McClanahan v. Salmonsen

Filing 97

ORDER granting 87 MOTION for Summary Judgment and DISMISSING CASE. Signed by Judge Brian Morris on 9/16/2024. Transmitted electronically to prison for delivery to inmate. (TAG)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
HELENA DIVISION

SHANE MCCLANAHAN,

CV 22–20–H–BMM

Plaintiff,
vs.

ORDER

JIM SALMONSEN,
Defendant.
Plaintiff Shane McClanahan is an inmate at Montana State Prison (“MSP”)
who has been diagnosed with melanoma. McClanahan alleges that Defendant
Warden Jim Salmonsen is preventing prison medical staff from providing him with
adequate care in violation of the Eighth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See
Doc. 44.) Warden Salmonsen seeks summary judgment, on the basis that no
constitutional violation has occurred because McClanahan’s medical needs are
being met. (See Doc. 88.) The undisputed facts show that McClanahan’s medical
care at MSP is sufficient. Warden Salmonsen’s motion is granted.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material if it impacts the outcome

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of the case in accordance with governing substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute of material fact is genuine “if the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.” Id. All reasonable inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party. Tatum v. Moody, 768 F.3d 806, 814 (9th Cir. 2014).
Nonetheless, the nonmoving party must identify, with some reasonable
particularity, the evidence that it believes precludes summary judgment. See Soto
v. Sweetman, 882 F.3d 865, 870–72 (9th Cir. 2018) (explaining that while pro se
parties are exempted from “strict compliance with the summary judgment rules,”
they are “not exempt[ed] . . . from all compliance,” such as the requirement to
identify or submit competent evidence in support of their claims).1
BACKGROUND2
McClanahan was diagnosed with melanoma in 2016 while incarcerated at
the Utah State Prison. (Doc. 89 at ¶¶ 2–3.) Medical officials discovered a
melanoma on McClanahan’s back upon his initial intake and the cancerous tissue
was surgically removed. (Id.) McClanahan was transferred back to MSP on
December 21, 2018. (Doc. 44 at 16.) McClanahan filed this action in February

Attached to Salmonsen’s motion was the requisite Rand Notice. (See Doc. 90).
The facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted, (see Docs. 89, 92), and viewed
in the light most favorable to McClanahan, Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 657
(2014) (per curiam).
1
2

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2022, alleging civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. McClanahan filed an
amended complaint on March 3, 2022, (Doc. 4), and a supplement on March 18,
2022, (Doc. 11). McClanahan then filed a second amended complaint on
December 13, 2022, (Doc. 44), and a supplement on January 6, 2023, (Doc. 46).
McClanahan generally alleges that his cancer “has spread further without any care
from M.S.P. since bringing [him] back” to Montana in 2018. (Doc. 44 at 16.)
ANALYSIS
Warden Salmonsen asserts that he is entitled to summary judgment on the
ground that no constitutional violation occurred because McClanahan is receiving
proper medical care. Alternatively, Warden Salmonsen argues he is entitled to
qualified immunity because no reasonable official could know that MSP’s
approach to monitoring a prison inmate’s cancer while it is in remission would
violate the inmate’s Eighth Amendment rights. Warden Salmonsen’s first
argument has merit. Summary judgment is granted in his favor.
A.

Medical Care

The undisputed factual record shows that McClanahan is receiving
constitutionally adequate medical care. “The government has an obligation to
provide medical care for those whom it is punishing by incarceration, and failure to
meet that obligation can constitute an Eighth Amendment violation cognizable
under § 1983.” Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 2014). To

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prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim for inadequate medical care, a plaintiff
must show “deliberate indifference” to his “serious medical needs.” Id. (quoting
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). This two-part inquiry includes “both
an objective standard—that the deprivation was serious enough to constitute cruel
and unusual punishment—and a subjective standard—deliberate indifference.”
Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2012), overruled in part on other
grounds by Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc).
“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard. . . . To show deliberate
indifference, the plaintiff must show that the course of treatment the doctors chose
was medically unacceptable under the circumstances and that the defendants chose
this course in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to the plaintiff’s health.”
Hamby v. Hammond, 821 F.3d 1085, 1092 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). “[A]n inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical
care, differences of opinion in medical treatment, and harmless delays in treatment
are not enough to sustain an Eighth Amendment claim.” Simmons v. G. Arnett,
No. 20-55043, 2022 WL 3906207, at *5 (9th Cir. Aug. 31, 2022).
McClanahan asserts that his cancer has spread “without any care” or
intervention from MSP officials since December of 2018. (Doc. 44 at 16–17.)
Specifically, he alleges he has been denied treatment by a “cancer specialist” for
his serious medical needs while at MSP. (Id. at 18.) Although McClanahan claims

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that he has been denied access to specialists and that treatments have been delayed,
McClanahan also acknowledges that he has undergone regular physicals and full
image CT scans at the direction of “attentive” MSP medical staff. (See Doc. 46-1
at 6, 8.) Consistently, the undisputed record shows that because of McClanahan
receives regular cancer screenings, due to his history of melanoma. (Doc. 89, at
¶ 4), including full-body examinations and CT or PET scans, (id. ¶ 13). On April
29, 2019, April 12, 2021, June 11, 2021, and January 12, 2022, MSP physician Dr.
Paul Rees, M.D., gave McClanahan full-body examinations, finding no indications
of metastasizing melanoma. (Id. ¶¶ 5, 6, 8, 9.) On April 23, 2021, McClanahan
underwent two CT scans: the first was a scan of his chest, abdomen, and pelvis,
which revealed no evidence of metastatic disease of these areas; and the second
was a scan of his head, which was normal. (Id. ¶ 7.)
McClanahan underwent another CT scan of his neck, chest, abdomen, and
pelvis on March 7, 2022. (Id. ¶ 10.) This scan did not reveal metastatic disease,
but the radiologist who performed the exam, Dr. Steven A. Larsen, M.D.,
suggested that a PET scan would provide a more sensitive detection of melanomas
metastatic disease. (Id.) Dr. Rees shared the results of the scan with McClanahan
on March 28, 2022. (Id.) On August 2, 2022, McClanahan presented with new
black lesions on his scrotum. (Id. ¶ 11.) Based on his history of melanoma, Dr.
Rees examined the area and recommended a biopsy of the largest black lesion.

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(Id.) On September 13, 2022, McClanahan presented with several pigmented
lesions on his penis, to which Dr. Rees planned excisional biopsies of each, but
McClanahan refused excision and biopsy. (Id. ¶¶ 12–13.)
Four months later, on January 3, 2023, McClanahan consented to the
excisional biopsy of the lesions on his penis and scrotum. (Id. ¶ 14.) Dr. Rees
performed the procedure and submitted the specimens to pathology. (Id.) On
January 12, 2023, McClanahan underwent a PET/CT scan from the base of his
skull to the mid thighs, as Dr. Larsen had suggested. (Id. ¶ 15.) The scan revealed
“mild focally increased uptake within the ventral surface of the mid-penile shaft
without a definite CT correlate.” (Id.) Dr. Rees attributed the uptake to evidence
of healing in the area of the recent excisional biopsy, not metastatic disease. (Id.
¶¶ 15–16.) Later that day, Dr. Rees received the results from the excisional biopsy,
which diagnosed the issue as melanocytic nevus, a benign condition commonly
known as a mole, confirming Dr. Rees’s opinion that the uptake indicated healing
was taking place. (Id. ¶ 17.)
Dr. Rees gave McClanahan a full-body examination on February 14, 2023,
that indicated no metastasizing melanoma. (Id. ¶ 18.) On October 26, 2023, Dr.
Rees gave McClanahan a full body examination, which revealed no indications of
metastasizing melanoma, but noted a pigmented lesion on the ventral side of
McClanahan’s penis. (Id. ¶ 19.) The following day, Dr. Rees excised the lesion

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from McClanahan’s penis and sent the excised specimen for biopsy. (Id. ¶¶ 19–
20.) The pathology report indicated the lesion was benign with no melanoma
recurrence identified. (Id.) Dr. Rees informed McClanahan of the results of the
pathology report on November 28, 2023. (Id. ¶ 21.)
Assuming that melanoma in remission, in fact, constitutes a serious medical
need, in response to the record of treatment described above, McClanahan has not
presented any evidence that the facility’s medical care was deficient. See von
Koenigsberg-Tyrvaldssen v. Kohut, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36405, at *19–22 (D.
Mont. 2017) (ongoing monitoring of cancer-in-remission constitutes adequate
medical care). McClanahan argues that Warden Salmonsen has still not provided
“medical records from MSP from 2015 and 2016 that proved deliberate
indifference among other violations.” (Doc. 92 at 2–11.) McClanahan complains
that Warden Salmonsen has “prolonged this matter of justice in moving for 1/2 a
dozen bogus summaries for dismissals against” him, and alleges that Dr. Rees,
“M.S.P.’s chosen friend of defendants,” is complicit. (Id.) These baseless
accusations fail to demonstrate the existence of a factual dispute regarding the
sufficiency of the medical care that McClanahan has received from MSP since his
melanoma diagnosis in 2016. See Soto, 882 F.3d at 870 (on summary judgment,
even pro se parties must identify or submit competent evidence in support of their
claims). No evidence indicates that McClanahan is receiving inadequate medical
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care at MSP. No trier of fact could reasonably find for McClanahan. Summary
judgment is granted in favor of Warden Salmonsen.
B.

Supervisory Liability

Even if McClanahan was receiving constitutionally deficient medical care
from MSP providers, there is likewise no evidence that Warden Salmonsen
personally participated in or directed any action or inaction that caused the alleged
deficient care. Supervisory officials can only be held liable under section 1983 if
they themselves personally violated a constitutional right. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 683 (2009). “Supervisory liability is imposed against a supervisory
official in his individual capacity for his own culpable action or inaction in the
training, supervision, or control of his subordinates, for his acquiescence in the
constitutional deprivations of which the complaint is made, or for conduct that
showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.” Corales v.
Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 570 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Thus, “[i]n a section 1983 claim, a supervisor is liable for the acts of his
subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of
the violations of subordinates and failed to act to prevent them.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). “The requisite causal connection may be established
when an official sets in motion a series of acts by others which the actor knows or

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reasonably should know would cause others to inflict constitutional harms.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
McClanahan seems to allege that Warden Salmonsen knew that his
condition warranted intervention by a “cancer specialist,” but nevertheless denied
and delayed that care. (See Doc. 44 at 22–25.) In support of his claim,
McClanahan asserts that in January of 2022, he met with Warden Salmonsen about
the prison’s lack of appropriate medical care and that Warden Salmonsen promised
him a transfer to California’s Donovan State Prison due to his special needs and
hardships. (Id. at 13–14.) As argued by Warden Salmonsen, however, “[a]
difference of opinion between a physician and the prisoner—or between medical
professionals—concerning what medical care is appropriate does not amount to
deliberate indifference.” Snow, 681 F.3d at 987.
And critically, McClanahan has not shown that Salmonsen either personally
participated in providing him inadequate medical care, or that there is a sufficient
causal connection between his conduct and any inadequate care that McClanahan
allegedly received. It is undisputed that Warden Salmonsen never communicated
to Dr. Rees that he should be indifferent to McClanahan’s medical needs, or that he
should provide McClanahan with medical care that does not meet professional
standards. (Doc. 89 at ¶ 23.) Generalized statements regarding the role of a
facility supervisor are insufficient to establish supervisory liability under § 1983.

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See Thomas v. Swarthout, 2016 WL 1359934, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2016)
(“[T]he causal link between . . . [a supervisory] defendant and the claimed
constitutional violation must be specifically shown.”). Because Warden
Salmonsen did not personally participate in McClanahan’s medical care, nor did
Warden Salmonsen direct any act or omission that injured him, McClanahan’s
claim against Warden Salmonsen fails.
C.

Qualified Immunity

Finally, Warden Salmonsen argues that should the Court find a
constitutional violation occurred, he would be entitled to qualified immunity
because he could not have known that McClanahan’s disagreement with the MSP
medical staff was a constitutional violation. See Snow, 681 F.3d at 987; Estelle,
429 U.S. at 107 (holding that an inmate’s disagreement with a medical provider
does not subject the prisoner to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth Amendment). Qualified immunity protects government officials from
liability for civil damages unless their conduct violates “clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Plaintiffs bringing § 1983 claims
against individual officials must demonstrate that (1) a federal right has been
violated, and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the violation.
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). “The qualified immunity standard

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gives ample room for mistaken judgments by protecting all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S.
224, 229 (1991) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
MSP’s regular monitoring of McClanahan’s melanoma was not medically
inadequate and does not constitute an Eighth Amendment violation. The Court
need not consider whether Warden Salmonsen is entitled to qualified immunity.
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001) (explaining that if the defendant’s
conduct did not violate a constitutional right, further analysis is unnecessary).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that Warden Salmonsen’s motion
for summary judgment (Doc. 87) is GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to enter
judgment in favor of Warden Salmonsen and close the case file.
DATED this 16th day of September, 2024.

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