Cini v. Cini-Lyon
Filing
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ORDER ADOPTING FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS for 4 Order, Findings and Recommendations. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Signed by Judge Dana L. Christensen on 3/9/2012. (APP, ) Copy mailed to Cini this date.
FILED
MAR 092012
PATRICK E. DUFFY, CLERK
By
7ioe~PUTYiiITV-;::;CLEi"ERKiiUi.MI""SSOUI.A=-::-:-
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRlCT OF MONTANA
MISSOULA DIVISION
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)
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Plaintiff,
vs.
ROBIN CINI-LYON,
CV 12-12-M-DLC-JCL
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NIGELCINI,
ORDER
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Defendant.
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Plaintiff Nigel Cini has filed a Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
his former wife Robin Cini-Lyon, alleging she violated his constitutional rights
with the help of the state courts that presided over their dissolution proceedings.
PlaintiffCini's lone cause of action alleges violation of his rights under the First,
Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. As a
remedy, Plaintiff requests that this Court to reverse the state court's order on
division of property and assets and assume jurisdiction over all present and future
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state court proceedings related to the dissolution.
Because Plaintiff Cini is proceeding in forma pauperis, United States
Magistrate Judge Jeremiah C. Lynch conducted preliminary screening of the
Complaint as required by 28 U.s.c. § 1915(e)(2). Under that statute, the court
engages in a preliminary screening to assess the merits of the claims and identify
cognizable claims, or dismiss the complaint or any portion thereof if the complaint
is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
The court should give a plaintiff leave to amend before dismissing a claim unless
it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of
other facts. LQpez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000).
Judge Lynch issued Findings and Recommendations in which he
recommends dismissal of the Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Judge Lynch first explained that Plaintiffs claim is barred by the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine because it is a de facto appeal of a state court judgment. See Rooker v.
Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court ofAppeals v.
Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). To the extent the state court proceedings are
ongoing, Judge Lynch continued, this Court is barred from interfering under the
abstention doctrine set forth in Younger v. Harris, 40 I U.S. 37 (1971), and
explicitly extended to apply to state domestic relations litigation in Moore v. Sims,
442 U.S. 415, 435 (1979). Judge Lynch recommends dismissal without leave to
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amend because the jurisdictional defect cannot possibly be cured by additional
factual allegations.
PlaintiffCini timely objected, thereby preserving his right to de novo review
ofthe record. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(I). He begins by arguing that Judge Lynch
erred in treating the preliminary screening process as mandatory under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2). Plaintiff argues the statute confers no such obligation on a district
court, but Plaintiff erroneously cites 18 U.S.C. § 1915, which is a provision of the
United States criminal code and has no application here. The applicable law, §
1915(e)(2) oftitle 28, does in fact require a district court to conduct preliminary
screening.
Plaintiff next takes issue with Judge Lynch's finding that this matter is not
one that could be removed to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1443-the civil
rights removal statute. Judge Lynch cites California v. Sandoval, 434 F.2d 635,
636 (9th Cir. 1970), for the proposition that removal under § 1443(1) is limited to
rights intended to insure equal racial treatment. Plaintiff argues that a more
nuanced reading of two United States Supreme Court cases, Georgia v. Rachel,
384 U.S. 780 (1966), and Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808 (1966), compels
the conclusion that the law contains no such limitation. This argument is
foreclosed by the very authority Plaintiff cites. In Georgia v. Rachel, the Supreme
Court states:
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[W]e conclude that the phrase "any law providing for >I< >I< >I< equal civil
rights" must be construed to mean any law providing for specific civil
rights stated in terms of racial equality. Thus, the defendants' broad
contentions under the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause
ofthe Fourteenth Amendment cannot support a valid claim for
removal under § 1443, because the guarantees ofthose clauses are
phrased in terms of general application available to all persons or
citizens, rather than in the specific language of racial equality that §
1443 demands.
384 U.S. at 792. Greenwood v. Peacock is likewise of no help to the Plaintiff, as it
limits removal under § 1443(2) to federal officers and those assisting such officers
in the performance of their duties. 384 U.S. at 815.
More fundamentally, it is irrelevant whether § 1443(1) or any other statute
giving rise to federal question jurisdiction applies in this case. Where a complaint
asks a federal district court to overturn a state court decision, the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine operates to bar federal jurisdiction even if the complaint articulates a
cause of action based on federal law. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1155 (9th Cir.
2003). "It is a forbidden de facto appeal under Rooker-Feldman when the plaintiff
in federal district court complains of a legal wrong allegedly committed by the
state court, and seeks relief from the judgment of that court." lsi at 1163. That is
precisely the situation here. 1
'The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar subject matter jurisdiction when the federal
plaintiff alleges a legal injury caused by an adverse party rather than by the state court. Noel, 341
F.3d at 1163. Although Plaintiff Cini names his former wife as the Defendant, his Complaint
does not seek redress for a legal injury caused by her. He accuses of her violating his rights with
the aid of "the gross abuse of discretion and authority of the state district court." Complaint
(Doc. No.2) at 13. There are no independent allegations of legal injury caused by Defendant
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Based on the foregoing, and after a de novo review, I adopt Judge Lynch's
Findings and Recommendations (Doc. No.4) in full.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
DATED this
qfh day of March, 2012.
Dana L. Christensen, District Judge
United States District Court
Ciill-Lyon outside of her conduct as a litigant in the state court proceedings. Thus, Plaintiff's
Complaint alleges only a "legal injury caused by a state court judgment because of a legal error
committed by the state court." Noel, 341 F.3d at 1164. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars
federal jurisdiction over such claims.
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