable Harm
A court may grant a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order to
preserve the status quo pending final determination of an action. See Textile
Unlimited, Inc. v. A. BMH & Co., 240 F.3d 781, 786 (9th Cir. 2001). In
environmental cases, a preliminary injunction can prevent the destruction of
natural resources while the case proceeds. See, e.g., Indigenous Env’t Network v.
U.S. Dep’t of State, 347 F. Supp. 3d 561, 591 (D. Mont. 2018) (enjoining the
construction of the Keystone XL pipeline border-crossing), order amended and
supplemented, 369 F. Supp. 3d 1045 (D. Mont. 2018), and appeal dismissed and
remanded sub nom. Indigenous Env’t Network v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 1836068, 2019 WL 2542756 (9th Cir. June 6, 2019); Sierra Club v. United States
Forest Serv., 843 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding an injunction should have
been granted to prevent logging of giant sequoia redwood forests because the U.S.
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Forest Service failed to complete required environmental analysis); Tenn. Valley
Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (affirming an order enjoining operation of a dam
that would have eradicated the endangered snail darter).
Plaintiffs argue that an injunction proves necessary to prevent harm to the
waters of the West Fork of the Gallatin River. (Doc. 22 at 14–15). Plaintiffs
specifically point to the potential for algal blooms that will impact organization
members who retain aesthetic, conservation, and recreation interests in those
waters. (Doc. 22 at 14–15). Big Sky District argues that such harms do not
represent the kinds of irreparable environmental harms generally contemplated
when a court issues an injunction. (Doc. 26 at 22–24). Big Sky District notes that it
has irrigated the Meadow Village Golf Course using treated effluent with MT DEQ
approval since the 1970s. (Doc. 26 at 22–24). At argument, Big Sky District
represented that irrigation would not commence until May at the earliest.
The irreparable harm factor weighs slightly against Plaintiffs, particularly
considering the factual uncertainty of whether pollutants from the WRRF holdings
ponds reach the West Fork of the Gallatin River. Plaintiffs provide the kind of
member impact statements useful for standing analysis. Those statements fail to
point to the kinds of irreparable harms, however, that would warrant the
“extraordinary and drastic remedy” of injunctive relief. Villegas Lopez v. Brewer,
680 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2012), 680 F.3d at 1072; see also Winter, 555 U.S.
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at 22. Plaintiffs fail to present the irreparable harms that would remain at the West
Fork of the Gallatin River after alleged pollutants wash away.
Balance of Equities and Public Interest
The balance of the equities and public interest prongs present nearly
identical analysis in this case. Big Sky District asserts that a preliminary injunction
would disable its ability to treat wastewater from the Big Sky community because
it could not dispose of its treated effluent. (Doc. 26 at 25–26). Big Sky District
argues, in part, that “the public has a strong interest in the District maintaining a
functional wastewater treatment and sewage system.” (Doc. 26 at 26). Plaintiffs
respond that the public retains a strong interest in preserving the water quality of
the West Fork of the Gallatin River. (Doc. 28 at 14–17). Plaintiffs further argue
that the current water treatment plant is “dysfunctional . . . and poses a risk to the
surface water.” (Doc. 28 at 15). The balance of equities and public interest prongs
fail to tip the scales in either direction.
Weighing the Factors
A preliminary injunction represents an extraordinary remedy, that should not
be awarded as a matter of right, but only “upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is
entitled to such relief.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 22. A preliminary injunction proves
inappropriate based on the record before the Court. Serious questions remain
regarding the success of Plaintiffs’ case. Plaintiffs fail to show irreparable injury.
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And the balance of equities and public interest prove inconclusive. The Court will
deny Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction. (Doc. 21).
ORDER
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that:
Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 21) is DENIED.
Dated the 23rd day of March, 2021.
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