Montanore Minerals Corporation v. Easements and Rights of Way under, through and across those certain unpatented lode mining claims located in the NE 1/4 of Section 15, Township 27 North, Range 31 West, Lincoln County, Montana, and id et al
Filing
142
ORDER denying 75 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 82 Motion ; granting in part and denying in part 83 Motion for Protective Order; granting in part and denying in part 88 Motion to Compel. Signed by Chief Judge Dana L. Christensen on 2/25/2015. (dle)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
MISSOULA DIVISION
MONTANORE MINERALS CORP.,
CV 13–133–M–DLC
Plaintiff,
ORDER
vs.
Easements and Rights of Way under,
through and across those certain
unpatented lode mining claims located
in the NE 1/4 and the NW 1/4 of
Section 15, Township 27 North, Range
31 West, Lincoln County, Montana,
and identified as POPS 12, POPS 13,
POPS 14 and POPS 15; ARNOLD
BAKIE; OPTIMA, INC.; FRANK
DUVAL; UNKNOWN OWNERS; and
all other persons, unknown, claiming
or who might claim any right, title,
estate, or interest in or lien or
encumbrance the unpatented lode
mining claims described above or any
cloud upon title thereto, whether such
claim or possible claim be present or
contingent,
Defendants.
Before the Court are several motions. For the reasons explained the Court
denies Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, grants in part and denies in part
Plaintiff’s motion for protective order and motion to deem answers admitted, and
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denies Defendants’ motion to require deposit.
Background
Because the parties are familiar with the factual and procedural background
of the case, it will only be repeated here as necessary to explain the Court’s order.
Montanore Minerals Corporation (“Montanore”) brought this diversity
action in condemnation pursuant to Rule 71.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and Montana Code Annotated § 70-30-101 to condemn easements and
rights of way across certain unpatented lode mining claims in which Defendants
claim an interest (“Subject Claims”). The Court granted Montanore’s motion for a
preliminary condemnation order and motion for preliminary injunction on April
29, 2014. To resolve the issue of just compensation, the Court has appointed a
three-member Commission and scheduled a Commission hearing for April 8,
2015.
I.
Motion for Summary Judgment
Legal Standard
A party is entitled to summary judgment if it can demonstrate that “there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment is warranted where
the documentary evidence produced by the parties permits only one conclusion.
2
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251 (1986). A party opposing a
properly supported motion for summary judgment “may not rest upon mere
allegation or denials of his pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 256. Only disputes over facts that might
affect the outcome of the lawsuit will preclude entry of summary judgment; factual
disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary to the outcome are not considered. Id.
at 248. In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, “[t]he evidence of the
non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his
favor.” Id. at 255.
Discussion
Montanore moves for summary judgment on the issue of just compensation,
requesting the Court to declare as a matter of law that the condemnation of the
easements and rights of way through Defendants’ unpatented mining claims does
not diminish the value of those claims and that the Defendants are not entitled to
any compensation. While the Court believes based on the current state of the
record that the evidence of diminution in value is minimal, Montana law states that
“just compensation is determined by equitable principles.” Alexander v. State
Highway Comm’n, 412 P.2d 414, 416 (Mont. 1966). Therefore, at this stage of
these condemnation proceedings the Court cannot find as a matter of law that
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Defendants are entitled to nothing for the taking of the easements and rights of
way condemned here. Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment is denied,
and the issue of just compensation will be resolved by the highly qualified
Commission based on all of the evidence presented at the hearing on April 8,
2015.
More specifically, Montanore contends that Defendants have failed to
produce expert testimony or evidence on loss in diminution in value of the Subject
Claims resulting from the taking, and that absent evidence of the decrease in
market value as a result of the taking – in the form of before and after appraisals –
it is entitled to summary judgment and Defendants are not entitled to any
compensation. Given the scant nature of Defendants’ proof, the argument has
some appeal, but is ultimately rejected for the reasons explained below.
Defendants do not actually contest Montanore’s assertion that they lack
evidence in the form of before and after appraisals speaking directly to fair market
value of the Subject Claims. Instead, Defendants argue that an appraisal
establishing the replacement cost for the Subject Claims should serve as evidence
of what constitutes just compensation. While the Court does not reject the general
proposition that replacement cost may be used to assess value in Montana
condemnation proceedings, see e.g. State Highway Comm’n v. Tubbs, 411 P.2d
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739, 743 (Mont. 1966), Defendants’ theory for replacement value here must be
rejected because it is contrary to the law and the facts.
Defendants’ replacement cost theory is premised on the contentions that (1)
they have a right of access to the adit, and (2) they own the adit. Both of these
contentions are without merit.
Defendants base their claim of access to the adit on two equally meritless
arguments: (1) the portal to the adit is on the Subject Claims rather than on
Montanore’s patented Johnstone Placer claim, and (2) even if the portal is on the
Johnstone Placer, Defendants have an implied easement through the Johnstone
Placer to access the adit’s portal.
Defendants fail to provide evidence sufficient to create a genuine dispute
about whether the portal to the adit is on the Johnstone Placer claim. On the other
hand, Montanore has provided undisputed sworn testimony from multiple
deponents establishing that the portal to the adit is on the Johnstone Placer.1 Lynn
Hagarty, district geologist for the United States Forest Service, testified that “[t]he
1
Both parties have repeatedly violated Local Rule with respect to filing exhibits in the
docket, making location of the parties’ supporting citations difficult and frustrating for the Court.
Local Rule 7.2, “Motion Exhibits,” provides, “Exhibits must be identified and electronically filed
so as to allow the Court, the parties, and the public to locate easily and refer unambiguously to a
specific page of a specific exhibit. Use of a short descriptive name in filing the exhibit, e.g.,
‘Smith Aff.’ or ‘Range Rover Vehicle Registration,’ in the docket and in the text of the brief is
required.” (emphasis added.) All future filings must comply with the Local Rules.
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portal is located on the Johnstone Placer patented mining claim.” (Doc. 103-3.)
Glen Cash, Sr., a land surveyor, testified that the “improvements” associated with
the portal to the adit “lie inside the Johnstone Placer.” (Doc. 103-4 at 12.) Glenn
Dobbs, the Board chairman and chief executive officer of Mines Management,
also testified that “the portal is located on the Johnstone Placer claims.” (Doc.
103-5 at 5.) Denver Winslow, Montanore’s engineer, testified that his use of the
term “portal” refers to “[t]he entrance to the adit on the Johnstone Placer.” (Doc.
94-4 at 4.) The only testimony by anyone possibly creating any dispute about this
is Defendant Frank Duval’s testimony, who in answer to the question of whether
the portal to the adit was on the Johnstone Placer, merely responded, “I don’t
know that.” (Doc. 103-6 at 8.) Defendants maintain that “Montanore does not
know where exactly the ‘portal’ lies in relationship to the boundary of the
Johnstone Placer,” and cite the Court to a snippet of Denver Winslow’s testimony
about the placement of a survey point on the Johnstone Placer. (Doc. 94 at 3.) As
noted, Winslow testified unequivocally that the portal to the adit is on the
Johnstone Placer and Defendants provide no explanation of how this snippet of
testimony means something contrary.
6
Defendants also contend in their Statement of Disputed Facts2 that whether
the portal to the adit is on the Johnstone Placer “has never been admitted by
Defendants.” Id. This is incorrect. In Defendants’ brief opposing Montanore’s
motion for a preliminary condemnation order, Defendants expressly declared that
“[t]he portal for the adit . . . is on [Montanore]’s private property.” (Doc. 29 at
15.) Even if judicial estoppel is not applicable against Defendants based on this
prior admission, Defendants fail to provide sufficient evidence to create a genuine
dispute. The undisputed fact is that the portal to the adit is located on
Montanore’s privately owned Johnstone Placer claim.
Defendants’ alternative claim of legal access to the adit is based on its
assertion that it is entitled to an implied easement across the Johnstone Placer to
access the portal. Defendants premise this argument on the claim that “[u]nity of
title formally existed between the Johnstone Placer and the Subject Claims by
virtue of the expansive Noranda mining lease and easement,” which, upon
severance of the lease, gave rise to an easement by implication. (Doc. 95 at 28.)
Though creative, this argument must be rejected. The Noranda mining lease
2
Defendants Statement of Disputed Facts does not comply with Local Rule, which
requires the party opposing summary judgment to “set forth verbatim the moving party’s
Statement [of Undisputed Facts]” and signify only whether the fact is undisputed or disputed.
L.R. 56.1(b). Again, all future filings must comply with the Local Rules.
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conveyed to Noranda the right to use the Subject Claims for mining and activities
incident thereto. The lease did not create unity of title between the Subject Claims
and the Johnstone Placer because it could not. Defendants’ predecessors, as the
owners of unpatented mining claims, did not own fee title to the land; an owner of
an unpatented mining claim owns only the right to use the claim for “prospecting,
mining or processing operations and uses reasonably incident thereto.” 30 U.S.C.
§ 612(a). Fee title to land subject to an unpatented mining claim remains with the
United States. Swanson v. Babbitt, 3 F.3d 1348, 1350 (9th Cir. 1993). The
Noranda mining lease could not convey more than what was owned by the lessor
to the lessee, Noyes v. Mantle, 127 U.S. 348, 354 (1888), so it could not convey
title or create unity of title in Noranda because the lessor did not own title to the
land. It is also highly questionable whether Defendants, as the owners of an
unpatented mining claim, have standing to assert a right to an implied easement
across Montanore’s private property. See Precious Offerings Mineral Exchange,
Inc. v. McLain, 194 P.3d 455, 457 (Colo. App. 2008).
Defendants do not attempt to fully explain their implied easement
theory–whether it is based on a theory of easement by necessity or easement by
existing use. But even assuming that Defendants have standing and that unity of
title was not a fundamental problem with the theory, more obvious problems arise
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in addressing the question of whether such an asserted implied easement is
warranted by either “strict necessity” or “apparent, continuous, and reasonably
necessary use” that was intended to continue. Yellowstone River, LLC v.
Meriwether Land Fund I, LLC, 264 P.3d 1065, 1077-78 (Mont. 2011). These
additional hurdles to the creation of an implied easement also cannot be overcome.
Defendants’ implied easement theory is without merit. Defendants lack access to
the adit because the portal is on Montanore’s private property and there is no
implied easement to cross this private property to access the portal.
Defendants’ assertion that they own the adit is similarly meritless.
Montanore’s predecessor in interest, Noranda, constructed the adit. During the
period of construction and for sometime afterward, Noranda paid Defendants’
predecessor in interest, pursuant to a lease agreement, for the right to use the
Subject Claims. When Noranda extinguished the lease, the portion of the adit that
ran through Defendants’ unpatented mining claims did not become the lessor’s
private property. Defendants never owned access to the adit and their rights as the
holder of unpatented mining claims were limited to those associated with that
“unique” property interest. Best v. Humboldt Placer Min. Co., 371 U.S. 334, 335
(1963); 30 U.S.C. § 612(a). Upon expiration, the lease did not, and could not,
transfer ownership of the adit to Defendants who lacked legal access to it and who
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held only the limited property interest associated with unpatented mining claims.
Accordingly, Defendants’ theory that just compensation for this taking may be
based on the replacement cost of constructing a new adit is fundamentally flawed
because, as the saying goes, you can’t lose what you ain’t never had.3
Despite it appearing to the Court that Defendants have largely, if not
entirely, premised their claim for just compensation on a theory of replacement
cost based on the flawed premise that they own or have access to the adit, the
Court nevertheless denies Montanore’s motion for summary judgment. Montana
law is clear that “just compensation is determined by equitable principles.”
Alexander v. State Highway Comm’n, 412 P.2d 414, 416 (Mont. 1966). The
measure of just compensation “varies with the facts.” Id. “[T]he value of property
cannot be measured solely by formula or artificial rule,” and assigning value in
eminent domain cases may “require[] consideration of factors beyond the usually
acceptable practices and methods employed in determining fair market value.” Id.
Moreover, “mining claims . . . can and do have market values based on the
speculative character of the property.” State Highway Comm’n v. Antonioli, 401
P.2d 563, 565 (Mont. 1965).
This does not mean that Defendants will be allowed to present testimony
3
Muddy Waters, You Can’t Lose What You Ain’t Never Had, (Chess Records 1964).
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and expert opinions supporting their flawed premise of adit ownership, or “based
upon unsupported assumption, conjecture or speculation.” Id. Defendants will
have the burden of proving the amount of just compensation, State v. Donnes, 711
P.2d 805, 808 (Mont. 1985), and equity may ultimately demand that little or
nothing be awarded because little or nothing was proven to have been taken, but
the Court is not prepared to rule that Defendants are entitled to nothing for the
taking absent a full airing of all the admissible evidence and the benefit of the
decision from the three Commissioners, who are experts on this subject.
Montanore’s motion for summary judgment is therefore denied.
II.
Motion for Protective Order
Montanore seeks a protective order precluding discovery on a wide variety
of topics. Defendants oppose the motion in part. The Court will address each
topic in turn.
A.
Adit Construction Cost
Montanore contends that information about its adit construction costs is
irrelevant to a determination of just compensation for the taking of Defendants’
unpatented mining claims. The Court agrees. Accordingly, the motion for
protective order as to this category of information will be granted.
Defendants assert that information about Montanore’s adit construction
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costs is required to allow its experts to testify about the value of the adit. This
argument presumes that the adit was an attribute of the unpatented mining claims
prior to these condemnation proceedings and that Defendants are entitled to
compensation for loss of the adit and/or loss of access to the adit. As explained
above, this contention is without merit. Defendants never owned the adit or had
any legal access to it. Accordingly, this information is not “relevant to any party’s
claim or defense,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1), and Montanore is entitled to a protective
order as to this category of information.
B.
Permitting Information
Defendants contend that information about the permits required for
Montanore’s mining operation are relevant to the issue of just compensation
because such information would shed light on “the differences between surface
exploration and development, and underground exploration and development.”
(Doc. 93 at 11.) Again, the Court understands that this argument is based on the
flawed premise that Defendants own or have access to the adit. Because
Defendants do not own or have access to the adit, this information is irrelevant to
the issue of just compensation and Montanore is entitled to a protective order with
respect to this category of information.
C.
Financial Information
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Defendants contend that information about Montanore’s financial
circumstances is relevant “because they are legitimately concerned about
[Montanore’s] ability to pay a judgment and the costs of this case.” Id. at 8.
Defendants’ purported worry about Montanore’s ability to pay a judgment in this
case is irrelevant to a determination of what Defendants are owed in just
compensation for the taking of easements and rights of way through their
unpatented mining claims. As support for their concern about Montanore’s
financial health, Defendants cite a newspaper article from The Western News, a
Libby weekly, in which a University of Montana professor opines that one of
Montanore’s recent financing efforts was “risky.” (Doc. 93-3 at 1.) The Court
puts little stock in such evidence, and notes that in another filing Defendants assert
that Montanore “does appear to have more than $3,000,000" in cash. (Doc. 85 at
9.) Information about Montanore’s financial situation is irrelevant to the issue of
just compensation, and Defendants’ purported worry about it appears to rest on
nothing more than speculation. Accordingly, Montanore is entitled to a protective
order as to this category of information.
D.
Geologic Information
Montanore seeks a protective order precluding discovery into “geology
pertaining to [its] mining project.” (Doc. 86 at 4.) Montanore insists that it has
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produced all information requested about “geologic information pertaining to [the]
Subject Claims.” Id. Defendants do not expressly dispute Montanore’s assertion
that it has properly disclosed geologic information about the Subject Claims.
Indeed, Defendants make clear that Montanore has disclosed information about its
expert who will opine about “the geology ‘in and around the Subject Claims.’”
(Doc. 93 at 12.) This is likely all that is relevant in terms of geologic information,
and to the extent that Defendants seek information about the geology of
Montanore’s mining project for the purpose of establishing the project’s value to
Montanore, the information is irrelevant, as has been explained before, and not
discoverable.
However, geologic information pertaining to Montanore’s mining project is
not necessarily wholly irrelevant to the value of the Subject Claims. As
Defendants have argued, the formations underlying the Subject Claims and
Montanore’s mining project are geologically complex. Thus, to the extent that
Defendants seek this information for the purpose of understanding the geology of
the area and establishing the mineral value of the Subject Claims, then the
information is potentially relevant. Montanore’s motion for a protective order as
to this category of information is based solely on relevancy. On this record, what
constitutes “irrelevant geologic data” is not clear to the Court. (Doc. 104 at 8.)
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Because information about the geology of Montanore’s mining project may lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence, it is discoverable absent some other valid
reason for its protection. Accordingly, Montanore’s motion for a protective order
as to this category of information is denied.
E.
Unopposed Categories
Montanore seeks a protective order precluding discovery into the following
additional categories of information: (1) the value of Montanore’s patented mining
claims; (2) the history and management of Montanore’s mining project; (3) the
corporate structure of Montanore and related companies; (4) financial information
for companies related to Montanore; and (5) estimates of future expenditures on
the Montanore project. Defendants assert no opposition to a protective order as to
these categories of information. Montanore has established that this information is
irrelevant and thus has shown good cause for a protective order. A protective
order as to these categories of information is granted.
III.
Motion to Deem Answers Admitted
Montanore served requests for admission on Defendants asking that
Defendants (1) “admit that no affidavit of assessment was filed with the office of
Lincoln County Clerk and Recorder in 2005 for the [Subject] Claims;” (2) “admit
that no notice of intent to hold was filed with the office of the Lincoln County
15
Clerk and Recorder in 2005 for the [Subject] Claims;” (3) “admit that no report of
work was filed with the office of the Lincoln County Clerk and Recorder in 2005
for the [Subject] Claims;” and (4) “admit that no annual maintenance fees were
paid for the Claims to cover the 2005 assessment year.” (Doc. 89-1 at 3-5.)
Defendants responded to all of these requests for admission with the following
identical answer:
Objection. This request for admission is in violation of the Court’s
Order dated April, 29, 2014 (Doc. 46) and the law of the case doctrine,
specifically subpart (5) of the Order (“Montanore’s motion to determine
claims (Doc. 32) is DENIED”). This request also is outside the scope of
permissible discovery relative to the claims and defenses alleged by the
parties in this matter. Without waiving these objections, I cannot admit
or deny this request for admission because I did not own the claims in
2005. To the best of my knowledge, all requisite filings have been made
and the Claims are valid.
Id. Despite Montanore’s contention that this same response to these four requests
is insufficient, Defendants have not supplemented their responses. The Court
declines to deem the answers admitted, but holds that the answers are insufficient
for failure to comply with Fed.R.Civ.P. 36(a)(4).
The Court agrees with Montanore that Defendants’ objections to the
requests for admission are without merit. The Court’s Order of April 29, 2014 did
not declare that Defendants claims are valid as a matter of law, and more
importantly, did not declare that the issue of whether the appropriate paper work
16
was filed with the County in 2005 is irrelevant to a determination of just
compensation. If the appropriate and necessary paperwork required to maintain
the Subject Claims was not filed in 2005, this would undoubtedly affect the fair
market value of the Subject Claims. While this Court will not endeavor to resolve
the question of the validity of the claims, as this determination is squarely before
the state court, any potential defect in title to the claims is relevant to a
determination of just compensation. Accordingly, Defendants’ objection that the
requests are in violation of the Court’s Order of April 29, 2014 is without merit.
The requests are also not outside the scope of permissible discovery because
potential defects in the title to the Subject Claims are relevant to the fair market
value of the claims. Defendants’ objections to the requests for admission are
therefore overruled.
The Court also agrees with Montanore that Defendants’ answers to the
requests are deficient because they assert lack of sufficient knowledge without
stating that a reasonable inquiry has been made. Fed.R.Civ.P. 36(a)(4).
Accordingly, the Court directs Defendants to supplement their answers to comply
with the requirements of Rule 36(a)(4).
The Court declines Montanore’s request to deem the answers admitted.
Montanore misconstrues the nature of its requests when it asserts that the
17
“requests for admission sought confirmation of information that is readily obtained
through the Clerk & Recorder’s Office of Lincoln County, Montana.” (Doc. 89 at
14.) The requests do not ask Defendants to admit that the Clerk & Recorder’s
Office has no record of the described documents for the Subject Claims for the
year 2005. Rather, the requests ask Defendants to admit that these documents
were not, in fact, filed by the owner of the Subject Claims. Because Defendants
did not own the Subject Claims in 2005, Defendants may be unable, even after
reasonable inquiry, to determine whether the described documents were actually
filed with the County in 2005. Montanore’s motion is therefore granted in part
and denied in part. Defendants must supplement their answers to comply with
Rule 34(a), and if Defendants claim lack of sufficient knowledge to answer,
reasonable inquiry must nevertheless be made.
IV.
Motion to Require Deposit
Defendants move to require a deposit in the amount of $3 million, or in the
alternative, to dissolve the injunction. Defendants contend that a deposit is
required pursuant to Montana Code Annotated § 70-30-311(1), because
Montanore has obtained a preliminary injunction granting it an immediate right of
possession of the easements and rights of way. Defendants premise their request
for a “minimum” of a $3 million deposit on their purported worry that Montanore
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may lack the cash necessary to pay the ultimate judgment in this case, the fact that
their statement of claim sought $10 million in just compensation for the taking,
and “the possibility that the award may very well exceed this amount.” (Doc. 85 at
10.) For the reasons explained, the Court denies the motion.
First, Montana substantive law and Federal procedural law do not require a
deposit simply because the Court has granted Montanore’s motion for a
preliminary injunction. Montanore’s current right of possession of the easements
and rights of way stems from a balancing of the preliminary injunction factors. It
does not stem from Montana’s eminent domain statutes. See Order of April 29,
2014 (Doc. 46 at 13-15.) Second, as the Court has already noted in its Order of
August 12, 2014, “the amount of any such deposit, and when such deposit should
be made [] are both matters within the discretion of the Court.” (Doc. 58 at 7.)
Finally, and most importantly, Defendants provide the Court with no sound basis
to grant their excessive request for a deposit, which ostensibly represents an
estimated loss amount for the taking of certain easements and rights of way
through three unproven and unpatented mining claims.
In the absence of any reasonable basis to require such an amount for
deposit, the Court will not order Montanore to make a deposit. In Defendants’
Statement of Claim, it was clear that the basis for the $10 million claim was that
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the ore body that Montanore seeks to develop “has exceptional value to
[Montanore]” and “[a]ccess through the Subject Claims is currently the only
feasible access to the ore body.” (Doc. 47 at 3.) Of course, just compensation, as
has been admitted by both parties, is not based on the value of the condemned
property to the condemnor, but is measured by the value of the condemned
property and the decrease in market value of the remainder that results from the
taking. MPI2D 5.11 (2003) Condemnation – Easement (Fair Market Value); K&R
Partnership v. City of Whitefish, 189 P.3d 593, 602-603 (Mont. 2008). Thus, the
$10 million figure was not representative of an estimate of the amount potentially
owed for the taking. Defendants’ current request for a $3 million deposit is
equally tenuous, since it is based on (1) Defendants’ purported worry about
Montanore’s ability to pay a judgment, and (2) what Defendants believe
Montanore has available in cash. These reasons are entirely divorced from any
facts establishing what an appropriate amount of compensation may be.
Based on the current state of the record, and the positions of the parties, the
range of claimed compensation is between zero and $10 million. The Court will
not require a deposit of an arbitrary sum. Instead, under these circumstances, the
Court will exercise its discretion under the statute to make a determination as to an
appropriate amount for a deposit based on “the amount assessed . . . by the
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commissioners.” Mont. Code Ann. § 70-30-311; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(c);
Johnson v. Couturier, 572 F.3d 1067, 1086 (9th Cir. 2009)(“Rule 65(c) invests the
district court with discretion as to the amount of security required, if
any.”(emphasis in original)). Defendants’ motion to require a deposit is denied.
The Court also denies Defendants’ alternative request to dissolve the
injunction. As explained in the Court’s Order of April 29, 2014, the factors for
granting a preliminary injunction weigh in favor of the injunction. The situation
has not changed in the interim. Because Defendants provide no sound basis for a
deposit, the Court will not require one at this time and the injunction shall remain
in place.
IT IS ORDERED that:
(1) Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 75) is DENIED.
(2) Plaintiff’s motion for protective order (Doc. 83) is GRANTED IN PART
AND DENIED IN PART.
(3) Plaintiff’s motion to deem answers admitted (Doc. 88) is GRANTED IN
PART AND DENIED IN PART.
(4) Defendants’ motion to require deposit (Doc. 82) is DENIED.
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Dated this 25th day of February 2015.
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