Peterson v. Frink et al
Filing
77
ORDER ADOPTING FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 66 , 67 in full; granting 57 Motion for Summary Judgment. Claim 1 of the Amended Petition 39 is DENIED. A certificate of appealability is DENIED. Signed by Judge Dana L. Christensen on 2/29/2016. (TAG, )
FILED
IN THE UNITED ST~TES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTluCT OF MONTANA
MISSOULA DIVISION
RONALD PETERSEN,
FEB 29 2016
Clerk, U.S Courts
District Of Montana
Missoula Division
CV 12-125-M-DLC-JCL
Petitioner,
ORDER
vs.
MARTIN FRINK; ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF THE STATE OF
MONTANA,
Respondents.
United States Magistrate Judge Jeremiah C. Lynch entered his Findings and
Recommendation in this case on AugU1st 10, 2015, recommending that
Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment be granted and Petitioner Ronald
Petersen's Petition for Writ of Habeas !Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 be
dismissed. (Docs. 66-67.) Petersen tipiely objected to the Findings and
Recommendation. (Doc. 70.)
Judge Lynch addressed Petersen's claims in two documents that together
compose the Findings and Recommendation. The Court issued an order on
January 21, 2016, setting a hearing ontthe single claim addressed within Document
67 of the Findings and RecommendatHm. (Doc. 72.) On January 26, 2016, the
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Court issued a separate order adopting! in full Document 66 of the Findings and
Recommendation. (Doc. 73.) The hearing on Petersen's sole remaining claim was
held on February 11, 2016.
Petersen's only remaining claimi is that his trial counsel were ineffective in
failing to dispute the validity of the anjest warrant dated January 27, 2008, the day
before his arrest. Because Petersen tiIJ!lely objected to Judge Lynch's findings as
to this claim, the Court conducts de novo review of the record. 28 U.S.C. §
636(b )(1 ). For the reasons listed below, the Court adopts Judge Lynch's Findings
and Recommendation in full.
Petersen was arrested on suspicilon of deliberate homicide in early 2008. He
does not dispute that probable cause fqr his arrest existed, but he argues that the
arrest warrant was not signed by a neutral and detached magistrate before his
arrest. Petersen was represented by two trial defense attorneys, neither of whom
disputed the validity of the arrest warrant. On January 2, 2009, Petersen entered
into a plea agreement, and a change o~plea hearing was held shortly thereafter.
I.
DISCUSSION
Petersen brings a Sixth Amendment Claim for ineffective assistance of
counsel, arguing that counsel's failurejto challenge the validity of his arrest
warrant led him to accept a plea rather! than go to trial. Judge Lynch recommended
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the Court grant judgment in the State's favor on Petersen's claim that trial counsel
were ineffective in failing to dispute tlie validity of the arrest warrant. Judge
Lynch determined that effective couns~l would have investigated the warrant,
which was deficient on its face, but that the error was inconsequential because the
warrant was in fact valid. Petersen objects, arguing that no valid warrant existed
at the time of his arrest and that an evidentiary hearing is necessary to fully
develop the record. The Court disagrees, determining that the record is
sufficiently developed and that summ~ judgment is appropriate.
Assuming that Petersen's trial c9unsel's performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness, .J!>etersen cannot show that there is no
"reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of
the proceeding would have been different." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 687-88, 694 (1984). Petersen ha$ failed to meet his burden of showing that
"there is a reasonable probability that, lbut for counsel's errors, he would not have
pleaded guilty and would have insiste<,l on going to trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474
U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
Petersen has consistently maintained that Judge Christopher did not sign an
arrest warrant for his arrest before he was taken into custody by Fort Bragg
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military police. He argues that effective trial counsel would have discovered the
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warrant's invalidity and successfully moved to suppress his confessions.
However, there is no reasonable probapility that Petersen would have gone to trial
had counsel moved to suppress Peters~n's confessions on the basis of the arrest
warrant's invalidity. His arguments a.¢ unavailing for at least two reasons. First,
his trial counsel would not have been able to suppress his statements. And second,
although Petersen's confessions are highly inculpatory, the weight of the other
evidence against Petersen is so great tl!tat it is unlikely he would have gone to trial
even had the confessions been suppre~sed.
A.
Validity of the Warrant
Petersen claims that because the arrest warrant was not signed by a neutral
and detached magistrate before his arrest, effective trial counsel would have
successfully moved to suppress his coh.fessions as the fruits of a procedurally
invalid arrest. In objecting to Judge Lynch's Findings and Recommendation,
Petersen argues that the Court cannot accurately determine whether a valid arrest
warrant was issued because the record! is insufficiently developed. He filed his
petition before this Court on July 11, 2o 12, and he has been represented by
counsel since August 20, 2014. Both parties have had extensive opportunities to
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develop the record. In fact, Judge Lytich expressly directed the parties to do so on
several occasions. Because Petersen Has failed to meet his burden of showing the
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existence of a genuine dispute of mat~rial fact, summary judgment is appropriate.
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The warrant appears to be valid( There is no dispute that probable cause to
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arrest Petersen existed, and the facts e$tablishing probable cause were clearly
communicated to Judge Christopher it1L the search warrant applications presented
to her on January 27, 2008. An arrest1warrant dated January 27, 2008 has been
produced before this Court. The samti warrant was faxed to a North Carolina
number within 48 hours of Petersen's ~est. Hours before Petersen's arrest, the
existence of a warrant was verified by1 the Lake County officer who entered
Petersen's record into the National Crime Information Center database and by the
individual at Fort Bragg who pulled Pbtersen' s record from the database.
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Petersen has not produced "suffli.cient probative evidence to permit a finding
[in his favor] based on more than mer~ speculation, conjecture, or fantasy."
Radwan v. Cnty. of Orange, No. SACV 08-0786 AG, 2010 WL 3293354, at *10
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2010) (quoting O.ip.C. Corp. v. Apple Computer, Inc., 792
F.2d 1464, 1467 (9th Cir. 1986)). Pet~rsen's argument is wholly speculative: he
argues that because the warrant references an information that cannot be located
over eight years later, the information illever existed and either Judge Christopher
backdated the warrant or someone els¢ fabricated it. What Petersen raises is not a
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genuine dispute of material fact but speculative theories insufficient to defeat
summary judgment.
B.
Prejudice
Even if trial counsel would have been successful in moving to suppress
Petersen's claims, summary judgmentlfor the State is appropriate because Petersen
has failed to show that "there is a reasbnable probability that, but for counsel's
errors, he would not have pleaded gui~ty and would have insisted on going to
trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, S9 (1985). Petersen claims that he would
have gone to trial had his statements been suppressed on the grounds that they
were the product of an illegal arrest. To establish the second Strickland prong of
prejudice, however, Petersen must do ~ore than simply tell the Court that he can
establish prejudice. Rather, he must demonstrate that suppression of the
statements "would have led counsel to change its recommendation as to the plea,"
which "in turn, will depend in large p~ on a prediction whether the evidence
likely would have changed the outcon).e of a trial." Id. Petersen cannot do so
because, after subtracting his confessibns, the evidence against him was great.
Petersen's statements are highl){ inculpatory. He makes clear that not only
did he kill Wilson but that he felt no r~morse for the killing. As damning as his
own statements are, however, their re:rhoval from the case leaves the State with a
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mountain of evidence against him.
Efective trial counsel would not have changed
the recommendation to accept the plea, especially given Petersen's frequently
articulated objective of wanting to actjept responsibility to save his friends and
family members from any criminal liability.
When Petersen pleaded guilty, t!he State had, at the very minimum, the
following evidence against him: four ~ndividuals' description of Petersen's anger
about law enforcement's non-prosecu~ion of Wilson for his alleged assault upon a
13-year-old girl; Wilson's girlfriend's! description of the shooter as similar in
height and stature to Petersen; Petersen's brother, Ryon's report to detectives that
Petersen admitted to the murder; Ryon's report of facts unknown to the general
public; Petersen's other brother, Lorep's statement to police, including Petersen's
admission to the murder and addition~l facts unreported to the public; Zach's
admission that he loaned a now-missiiji.g .45 caliber pistol to Petersen; a match
between the gun Zach loaned to Petersen and the shell casings found at the scene;
the case to the .45 caliber pistol, a testi-firing casing, and a holster all found in
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Zach's home; a ski mask matching th~ description provided by Wilson's
girlfriend; and a letter from Petersen t~ Wilson's 13-year-old alleged victim, also
found in Zach's home. The evidence weighs heavily in favor of Petersen's guilt,
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and effective trial counsel could reasonably recommend a defendant facing this
evidence accept the plea rather than g~ to trial.
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Petersen cannot show that supptessing his claims would have created a
likelihood of success on any of the defenses he could have potentially brought at
trial: mitigation, innocence, or self-defense. Mont. Code Ann. §§ 45-3-102,
45-5-102, 45-5-103. Petersen did ndt object to the Findings and
Recommendation as to Judge Lynch'sl determination that Petersen could not have
succeeded in a mitigation defense. (l)oc. 66 at 11.) As noted above, the State
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could have presented substantial evidence on all elements of deliberate homicide,
making acquittal highly unlikely.
An4 no facts suggest that Petersen could
successfully show self-defense when Wilson's shooter entered Wilson's home in
the middle of the night to fire four shtjts at him from point-blank range while he
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was sleeping.
Further, the facts suggest that Pbtersen would have rejected trial counsel's
suggestion to go to trial, had that suggestion been made. "Prejudice does not
generally exist when a defendant chodses to plead guilty." Smith v. Mahoney, 611
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F.3d 978, 991 (9th Cir. 2010). Petersen "strongly and repeatedly insisted on
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pleading guilty," Id. (citation omitted), making it "highly unlikely that his attorney
could have provided any information which would have dissuaded him[,]"
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Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 9~0 (9th Cir. 2004). Between his arrest and
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sentencing, Petersen repeatedly statedl that he wanted to accept responsibility for
Wilson's death to avoid prosecution o[ his friends and family members. At
sentencing, Petersen clearly communicated his lack of remorse for the homicide
and his simultaneous desire to accept fbe consequences of what he determined to
be a righteous killing. Petersen has faji.led to show prejudice, and his petition must
be denied.
C.
Certificate of AppealabUity
Petersen has not "made substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253. Here, where there is no genuine dispute of material fact
and the legal issues are well-establish~d, there are neither close questions nor
reason to encourage further proceedings. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484
(2000). A certificate of appealability is unwarranted.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED:
(1)
The Findings and Recommendation (Docs. 66 and 67) are ADOPTED
in full.
(2)
The State's motion for sujmmary judgment (Doc. 57) is GRANTED.
(3)
Claim 1 of the Amended J_>etition (Doc. 39) is DENIED for lack of
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merit.
(4)
A certificate of appealabi!lity is DENIED.
(5)
The Clerk of Court is dir¢cted to enter by separate document a
judgment in favor of Respondents and against Petitioner.
Dated this ).'f~day of February, 20
iDana L. Christensen, Chief Judge
junited States District Court
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