Blackwell et al v. LaFriniere

Filing 14

ORDER denying 5 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; denying 5 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. Signed by Chief Judge Dana L. Christensen on 6/10/2016. (DLE)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
MISSOULA DIVISION

LAWRENCE A. BLACKWELL and
RANDYL H. BLACKWELL, individually
and on behalf of their minor children,

CV 16–22–M–DLC

ORDER
Plaintiffs,
vs.
SUSAN ANN LaFRINIERE,
Defendant.
Before the Court is Defendant Susan Ann LaFriniere’s (“LaFriniere”)
motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint for failing to state a claim. Plaintiffs
Lawrence and Randyl Blackwell (“the Blackwells”) allege that for the past three
years, they have been the victim of LaFriniere’s incessant racially-motivated
harassment, which has resulted in their being denied equal housing rights. The
Blackwells are a mixed-race family and reside in the same subdivision as
LaFriniere in Missoula, Montana. The Blackwells advance claims under the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. §1982; the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§3604 and
3617; and the Montana Human Rights Act, Montana Code Annotated § 49–2–305.
LaFriniere’s motion, succinct as it is, consists of two prongs. First, she
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contends that by the plain text of § 1982, the Blackwells fail to state an actionable
claim because they fail to allege discrimination in the course of a property
transaction—the statute affords equal rights to “inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold,
and convey real and personal property.” Second, LaFriniere argues that because
Randyl Blackwell is Caucasian, she has no standing to bring claims of racial
discrimination under § 1982.
Both of LaFriniere’s theories are dismissible out of hand. As to the first,
§ 1982 clearly affords racial minorities equal rights to hold property, and the
Blackwells allege that LaFriniere’s overt racial animus interfered with that right
with respect to their own home. While Ninth Circuit case law is slim on this point,
numerous district courts in the Ninth Circuit are in accord with the Court’s simple
reading of § 1982. See, e.g., Egan v. Schmock, 93 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1093 (N.D.
Cal. 2000) (“allegations of violent or intimidating acts motivated by a
discriminatory animus are sufficient to state a claim for deprivation of the right to
‘hold’ real property as guaranteed under § 1982"). As to the second, “plaintiffs
who are not members of the protected class [at issue in a case] have standing to
challenge racially discriminatory conduct in their own right when they are the
direct target of the discrimination.” RK Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d
1045, 1055 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Maynard v. City of San Jose, 37 F.3d 1396,
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1403 (9th Cir. 1994); Estate of Amos v. City of Page, 257 F.3d 1086, 1093–1094
(9th Cir. 2001). LaFriniere made Randyl Blackwell the direct target of her
discrimination when she stalked and threatened Ms. Blackwell and her schoolaged children—in violation of an order of protection.
In light of the foregoing, and mindful that at this stage, the Court must
accept all factual allegations in the Complaint as true and construe the pleadings in
the light most favorable to the Blackwells, Kneivel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072
(9th Cir. 2005),
IT IS ORDERED that LaFriniere’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 5) is DENIED.
DATED this 10th day of June, 2016.

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