Spreadbury v. Bitterroot Public Library et al
Filing
300
ORDER ADOPTING IN PART AND REJECTING IN PART THE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS - DENIED as moot 148 Motion for Summary Judgment; DENIED as moot 150 Motion for Summary Judgment... The motions are otherwise GRANTED, and all of Spreadbury's claims against the Municipal Defendants are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The Municipal Defendants' 252 Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Summary Judgment Motion and Brief is DENIED as moot. Because no claim remains against the Municipal Defendants, all deadlines pertaining to them, including the jury trial scheduled for June 25, 2012, are VACATED. Signed by Judge Donald W. Molloy on 5/30/2012. (APP, ) Copy mailed to Spreadbury this date.
FILED
MAY 3 0 2012
PATRICK E DUFFY, CLERK
ByoePUTYClERK, MISSOULA
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
MISSOULA DIVISION
MICHAEL E. SPREADBURY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
BITTERROOT PUBLIC LIBRARY,
CITY OF HAMILTON,
LEE ENTERPRISES, INC., and
BOONE KARLBERG P.C.
Defendants.
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CV 11-64-M-DWM-JCL
ORDER
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March 6, 2012, United States Magistrate Judge Jeremiah C. Lynch entered
Findings and Recommendations (doc. 250) concerning two summary judgment
motions (docs. 148, 150) filed by Defendants Bitterroot Public Library (the
Library"), City of Hamilton ("the City"), Dr. Robert Brophy, Trista Smith, Nansu
Roddy, Jerry Steele, Steve Snavely, Steven Bruner-Murphy, Ryan Oster, Kenneth
Bell, and Jennifer Lint (collectively, the "Municipal Defendants"). Judge Lynch
recommended the motions be granted in part and denied in part.
Specifically, he determined disputed issues of fact remained as to the
following issues: (1) whether Officer Snavely negligently investigated Plaintiff
Michael E. Spreadbury's purported trespass on Library property on August 20,
2009; (2) whether Officer Bruner-Murphy negligently investigated allegations that
Spreadbury was stalking the Library Director; and (3) whether Robert Brophy, the
Chairman of the Bitterroot Public Library's Board of Trustees, negligently
revoked Spreadbury's library privileges. Because Judge Lynch determined these
negligence claims survived, he also denied summary judgment on Spreadbury's
claims for punitive damages and for injunctive relief relating to access to the
Library.l
The Library and the City timely filed objections (doc. 256), and Spreadbury,
proceeding pro se, filed a "Response to City, Library Objection to Court Order,
Findings Doc. # 250" (doc. 257). Construed liberally, his filing appears to include
objections to Judge Lynch's findings as well as a response to the arguments of the
lIt is important to note that Judge Lynch did not find any defendant liable for negligence,
contrary to Spreadbury's assertions (doc. 257 at 1,5). When a court denies one party's motion
for summary judgment, summary judgment is not automatically granted in favor of the other
party.
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City and Library. The parties are entitled to de novo review ofthose findings or
recommendations to which they object. 28 U.S.C. § 636(bXl). The portions of
the Findings and Recommendation not specifically objected to are reviewed for
clear error. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Commodore Bus. Mach., Inc., 656 F.2d
1309,1313 (9th Cir. 1981).
For the reasons discussed below, Judge Lynch's Findings and
Recommendations are adopted in part and rejected in part. Defendants are entitled
to summary judgment on all issues.
I. Spreadbury's Objections
A. Termination of Library Privileges
Spreadbury was not wrongfully deprived ofhis statutory and constitutional
liberty interest in the right to use a public library when the Library DefendantS
banned him from the premises. The record demonstrates that he intimidated
various library staff and patrons after the Library refused his request to include a
letter he had written to President Obama in its collection. We all have a right to
use our public libraries. Kreimer v. Bureau ofPolice for the Town ofMorristown,
958 F.2d 1242, 1255 (3rd Cir. 1992) (recognizing "the right to some level of
lnte Library Defendants are the Bitterroot Public Library, Robert Brophy, Trista Smith,
and Nansu Roddy.
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access to a public library, the quintessential locus of the receipt of information").
But the right is not unqualified. Jd. A person may be constitutionally deprived of
a liberty interest if afforded due process, and Spreadbury was granted adequate
procedural protections. Pinnacle Armor, Inc. v. United States, 648 F 3d 708, 716
(9th Cir. 20ll).
Judge Lynch properly identified the Library as a limited public forum.
[A]s a limited public forum, the Library is obligated only to permit the
public to exercise rights that are consistent with the nature ofthe Library
and consistent with the government's intent in designating the Library
as a public forum. Other activities need not be tolerated.
Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1262. A public library may refuse service to anyone who
willfully violates a library policy. Mont. Code Ann. § 22-1-311. The relevant
Library Operation Policy in place at the time stated:
Patron behavior that becomes disruptive to other library users or staffor
constitutes a public nuisance is not allowed and the person(s) will be
asked to leave. The library reserves the right to refuse service to anyone
not complying with established library policies.
(Quoted in doc. 152-10). Contrary to Spreadbury's assertions, the policy does not
state that the Library may only refuse service to a disruptive patron if it has
previously asked the patron to leave. Such an interpretation would require the
Court to insert words in the policy that are not there.
Spreadbury willfully engaged in behavior that became disruptive. On at
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least two occasions. prior to the tennination of his library privileges, he confronted
staffin an intimidating manner. (Docs. 152-1, -7, -8, -9; 158-1, -2.) Additionally,
his reference to the Unabomber in a letter to the Library director could reasonably
be construed as threatening. (Doc. 152-4.) Willfulness "does not require any
intent to violate the law [or] to injure another." Mont. Code Ann. § 1-1-204(5). It
is enough that Spreadbury had a "purpose or willingness," id., to confront staff
and reference the Unabomber, and a reasonable person would see his behavior as
disruptive. Accordingly, Spreadbury violated a Library policy, and the Library
could refuse him service so long as it provided him the minimum due process
requirement of notice and an opportunity to be heard. See Hill v. Derrick, 2006
WL 1620226, *8 (M.D. Pa. 2006).
The Library provided adequate procedural protections. See Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334--35 (1976) (describing the three factors a court must
weigh in detennining the adequacy of the process by which a person was deprived
of a liberty interest). Based on repeated disruptive incidents that frightened staff,
he was given written notice that he was banned from the premises and told the
reason why. (Doc. 152-10). He was also afforded an opportunity to be heard. He
emailed a member of the Board of Trustees requesting permission to attend a
meeting to argue that his rights should be restored, and he submitted a
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Reconsideration Request Fonn to Library staff again demanding his letter be
accepted into the Library's collection. (Docs. 152-6, -13, -14). The Library
considered and denied his requests for reconsideration, and the Library Board
supported the decisions. (Doc. 152-6). Finally, the ban furthered the
government's significant interest in maintaining the peaceful character of a library.
Brown v. State o/Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 142 (1966) (noting a library is "a place
dedicated to quiet, to knowledge, and to beauty").· The Library was not required to
follow the specific procedures Spreadbury believes it should have, and it provided
sufficient process to protect Spreadbury's limited liberty interest.
"Prohibiting disruptive behavior is perhaps the clearest and most direct way
to achieve maximum Library use." Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1263 (upholding a
library rule prohibiting disruptive behavior). Unfortunately, Spreadbury has
continued to engage in disruptive behavior, resulting in a criminal trespass charge,
an order ofprotection that has been affinned by the Montana Supreme COUrt,3 and
his nolo contendere plea to felony intimidation.
B. Qualified Immunity of City Officers
Spreadbury disputes Judge Lynch's finding that Officer Snavely, who
3Regardless of the status of Spreadbury's library privileges, he cannot come within 600
feet of the Library under the Order of Protection until 2015. (Doc. 152 at 13-14.)
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investigated him for criminally trespassing on Library property, is entitled to
qualified immunity. (Doc. 257 at ~.) He insists there is a clearly established
constitutional right not to be investigated for trespass on public property. (Id. at
5.) He is incorrect There is no "clearly established" right to be free from
investigation, and the criminal trespass charge was not clearly precluded under
Montana law.
There is no constitutional right not to be investigated by law enforcement
for suspected violations of the law. E.g. SEC. v. Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc., 467 U.S.
735,742 (1984) (an investigation by the SEC into possible violations ofsecurities
laws does not implicate the Due Process or the Sixth Amendment); Krainski v.
Nev. ex reI. Bd. ofRegents ofNev. System ofHigher Educ., 616 F.3d 963, 971 (9th
Cir. 2010) (allegations that defamation by a state actor impaired future
employment opportunities or caused psychological trauma are insufficient to
invoke constitutional protection from being investigated); Aponte v. Calderon, 284
F.3d 184, 193 (1st Cir. 2002) ("Investigations alone do not trigger due process
rights."); United States v. Cnlmp, 934 F.2d 947,957 (8th Cir. 1991); United States
v. Trayer, 898 F.2d 805, 808 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("But, of course, there is no
constitutional right to be free of investigation.").
Spreadbury argues that it is not a violation ofthe law for a member ofthe
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public to be on public land even ifhe has been banned from the property. Even
assuming there is a right not to be investigated for noncriminal conduct, it is not
clearly established under Montana law that criminal trespass is inapplicable on
public land. "[A] person commits the offense of criminal trespass to property if
the person knowingly ... enters or remains unlawfully in or upon the premises of
another." Mont. Code Ann. § 45-6-203( I). "Property of another" includes real
property "in which a person other than the offender has an interest that the
offender has no authority to defeat or impair, even though the offender may have
an interest in the property." § 45-2-101(62). The privilege to enter on the
premises of another "may be revoked at any time by personal communication of
notice by the landowner or other authorized person." § 45-6-201(1). And as
discussed above, a Library is authorized to restrict access to patrons if adequate
procedural protections are observed. Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1262.
Here, Spreadbury entered on public Library property-in which other
members ofthe public also have an interest that he has no authority to defeat or·
impair-after his privilege to do so had been properly revoked by the Library.
This conduct satisfies the statutory definition of criminal trespass. The decision in
State v. Blakely that criminal trespass had not occurred where the property was
open to the public is distinguishable from the facts here. 592 P.2d 501, 503
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(Mont. 1979). In that case, the defendant had not been banned from the public
property for violating the rules of the public agency responsible for the property.
Thus, neither case law nor the criminal trespass statute clearly establishes that a
criminal trespass charge is not applicable on public land. Officer Snavely is thus
entitled to qualified immunity for his decision to investigate Spreadbury for
trespass.
For these reasons and for the reasons discussed by Judge Lynch, all the City
officers are entitled to qualified immunity for their actions in this case.
C.
Malicious Prosecution
Spreadbury reasserts that he was maliciously prosecuted for trespass on
public property. (Doc. 257 at 2.) However, he fails to provide any reason to reject
Judge Lynch's conclusion that probable cause for the trespassing charge existed as
a matter of law, negating the third element of a malicious prosecution claim. See
Plouffe v. Mont. Dept. o/Pub. Health & Human Servs., 45 P.3d 10, 14 (Mont.
2002). There being no clear error in Judge Lynch's reasoning, the Municipal
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
D.
Negligent and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Spreadbury also asks this Court to reject Judge Lynch's recommendation to
dismiss his claims for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
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(Doc. 257 at 7, 10.) However, he gives no reason to reject Judge Lynch's
reasoning and does not point to any evidence in the record that would support his
claims. He merely re-alleges that "stress caused permanent impairment of
Spreadbury's health NIED criteria is met." (!d. at 7.) Spreadbury has failed to
make the "threshold showing to the court that [his] emotional distress is 'serious'
or "severe.'" Jacobsen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 215 P.3d 649, 663 (Mont. 2009). Mere
allegations, unsupported by evidence, are insufficient at the summary judgment
stage to create a genuine dispute over a material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
II. The City's and Library's Objections
A. Negligence claims
Spreadbury brought three negligence claims against the City and Library.
He alleges that Officers Snavely and Bruner-Murphy acted negligently in
investigating and preparing police reports concerning accusations that he was
criminally trespassing on Library property and stalking the Library director.
Specifically, he alleges that Snavely should have known that it is not illegal for a
member of the public to be on public property, and that Bruner-Murphy should
have known that Spreadbury did not commit the crime of stalking in part because
Spreadbury has never met the alleged victim. Spreadbury also alleges the Library
Board, through Chairman Brophy, acted negligently in revoking his right to use
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the library. He alleges that Brophy should have known that Spreadbury was never
asked to leave the Library and did not willfully violate any Library policies, and
that Brophy ignored his written request for reconsideration.
Judge Lynch recommended denying summary judgment as to these claims.
He found the Municipal Defendants had failed to address the elements of breach,
causation, and damages, and he rejected their argument that they did not owe
Spreadbury a duty under Montana's public duty doctrine. He predicted that the
Montana Supreme Court would not apply the public duty doctrine when a
govermnent agent "is not merely performing a general duty to protect citizens
from private harms but is instead acting affirmatively towards a plaintiff and is,
him or herself, the injurious force that caused harm to the plaintiff." (Doc. 250 at
41.) Judge Lynch also predicted the Court would conclude "the public duty
doctrine does not protect a law enforcement officer from liability for harm caused
by a negligent criminal investigation as to the subject ofthe investigation." (Doc.
250 at 42 n. 12.) He reasoned:
The public duty doctrine generally deals with situations where a law
enforcement officer allegedly breaches a general duty to protect the
public by failing to protect a specific plaintiff against an injury caused
by a third party or other independent source. In contrast, the public duty
doctrine is inapplicable where a law enforcement officer is not merely
performing a general duty to protect citizens from private harms, but is
instead acting affirmatively towards a plaintiff and is, him or herself, the
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injurious force that caused harm to the plaintiff.
(Id at41 (internal citations omitted).) See also Jones v. Maryland, 38 A.3d 333
(Md. 2012); Liser v. Smith, 254 F. Supp. 2d 89 (D.D.C. 2003); Strickland v. U. of
NC. at Wilmington, 712 S.E.2d 888 (N.C. App. 2011); Batesv. Doria, 150 N.E.3d
1025 (IIl. App. Dist. 2 1986).
Assuming without deciding that Judge Lynch is correct that the Municipal
Defendants owed Spreadbury a duty, the facts in the record do not establish what
that duty is or if it was breached. These claims involve a sort of professional
malpractice, requiring a jury to decide what a reasonable Library board or a
reasonable police officer would do in each situation. There is no expert testimony
to establish what duty an officer owes in investigating or reporting on a call for
assistance or what duty a Library owes in revoking a patron's library privileges.
The City and Library are also entitled to summary judgment as to breach.
The evidence underlying the negligence claims is the same as the evidence
underlying Spreadbury's constitutional claims. This evidence was discussed in the
City's and Library's summary judgment briefing and laid out in their Statement of
Undisputed Facts. Spreadbury failed to raise a genuine dispute over any material
fact in his response brief. In their objections before this Court, the City and
.
Library explained how the facts demonstrate they did not breach a duty, if they
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have one, to Spreadbury. Again, Spreadbury had the opportunity to counter their
arguments but failed to do so. See Spreadbury's "Response to City, Library
Objection to Court Order, Findings Doc. # 250." Accordingly, the issue of breach
has been fully briefed and is properly before the Court.
1. The Library
There is no evidence to suggest the Library breached any duty toward
Spreadbury. The undisputed facts demonstrate Spreadbury engaged in multiple
confrontations with staff and, after he had been banned from the Library, with
both staff and patrons. Spreadbury requested that the Library maintain a letter he
had written to President Obama in its collection. The first time his request was
refused by a staffmember, Spreadbury became animated and "a bit scarey." (Doc.
152-1.) The staffrnember reported the incident to the Library Director. (Id.)
Spreadbury then wrote a letter to the Library Director again demanding that his
letter be placed in the collection. (Doc. 152-4.) In it, he made a veiled reference
to the Unabomber:
"Let me remind you both that in 1995 a 'personal letter' was published
and available at national libraries which advocated violence, and
condoned murder. The letter ended up being from Lincoln, Montana."
(Id.) In response, the Library Director wrote to Spreadbury, again denying his
request and explaining that his letter is not authoritative or objective and that other
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avenues are available for Spreadbury to voice his opinions. (Doc. 152-5.) Two
days later, Spreadbury confronted another staffperson at the Library. This time,
his "tirade" was so frightening that the staffmember had to be allowed to go home
to calm down, and she reported the incident to the police. (Doc. 152-1; 158-1, -2.)
Another staffmember who witnessed this "tirade" agreed that Spreadbury's
conduct was "despicable" or "pitiful." (Doc. 152-8.)
Though Spread bury insists this behavior was not disruptive, it objectively
disrupted the staff s ability to do their work and their sense of safety. The Library
director decided to terminate his Library privileges in accordance with the policy
and Montana Code Annotated § 22-1-31l. Spreadbury has not raised any genuine
issue of material fact suggesting the Library acted negligently. His only
arguments concern the legality of the .Library's process, which is addressed in the
discussions of due process above and in Judge Lynch's Findings and
Recommendations.
h. Officer Snavely
The undisputed facts show that Spreadbury was notified by letter on June
11, 2009, that he was no longer allowed in the Library building or on the grounds.
Nonetheless, Spreadbury was seen in the Library gazebo on August 20, 2009. The
Library Director reported that Spreadbury was trespassing, and Officer Snavely
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responded to the call. He spoke with Spreadbury in the gazebo, warned him not to
return to the Library, and took a report. Spreadbury voluntarily left the premises.
Later that day, Spreadbury met with Officer Snavely again at City Hall and was
again warned not to return to the Library. However, he returned that very day,4
ultimately confronting a patron, Ms. Cassens, demanding to know if she had
talked with the police and her name and phone number. He yelled at her, making
her and two witnesses nervous. He left but returned soon after with a video
camera and began filming Ms. Cassens. When she reported the incident to Library
staff, the Library director again called the police. Officer Snavely interviewed Ms.
Cassens, two witnesses, and the Director, and prepared another report. No
evidence suggests that the interviews were conducted negligently or that Officer
Snavely misrepresented or omitted anything he saw or learned in the reports. He
clearly explained in his report that Spreadbury had been banned from the Library
and identified the premises as the Bitterroot Public Library.
Again, Spreadbury's argument is purely legal-he insists Officer Snavely
"should have known" that it is not possible to criminally trespass on public
property. However, as discussed above in the discussion of whether Spreadbury's
4Ms.
Cassens reported that Spreadbury may have stayed on the sidewalk during the
confrontation.
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constitutional rights were violated, it is not clear under Montana law that criminal
trespass is inapplicable on public land. Moreover, no evidence suggests that
Officer Snavely interfered with the prosecutor's exercise of independent judgment
in reviewing the reports and deciding to press charges.
c. Officer Bruner-Murpby
The facts found by Judge Lynch in his discussion of whether Officer
Bruner-Murphy committed any constitutional violations also establish that Bruner
Murphy did not act negligently. The Library Director contacted the police
department to make a complaint that Spreadbury was "stalking" her. She
described his conduct to Bruner-Murphy and provided him several documents
representing the conduct she was complaining of. Bruner-Murphy explained the
procedure for filing for an order ofprotection and prepared a report based on the
interview and documents. No evidence suggests that Bruner-Murphy
misrepresented or omitted anything in the report, no charges were ever filed
relating to this report, and Spreadbury has alleged no damages relating to the
investigation.
Conclusion
Because the undisputed facts in the record do not establish the relevant
standard of care or that it was breached, the Municipal Defendants are entitled to
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summary judgment as to each of Spreadbury's negligence claims.
B.
Punitive Damages and Injunctive Relief
Because all of Spreadbury's claims against the Municipal Defendants fail, he is
not entitled to injunctive relief or punitive damages.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. Judge Lynch's Findings and Recommendations (doc. 250) are adopted in
part and rejected in part based on the additional briefmg of the parties.
2. The Municipal Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment (docs. 148
and 150) are DENIED as moot with respect to Spreadbury's claims for punitive
damages because there is no underlying cause of action on which punitive
damages could be awarded. The motions are otherwise GRANTED, and all of
Spreadbury's claims against the Municipal Defendants (the Bitterroot Public
Library, City of Hamilton, Dr. Robert Brophy, Trista Smith, Nansu Roddy, Jerry
Steele, Steve Snavely, Steven Bruner-Murphy, Ryan Oster, Kenneth Bell, and
Jennifer Lint) are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
3. The Municipal Defendants' Motion for Leave to File Supplemental
Summary Judgment Motion and Brief (doc. 252) is DENIED as moot.
5. Because no claim remains against the Municipal Defendants, all
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deadlines pertaining to them, including the jury trial scheduled for June 25, 2012,
are VACATED.
Dated this
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