Oliver v. United States Marshals Service et al
Filing
99
ORDER ADOPTING 96 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS; granting 31 Motion for Summary Judgment. Any appeal of this decision would not be taken in good faith. Signed by Judge Donald W. Molloy on 5/15/2015. Mailed to Oliver. (TAG, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
MISSOULA DIVISION
FILED
MAY 15 2015
Cieri<, u.s District Court
District Of Montana
Missoula
CV 13-224-M-DWM-JCL
CLIFTON RAY OLIVER,
Plaintiff,
ORDER
vs.
TARA ELLIOTT, GUY BAKER, U.S.
MARSHAL MARVIN GOFFENA,
U.S. MARSHAL MARTINEZ, and
JOHN DOE MARSHALS,
Defendants.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Clifton Ray Oliver, appearing prose, alleges in his Second
Amended Complaint denial of his due process and equal protection rights as a
result of his detention in segregation as a federal pretrial detainee. (Doc. 57.)
Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim or in the
alternative a Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 31.) Magistrate Judge
Jeremiah Lynch entered Findings and Recommendations on March 31, 2015,
recommending that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment be granted. (Doc.
96.) Oliver filed objections to the Findings and Recommendations on April 20,
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2015, (Doc. 97), and Defendants filed a response on May 1, 2015, (Doc. 98).
Oliver is entitled to de novo review of the specified findings or recommendations
to which he objects. 28 U.S.C. ยง 636(b)(1 ). His objections encompass the entirety
of the Findings and Recommendations.
DISCUSSION
Oliver objects to the findings of fact and analysis in the Findings and
Recommendations that relate to his segregation in multiple facilities.
Additionally, Oliver insists that he requested a continuance so he could conduct
further discovery to gather evidence he claims would corroborate the genuine
material factual disputes that exist and that his request was ignored. According to
Defendants, the Findings and Recommendations should be adopted because Judge
Lynch's careful review of the facts show Defendants are entitled to summary
judgment on their claim of qualified immunity. For the reasons stated below,
Oliver's objections are overruled, his request for a continuance is denied, and
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
I.
Qualified Immunity
Courts apply a two-part test in evaluating qualified immunity: "whether
plaintiffs allegations, if true, establish a constitutional violation," and whether the
defendants' actions violated "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
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of which a reasonable person would have known." Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730,
736, 739 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). The facts must be viewed in
the light most favorable to plaintiff. Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1866 (2014)
(per curiam).
"Pretrial detainees have a substantive due process right against restrictions
that amount to punishment." Valdez v. Rosenbaum, 302 F.3d 1039, 1045 (9th Cir.
2002) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979)). "This right is violated if
restrictions are 'imposed for the purpose of punishment.' There is no
constitutional infringement, however, if restrictions are 'but an incident 'of some
other legitimate government purpose."' Id. (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 535)
(internal citation omitted). "In distinguishing between a permissible restriction
and impermissible punishment, [courts] first examine whether the restriction is
based upon an express intent to inflict punishment.... [and] next consider
whether punitive intent can be inferred from the nature of the restriction." Id.
Here, there is no indication Defendants had an express intent to inflict punishment
on Oliver. As to whether punitive intent can be inferred, "'if a particular condition
or restriction of pretrial detention is reasonably related to a legitimate
governmental objective, it does not, without more, amount to 'punishment."' Id.
(quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 539).
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Oliver objects to the analysis in the Findings and Recommendations that
relate to his segregation at the Missoula County Detention Facility beginning May
23, 2012; the Federal Detention Center in SeaTac, Washington, in August and
September, 2012; the Missoula County Detention Facility in October, 2012; and
Crossroads Correctional Center, the CCA Nevada Southern Detention Center, and
the U.S. Medical Center for Federal Prisoners ("USMCFP") in Springfield,
Missouri from February through May, 2013. (Doc. 97.)
A.
Missoula County Detention Facility beginning May 23, 2012
Oliver was placed in administrative segregation at the Missoula County
Detention Facility on May 23, 2012, because Oliver was attempting to intimidate
witnesses in his case. (Docs. 34, 36.) The government has a legitimate interest in
preventing witness tampering. Jones v. Horne, 634 F.3d 588, 597-600 (D.C. Cir.
2011); Haraszewski v. Brannan, 2013 WL 4516776, at **9-10 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 21,
2013) (slip copy). Oliver's segregation "was reasonably related to this interest,"
Valdez, 302 F.3d at 1046, and it therefore does not amount to punishment. Oliver
insists his segregation was instigated by FBI Task Force Officer Guy Baker rather
than Deputy U.S. Marshal Marvin Goffena. (Doc. 97 at 1-5.) This distinction is
immaterial. Regardless of who alerted Assistant U.S. Attorney Tara Elliott to
Oliver's attempts to contact a witness in his case, it is undisputed Oliver was
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placed in administrative segregation because of his attempts to contact the witness.
(Docs. 32 at ,-r,-r 41-42; 79 at ,-r,-r 41-42.) Oliver also insists that portions of Baker's
reports documenting Oliver's witness tampering between March 14 and May 22,
2012, (see Doc. 61), are false. (Doc. 97 at 1-5.) Yet it is undisputed Oliver
subsequently plead guilty to one count of witness tampering for his attempts to
contact the witness between March 14 and May 22, 2012. (Doc. 35 at 91-92,
95-121.) Oliver's objection is overruled.
B.
SeaTac Federal Detention Center in August and September, 2012
Oliver was placed in segregation when he arrived at the SeaTac Federal
Detention Center on August 27, 2012, and he remained in segregation until
September 10, 2012. Oliver was placed in segregation because it was SeaTac's
practice at that time to segregate a person admitted for a mental capacity
examination for a period of time to determine whether safety issues exist. (Doc.
72.) The government has a legitimate interest in maintaining security and order in
operating an institution. Bell, 441 U.S. at 540 n.23. Because Oliver's segregation
"was reasonably related to this interest," Valdez, 302 F.3d at 1046, it does not
amount to punishment. Oliver insists that correspondence from Elliott to SeaTac
played a significant role in his placement in segregation. (Doc. 97 at 5-6.) Elliott
did not deny playing a role in SeaTac's housing decision, and her declarations
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express her continued concern about Oliver contacting the witness in his case both
before and after his time at SeaTac. (Docs. 34, 63.) Yet drawing the inference
that Elliott did play a role in Oliver's placement in segregation at SeaTac does not
change the conclusion that the segregation did not amount to punishment.
Elliott's declaration shows that her requests to have Oliver isolated were based on
the legitimate governmental interest of protecting the witness in Oliver's case.
(Docs. 34, 63.) Oliver's objection is overruled.
C.
Missoula County Detention Facility in October, 2012
Oliver returned to the Missoula County Detention Facility on October 15,
2012, and was held in a "classification" pod until October 29. Oliver was held in
that pod due to a previous request from the U.S. Attorney's Office to not allow
access by Oliver to the phone because of his repeated attempts to contact the
witness. (Doc. 65.) Because the government has a legitimate interest in
preventing witness tampering, Jones, 634 F.3d at 597-600, and Oliver's
segregation "was reasonably related to this interest," Valdez, 302 F.3d at 1046, it
does not amount to punishment. According to Oliver, he was in 23-hour
lockdown in the classification pod rather than half-day lockdown, as stated in
County Housing Unit Manager Mark Harris's declaration, to restrict Oliver's
access to the phone. (Doc. 97 at 6-8.) Yet drawing an inference that Oliver was
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on 23-hour lockdown does not change the conclusion that his segregation did not
amount to punishment. The distinction as to the extent of his isolation is
immaterial, as it is undisputed that the decision to isolate Oliver from the phone
was because of his continued attempts to contact the witness in his case, and not to
inflict punishment. (Doc. 65 at ifif 3-5.) Oliver's objection is overruled.
D.
Crossroads Correctional Center, the CCA Nevada Southern
Detention Center, and USMCFP Springfield from February
through May, 2013
Oliver was transferred to Crossroads Correctional Center on February 1,
2013, and held there until February 7. Oliver was placed in segregation due to his
"serious" felony charges, "significant" criminal history, a request for separation
from another inmate, and comments in his paperwork noting violent tendencies,
assaultive behavior, being a sexually violent predator, and medical issues. (Doc.
69 at if 3.) Oliver was transferred to the CCA Nevada Southern Facility, where he
was held from February 7 to February 21 and May 3 to May 7, 2013. Oliver was
held in administrative segregation because of security concerns as a result of his
current charges, criminal history, comments on the Form 129 regarding assaultive
behavior, violent tendencies, and medication issues, and a request for separation
from another inmate. (Doc. 70 at if 5.) Oliver was committed to USMCFP
Springfield from February 27 to April 25, 2013. He was assigned to a single-7-
occupancy cell in a locked unit because it was standard procedure to assign
inmates to those cells who were designated to the facility for a forensic evaluation.
(Doc. 68 at if 3.) Oliver remained in a secured setting due to a "continued concern
about his stability and potential risk he posed towards others if he were released to
a general population housing unit." (Id. at if 4.) Because the government has a
legitimate interest in maintaining security and order in operating its institutions,
Bell, 441 U.S. at 540 n.23, and Oliver's segregation in these three facilities "was
reasonably related to this interest," Valdez, 302 F .3d at I 046, it does not amount to
punishment. Oliver insists that Alert Notices exist that were prepared by the U.S.
Marshals and that the Alert Notices played a significant role in his placement in
segregation at these facilities. (Doc. 97 at 9-13.) Yet drawing the inference that
the Alert Notices exist does not change the conclusion that Oliver's segregation
did not amount to punishment. The many legitimate reasons given by the facilities
to justify their security concerns and placement decisions overcome Oliver's
argument that Alert Notices played a central role in his placement. (See Docs. 68,
69, 70.) Oliver's objection is overruled.
E.
Remaining Objections
Oliver's objection to the conclusion that he failed to present a genuine issue
of material fact regarding whether Defendants are responsible for his placement in
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segregation after he was transferred to SeaTac, (Doc. 97 at 13), is overruled. As
discussed above, the facilities located outside of Missoula made legitimate
placement decisions based on their own procedures and security assessments of
Oliver. Oliver's objection to the recommendation that any appeal would not be
taken in good faith, (Doc. 97 at 14-16), is also overruled. Under de novo review,
the record makes plain that the Second Amended Complaint is frivolous and lacks
arguable substance in law or fact.
II.
Request for Continuance
Oliver requests a continuance to perform additional discovery under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d). The party seeking additional summary judgment
discovery bears the burden to proffer sufficient facts to show that the evidence
sought exists and that it would prevent summary judgment. Blough v. Holland
Realty, Inc., 574 F.3d 1084, 1091 (9th Cir. 2009). Oliver has not met his burden.
Oliver seeks correspondence between SeaTac and Elliott, lockdown log books,
and Alert Notices. (Doc. 97 at 6, 8, 10.) All inferences as to this evidence have
been drawn in Oliver's favor and do not change the conclusion that his placement
in segregation did not amount to punishment. As the evidence would not prevent
summary judgment, Oliver's request is denied.
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Oliver, a reasonable jury
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would not conclude that Oliver's segregation amounted to punishment to
constitute a constitutional violation. Defendants are entitled to qualified
immunity.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the Findings and Recommendations
(Doc. 96) are ADOPTED to the extent they are consistent with this Order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. 31) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is directed to close this
matter and enter judgment pursuant to Rule 5 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is directed to have the
docket reflect that the Court certifies pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 24(a)(3)(A) that any appeal of this decision would not be taken in good
faith. The record makes plain the instant Complaint is frivolous as it lacks
arguable substance in law or fact.
DATED this Jrtay of May, 2015.
Donald W /Moll y, District Judge
Di trict Court
United
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