Spreadbury v. Bitterroot Public Library et al

Filing 255

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 211 Motion in Limine. Signed by Jeremiah C. Lynch on 3/16/2012. (TCL, ) Modified on 3/19/2012 to reflect copy mailed to Spreadbury this date (APP, ).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
MISSOULA DIVISION
_____________________________________________
MICHAEL E. SPREADBURY,

CV 11-64-M-DWM-JCL

Plaintiff,
ORDER
vs.
BITTERROOT PUBLIC LIBRARY,
CITY OF HAMILTON,
LEE ENTERPRISES, INC.,
BOONE KARLBERG, P.C.,
DR. ROBERT BROPHY, TRISTA SMITH,
NANSU RODDY, JERRY STEELE,
STEVE SNAVELY, STEVEN BRUNER-MURPHY,
RYAN OSTER, KENNETH S. BELL, and JENNIFER LINT,
Defendants.
_____________________________________________
Before the Court is the City and Library Defendants’ motions in limine.
Having considered the merits of the parties’ respective positions on the matters at
issue in the motion, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. Motion in Limine No. 1 — alleged misconduct by Boone attorneys — is
GRANTED under Fed. R. Evid. 402;
2. Motion in Limine No. 2 — public fraud and litigation defense by
Montana Municipal Interlocal Authority — is GRANTED under Fed. R. Evid.
402;
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3. Motion in Limine No. 3 — ostracism. The motion is GRANTED to the
extent it seeks to preclude speculative evidence of general community ostracism.
But to the extent it seeks to preclude evidence of specific relationships adversely
affected, the issue can only be resolved in the context of the evidence presented at
trial, and the motion is DENIED in that respect;
4. Motion in Limine No. 4 — loss of mayoral election — is GRANTED
under Fed. R. Evid. 402 and 403;
5. Motion in Limine No. 5 — bad acts. Defendants move for an order in
limine excluding reference to, or evidence of, the following matters: (A) the
Bitterroot Public Library’s conduct in opening an alleged “pedophilia room” and
the alleged improper use of public funds to defend against complaints filed about
the room; and (B) Defendant Ryan Oster’s alleged conduct in obstructing justice,
tampering with evidence, covering up a felony injury accident, and encouraging
pretrial detainees to commit suicide. Defendants’ motion as to these referenced
matters is GRANTED under Fed. R. Evid. 402.
Defendants’ motion, however, is DENIED to the extent it seeks a broad
proscription baring the admission of evidence of any prior act or omission that
may otherwise be admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2) if Plaintiff can satisfy
the conditions applicable to the admission of evidence under Rule 404(b)(2). The

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issue of the admissibility of any other specific evidentiary matter is more
appropriately resolved in the context of the evidence presented at trial;
6. Motion in Limine No. 6 — cover ups and code of silence — is
GRANTED under Fed. R. Evid. 402;
7. Motion in Limine No. 7 — Plaintiff’s opinions. Defendants move to
preclude Plaintiff from presenting his opinion testimony at trial. Specifically,
Defendants refer to examples of Plaintiffs’ opinions that he has expressed
regarding Defendants’ conduct that he believes constituted a violation of a policy
or a violation of his legal rights. A witness, including an expert witness, may not
“give an opinion as to [his or] her legal conclusion, i.e., an opinion on an ultimate
issue of law.” Nationwide Transport Finance v. Cass Information Systems, Inc.,
523 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Hangarter v. Provident Life and
Accident Ins. Co., 373 F.3d 998, 1016 (9th Cir. 2004)). Defendants’ motion is,
therefore, GRANTED in this respect, and Plaintiff is precluded from testifying as
to his legal conclusions identified in items 1 through 7 on pages 11 - 12 of
Defendants’ brief. Dkt. 212 at 11-12.
Defendants also move to exclude Plaintiff’s opinion testimony to the extent
he may attempt to present that testimony in the form of expert opinions recognized
under Fed. R. Evid. 702. The motion is GRANTED to the extent Plaintiff may

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have failed to properly disclose expert opinion testimony as required under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(A) and (B), by the expert witness disclosure deadlines imposed in
the Court’s scheduling order entered November 30, 2011. If Plaintiff properly and
timely disclosed expert witness opinion testimony by the referenced deadlines,
then Defendants’ motion is DENIED in that respect, and the admissibility of any
properly disclosed expert witness opinion testimony will be resolved in the context
of the evidence presented at trial.
Finally, the Court notes Plaintiff may be able to present limited lay witness
opinion testimony to the extent he can satisfy the conditions applicable to the
admission of that opinion testimony prescribed under Fed. R. Evid. 701; and
8. Motion in Limine No. 8 — matters already decided — is GRANTED
under Fed. R. Evid. 402.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 16th day of March, 2012.

/s/ Jeremiah C. Lynch
Jeremiah C. Lynch
United States Magistrate Judge

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