Jackson v. Montana State Prison et al

Filing 14

ORDER ADOPTING FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN FULL. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Jackson's due process claim is DISMISSED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Montana State Prison is DISMISSED. Copy mailed to Jackson. Signed by Judge Dana L. Christensen on 10/17/2018. (HEG)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
HELENA DIVISION

BRADLEY V. JACKSON,
CV 18-1-H-DLC-JTJ
Plaintiff,
vs.

ORDER

MONTANA STATE PRISON,
WARDEN MICHAEL FLETCHER,
MARRISA BOSTWICK and
TIFFANY MORRISON,
Defendants.
United States Magistrate Judge John T. Johnston entered his Order and
Findings and Recommendations in this case on August 1, 2018, recommending the
dismissal of Plaintiff Bradley V. Jackson's ("Jackson") due process claim and the
dismissal of Montana State Prison as a defendant. (Doc. 6 at 9.) Jackson timely
filed an objection. (Doc. 9.) Accordingly, Jackson is entitled to de novo review
of those findings and recommendations to which he has specifically objected. 28
U.S.C. § 636(b )(1 )(C). Absent objection, this Court reviews findings and
recommendations for clear error. United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,
1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en bane); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985). Clear
error exists ifthe Court is left with a "definite and firm conviction that a mistake

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has been committed." United States v. Syrax, 235 F.3d 422, 427 (9th Cir. 2000)
(citations omitted). "A party makes a proper objection by identifying the parts of
the magistrate's disposition that the party finds objectionable and presenting legal
argument and supporting authority, such that the district court is able to identify
the issues and the reasons supporting a contrary result." Montana Shooting Sports

Ass'n v. Holder, 2010 WL 4102940, at *2 (D. Mont. Oct. 18, 2010) (citation
omitted).
Because Jackson is a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis, Judge Johnston
reviewed his Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and§ 1915A. Sections
1915A(b) and 1915(e)(2)(B) require the Court to dismiss a complaint filed in
forma pauperis and by a prisoner against a government defendant before it is
served if it frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from an immune defendant. Under this standard,
Judge Johnston found that Jackson failed to state a due process claim and
recommended that this claim be dismissed. (Doc. 6 at 6.)
Jackson alleged that on multiple occasions he was told he could not go to
church ifhe wanted an education. He claims that Defendants forced him to choose
between school and church. Jackson claims that this is a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. (Doc. 2 at 6.)

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Judge Johnston accurately laid out the proper legal standard for determining
if Jackson stated a viable claim for a due process violation. (Doc. 6 at 5-6.) In
order to state a cause of action for a deprivation of due process, a plaintiff must
first identify a liberty interest for which the protection is sought. Wilkinson v.

Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). The Due Process Clause does not confer a
liberty interest in freedom from state action taken within a prisoner's imposed
sentence. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 480 (1995). A prisoner has a liberty
interest protected by the Due Process Clause only where the restraint "imposes
atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents
of prison life." Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting

Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484). Judge Johnston found that because "the due process
clause ... does not create a liberty interest in prison education or rehabilitation
classes," Jackson had failed to state a due process claim. (Doc. 6 at 6.)
Jackson objects to the dismissal of his due process claim on the basis that
while Judge Johnston found that could not state a due process claim in relation to
prison education, Judge Johnston did not decide whether Jackson could state a due
process claim for a violation of his "Right to Freedom of Religion." (Doc. 9 at 1.)
Because Judge Johnston did not decide this issue explicitly, this Court will review
this claim de novo.

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A complaint is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in
fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). "A case is malicious if it
was filed with the intention or desire to harm another." Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d
1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005). A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted if a plaintiff fails to allege the "grounds" of his "entitlement to
relief." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a
complaint to "contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Rule 8(a)(2) provides that a complaint "that states a claim for relief must
contain ... a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the [plaintiff] is
entitled to relief." In order to satisfy the requirements in Rule 8, a complaint's
allegations must cross "the line from conceivable to plausible." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
680. There is a two-step procedure to determine whether a complaint's allegations
cross that line. First, the Court must identify "the allegations in the complaint that
are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id. at 679. Factual allegations are not
entitled to the assumption of truth if they are "merely consistent with liability," or
"amount to nothing more than a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

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constitutional claim." Id. at 679, 681 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Second, the Court must determine whether the complaint states a
"plausible" claim for relief. Id. at 679. A claim is "plausible" ifthe factual
allegations, which are accepted as true, allow "the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. at 678. This
inquiry is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its
judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 679. If the factual allegations,
which are accepted as true, "do not permit the court to infer more than the mere
possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not show[n]-that
the pleader is entitled to relief." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
Construing Jackson's complaint liberally, as required, he has failed to allege
a due process violation. Erickson v. Pardu, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Again, a
prisoner has a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause only where the
restraint "imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the
ordinary incidents of prison life." Keenan, 83 F.3d at 1088 (quoting Sandin, 515
U.S. at 484). It is well settled that an inmate's religious freedoms may be curtailed
when justified and reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Turner v.
Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). In light of this, and assuming the factual

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allegations in Jackson's Complaint are true, the Court cannot find that being forced
to choose between attending a religious ceremony and attending educational
activities is an "atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the
ordinary incidents of prison life." Consequently, Jackson has failed to state a due
process claim.
IT IS ORDERED that Judge Johnston's Order and Findings and
Recommendations (Doc. 6) are ADOPTED IN FULL.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Jackson's due process claim is
DISMISSED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Montana State Prison is
DISMISSED.

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DATED this J2 day of October, 2018.

Dana L. Christensen, Chief Judge
United States District Court

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