Jonas et al v. Waterman et al

Filing 97

ORDER ADOPTING FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS - granting 42 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying as moot 70 Motion to Amend/Correct; denying as moot 76 Motion for Certificate of Appealability; finding as moot 88 Motion to Vacate ; adopting Findings and Recommendations re 91 Findings and Recommendations. Signed by Judge Dana L. Christensen on 12/2/2013. (APP, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA

MISSOULA DIVISION

EDWIN R. JONAS III,

CV 13-16-M-DLC- JCL

Plaintiff,
ORDER
vs.
RONALD F. WATERMAN, ESQ.,
GOUGH, SHANAHAN, JOHNSON &
WATERMAN, a professional limited
liability partnership,

FILED
DEC 022013
Clerk. u.s District Court
District Of Montana
Missoula

Defendants.

Pro se Plaintiff Edwin R. Jonas ("Jonas") filed suit in January 2013 alleging
legal malpractice against his former attorney and his attorney's law firm.
Defendants Ronald F. Waterman ("Waterman") and Gough, Shanahan, Johnson &
Waterman, PLLP (collectively "Defendants") moved for summary judgment.
(Doc. 42.)
United States Magistrate Judge Jeremiah C. Lynch issued findings and
recommendations

g~anting

Defendants' motion in full. (Doc. 91.) Jonas timely

filed objections and is entitled to de novo review of the specific findings and
recommendations to which he objects. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The portions of the

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findings and recommendations not specifically objected to will be reviewed for
clear error. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Commodore Bus. Mach., Inc., 656 F.2d
1309,1313 (9th Cir. 1981). For the reasons stated below, the Court adopts Judge
Lynch's findings and recommendations in full. The parties are familiar with the
factual and procedural background of this case so it will not be repeated here.

A. Res Judicata
Jonas first objects to Judge Lynch's finding that the doctrine of res judicata
applies to this action. Specifically, Jonas contends that Judge Lynch erroneously
found that the Montana Supreme Court held that Jonas' suit would have been
barred by res judicata. Jonas bases this objection on two arguments: (1) Judge
Lynch ignored the previous decisions in the underlying litigation; and (2) the
Court's finding of res judicata was merely dictum because the issue was not raised
at the trial level or on appeal.
Jonas' first argument is utterly without merit. Judge Lynch clearly
considered the previous decisions leading to Jonas' appeals to the Montana
Supreme Court, as well as that Court's ultimate decisions. (See Doc. 91 at 10-15.)
Additionally, Jonas claims Judge Lynch ignored the opinions and findings of the
New Jersey decisions, which formed the basis for the Montana litigation. Again,
this argument is without merit. In Jonas v. Jonas, CV 13-90-M-DWM-JCL,
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D. Mont. (Aug. 21, 2013), Judge Lynch thoroughly reviewed the New Jersey
judgments and ultimately concluded they were final. As such, Jonas' argument
that Judge Lynch ignored the previous decisions in the underlying litigation is
baseless.
Jonas' second contention, that the res judicata issue was not raised at the
trial or on appeal, is simply false. Disregarding the fact the Jonas fails to cite to
any legal authority for the argument that the Montana Supreme Court's finding is
dictum, l a review of the record clearly shows the issue of res judicata was raised
both at trial and on ~ppeal. At the trial level, Linda Jonas raised the issue of res
judicata and Waterman replied to the argument in a sur-reply brief. (Doc. 49-11.)
Also, Linda thoroughly briefed the argument in her response brief to Jonas' first
appeal to the Montana Supreme Court. Appellee's Response Br., Jonas v. Jonas,
249 P.3d 80 (Mont. 2010) (unpublished opinion). Accordingly, Jonas' argument
that the issue was never raised is simply not true.
Turning to Jonas' dictum argument, the Montana Supreme Court clearly
held that Jonas' suit was barred by res judicata:

IThis is not the only argument for which Jonas fails to cite to legal authority. Jonas fails
to cite to any legal authority for any of his objections to Judge Lynch's findings and
recommendations.

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All the elements of res judicata are met. It appears this issue was
actually litigated. See Jonas v. Jonas, 2008 WL 239069 * 1 (N.J.
Super. A.D. January 30, 2008). Even if it was not, the record makes
clear that [Jonas] had the opportunity to litigate this issue in New
Jersey before the judgments were entered. Res judicata bars [Jonas']
claim in Montana.

Jonas v. Jonas, 249 P.3d 80, *2 (Mont. 2010) (unpublished opinion).
As Judge Lynch states, the opinion expressly holds that Jonas' claim is
barred by res judicata.
Finally, Jonas repeatedly urges the Court to reevaluate the Montana
Supreme Court's decisions for error in application of the law to the facts of the
underlying suit. Essentially, Jonas argues that the Montana Supreme Court's
application of res judicata was incorrect, and that it is this Court's duty to rectify
the error. It is not this Court's duty to review a state supreme court's decision for
error, and it declines to do so here.
B. Causation

Jonas' argues that Judge Lynch erred in finding that Waterman's alleged
conduct was not the cause of Jonas' damages. Jonas bases his objection on two
arguments: (1) Waterman's failure to file supporting briefs foreclosed any
opportunity for the trial court to rule on the merits of Jonas' defense to Linda's
domestication suit; and (2) .this failure resulted in the Montana Supreme Court

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issuing a decision based on dictum, rather than on the merits. Both of these
arguments must fail.
First, although Waterman was cited by the state trial court and the Montana
Supreme Court for failing to file supporting briefs, both courts heard Jonas'
defense to Linda's domestication suit. As stated above, Waterman filed a
responsive brief and a sur-reply in opposition to Linda's motion for a charging
order. In the sur-reply, Waterman argued Jonas' defense to Linda's suit, as well as
the issue of res judicata. (Doc. 49-11 at 2.) Waterman also raised Jonas' defense
to Linda's suit in the opening brief to the Montana Supreme Court. Opening Br.
of Appellant, Jonas v. Jonas, 249 P.3d 80 (Mont. 2010) (unpublished opinion).
The Court acknowledged this defense when it stated "[Jonas'] claim that the 2006
New Jersey jUdgements were satisfied by prejudgment transfers of money and
property held in constructive trust for Linda is barred by res judicata." Jonas, 249
P.3d at *2. Thus, both the trial court and the Montana Supreme Court heard
Jonas' defense to Linda's suit.
Second, Jonas' repeatedly characterizes the Montana Supreme Court's
holding that his claim was barred by the doctrine of res judicata as dictum. As
established above, the determination that Jonas' claim is barred by res judicata is
clearly part of the Court's holding, notwithstanding the alleged procedural errors
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committed by Waterman. Jonas bases his legal malpractice claims on the
argument that if Waterman had not committed the alleged procedural errors, the
outcome of the decision would have been different. However, a plain reading of

Jonas I clearly establishes that the Montana Supreme Court would have barred
Jonas' suit, regardless of the alleged errors. To defeat Waterman's motion for
summary judgment, Jonas must present evidence that the outcome of the
underlying litigation would have been decided differently but for Waterman's
alleged negligence. Labair v. Carey, 291 P.3d 1160, 1166 (Mont. 2012). Jonas
does not allege any conduct by Waterman that would have altered the Montana
Supreme Court's decision on res judicata. Accordingly, Defendants' motion for
summary judgment will be granted.
C. Rule 11 Sanctions

Jonas also objects to Judge Lynch's recommendation that the Court deny his
motion for Rule 11 sanctions against Waterman. Jonas fails to advance a
compelling argument or cite any legal authority for rejecting Judge Lynch's
recommendation. Jonas' Rule 11 motion is entirely inappropriate and unfounded.
The Court will adopt Judge Lynch's findings and recommendations, and deny
Jonas' motion for Rule 11 sanctions.

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There being no clear error in Judge Lynch's remaining findings and
recommendations, IT IS ORDERED:
1. Judge Lynch's Findings and Recommendations (Doc. 91) are ADOPTED
in full.
2. Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Doc. 42) is GRANTED, and
this case is DISMISSED in its entirety.
3. Plaintiffs alternative motions (Docs 70; 76) to amend the June 12,2013,
order of dismissal to either set forth the grounds necessary for an interlocutory
appeal under 29 U.S.C. § 1292(b) or include a certification under Fed. R Civ. P.
54(b) are DENIED as moot.
4. Plaintiffs motion for sanctions pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 is
DENIED.
5. The Clerk shall close this matter, vacate all pending deadlines, and deny
all pending motions as moot.

Dated this

? () ~day of November 2013.

Dana L. Christensen, Chie Judge
United States District Court
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