Pedersen v. TJX Companies

Filing 28

ORDER granting 22 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Donald W. Molloy on 10/1/2013. (dle)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
MISSOULA DIVISION
CINDY PEDERSEN,

CV 12–210–M–DWM

Plaintiff,
ORDER
vs.
THE TJX COMPANIES, INC.,
Defendant.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Cindy Pedersen (“Pedersen”) filed suit against Defendant The TJX
Companies, Inc. (“TJX”) pursuant to Montana’s Wrongful Discharge from
Employment Act, alleging TJX lacked good cause to terminate her employment
and that the reasons TJX gave for her termination were merely a pretext. TJX
filed a motion seeking summary judgment on all of Pedersen’s claims. (Doc. 22.)
Because no genuine issues of material fact remain, summary judgment is granted
in favor of TJX for the reasons set forth below.
BACKGROUND
TJX operates T.J. Maxx stores throughout the country. Pedersen worked at
-1-

the T.J. Maxx store in Missoula, Montana, from 2002 until her employment was
terminated on January 17, 2012. (Def.’s SUF, doc. 24 at ¶ 3.) During the course
of her employment, she worked as an hourly employee in multiple positions and,
at the time of her termination, served as the Assistant Store Manager. (Id. at ¶ 3.)
On January 5, 2012, Pedersen went to Kalispell with 8 other T.J. Maxx
employees to perform inventory at the Kalispell T.J. Maxx store. (Id. at ¶¶ 20-21.)
Pedersen was the only managerial employee from the Missoula store to go to
Kalispell. (Id. at ¶ 24.) T.J. Maxx paid for all the costs associated with the trip,
including the hotel room, rental cars, gas, and breakfast. (Id. at ¶ 26.) After
checking into the hotel in Kalispell, Pedersen drove three members of her
inventory team to a local liquor store, where they purchased two twelve-packs of
beer and a bottle of vodka. (Id. at ¶ 28.) The employees then went to the T.J.
Maxx store, performing inventory from approximately 6 p.m. to 12:45 a.m., on the
morning of January 6. (Id. at ¶ 29.) Upon completing inventory, the employees
returned to the hotel and Pedersen joined up with four other employees (including
nineteen-year old Cody Posio) and they drank the alcohol purchased earlier in the
evening. (Id. at ¶¶ 30-31.)
Penny Dickey, the Missoula store manager, was told about the events of that
night by one of the employees on the trip. Dickey then corroborated the incident
-2-

by a conversation with hotel staff the next morning. (Id. at ¶¶ 35-38.) District
Manager Denis Lattin then began an investigation into Pedersen’s conduct and he
interviewed Pedersen. Pedersen admitted to consuming alcohol the morning in
question and that Posio was present at the time. (Id. at ¶ 39.) After speaking to
the other employees involved, Lattin decided to terminate Pedersen’s employment,
and this decision was communicated to Pedersen by Dickey on January 17, 2012.
(Id. at ¶ 50.)
TJX publishes a Global Code of Conduct Guide (“Code of Conduct”) on an
annual basis. (Id. at ¶ 7.) Pedersen annually signed a certificate acknowledging
she received and review the Code of Conduct. (Id. at ¶ 8.) The relevant
provisions of the Code of Conduct state:
•

•

•

“[N]one of us may report to work, come onto Company property, perform
any job-related activity, or drive a company vehicle, while under the
influence of alcohol or illegal drugs.” (Id. at ¶ 9.)
“A conflict of interest exists when a personal interest or activity interferes
with the duties that you perform for and owe to TJX. You should always
perform your duties with only the interests of the Company in mind.” (Id. at
¶ 14.)
“Our culture of integrity and compliance starts at the top. All members of
management must not only fulfill their duties, but also assume responsibility
for those who report to them. If you are a supervisor, manager or executive
you must carefully follow the principles listed below:
•
Earn respect and lead by example – your Associates expect you to do
the right thing.
•
Understand this Code and all Company policies that affect your job
and help Associates understand this information too.
-3-

•
•

Promote compliance with the Code – even in difficult situations.
Create an environment of integrity, accountability and mutual respect
that supports doing the right thing.” (Id. at ¶ 18.)

The Code of Conduct states that “violat[ions] of the Code, Company
policies, or the law . . . may result in discipline, up to and including termination . .
. .” (Id. at ¶ 7.)
SUMMARY CONCLUSION
T.J. Maxx had cause to terminate Pedersen and Pedersen has failed to
demonstrate any genuine issues of material fact remain or to produce sufficient
evidence that the reason for her termination was a pretext. TJX’s motion for
summary judgment (doc. 22) is granted for the reasons set forth below.
STANDARD
A party is entitled to summary judgment if it can demonstrate that “there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment is warranted where
the documentary evidence produced by the parties permits only one conclusion.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251 (1986). Only disputes over
facts that might affect the outcome of the lawsuit will preclude entry of summary
judgment; factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary to the outcome are
not considered. Id. at 248.
-4-

ANALYSIS
TJX maintains that it had good cause to terminate Pedersen’s employment
based on her conduct during the Kalispell trip and that no genuine issues of
material fact remain. Pedersen insists that TJX had no basis to terminate her
because the conduct in question occurred outside of her employment and fact
disputes remain as to whether the Code of Conduct prohibited drinking. Contrary
to Pedersen’s argument, no genuine issues of material fact remain so that TJX is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
The Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act provides that it is unlawful
to discharge an employee if “the discharge was not for good cause and the
employee had completed the employer’s probationary period of employment[.]”
Mont. Code Ann. § 39-2-904(1)(b) (2013). To defeat a motion for summary
judgment, an employee may “either prove that the reason given for the discharge is
not ‘good cause’ in and of itself, or that the given reason is a pretext and not the
honest reason for the discharge.” Becker v. Rosebud Operating Servs., 191 P.3d
435, 441 (Mont. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The
employee must present “evidence, [] not mere speculation or denial.” Kestell v.
Heritage Health Care Corp., 858 P.2d 3, 8 (Mont. 1993).

-5-

I.

TJX had good cause to terminate Pedersen’s employment.
TJX has established by uncontroverted facts that it had good cause for

terminating Pedersen. “Good cause” is defined as “reasonable job-related grounds
for dismissal based on a failure to satisfactorily perform job duties, disruption of
the employer’s operation, or other legitimate business reason.” § 39-2-903(5). A
legitimate business reason is one that is “neither false, whimsical, arbitrary or
capricious, and it must have some logical relationship to the needs of the
business.” Kestell, 858 P.2d at 7 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
“It is not arbitrary to ‘terminate an employee who acted inappropriately some, but
perhaps not all, of the time[.]’” Berg v. TXJ Cos., 2013 WL 3242472 *4 (D. Mont.
June 24, 2013) (quoting Sullivan v. Contl. Const. of Mont., LLC, 299 P.3d 832,
838 (Mont. 2013)). In analyzing “good cause,” the Montana Supreme Court has
“stressed the importance of the right of an employer to exercise discretion over
whom it will employ and keep in employment.” Sullivan, 299 P.3d at 835
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court “afford[s] employers
the greatest discretion” where an employee occupies a managerial position. Id.;
see also Buck v. Billings Mont. Chevrolet, Inc., 811 P.2d 537, 541 (Mont. 1991);
McConkey v. Flathead Elec. Co-op, 125 P.3d 1121, 1127 (Mont. 2005).
Here, Pedersen occupied a managerial position as she was the Assistant
-6-

Store Manager. Her ability to exercise broad discretion while acting in that
capacity is evidenced by the fact that she helped determine which employees
would travel on the inventory trip and that she alone was assigned to travel to
Kalispell to oversee those employees including a nineteen year old staffer. As
such, T.J. Maxx is given greater discretion over its decision regarding her
termination. See Sullivan, 299 P.3d at 835.
There is no question Pedersen drank with subordinate employees—one of
whom was 19 years-old—while on a company trip and that alcohol was purchased
before the inventory work commenced. Even though Pedersen argues that she was
on her “own time” when the conduct in question occurred, T.J. Maxx determined
her behavior violated its Code of Conduct and negatively impacted its trust in her
as a supervisor. While the conduct in question may qualify as personal activity,
the Code of Conduct specifically states that a conflict of interest exists if a
personal activity interferes with the employee’s duties or the interests of the
company. (See Def.’s SUF, doc. 24 at ¶ 14.) The Code of Conduct further
references the higher standards to which supervisors are held, especially in their
interactions vis-a-vis subordinate employees. (See id. at ¶ 18.)

For these

reasons, in the absence of a factual dispute, the employer’s decision stands.
Furthermore, in Sullivan, McConkey, and Buck, the Montana Supreme Court
-7-

found a business has legitimate interest in employing a manager whom it could
trust in the day-to-day operation of the business. Sullivan, 299 P.3d at 836;
McConkey, 125 P.3d at 1127; Buck, 811 P.2d at 541. Being able to trust that a
supervisor will not engage in this type of conduct on a business trip logically
relates to the needs of T.J. Maxx and how it operates its business. This is
especially so when the conduct engaged in was illegal, in other words providing
alcohol or making it available to a minor. Thus, T.J. Maxx acted within its
discretion when it concluded Pedersen’s conduct violated its Code of Conduct and
that her termination served a legitimate business purpose. See Berg, * 5. As a
result, TJX has demonstrated good cause for its decision, with no factual issue that
the decision was pretextual.
Pedersen insists that because the notice of termination only noted the reason
as “improper behavior,” any other grounds provided by TJX are irrelevant and
inadmissible. However, “evidence offered to substantiate the reasons already
given in the termination letter [is] admissible.” McConkey, 125 P.3d at 1127
(quotations and alterations omitted). Here, the termination form references
“improper behavior,” the Code of Conduct, the Conflict of Interest policy, and
specifically states that Pedersen failed to “perform her duties with the interests of
the company in mind” and “put herself in a situation in which her loyalty to the
-8-

company interests was compromised.” (Doc. 25-1.) All of the arguments raised
by TJX expand upon these initial disclosures, making them both relevant and
admissible.
II.

Pedersen has provided insufficient evidence to support a finding of
pretext.
The record does not support a finding of pretext. In attempting to show

pretext, “[m]ere denial or speculation will not suffice, the non-moving party must
show facts sufficient to raise a genuine issue.” Cecil v. Cardinal Drilling Co., 797
P.2d 232, 235 (Mont. 1990); see also Johnson v. Costco Wholesale, 152 P.3d 727,
734-35 (Mont. 2007) (rejecting the plaintiff’s mere “speculation” that the stated
reason for his termination was a pretext and granting summary judgment for the
employer); Mysse v. Martens, 926 P.2d 765, 771 (Mont. 1996) (holding the
plaintiff’s allegation that she was a scapegoat was “mere speculation” and did “not
rise to the level of a ‘pretext.’”)
Pedersen has not pointed to any specific facts to support her argument that
TJX’s proffered rationale for her discharge was a pretext. Her entire pretext
argument is based on her speculation that Store Manager Penny Dickey wanted to
“squeeze” her out and hire new people. (Def.’s SUF, doc. 24 at ¶ 54.) However,
Pedersen comes up with no facts to show that Dickey had any input in deciding to

-9-

terminate Pedersen’s employment or that any statements made by Dickey about
new hires, if made, were in any way related to her discharge. (See id. at ¶¶ 39-44.)
Pedersen has failed to raise facts that could show, or imply, that the given reason
for the discharge was “not the honest reason for the discharge.” Becker, 191 P.3d
at 441.
CONCLUSION
Because TJX’s rationale for terminating Pedersen’s employment was based
on legitimate business purposes and Pedersen merely speculates as to pretext, TJX
is entitled to summary judgment as to all of Pedersen’s claims. Based on the
foregoing, TJX’s motion for summary judgment (doc. 22) is GRANTED.
The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendant and against
Plaintiff.
The Clerk is further ordered to notify the parties of the entry of this order
and judgment.
Dated this 1st day of October, 2013.

-10-