Lucas v. Jovanovich et al
Filing
19
ORDER ADOPTING IN PART 10 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS; denying 8 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; denying 15 Motion to Compel. Defendants shall file their Answer to the Complaint on or before June 24, 2016. Signed by Judge Dana L. Christensen on 6/10/2016. Mailed to Lucas. (TAG, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
HELENA DIVISION
CV 15-76-H-DLC-JTJ
DAVID EMMANUEL LUCAS,
Plaintiff,
ORDER
vs.
SAM JOVANOVICH, TAYLOR
CUNNINGHAM, KEN ARNOLD,
SGT.WOHLMAN, LEROY
KIRKEGARD, and DAN HUNTER,
Defendants.
United States Magistrate Judge John Johnston entered Findings and
Recommendations in this matter on February 9, 2016, recommending that
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) be denied. Defendants timely filed objections and are therefore entitled
to de novo review of those Findings and Recommendations to which they
specifically object. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l)(C). This Court reviews for clear error
those findings and recommendations to which no party objects. See McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Commodore Bus. Mach., Inc., 656 F.2d 1309, 1313 (9th Cir.
1981); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985). "Clear error exists ifthe Court
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is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed."
United States v. Syrax, 235 F.3d 422, 427 (9th Cir. 2000). For the reasons stated
below, the Court will adopt Judge Johnston's recommendation to deny thamotion
to dismiss, but will modify his findings as to the basis for the denial.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Pro se Plaintiff David Emmanuel Lucas ("Lucas") filed a Complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Defendants
violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and usual punishment.
Lucas is an inmate at the Montana State Prison ("MSP"). In his Complaint, Lucas
contends that he was seriously injured when he fell approximately eight to ten feet
down an unmarked open shaft.
According to the Complaint, Lucas was ordered by Defendant Taylor
Cunningham ("Officer Taylor") 1 to gather some supplies and laundry in an unlit
area known as the "Wire Room." (Doc. 2 at 6.) This room contained a shaft that
opened to the lower level of the prison and was designed to be covered by a metal
plate. The Complaint states that Officer Taylor "was in a hurry" and told him to
1
Lucas also refers to Defendant Taylor Cunningham as CO Taylor. Defendants provide
that the allegations in the Complaint are actually against Correctional Officer Ryan Taylor.
Nonetheless, Defendants maintain that Lucas fails to state a claim against either Cunningham or
Taylor.
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"please be quick and hurry up before [Lucas] had gotten to the Wire Room." (Id.)
Unbeknownst to Lucas, a maintenance supervisor, Defendant Dan Hunter
("Hunter"), left the shaft uncovered while working in a nearby area. Lucas then
entered into the dark room and fell through the open shaft, injuring his back, left
knee, left hip, left shoulder, left wrist, and fracturing his left elbow. Lucas alleges
that the shaft contained no safety measures, such as a chain or warning signs
indicating the hazard, and that inmates were ordered to work in this unlit area with
little or no supervision. Lucas further maintains that all Defendants were aware of
this safety hazard either through personal knowledge or second hand information,
such as reports from staff or inmates.
On August 10, 2015, Lucas filed a Complaint in this Court and Magistrate
Judge John Johnston was assigned to conduct all pre-trial matters. In December of
2015, Judge Johnston issued an order stating that,
The Court has considered whether Mr. Lucas's Complaint is
frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks solely monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2),
1915A(b). It has also considered whether Mr. Lucas has a reasonable
opportunity to prevail on the merits. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Dismissal is not appropriate at this time. Defendants must respond to
the Complaint.
(Doc. 6 at 1.)
Following the December 2015 Order, Defendants moved to dismiss the
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Complaint for failure to state a claim. Judge Johnston issued Findings and
Recommendations recommending that the undersigned deny the motion. In
support of this recommendation, Judge Johnston noted that Lucas's Complaint had
already been screened for failure to state a claim and a determination had been
made that sufficient facts were alleged to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. Defendants now object to this recommendation and argue that Lucas's
Complaint should be dismissed because the allegations in the Complaint fail to
allege a claim of deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment and,
instead, merely allege a claim of ordinary negligence.
II. Analysis
Before turning to the merits of Defendants' motion to dismiss, the Court
must first determine ifthe motion is moot in light of Judge Johnston's preliminary
screening under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A(b).
A. Preliminary Screening
The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PLRA") "details a court's
obligation to dismiss a plaintiffs in forma pauperis complaint in three separate but
interrelated provisions, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(c)." O'Neal v. Price, 531F.3d1146, 1152 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Lopez
v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 & n. 7 (9th Cir. 2000) (en bane)). Under§ 1915A,
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a district court must conduct a preliminarily review of an inmate's complaint
against "a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity."
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). If a court finds that the complaint is "frivolous, malicious,
or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or ... seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief," the complaint must be
dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
Similarly,§ 1915(e)(2)(B) requires a district court to dismiss an inmate's in
forma pauperis case "at any time ... if the court determines that the action is (i)
'frivolous or malicious'; (ii) 'fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted';
or (iii) 'seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief."' O'Neal, 531 F.3d at 1153. Further, pursuant to§ 1997e, "any action
brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title," must be
dismissed "if the court is satisfied that the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
When determining if a complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may
be granted under either§§ 1915A or 1915(e)(2), courts employ the same standard
used to test the sufficiency of a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure '
12(b)(6). Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) ("Failure to
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state a claim under § 1915A incorporates the familiar standard applied in the
context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6).") (citations omitted); Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) ("The
language of section 1915(e)(2), as it applies to dismissals for failure to state a
claim, parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).")
(citation and quotation marks omitted). Thus, because the standard under 12(b)(6)
is the same standard applied during preliminary screening under§§ 1915A and
1915(e)(2), it could be argued that a subsequent Rule 12(b)(6) motion is
inappropriate, and to the extent that this is what the U.S. Magistrate Judge did in
this case, it is understandable, particularly since there is no Ninth Circuit
precedent directly on point.
Nevertheless, courts have examined this issue and have found that the
screening procedures outlined in the PLRA do not relieve a district court of its
obligation to hear a defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) motion on the merits. Teahan v.
Wilhelm, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1119 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (providing that 1915A's
"screening and dismissal procedure is cumulative of, not a substit,ute for, any
subsequent Rule 12(b)(6) motion that the defendant may choose to bring"). 2 This
2
The Court notes, however, that some courts view a motion to dismiss following initial
pre-screening as little more than a motion for reconsideration. Moreno v. Beddome, 2012 WL
3150205, at *2 (D. Ariz. Aug. 2, 2012) (treating the motion to dismiss as a motion for
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view is supported by the rationale that not deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion on the
merits following initial screening "would deprive Defendants of the basic
procedural right to challenge the sufficiency of the pleadings." James v. Perez,
2012 WL 5387676, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2012) (Ninth Circuit Judge Richard C.
Clifton sitting by designation) (unreported). Though this view has not been
adopted by the Ninth Circuit and is not, therefore, controlling authority, the
rationale supporting it has been persuasive to other district courts. Id. at *2 (citing
Teahan, 481 F. Supp. 2d at 1119-1120). Likewise, this Court finds this view
persuasive and will review Defendants' motion to dismiss on the merits.
B. Motion to Dismiss
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a pleading must
contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-678 (2009). This standard
reconsideration and providing that "a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is almost never an
appropriate response when the court has already screened a prisoner complaint pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b) and directed the defendant to respond"); see also Manon v. Hall, 2015 WL
8081945, at *3 (D. Conn. Dec. 7, 2015) ("Defendants' motion in effect seeks reconsideration of
this Court's prior initial review order, but a party should pause before making such a request
absent particularly compelling reasons such as 'mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect.'") (citing to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(l)). Additionally, at least one court takes the position
that it is always inappropriate to move to dismiss following preliminary screening simply because
the moving party views the complaint differently than the reviewing judge. Manon, 2015 WL
8081945 at *3 (stating that "a party should never move to dismiss claims that have already been
dismissed or seek dismissal of claims that the Court has determined to be non-frivolous solely on
the basis that the moving party disagrees"). Though this Court does not adopt this approach in
this case, Defendants are cautioned, in the future, to move for dismissal wisely.
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"does not require 'detailed factual allegations,' but it demands more than an
unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." .Id. at 678 (quoting
Bell A. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). "To survive a motion to
dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."' Id. (quoting Twombly, 550
U.S. at 570).
Applying this standard, the Court must construe all factual allegations as
true and "in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Cahill v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-338 (9th Cir. 1996). Further, prose complaints
are held "to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers."
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). The rule of liberal construction
is "particularly important in civil rights cases." Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258,
1261 (9th Cir. 1992). Accordingly, "[p]ro se complaints are construed liberally
and may only be dismissed if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove
no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief."
Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2014) (citations and quotation
marks omitted).
Lucas contends that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to this alleged
safety hazard and violated his Eight Amendment right to be free from cruel and
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unusual punishment. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994) ("A prison
official's deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate
violates the Eighth Amendment."). To sustain a claim of deliberate indifference,
an inmate must show that the prison official was subjectively aware of an
excessive risk to inmate health and safety, but disregarded that risk. Id. at 828,
83 7. Further, "the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference
could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also
draw the inference. Id. at 837. Accordingly, a prison "official's failure to
alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not" cannot serve
as a basis for a claim of deliberate indifference. Id. at 838.
Defendants maintain that Lucas's Complaint fails to allege sufficient factual
details to maintain a claim of deliberate indifference. Instead, Defendants argue,
Lucas's Complaint merely states a claim of ordinary negligence. Defendants read
the Complaint too strictly.
As stated above, the Court must construe Lucas' s Complaint liberally and
give him the benefit of any doubt as to whether he has alleged a claim of
deliberate indifference to inmate health and safety. Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d
1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) ("[W]e have an obligation where the petitioner is pro
se, particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to
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afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt.") (citation omitted). Here, the
Complaint not only alleges that Defendants collectively knew about this safety
hazard, 3 it also alleges facts against each individual Defendant.
For example, Lucas states that: (1) Defendant Sam Jovanovich had been in
the Wire Room numerous times and knew about the safety hazard because he
directly saw it and was also told about it by other inmates (Doc. 2 at 6.); (2)
Defendant Officer Taylor had been in the Wire Room many times, knew of the
hazard through direct knowledge, and subsequently ignored it (Id.); (3) Defendant
Sgt. Wohlman, who was the unit supervisor when Lucas fell down the shaft, knew
the shaft was open and a safety hazard, and ignored it (Id.); (4) Defendant Hunter,
the maintenance worker on duty, left the hatch open, did not put any safety
measures in place, knew inmates frequented that area of the prison unsupervised,
and ignored the haz~d (Id. at 7.); (4) Defendant Kirkegard, the Warden ofMSP,
was informed that the shaft was dangerous through reports by staff and inmates,
but ignored those reports (Id. at 8.); and (5) Defendant Ken Arnold, the Director of
Maintenance at MSP, knew about the safety hazards associated with the Wire
3
"Defendants listed in this complaint all know about the safety hazzard [sic] of this
unmarked shaft.... All defendants listed in this complaint have been told by both staff and
inmates that this safety hazzard [sic] exists, but they were deliberately indifferent and purposely
ignored same." (Doc. 2 at 6.)
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Room through direct knowledge and through staff and inmate notifications, knew
that inmates entered the room unsupervised, and deliberately ignored these safety
concerns (Id.).
Accordingly, it could be reasonably inferred from the Complaint that all
Defendants had subjective knowledge that this room was dangerous and posed an
excessive risk to inmate health and safety, but deliberately ignored this risk. It
could be further inferred that this was not the first time the shaft was left
uncovered and other inmates have been exposed to this risk in the past. (See Id. at
7.) ("Defendant Hunter knew that the safety hazzard [sic] of leaveing [sic] the
basement shaft door open existed on or before Plainitff Lucas fell down the
basement shaft.") Lucas has alleged enough facts supporting a claim of deliberate
indifference under the Eighth Amendment. The Court will adopt Judge Johnston's
recommendation and deny Defendants' motion to dismiss. The body of the
Findings and Recommendations will be modified and replaced by sections I and II
of this Order.
Lastly, Lucas has moved the Court to compel Defendants' Answer to his
Complaint. Defendants respond that the time to respond to the Complaint has
been tolled pending the Court's ruling on their motion to dismiss. The Court
agrees and will deny Lucas's motion to compel. However, because the Court will
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deny the motion to dismiss, Defendants must now file their responsive pleading.
Accordingly, Defendants will be given two weeks fromthe date of this Order to
respond to the Complaint.
IT IS ORDERED that:
(1) Judge Johnston's Findings and Recommendations (Doc. 10) are
ADOPTED in part and MODIFIED in part in accordance with the above Order.
(2) Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 8) is DENIED. Defendants shall
file their Answer to the Complaint on or before June 24, 2016.
(3) Plaintiffs Motion to Compel (Doc. 15) is DENIED.
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DATED this JQ_ day of June, 2016.
Dana L. Christensen, Chief Ju ge
United States District Court
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