Harden v. Britten et al

Filing 28

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER that Petitioner's Motion to Withdraw Document 26 construed as a motion to voluntarily dismiss, is granted. This matter is dismissed without prejudice. A separate judgment will be entered in accordance with this Memorandum and Order. All other pending motions are denied as moot. Ordered by Judge Laurie Smith Camp. (Copy mailed to pro se party) (JSF)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA
ROBERT HARDEN,
Petitioner,
v.
FRED BRITTEN, Warden, and
ROBERT HOUSTON, Director of the
Department of Corrections,
Respondents.

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CASE NO. 4:11CV3084

MEMORANDUM
AND ORDER

This matter is before the court on Petitioner’s Motion for Leave to Withdraw Writ for
Habeas Corpus, which the court liberally construes as a motion to voluntarily dismiss.
(Filing No. 26.) In his Motion, Petitioner requests that the court dismiss his Petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus without prejudice because he “is not knowledgeable on the correct and
proper procedure,” and because the court has previously denied his requests for
appointment of counsel. (Id. at CM/ECF p. 1.) Respondents have not objected to
dismissal. For good cause shown, the Motion is granted.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:
1.

Petitioner’s Motion to Withdraw Document (Filing No. 26), construed as a
motion to voluntarily dismiss, is granted;

2.

This matter is dismissed without prejudice. A separate judgment will be
entered in accordance with this Memorandum and Order; and

3.

All other pending motions are denied as moot.

DATED this 7th day of November, 2011.
BY THE COURT:
s/Laurie Smith Camp
United States District Judge

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