Compass Airlines v. Montana Department of Labor and Industry, Hearings Bureau
Filing
27
ORDER granting 8 Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Signed by Judge Charles C. Lovell on 12/27/2012. (MKB)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
HELENA DIVISION
*******
COMPASS AIRLINES, LLC
CV 12-105-H-CCL
Plaintiff,
-vMONTANA DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR AND INDUSTRY,
HEARINGS BUREAU,
PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION
ORDER
Defendant,
and
DUSTIN HANKINSON,
Intervenor.
*******
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, filed
pursuant to Rule 65(b), Fed. R. Civ. P. (Doc. 8.) The motion is opposed by
Intervenor Dustin Hankinson, but unopposed by Defendant Montana Department
of Labor and Industry, Hearings Bureau (“ML&I”), which has filed a Notice of
non-appearance and non-opposition to the Motion for Temporary Restraining
Order and Preliminary Injunction. (Doc. 20.) The Motion for Preliminary
Injunction came on for hearing on December 20, 2012. Compass Airlines was
represented at the hearing by Christopher Mangan, Jeffrey Ellis, and David Hayes.
Intervenor Hankinson was represented by Linda Deola and Brian Miller (on brief).
Having considered the arguments of the parties, the Court is prepared to rule on
the motion.
I. Procedural Background.
This case was filed by Compass Airlines on November 15, 2012, as an
action for declaratory judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, and the Court’s
federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. On December 11,
2012, Plaintiff Compass Airlines filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order
and Expedited Preliminary Injunction. The Court granted the temporary
restraining order on December 13, 2012, and set down an expedited hearing on the
preliminary injunction motion that is now before the court. Following the
issuance of the temporary restraining order, the Defendant Montana Department of
Labor & Industry (which is the umbrella agency of the Montana Human Rights
Commission, Hearings Bureau, which was the original named Defendant) filed a
notice of non-appearance and non-opposition to the issuance of either the
temporary restraining order or the preliminary injunction. However, Intervenor
2
Hankinson does object to the motion for preliminary injunction that is now before
the Court.
II. Factual Background.
This case arises from the October 4, 2011, alleged denial of transportation
on a commercial aircraft carrier by a flight attendant employed by Plaintiff
Compass Airlines (operating Delta Connection flight 5820 from Missoula to
Minneapolis/St. Paul). The passenger who was allegedly denied boarding was an
individual with a disability. Mr. Dustin Hankinson was preparing to board the
flight when a flight attendant stopped him because she thought he was bringing a
prohibited Portable Oxygen Concentrator (“POC”) onto the flight. She was twice
wrong, because a POC is permitted and because the device was actually a
ventilator, not a POC. The flight attendant also stated that Mr. Hankinson was
required to present a medical release for the flight, and there, too, she was wrong.
Before the aircraft left the jet bridge, however, a Delta Complaint Resolution
Officer (“CRO”) arrived at the gate (as is required by federal regulations whenever
a disabled passenger is denied boarding), and the CRO was able to correct the
flight attendant’s multiple misunderstandings. Mr. Hankinson was then told he
could board the flight. Mr. Hankinson was upset, and he declined to do so. On
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the same day, Mr. Hankinson filed a complaint with the U.S. Department of
Transportation, alleging a violation of the Air Carrier Access Act (“ACAA”), 49
U.S.C. § 41705, and the implementing regulations promulgated by the U.S.
Department of Transportation (“DOT”), 14 C.F.R. Part 382. The ACAA prohibits
air carriers from discriminating against passengers on the basis of disability, and
requires the Secretary of the Department of Transportation to investigate any
complaints by individuals of disability discrimination, to publish complaint data,
to report annually on such complaints to Congress, and to implement a plan to
provide technical assistance to airlines and individuals with disabilities in
understanding the rights and responsibilities mandated by the ACAA.
In response, Compass apologized by telephone and in writing to Mr.
Hankinson and issued him and his traveling companion vouchers for a free flight.
In addition, Compass Airlines immediately suspended all the crew members
pending its investigation. At the conclusion of that investigation, Compass
terminated both of the flight attendants’ employment and disciplined the pilot
(temporary suspension without pay) for failing to intervene. Compass Airlines
then created a training video, quiz, and questionnaire to teach its employees how
to recognize medical devices and how to interact respectfully with passengers with
disabilities. All 417 Compass Airlines flight attendants have now completed this
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training, and the training is currently being presented at annual pilot training
classes.
In response to Mr. Hankinson’s informal complaint, DOT investigated the
incident and gave notice to the parties of its findings and conclusions. DOT
issued a letter of warning to Compass Airlines.
Mr. Hankinson then filed a complaint with the Montana Human Rights
Bureau (“MHRB”) alleging a violation of the Montana Human Rights Act
(“MHRA”) based on the same incident. Plaintiff notes that Mr. Hankinson is a
Montana Human Rights Commission Member, one of five individuals appointed
by Montana’s Governor to review the decisions of the MHRB.
The DOT has promulgated detailed and expansive regulations pursuant to
its authority under the Federal Aviation Act (“FAA”), 49 U.S.C. § 40103, and the
ACAA. Specifically, under 14 C.F.R. § 382.1-.159 (“Nondiscrimination on the
basis of disability in air travel”), the Secretary has promulgated 159 regulations to
carry out the ACAA.
Multiple federal regulations are relevant to the October 4, 2011 incident
wherein Mr. Hankinson was challenged during the boarding process. One of the
regulations specifically addresses electronic respiratory devices utilized by
passengers during flights, and it states “you must permit any individual with a
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disability to use in the passenger cabin during air transportation, a ventilator,
respirator, continuous positive airway pressure machine, or an FAA-approved
portable oxygen concentrator (POC). . . .” 14 C.F.R. § 382.133. Also, a carrier
“must not require a passenger with a disability to have a medical certificate as a
condition for being provided transportation.” 14 C.F.R. § 382.23(a). However, a
carrier “may require a medical certificate for a passenger with a disability–(i) who
is traveling in a stretcher or incubator; [or] (ii) who needs medical oxygen during a
flight. . . .” 14 C.F.R. § 382.23(b). A carrier may actually refuse to provide
transportation on the basis of disability under certain specified circumstances. 14
C.F.R. § 382.19. If the carrier’s actions are inconsistent with subpart B of the
regulations (“Nondiscrimination and Access to Services and Information”), the
carrier is made subject to a DOT enforcement action pursuant to subpart K of the
regulations. 14 C.F.R. § 382.19(c)(4).
The initial phase of an enforcement action under the ACAA requires the
carrier to respond in writing to a disability complaint within 30 days of its receipt,
and the response must admit or deny whether the violation occurred. 14 C.F.R.
§ 382.155(d). If the violation is admitted, the carrier must provide to the
complainant a written statement of the facts and the steps to be taken by the carrier
in response to the violation. 14 C.F.R. § 382.155(d)(1). That statement must also
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“inform the complainant of his or her right to pursue DOT enforcement action
under this part.” 14 C.F.R. § 382.155(d)(3). A formal complaint may be filed
with the DOT to obtain a full evidentiary hearing, 14 C.F.R. § 382.159(b), and an
adverse decision by the Secretary or the Administrator of the FAA may be
appealed to the court of appeals where the complainant resides. See 49 U.S.C.
§46110.
III. Legal Standard.
“‘A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely
to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence
of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an
injunction is in the public interest.’” Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, 645 F.3d
1109, 1115 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Winter v. Natural Resource Def. Council, Inc.,
555 U.S. 7, 24-25 (2008)).
Generally, this is an action for declaratory judgment. “In a case of actual
controversy within its jurisdiction . . .any court of the United States, upon the
filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations
of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or
could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final
judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a).
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The party seeking declaratory judgment must show an actual controversy
regarding a matter within federal court subject matter jurisdiction. See Calderon
v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740, 745, 118 S.Ct. 1694, 1698 (1998). A private party may
seek declaratory and injunctive relief against state action on the basis of federal
preemption where a federal right exists. Bernhardt v. Los Angeles County, 339
F.3d 920, 929 (9th Cir. 2003). Although the Declaratory Judgment Act creates a
federal remedy, it does not provide an independent basis for federal jurisdiction.
Subject matter jurisdiction must be founded upon parties of diverse citizenship or
“arise under” federal law. In this case, the Complaint is between parties of diverse
citizenship but founded upon federal law (the Air Carrier Access Act of 1986, as
amended). In this case, Intervenor Hankinson apparently asserts that at least some
of his underlying claims arise under the ACAA (see Doc. 15), and therefore it is
clear that this action arises under federal law.1 Plaintiff Compass Airlines seeks a
declaratory judgment that the ACAA has completely preempted the field raised by
Intervenor’s underlying claims and has displaced all state law remedies that
Intervenor could seek. If Plaintiff is correct (that the pertinent field raised by
1
Intervenor Hankinson states that “All Dustin is arguing in his complaint [filed in the
Montana Human Rights Bureau] is that Compass violated the ACAA in its treatment of him, and
that such violation is actionable under the MHRA. Dustin will use the federal standard of care
imposed by the ACAA and DOT.” (Doc. 15 at 6-7.)
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Intervenor’s underlying claims is completely preempted by federal law), then the
claims asserted by Intervenor must be treated as federal claims, even if pleaded in
the underlying case as arising under state law.
IV. Discussion.
The substantial regulations promulgated by the DOT regarding the use of
electronic respiratory devices by passengers of commercial air carriers are
detailed, unambiguous, and expansive. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of
Handicap in Air Travel, 55 Fed. Reg. 8008, 8014 (Mar. 6, 1990) (“interested
parties should be on notice that there is a strong likelihood that state action on
matters covered by this rule will be regarded as preempted.”). Such pervasive
regulation of a subject area may well give rise to field preemption and federal
jurisdiction to the exclusion of state law claims.
Although the ACAA contains no express preemption provision, Congress
may express its intent to preempt state law by implication through the structure
and purpose of its law. See Martin ex rel. Heckman v. Midwest Express Holdings,
Inc., 555 F.3d 806, 809 (9th Cir. 2009) (addressing implied preemption of claims
under pervasive regulations of Federal Aviation Act). The Ninth Circuit has not
addressed whether the ACAA impliedly preempts state law claims, but generally
9
district courts within the Ninth Circuit have so found when pervasive federal
regulations govern the controversy. See Edick v. Allegiant Air, LLC, 2012 WL
1463580 (D. Nev. Apr. 27, 2012); Russell v. Skywest Airlines, Inc., 2010 WL
2867123 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2010); Johnson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 2010 WL
5564629 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2010).
Implied preemption may be the result of either a direct conflict with a state
law that stands as an obstacle to a federal law, or it may be the result of a field
preemption. “Implied preemption exists when federal law so thoroughly occupies
a legislative field as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room
for the States to supplement it. Thus, field preemption occurs when Congress
indicates in some manner an intent to occupy a given field to the exclusion of state
law.” Id. (internal citations omitted). In this case, Compass Airlines asserts that
regulations relating to electronic respiratory devices constitute a pervasive
regulation of a very narrow field, such that leads to the conclusion that Congress
left no room for supplementation by state law.
Intervenor Hankinson argues that this case is like that of Summers v. Delta
Airlines, Inc., 805 F.Supp.2d 874 (N.D. Cal. April 4, 2011), and he promises that,
relying on Summers, he will use the federal standard of care in pursuing his claim
in state administrative proceedings under the MHRA. Intervenor cites Summers
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footnote 6 for the proposition that state law claims can co-exist with the ACAA as
long as the state law claim uses the same standard of care as that required by
federal law (the ACAA). In this case, wherein the air carrier has already admitted
violating ACAA regulations during the DOT civil enforcement proceeding,
Intervenor’s legal theory would permit him to take the per se violation and collect
damages for it either in the state administrative proceeding or in state court. The
Summers case discusses this possibility in footnote 6, disapproving of the district
court decision in Gilstrap that finds such state proceedings to be in conflict with
the DOT civil enforcement proceeding and therefore preempted. See Gilstrap v.
United Air Lines, Inc., No. 2:10-cv-06131-JHN-JCx (C.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2011)
(finding no private right of action under ACAA and finding state claims under
ACAA preempted).
However, the Summers footnote 6 was dicta only. The actual holdings of
Summers were that (1) the airline passenger’s negligence claim for failure to
provide her assistance in deplaning was preempted by the ACAA, and (2) the
airline passenger’s negligence claim for failure to warn of and cure dangerous
conditions was not preempted by the ACAA because no federal regulation
addressed this latter claim. In fact, the latter negligence claim had little or
nothing to do with disability discrimination and was actually a typical tort
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sounding in negligence and alleging severe physical injuries. The most significant
part of the first holding (the preempted ACAA claim) was that “Plaintiff’s claims
are preempted by the ACAA and cannot be amended to cure the deficiency.”
Summers, 805 F.Supp.2d at 887.
Bernice Summers, an 84-year-old woman who suffered numerous physical
limitations, complained that Delta personnel did not provide her with a wheel
chair or assistance in exiting the plane. This claim, which was framed by the
plaintiff as a state negligence claim, was found to be preempted by the ACAA due
to the numerous and pervasive regulations governing the provision of assistance to
passengers with disabilities. As stated above, the Summers court ruled that such
preempted claims “cannot be amended to cure the deficiency.” Summers, 805
F.Supp.2d at 887. It is unsurprising that the Summers case never even discusses
whether the plaintiff has a private right of action under the ACAA, because not
only is Summers’ first claim a state law claim, but all of her claims are alleged
under various state laws in a federal diversity jurisdiction context. Thus, the
district court did not have an ACAA claim pending with which to consider an
implied private right of action, although it seems significant that the district court
would not permit the plaintiff to amend her state law claim to present it as an
ACAA claim.
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Factually, Summers’ second claim arose when she encountered a gap
between the plane’s door and a raised platform, she tripped on the gap, and she fell
onto the platform, seriously injuring her leg and hip so as to require surgery and
weeks in the hospital. No ACAA regulation (or any other regulation) applied to
these allegations of negligence (failure to warn of or cure dangerous condition on
premises). Therefore, the Summers court found that this claim, which was clearly
a state law negligence claim, was not preempted by the ACAA and was properly
alleged pursuant to state law.
All courts agree that there is no express private right of action pursuant to
the ACAA. Although the question of an implied private right of action under the
ACAA is not addressed in the Summers case, numerous courts in the Ninth Circuit
have directly addressed whether an implied private right of action exists under the
ACAA. Recently, for example, in Segalman v. Southwest Airlines, 2012 WL
5289308 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2012), a district court of this circuit concluded that “it
appears that Congress did not intend for the courts to find an implied private right
of action; therefore, this Court declines to find a private right of action in the
ACAA.” Segalman, slip op. at *5 (citing Lopez v. Jet Blue Airways, 662 F.3d 593
(2d Cir. 2011) (same); Boswell v. Skywest Airlines, Inc., 361 F.3d 1263 (10th Cir.
2004) (same); Love v. Delta Air Lines, 310 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2002) (same)); but
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see Shinault v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 936 F.2d 796, 800 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that
ACAA allows damage remedies); Tallarico v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 881
F.2d 566, 570 (8th Cir. 1989) (finding private right of action consistent with
purposes of ACAA).
Significantly, after the Shinault and Tallarico cases were decided, Congress
amended the ACAA in 2000 to add the DOT civil enforcement action provisions.
These amendments have been interpreted by federal courts as an indicator that
Congress did not intend a private right of action under the ACAA. In addition, as
Segalman noted, after the Fifth and Eighth Circuits found a private right of action
under the ACAA, the Supreme Court in Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 121
S.Ct. 1511, 149 L.Ed.2d 517 (2001), “narrowed the authority of courts to find
implied rights of action in statutes that do not expressly create a private cause of
action. . . .” Segalman, slip op. at *4. Pre-amendment cases such as Shinault and
Tallarico, must therefore also be read in the post-Sandoval context, which
provided that “absent a showing of congressional intent, ‘a cause of action does
not exist and courts may not create one, no matter how desirable that might be as a
policy matter, or how compatible with the statute.’” Segalman, slip op. at *5
(quoting Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286-87).
When Congress added the DOT civil enforcement provisions to the ACAA,
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it certainly gave no indication thereby that it intended to create a separate implied
right of action. There is a strong argument to be made that the opposite is true,
and that a subsequent state claim premised upon violation of the ACAA regulation
serves as an impediment and obstacle to the purposes of the DOT’s enforcement
action. (Such was the basis of the finding of conflict preemption in Gilstrap v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 2011 WL 8318395, slip op. at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2011)
(quoting ERISA preemption case for proposition that conflict preemption applies
when ‘state-law cause of action . . . duplicates, supplements, or supplants the . . .
civil enforcement remedy [and] conflicts with the clear congressional intent to
make the . . . remedy exclusive and is therefore pre-empted.”).) This is especially
true when the DOT enforcement action has obtained an admission of violation by
the air carrier and has resulted in immediate retraining of the air carrier’s
personnel. It is not hard to imagine that if such DOT enforcement actions were
routinely followed by state cases charging the same violation, the adversarial
element would be inserted into the process so that the DOT enforcement actions
would no longer be resolved quickly, would not obtain admissions by air carriers,
and would not result in the undertaking of immediate corrective measures by the
air carriers.
During argument, counsel for Intervenor attempted to rescue Intervenor’s
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state claim under the MHRA by stating that there is still something that remains
after the ACAA claims are set aside. What remains is Intervenor’s claim for
emotional distress caused when the flight attendant denied him access to the
aircraft due to the suspected POC, because she “had a hostile and demeaning
attitude towards me, did not look at me while speaking to me, did not inquire
about my health or safety, made no efforts to check with airlines to see if I
required any clearance.” (Hankinson Charging Complaint to MHRB, Doc. 1-2 at
2, ¶ II.f.) The Charging Complaint further explains that “at no time did the flight
attendant or captain of the airplane come and inform me that I was welcome to
board the plane. At no time did any of the personnel who committed the
discrimination express regret or acknowledge the discriminatory nature of their
conduct.” (Hankinson Charging Complaint to MHRB, Doc. 1-2 at 3, ¶ Ik.) This
lack of concern and discriminatory intent is emphasized repeatedly by Intervenor’s
Charging Complaint, but in each instance, the actual discrimination identified by
Intervenor is the violation of ACAA regulation. Intervenor’s complaint makes
clear that all his allegations of emotional distress are all connected to and
predicated upon the disability discrimination reflected in the violation of ACAA
regulation. Thus, any state claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress, as
suggested by Intervenor’s counsel at argument, would be a derivative claim
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predicated upon the ACAA violation. Such a derivative claim must also be
preempted along with the main ACAA claims, or else such an exception would
swallow the preemption whole. Because Intervenor makes no factual allegation
that does not also arise out of the alleged violation of ACAA regulation, any state
law claim that he could present on these facts would be derivative of the central
ACAA disability discrimination claim, which is itself most likely preempted.
Because this Court concludes both that Intervenor’s state claims are
preempted by the pertinent, pervasive regulations of the ACAA and also that there
is no implied private right of action under the ACAA, Plaintiff Compass Airlines
has made a strong showing of success on the merits of its case. The Court is
persuaded that the first preliminary injunction factor is met because Compass
Airlines shows a likelihood of success on the merits of its preemption argument.
In granting the temporary restraining order, the Court conceded that the next
prong is somewhat less convincing. Plaintiff argues that it is at risk of immediate
and irreparable harm if the MHRB (or the Department of Labor & Industry,
Hearings Bureau) is permitted to proceed with Mr. Hankinson’s discrimination
complaint. Indeed, Plaintiff is facing discovery requests and a deposition in the
state administrative proceeding, in which Mr. Hankinson has filed for a default
judgment for Plaintiff’s failure to file a prehearing statement. Clearly the state
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administrative proceedings will go forward absent an injunction in this case.
Given the strength of the likelihood of Plaintiff’s success on the merits and the
fact that Plaintiff is currently facing a potential default judgment in the
administrative proceedings, the Court finds that Plaintiff has met the prong
requiring it to show a likelihood of irreparable injury if the state administrative
proceedings are not enjoined. The threat is thus likely and immediate, and the
harm of being forced to defend in a proceeding by administrative agency lacking
jurisdiction over the matter may not be remedied by monetary damages.
The third prong, balance of the equities, favors Plaintiff Compass Airlines.
If the declaratory judgment sought by Plaintiff is subsequently denied, Mr.
Hankinson’s position will be unchanged (after a minor delay). Being required to
appear and defend a preempted federal claim in a state administrative proceedings,
however, might cause Plaintiff Compass Airlines to lose the protection of a federal
law to which it may be entitled. The hardship thus tips in Plaintiff’s favor. See
also Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 112 S.Ct. 2031, 119
L.Ed.2d 157 (1992) (noting Hobson’s choice of violating the state law or obeying
the state law during pendency of state proceedings).
The fourth prong, the public interest analysis, causes the Court to consider
the important governmental purpose of discouraging all forms of prohibited
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discrimination under the Montana Human Rights Act. This is a difficult case
because it is clear that Intervenor was distressed by the violation of federal
regulations and because there appears to be no compensatory scheme to address
his distress. Nevertheless, the ultimate goal of Congress of discouraging disability
discrimination in commercial air transportation has been furthered by the
retraining of the Compass Airlines flight staff and pilots. Additionally, the Court
must consider the public interest requirement that the rule of law not be violated
and the Supremacy Clause preserved in a case of conflicting state and federal
jurisdiction. See Am. Trucking Ass’n v. City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 105960 (9th Cir. 2009) (in a case finding preemption of local regulations by federal
motor carrier transportation regulations and considering the public interest to be
represented by “the Constitution’s declaration that federal law is to be supreme”).
Essentially, it is in the public interest to avoid constitutional violation. It is also in
the public interest to uphold the decisions of Congress. See, e.g., Am. Trucking
Ass’n, 559 F.3d at 1059-60 (balancing the public interest embodied in the local
law “against the public interest represented in Congress’ decision to deregulate the
motor carrier industry....”). It is further in the public interest to uphold the
uniformity of federal law as it pertains to safety in air travel (the federal regulation
of personal electronic respiratory devices used by passengers being one narrow
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aspect of safety in air travel) and to promote the purposes of the ACAA’s civil
enforcement scheme.
It appears likely that this Court will find ultimately that Intervenor
Hankinson’s complaint of disability discrimination pursuant to the MHRA is
preempted by the ACAA and its regulations. It is also likely that this Court will
ultimately find that there is no implied private right of action for violations of the
ACAA’s regulations as to the utilization of electronic respiratory devices by
passengers during flights. Finally, it appears likely that this Court will find that
none of Intervenor’s state claims can survive the preemption.
IV. Conclusion.
The Court concludes that Plaintiff has clearly demonstrated a likelihood of
success on the merits, a threat of imminent and irreparable harm, the balance of
equities tipping in its favor, and a furtherance of the public interest, all in support
of the granting of a preliminary injunction. Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Expedited
Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 8) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED that within 20 days the parties shall
convene an attorney conference for the purpose of proposing a schedule for final
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disposition of the case. The parties shall promptly thereafter submit a proposed
schedule or notify the Court that a scheduling conference with the Court is
required.
DONE and DATED this 27th day of December, 2012.
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