Golden v. NorthWestern Corporation

Filing 10

ORDER granting 5 Motion to dismiss Count II of Complaint. Signed by Judge Dana L. Christensen on 1/29/2013. (dle)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
MISSOULA DIVISION

TONY GOLDEN,

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Plaintiff,
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vs.
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NORTHWESTERN CORPORATION,
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d/b/a NORTHWESTERN ENERGY,
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Defendant.
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___________________________________ )

CV 12-190-M-DLC

ORDER

Defendant Northwestern Corporation, d/b/a/ Northwestern Energy, filed a
motion to dismiss Count II of Plaintiff Tony Golden’s complaint on November 29,
2012 (doc. 5). Plaintiff failed to respond to Defendant’s motion. Defendant’s
motion is well-taken and will be granted pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(d)(1)(B).
Plaintiff’s complaint asserts claims for wrongful discharge (Count I) and
negligent training and supervision (Count II) arising from his discharge from
Northwestern Energy. Defendant moved to dismiss Count II of the complaint,

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arguing Montana’s Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act (“WDEA”) is
Plaintiff’s exclusive remedy for his discharge. Defendant further argues negligent
supervision requires a third party actor and Plaintiff’s claim fails because no third
party is involved in the circumstances surrounding his discharge.
Plaintiff’s exclusive remedy lies under the WDEA. The WDEA provides
the exclusive remedy for wrongful discharge in Montana with few exceptions.
Mont. Code Ann. § 39-2-902; Solle v. Western States Ins. Agency, Inc., 999 P.2d
328, 330-331 (Mont. 2000). The Montana Supreme Court has “held that §
39-2-913, MCA, bars all claims arising from an asserted wrongful discharge based
upon common law tort or implied or express contract” so long as the tort or
contract claims are for discharge. Solle, 999 P.2d at 331.
Plaintiff’s claim is clearly based on his allegedly wrongful discharge from
Northwestern Energy. Count I of his complaint alleges a violation of the WDEA,
stating Defendant did not have good cause for his termination. (Doc. 4 at 2.)
Count II alleges Defendant failed to properly train and supervise Plaintiff
regarding his personal computer useage and such negligent supervision led to his
discharge. Negligent supervision claims are generally based on a claim by an
injured plaintiff against the tortfeasor’s supervisor, not against the tortfeasor
himself, as Plaintiff alleges here. Saucier v. McDonald’s Restaurants of Mont.
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Inc., 179 P.3d 481, 495 (Mont. 2008); Hoffman v. Austin, 147 P.3d 177, 181
(Mont. 2006) overruled on other grounds, Giambra v. Kelsey, 162 P.3d 134
(Mont. 2007). Both Montana law and the Comments to the Restatement (Second)
of Agency § 213 imply without directly stating that negligent supervision claims
apply only to harms against third persons, not the employee directly.
Because the WDEA provides the exclusive remedy for Plaintiff’s claim, this
Court need not analyze whether a negligent supervision claim may be brought
directly by an employee. Plaintiff had the opportunity to address these issues, and
failed to respond to Defendant’s motion to dismiss Count II. For this reason and
because Defendant’s motion is supported by Montana law, the motion will be
granted. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to dismiss Count II of the
complaint (doc. 5) is GRANTED.
Dated this 29th day of January, 2013.

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