Equihua-Equihua et al v. Holder et al
Filing
19
ORDER denying 13 Motion for Attorney Fees; denying 17 Motion for Leave to File Surreply. Signed by Judge Donald W. Molloy on 2/12/2016. (NOS, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
MISSOULA DIVISION
FILED
FEB 12 2016
Cieri<, U.S. District Court
District Of Montana
Missoula
CV 14-268-M-DWM
YESENIA EQUIHUA-EQUIHUA,
MIGUEL DIAZ, and RICARDO
DIAZ-RAMIREZ,
ORDER
Plaintiffs,
vs.
LORETTA LYNCH, Attorney General
of the United States; JEH JOHNSON,
Secretary of Department of Homeland
Security; LEON RODRIGUEZ,
Director, U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Service; JODI BARD,
Field Office Director, U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Services, Helena,
Montana; and CORINA E. ALMEIDA,
Chief Counsel, Office of the Chief
Counsel, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, Denver, Colorado,
Defendants.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs Yesenia Equihua-Equihua, Miguel Diaz, and Ricardo DiazRamirez brought this action for mandamus and declaratory relief against the
Department of Homeland Security and other immigration agencies, alleging
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improper adjudication of their applications for adjustment of status. While the
case was stayed at the request of the parties, they reached a series of agreements
that ultimately resulted in Plaintiffs receiving their green cards. Now before the
Court is Plaintiffs' motion for attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice
Act ("the Act"). For the reasons stated below, the motion is denied. Because the
parties are familiar with the background of this case, factual and procedural details
are included only in the context of the Court's analysis.
STANDARD
"Under [the Act], a litigant is entitled to attorney's fees and costs if: (1) he
is the prevailing party; (2) the government fails to show that its position was
substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust; and (3)
the requested fees and costs are reasonable." Carbonell v. INS, 429 F.3d 894, 898
(9th Cir. 2005); accord 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(l)(A).
ANALYSIS
I.
Prevailing Party Status
"[A] litigant must meet two criteria to qualify as a prevailing party. First, he
must achieve a 'material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties.'
Second, that alteration must be 'judicially sanctioned."' Carbonell, 429 F .3d at
898 (quoting Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W Va. Dept. ofHealth &
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Human Servs., 532 U.S. 598, 604-05 (2001)). Equihua and Diaz satisfy the first
prong of the prevailing party test. Prior to the Court's Order staying the case,
Equihua and Diaz were left with no recourse. According to the parties'
agreements, however, Citizen and Immigration Services agreed to reopen their
applications and refrain from denying Equihua's application on the basis of any
failure to prove she was inspected and admitted. The agreements "thus 'materially
altered the legal relationship between the parties, because the defendants were
required to do something directly benefitting the plaintiff1s] that they otherwise
would not have had to do.'" I d. at 900 (quoting RichardS. v. Dept. of
Developmental Servs. of Cal., 317 F .3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2003)).
Although a closer question, Equihua and Diaz do not satisfy the second
prong of the prevailing party test because the results in this case were not
compelled by the Court. A judgment on the merits, a settlement agreement
enforced through a consent decree, or an order that incorporates a stipulation may
qualify as judicial action sufficient to convey prevailing party status. I d. at 898,
901. Here, the Court entered an Order staying the case "[p]ursuant to the
stipulation of the parties," and the Court entered the parties' Consent Decree as a
final judgment, but upon closer examination these actions are not "stamped with
the necessary judicial imprimatur to convey prevailing party status." !d. at 901.
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First, the degree of judicial involvement in the Order staying the case is
insufficient because the Court did not expressly incorporate the terms of the
parties' stipulation into the Order. See Smyth ex rei. Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F .3d
268, 283 (4th Cir. 2002) (district court must "give a clear indication" that it is
incorporating the terms of the agreement into the order). Although the parties'
proposed order included the terms of their stipulation, (Doc. 7-1 ), the Court
explicitly rejected that proposed form by not adopting it, (Doc. 8). And a "judge's
mere awareness and approval of the terms of the settlement agreement do not
suffice to make them part of his order." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of
Am., 511 U.S. 375,381 (1994).
Second, the Consent Decree does not amount to a judicially sanctioned
change in the legal relationship of the parties. The characteristic features of a
consent decree are that it receives court approval and is subject to ongoing court
oversight. Smyth, 282 F.3d at 281. Here, the Consent Decree did not embody the
Court's approval because Equihua had already received her green card and Diaz
had substantially received relief where Citizen and Immigration Services provided
notice of its intention to reopen and approve his application, subject only to his
submission of a medical examination. (Doc. 12 at 6.) "A plaintiff does not
become a prevailing party if the court merely recognizes what the government has
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voluntarily agreed to and only requires the government to follow through with
what it had already voluntarily promised to do." Aronov v. Napolitano, 562 F.3d
84, 93 (1st Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
Additionally, the Court denied ongoing oversight of the agreement when it
explicitly rejected the provision that "Plaintiffs reserve the right to return to the
Court to enforce the terms of this agreed settlement" by adding in the language,
"by filing a new action." (Doc. 12 at 7.) Despite the filing of the action having
been a catalyst for the positive outcome for Plaintiffs, the Court's role was
insufficient to convey prevailing party status. See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603
(rejecting catalyst theory).
II.
Substantial Justification
Even if the Court's Order and Consent Decree rendered Plaintiffs the
prevailing party, the second condition for an attorney's fee award under the Act
has not been met. "The government bears the burden of demonstrating substantial
justification." Thangaraja v. Gonzales, 428 F.3d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 2005)
(quoting Gonzales v. Free Speech Coalition, 408 F.3d 613, 618 (9th Cir. 2005)).
'"Substantial justification' is equated with 'reasonableness.' ... The
government's position is 'substantially justified' if it 'has a reasonable basis in law
and fact."' Id. (quoting Ramon-Sepulveda v. INS, 863 F.2d 1458, 1459 (9th Cir.
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1988)). "[T]he substantial justification analysis does not hinge on whether the
agency was right or wrong but on whether its actions were reasonable." Aronov,
562 F.3d at 95. The conduct to be evaluated here is Citizen and Immigration
Services' denial of Equihua' s and Diaz' s applications for adjustment of status. 1
The denial ofEquihua's application for adjustment of status based on
inconsistencies regarding her entry into the United States and her failure to prove
she was inspected or admitted did not contravene clearly established law. It is
unclear whether Citizen and Immigration Services in adjudicating an application
for adjustment of status is bound by a decision issued by an immigration judge
during removal proceedings. (See Docs. 15 at 13; 16 at 9 (both parties asserting
there is no binding case law)). There is persuasive, non-binding authority that
supports both parties' positions. Compare Amrollah v. Napolitano, 710 F.3d 568,
571 (5th Cir. 2013) (concluding on summary judgment Citizen and Immigration
Services was collaterally estopped from disregarding an immigration judge's
asylum decision when adjudicating an application for permanent resident status);
with Mugomoke v. Hazuda, 2014 WL 4472743, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2014)
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Plaintiffs do not argue Defendants' litigation position was not substantially justified.
(Doc. 14 at 11.) Also, the decisions of Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Citizen and
Immigration Service on whether to file amended charges against Equihua or to commence
charges against Diaz are within the Department of Homeland Security's unreviewable discretion.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(g); Matter ofG-N-C, 22 I & N Dec. 281,284 (BIA 1998), abrogated on other
grounds by Castro-Cortez v. INS, 239 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2001).
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(concluding on summary judgment application of the collateral estoppel doctrine
unsuitable in light of the two-stage evaluation process for obtaining permanent
residency created by Congress). Yet for the purposes of the Act, it does not matter
whether the doctrine applies; it only matters whether Citizen and Immigration
Services acted reasonably. Aronov, 562 F.3d at 95. "When the issue is a novel
one on which there is little precedent, courts have been reluctant to find the
government's position was not substantially justified." Saysana v. Gillen, 614
F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2010). In the absence of binding, on-point authority, it was
reasonable for Citizen and Immigration Services to conclude it was not bound by
an earlier removability determination and to reach its own conclusion as to
whether Equihua met her burden of proving she was inspected and admitted.
Defendants' agreement to refrain from denying Equihua's application on the basis
that she failed to prove she was inspected and admitted does not alter that
conclusion. See Renee v. Duncan, 686 F.3d 1002, 1017 (9th Cir. 2012) ("That the
[government] did not prevail on the positions [it] has taken does not invoke a
presumption that [its] position was not substantially justified.").
Even if Citizen and Immigration Services was collaterally estopped from
reaching a contrary conclusion as to whether Equihua was inspected and admitted,
its credibility determinations are supported by substantial evidence. The record
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supports the conclusion that Equihua disregarded immigration laws by arranging
to have Diaz smuggled into the United States and by purchasing fraudulent
documentation to obtain employment. (Docs. 1-2 at 3; 1-4 at 13; 1-6 at 46-50; 119 at 4-5; 1-20.) The record also supports the conclusion that Diaz failed to meet
his burden of proving he was inspected and admitted given his age at the time of
his entry and a lack of corroborating evidence. (Docs. 1-4 at 13; 1-6 at 46-50; 111; 1-19 at 4-5.) See Mendoza Manimboa v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 655, 661 (9th Cir.
2003) (the agency is in the best position to make credibility determinations).
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees
(Doc. 13) is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motion to File a Surreply
(Doc. 17) is DENIED.
DATED this
ffiy
of February, 2016.
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