Goldsmith v. Lewis and Clark County et al

Filing 60

ORDER denying 42 Motion for Protective Order; denying 55 Motion for Access to Legal Materials. Signed by Magistrate Judge Keith Strong on 9/5/2014. Mailed to Goldsmith. (TAG, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
HELENA DIVISION
DARREN DEE GOLDSMITH, SR.,

CV 13-0051-H-DWM-RKS

Plaintiff,
vs.

ORDER

LEO DUTTON and BENEFIS SPECTRUM
MEDICAL, INC.,
Defendants.
Synopsis
Plaintiff Darren Goldsmith has filed a Response to Spectrum’s Request for
Production of Documents (which has been construed as a motion for protective
order) (Doc. 42) and a Motion for Access to Legal Materials (Doc. 55). Mr.
Goldsmith failed to comply with Local Rules 7.1 and 26 and his motions lack
merit. The motions will be denied.
Mr. Goldsmith also filed a Motion for Issuance of Subpoenas (Doc. 43).
Because he has since withdrawn the motion (Doc. 59), it will not be addressed in
this Order.
Jurisdiction
Mr. Goldsmith’s Complaint presents a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, giving

1

rise to federal question jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The case is assigned to
District Court Judge Donald Molloy and was referred to this Court for pretrial
proceedings. See L.R. 72.2(a)(1).
Analysis
Federal and Local Rules
Mr. Goldsmith’s motions should be dismissed for failure to comply with the
Court’s Local Rules. Local Rule 7.1(c)(1) provides that “[t]he text of the motion
must state that other parties have been contacted and state whether any party
objects to the motion.” Mr. Goldsmith’s motions do not indicate that he contacted
opposing counsel prior to filing his motions.
Additionally, Mr. Goldsmith seeks a protective order which requires a
“certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer
with the other affected parties in an effort to resolve the dispute without court
action.” Fed.R.Civ. P. 26(c).
Mr. Goldsmith received these rules with the Court’s May 5, 2014
Scheduling Order (Doc. 23). He has blatantly failed to comply with them. Any
future motions filed without first complying with these rules will be summarily
denied.

2

Response to Spectrum’s Request for Production of Documents
Mr. Goldsmith’s Response to Spectrum’s Request for Production of
Documents has been construed as a motion for a protective order. Under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1), “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense.” “Relevant
information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1).
But the right to access information is not absolute, and “[t]he court may, for good
cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment,
oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c)(1). “The party
opposing disclosure has the burden of proving ‘good cause,’ which requires a
showing ‘that specific prejudice or harm will result’ if the protective order is not
granted.” In re Catholic Archbishop of Portland Oregon, 661 F.3d 417, 424 (9th
Cir. 2011) (quoting Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1130
(9th Cir. 2003)).
Mr. Goldsmith alleges that on June 27, 2014, Defendant Dutton submitted
requests for the production of documents to Defendant Spectrum seeking “all
information in your possession regarding plaintiff.” Mr. Goldsmith submits that
some of this information may be federally protected under HIPPA and/or other
3

privacy laws. He alleges the documents are highly confidential and are mostly
Department of Veteran Affairs medical records that are, for the most part, not
relevant to the case at hand. (Doc. 42 at 1.) He also alleges that Defendant Dutton
did not particularly describe the information sought in violation of Rule
34(b)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Mr. Goldsmith includes
allegations that jail deputies seized several hundred pages of private V.A. medical
records which they turned over to Spectrum. He objects to Spectrum providing
copies of those records back to the jail.
Defendants argue that Sheriff Dutton is entitled to Mr. Goldsmith’s medical
records because (1) pursuant to the contract between Spectrum and LCCDC, any
records acquired by Spectrum while treating inmates at the detention center are the
property of Lewis and Clark County; (2) HIPAA to the extent it applies, allows a
provider to use or disclose protected health information for purposes of litigation
as part of its health care operations; (3) Mr. Goldsmith’s medical conditions are at
issue, and therefore, his medical records are relevant and discoverable; and (4) Mr.
Goldsmith cannot assert a new cause of action regarding Spectrum’s allegedly
improper receipt and retention of his medical records. (Doc. 45.)
As Mr. Goldsmith has put his medical conditions at issue in this lawsuit, his
medical records in the possession of Spectrum Medical are relevant and
4

discoverable. The records are not privileged as there is no physician-patient
privilege recognized under federal common law or in the Ninth Circuit. In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 801 F.2d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 1986).
Defendants are correct that HIPAA, to the extent it applies, allows for
disclosure of medical records for the purposes of litigation. HIPAA permits
disclosure of protected health information in judicial proceedings in response to
subpoenas or discovery requests if there is a protective order that both prohibits the
parties from using or disclosing the protected health information for any purpose
other than the litigation and requires the return or destruction of the protected
health information at the end of the litigation or proceeding. 45 C.F.R. §
164.512(e)(1)(ii), (v). Spectrum represents that they have entered into a
Stipulation with Sheriff Dutton that prohibits the use or disclosure of Mr.
Goldsmith’s medical records for any purpose other than this litigation, and requires
Sheriff Dutton to destroy or return to Spectrum any medical records received from
Spectrum at the conclusion of this litigation. (Spectrum’s Response, Doc. 45 at 12,
n.2.) Thus, to the extent HIPAA applies, the parties have complied by entering
into an appropriate stipulation.
Mr. Goldsmith cannot claim he has been denied proper medical care and not
expect his medical records to be discoverable. Whether or not the records were
5

improperly obtained is not the proper subject for a motion for protective order.
Mr. Goldsmith’s motion for a protective order is denied.
Motion for Access to Pro Se Legal Documents
Mr. Goldsmith’s last motion seeks a Court order granting access to “pro se
legal documents.” Mr. Goldsmith indicates that some of his case materials were
lost in his transfer to the Gallatin County Jail from the Lewis and Clark County
Detention Facility and to the Missoula Assessment and Sanction Center (MASC).
He also indicates that he is having difficulties obtaining an “indigent pro se
supplies kit.”1
The United States Supreme Court has cautioned federal courts not to
interfere with the day-to-day operations of the prisons, a task which is best left to
prison officials who have particular experience in dealing with prisons and
prisoners. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 8486, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64
(1987); Wright v. Rushen, 642 F.2d 1129, 1132 (9th Cir. 1981) (courts should
avoid enmeshing themselves in minutiae of prison operations). The Court will not
interfere in this aspect of prison administration. If Mr. Goldsmith is being denied
access to the courts as a result of the facility’s regulations, that is the subject of

1

Mr. Goldsmith indicates in his reply brief that he has now obtained his copy
of the Court’s Scheduling Order. (Reply, Doc. 58 at 9.)
6

another lawsuit.
It is ORDERED:
1. Mr. Goldsmith’s Motion for Protective Order (Doc. 42) is denied.
2. Mr. Goldsmith’s Motion for Access to Legal Materials (Doc. 55) is
denied.
3. At all times during the pendency of this action, Mr. Goldsmith shall
immediately advise the Court and opposing counsel of any change of address and
its effective date. Failure to file a notice of change of address may result in the
dismissal of the action for failure to prosecute pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b).
DATED this 5th day of September, 2014.
/s/ Keith Strong
Keith Strong
United States Magistrate Judge

7