Smith v. State of Montana et al

Filing 67

ORDER ADOPTING 65 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS in full; denying 35 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 37 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 39 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 41 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Dana L. Christensen on 8/11/2016. Mailed to Smith. (TAG, )

FILED
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
HELENA DIVISION

AUG 11 2016
Cle~. y.s D~trict Court
District_ Of Montana
Missoula

CV 14-62-H-DLC-JTJ

BENJAMIN KARL SMITH,
Plaintiff,

ORDER
vs.
WARDENKIRKEGARD, SGT.
POSTMA, OFFICER DAVID AUGUST
(BOGUT), and CAPTAIN SCOTT
CLARK,
Defendants.
United States Magistrate Judge John T. Johnston entered findings and
recommendations in this case on May 3, 2016, recommending that: (1) Defendant
David August's ("August") motion for summary judgment be denied; (2)
Defendant Scott Clark's motion for summary judgment be granted; (3) Defendant
Kirkegard's motion for summary judgment be granted; and (4) Defendant Sgt.
Postma's ("Postma") motion for summary judgment be denied. Defendants
August and Postma filed objections to the findings and recommendations on May
20, 2016, and so are entitled to de novo review of those findings and
recommendations to which they specifically object. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1 )(C).
This Court reviews for clear error those findings and recommendations to which
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no party objects. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Commodore Bus. Mach., Inc.,
656 F.2d 1309, 1313 (9th Cir. 1981); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985).
"Clear error exists if the Court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed." United States v. Syrax, 235 F.3d 422, 427 (9th Cir.
2000). For the reasons explained below, the Court adopts Judge Johnston's
findings and recommendations in full.
This case stems from Smith's alleged mistreatment by staff at Montana State
Prison. Smith claims that, during the Ramadan holiday in 2014, August made
offensive and threatening remarks with respect to Smith's race and Muslim
religious beliefs, and refused to release him for a morning meal. Smith also claims
that during the same time Postma searched one of his meals with bare hands
within Smith's view, and refused to provide him with a replacement meal.
Together, Smith contends, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that these actions burden
the free exercise of his Muslim religious beliefs, in violation of the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Defendants filed motions for
summary judgment with respect to these claims on December 11, 2015. Smith
acknowledged that Defendants Kirkegard's and Clark's motions should be
granted, but opposed August's and Postma's motions.
In his May 3, 2016 findings and recommendations, Judge Johnston
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concluded that fact questions precluded summary judgment in favor of August and
Postma, and recommended that this Court deny their motions accordingly. Judge
Johnston first noted that, to maintain a free exercise claim, Smith must show that
Defendants' actions substantially burdened the exercise of his sincerely held
religious beliefs. See Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023, 1031 (9th Cir. 2015). As
to the sincerity of his beliefs, Judge Johnston found that neither Smith's alleged
consumption of a bacon cheeseburger on one occasion nor his disciplinary record
establish that, as a matter of law, Smith's beliefs are not sincerely held. As to
whether the defendants' actions substantially burdened Smith's exercise of those
beliefs, Judge Johnston concluded that the individual allegations against August
and Postma-which both defendants dispute-could be viewed as putting pressure
on Smith to forego his Muslim beliefs. This is especially so when viewing the
cumulative impact of the defendants' actions, as well as their timing during what
is an important month for practitioners of the Muslim faith. Ultimately, Judge
Johnston recommended denying August's and Postma's motions for summary
judgment because "[t]he material facts of this case are highly disputed and
supported by conflicting evidence," and because the defendants' "individual
actions considered together could establish that[] Smith's observance of Ramadan
was substantially burdened." (Doc. 65 at 14.)
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In their objections, August and Postma focus primarily on what they claim
was Judge Johnston's inappropriate transposition of the legal standard governing
claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
("RLUIPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq., onto Smith's§ 1983 free exercise
claims. August and Postma contend that, because RLUIPA specifically authorizes
suits against "a government," viewing the actions of multiple official-capacity
defendants in the aggregate may be appropriate in cases governed by RLUIPA.
They argue that under§ 1983, however, "each defendant must personally
participate in [an] alleged deprivation," meaning that an individual defendant
cannot be held liable for the actions of his co-defendants unless he affirmatively
participates in or in some way ratifies those actions. (Doc. 66 at 5 (citing Jones v.

Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002).) Thus, August and Postma claim that
their actions cannot be combined to rise to the level of a substantial burden, nor do
their actions rise to that level individually.
The defendants' arguments on this issue are unavailing. While the cases
August and Postma cite in their objections do support the notion that there must be
a causal connection between a § 1983 plaintiffs alleged harms and a defendant's
actions, each case approaches this idea from the perspective of respondeat
superior. See Lemire v. Cal. Dep 't of Corr. & Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074-75
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(9th Cir. 2013) ("A prison official in a supervisory position may be held liable
under§ 1983, however, ifhe or she was personally involved in the constitutional
deprivation or a sufficient causal connection exists between the supervisor's
unlawful conduct and the constitutional violation.") (emphasis added and citations
omitted); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 2011); Johnson v.

Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 742-44 (9th Cir. 1978) (examining a sherifrs liability for the
actions of a parole-related committee whose members the sheriff appointed). The
exception amongst the defendants' citations is Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930,
934 (9th Cir. 2002), wherein the court found that a so-called "team liability"
theory only holds water in a § 1983 case when the plaintiff nevertheless shows
each defendant's "individual participation in the unlawful conduct." Be that as it
may, August and Postma fail to recognize that Judge Johnston, parsing openly
disputed facts, specifically found that their actions on an individual level could be
viewed as imposing a substantial burden on Smith's free exercise. The bottom
line is that Judge Johnston concluded, and this Court agrees, that each of the
alleged acts could represent a substantial burden on Smith's free exercise, and
viewing the acts in totality simply highlights the burden.
Finding no clear error in the remainder of Judge Johnston's analysis,
IT IS ORDERED that the findings and recommendations (Doc. 65) are
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ADOPTED IN FULL. Defendants Clark's and Kirkegard's motions for summary
judgment (Docs. 37 & 39) are GRANTED. Defendants August's and Postma's
motions for summary judgment (Docs. 35 & 41) are DENIED.

~
DATED this _l_l_ day of August, 2016.

Dana L. Christensen, Chief Judge
United States District Court

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