Cowan v. U.S. Department of Justice et al
Filing
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ORDER ADOPTING FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 7 in full. This matter is DIsrvnsSED. Cowan's motion for injunctive relief 3 is DENIED. This dismissal counts as a strike pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(g). Any appeal of this decision would not be taken in good faith. Signed by Judge Donald W. Molloy on 1/6/2014. Mailed to Cowan. (TAG, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
MISSOULA DIVISION
FILED
JAN 0 6 2014
Clerk. u.s. District Court
DistriCt Of Montana
Missoula
SHAWN RYAN COWAN,
CV 13-231-M-DWM-JCL
Plaintiff,
ORDER
vs.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
GOVERNMENT OF MONTANA
DISTRICT, 21 ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT,
JEFFERY H. LANGTON, and
NUMEROUS UNKNOWN OR
CURRENTL Y UNIDENTIFIED
DEFENDANTS,
Defendants.
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Shawn Ryan Cowan's
proposed Complaint (Doc. 2) and motion for injunctive relief (Doc. 3). Magistrate
Judge Jeremiah Lynch entered findings and recommendations on December 4,
2013, recommending this matter be dismissed and the motion for injunctive relief
denied. (Doc. 7.)
Cowan is entitled to de novo review of the specified findings or
recommendations to he objects. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b )(1). The Court reviews the
findings and recommendations that are not specifically objected to for clear error.
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McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Commodore Bus. Mach., Inc., 656 F.2d 1309, 1313
(9th Cir. 1981). Cowan filed objections to Judge Lynch's findings and
recommendations on December 23,2013. (Doc. 9.) Despite these objections, the
Court agrees with Judge Lynch's analysis and conclusion. Because the parties are
familiar with the factual and procedural background, it will not be restated here.
Cowan objects to Judge Lynch's findings that: (1) Cowan cannot challenge
the validity of his criminal conviction by way of civil action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, (2) Judge Langton is entitled to judicial immunity, (3) claims arising prior to
November 4,2010 are barred by the applicable statute of limitations, and (4) the
State of Montana and all state agencies are protected by immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution.
I.
In response to Judge Lynch's determination that Cowan cannot challenge
the validity of his criminal conviction through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Cowan asserts
that he suffers from a cognitive disability and has been denied his medication and
equal redress due to his inability to teach himself the legal process. Cowan's
objection does not specifically address Judge Lynch's interpretation or application
ofHeckv. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994) or the determination that 42
U.S.C. § 1983 is not the proper vehicle for his claims. Although pro se filings are
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to be liberally construed and held to less stringent standards, Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89,94 (2007), Cowan has not demonstrated that his conviction or
sentence has been invalidated. Because Cowan's claims would necessarily imply
the invalidity of his conviction, Cowan's claims are barred by Heck.
II.
Cowan also objects to Judge Lynch's findings regarding judicial immunity.
As discussed by Judge Lynch, judges are absolutely immune from suit for judicial
actions taken by them in the course of their official duties in connection with a
case, unless the judge acts outside the judge's official capacity or in the complete
absence of all jurisdiction. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9,11, 12 (1991). For the
purposes ofjudicial immunity, "[ a] clear absence of all jurisdiction means a clear
lack of subject matter jurisdiction." Mullis v. United States Bankruptcy Ct., 828
F.2d 1385,1389 (9th Cir. 1987). Cowan contends judicial immunity does not
apply to Jeffery H. Langton because of his previous recusal and because the State
of Montana relinquished jurisdiction.
It is unclear from the objections how the State of Montana relinquished
jurisdiction or how Judge Langton acted outside of his judicial duties. Absent
such a showing, judicial immunity applies to Judge Langton as all the allegations
against him arise from his duties in connection with Cowan's criminal
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proceedings.
As further noted by Judge Lynch, the Supreme Court has held that as long
as a judge has jurisdiction to perform the "general act" in question, he or she is
immune "however erroneous they act may have been ... however injurious in its
consequences it may have proved to the plaintiff and irrespective of the judge's
motivations." Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 199,200 (1985). Cowan's
objection focuses on what he perceives were wrong-doings on the parts of the
investigators, the attorneys, Judge Langton and the State. The conduct described,
however, does not prevent the State from having jurisdiction or the application of
judicial immunity in the present matter.
III.
Cowan contends the Bill of Rights is "not attached to a statute of
limitations." (Doc. 9 at 4.) However, Cowan alleges personal injury at the hands
of the State and its actors. (Doc. 2 at 8-9.) For actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
the Court applies the forum statue's statute of limitations for personal injury
actions. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004). In Montana, that
period is three years after the action accrues. Mont Code Ann. § 27-2-204(1).
Further, to the extent the Complaint alleges a civil RICO action, such claims are
barred by the relevant four-year statute of limitations. See Rotella v. Wood, 528
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U.S. 549 (2000) (holding that the four-year statute of limitations period begins as
soon as the plaintiff discovers his injury).
IV.
Finally, Cowan objects to Judge Lynch's findings of immunity for the State
under the Eleventh Amendment. The United States Supreme Court has interpreted
the Eleventh Amendment to mean that absent a waiver, neither a State nor an
agency of the State acting under its control may be subject to suit in federal court.
P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144
(1993). There is an exception to this general prohibition when a plaintiff is
seeking prospective declaratory or injunctive relief against state officials in their
official capacity. Idaho v. Couer d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997).
Cowan has not named any state official in his or her official capacity, thus
the limited exception to the general immunity rule does not apply in this case.
There is also no indication of waiver. However, Cowan contends the State and its
agencies were not "acting under [the State's] control" when violating State and
Federal laws and his Constitutional rights. Cowan provides no support for this
contention. Rather, Cowan's Complaint repeatedly alleges unconstitutional State
action and alludes to a conspiracy between the State and its agencies to violate the
rights of the Cowan family. (Doc. 2.)
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Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that this matter is DIsrvnsSED. The Clerk
of Court is directed to close the case and enter judgment pursuant to Rule 58 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in light of this dismissal, Cowan's motion
for injunctive relief (Doc. 3) is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is directed to have the
docket reflect that this dismissal counts as a strike pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(g).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is directed to have the
docket reflect that the Court certifies pursuant to Rule 24(a)(3)(A) of the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure that any appeal of this decision would not be taken
in good faith. No reasonable person could suppose an appeal would have merit.
The record makes plain this action lacks arguable substance in law or fact.
Dated this Jd!:day of January, 2014.
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