Haagenson v. Colvin

Filing 35

ORDER; Plaintiff's Motion for Attorneys Fees 32 under the EAJA is GRANTED IN FULL, in the amount of $15,917.53. Signed by Judge Brian Morris on 11/15/2016. (TLO, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
GREAT FALLS DIVISION

ROSINA M. HAAGENSON,

CV-13-04-BMM

Plaintiff,
vs.
ORDER ON MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S
FEES UNDER THE EAJA

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Defendant.

This Court, the Magistrate Judge (Judge Johnston), and the Administrative
Law Judge (“ALJ”) all previously denied Haagenson’s application for Social
Security disability benefits (Doc. 24.) The Ninth Circuit then reversed the denial
and remanded to the ALJ for the calculation and award of benefits. (Doc. 30.)
Haagenson, the Plaintiff in this action, filed a motion for attorney’s fees under the
Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”) on September 19, 2016 in the amount of
$15,917.53. (Doc. 32.)
In order to award attorney’s fees under the EAJA, the Court must find that
the government’s decision to deny benefits and the government’s position in
defending the denial were “substantially justified.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The

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government’s position is substantially justified “if it has a reasonable basis in law
and fact.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 566 n.2 (1988).
Haagenson contends that the Ninth Circuit’s remand for an award of benefits
established that the evidence did not support a denial under any appropriate review.
(Doc. 34 at 2.) The Ninth Circuit determined that the ALJ improperly rejected
Haagenson’s pain testimony and the opinion of Haagenson’s nurse provider and
counselor, improperly relied upon a treating physicians’ failure to restrict
Haagenson’s activities, and improperly favored the opinions of two non-treating
state physicians over the opinion of the treating physician. (Doc. 34 at 2-3.)
Haagenson argues that these determinations render the government’s position
unjustifiable.
The government counters that its denial and subsequent litigation position
are substantially justifiable by virtue of the fact that the ALJ, the Magistrate Judge,
and this Court all affirmed the denial. (Doc. 33 at 4.) The government argued that
reasonable minds could and did disagree on the various grounds for reversal. Id.
Haagenson responds, however, by citing a Ninth Circuit decision, Meier v. Colvin,
727 F.3d 867 (9th Cir. 2013), wherein the grounds for reversal of the ALJ’s denial
were similar to the case at issue. The Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court’s
denial of attorney’s fees in Meier and rejected the premise that the District Court’s
prior affirmance of the denial established justifiability. Meier, 727 F.3d at 869.
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The Court finds Meier instructive. The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded
on similar premises to the case at issue, and the Ninth Circuit subsequently
determined that the government’s position was not substantially justified and that
an award of attorney’s fees was required under the EAJA. The government’s
position here similarly fails to meet the substantially justified standard.
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees under the
EAJA is GRANTED IN FULL, in the amount of $15,917.53.
DATED this 15th Day of November, 2016.

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