Villanueva v. City of Scottsbluff et al

Filing 27

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - The defendants' motion to dismiss (filing 21 ) the plaintiff's equal protection claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is denied. To the extent the defendants' motion to dismiss (filing 21 ) pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is asserted against Villanueva's substantive due process claim, the motion is denied. To the extent Villanueva asserts a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress under state law against defendant Alex Moren o individually for acts taken within the scope of his employment, Defendants' motion to dismiss (filing 21 ) pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is granted. To the extent Villanueva asserts a claim for negligent infliction of emotional dist ress under state law against defendant Alex Moreno individually for acts taken outside the scope of his employment, Defendants' motion to dismiss (filing 21 ) pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is denied. Defendants' motion to strike (filing 23 ) is granted. Accordingly, Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Scottsbluff and defendant Alex Moreno in his official capacity is stricken, and Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages against all defendants for acts alleged to constitute negligent infliction of emotional distress under Nebraska law is stricken. Ordered by Senior Judge Richard G. Kopf. (GJG)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA
TAMARA VILLANUEVA,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF SCOTTSBLUFF, and
ALEX MORENO, Individually and
in his official capacity as Chief of
Police,
Defendants.

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4:11CV3185

MEMORANDUM
AND ORDER

Plaintiff Tamara Villanueva brings this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the City
of Scottsbluff and its chief of police, Alex Moreno, in his individual and official
capacities for alleged violations of her rights to equal protection and substantive due
process1, as well as for negligent infliction of emotional distress under Nebraska law.
(Filing 20, Second Amended Complaint ¶ 1.) Villanueva’s claims stem from the
defendants’ alleged failure to respond to her repeated reports of assault and
harassment by her ex-husband, as well as harassment and serious threats directed at
Plaintiff and her family that were supposedly orchestrated by Moreno. Pending before
the court are the defendants’ motion to dismiss (filing 21) pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) and motion to strike (filing 23) Plaintiff’s claims for punitive damages.

1

In a prior memorandum and order (filing 19) on Defendants’ motion to dismiss
Plaintiff’s amended complaint, I stated that Plaintiff did not assert a substantive due
process claim. However, Plaintiff’s second amended complaint (filing 20) adds a
third cause of action which I construe to be a substantive due process claim. (Filing
20 ¶¶ 54-63.)

A. Standard of Review
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal citations & quotations
omitted). This “plausibility standard” is not one of probability, “but it asks for more
than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint
pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the
line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. (internal citations
& quotations omitted).
“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be
a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the
court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id. at 679
(internal citation omitted; quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). “While legal conclusions
can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual
allegations.” Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported
by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678.
B. Plaintiff’s Allegations
Plaintiff Villanueva’s second amended complaint (filing 20) alleges that she
lives in Scottsbluff, Nebraska, where defendant Alex Moreno is the chief of police.
In August 2010, Villanueva met with Moreno to discuss her resignation as the
“contact person” for her neighborhood-watch group. In that capacity, Villanueva had
made frequent calls to the police department, and the police department had acted
upon Villanueva’s calls. During her meeting with Moreno, Villanueva disclosed that
2

she was the victim of domestic assault by her now ex-husband, but she did not file a
formal report. (Filing 20 ¶¶ 4-10.)
Three days after Villanueva’s and Moreno’s meeting, Villanueva’s ex-husband
met with Moreno at the police department and admitted committing the assault.
(Filing 20 ¶ 12.) According to the complaint, “Plaintiff continued to have contact with
Defendant Moreno regarding the abuse and threats of abuse by her ex-husband.
Defendant Moreno became aware of the Plaintiff’s vulnerable mental and emotional
state as a result of their discussions about the domestic abuse the Plaintiff suffered.”
(Filing 20 ¶ 14.)
Beginning on October 22, 2010, Villanueva and Moreno entered into a
“physical relationship,” and four days later into a sexual relationship. (Filing 20 ¶¶
15-17.) The amended complaint alleges that Moreno contacted Villanueva via e-mail
to communicate sexual messages and to arrange sex, but Villanueva ended the
relationship after Moreno “sent graphic, lewd, sexual references to the Plaintiff.”
(Filing 20 ¶¶ 18-21.) After the relationship ended, Villanueva was harassed by
telephone calls warning her to stay away from Moreno; by strangers who approached
Villanueva questioning her about her relationship with Moreno; and by people who
would pull into her driveway and wait. While “[t]he Plaintiff would call the police,
. . . no action was taken to investigate the people harassing the Plaintiff.” (Filing 20
¶ 22-25.)
Villanueva’s second amended complaint alleges that Moreno told others that
Villanueva was “stalking, harassing, and attempting a physical relationship” with
Moreno, and that Villanueva resigned from her position as “contact person” for her
neighborhood-watch group after Moreno rejected her advances. (Filing 20 ¶ 27.)
Further, Villanueva alleges that between October 1999 and August 31, 2011, she made
219 calls to the police department to report suspicious activity on behalf of herself and
in her role as the neighborhood-watch contact person. Villanueva asserts that “[a]ll

3

calls that did not relate to the harassment of the Plaintiff were promptly investigated.”
(Filing 20 ¶ 29.)
Citing numerous specific examples, Villanueva’s second amended complaint
alleges that since August 2010, Villanueva made more than 12 reports to the police
regarding domestic violence directed at her, harassing and threatening telephone calls,
and suspicious activity outside her home, including vehicles whose occupants were
“watching the house” and “tak[ing] pictures of the Plaintiff and her children.” (Filing
20 ¶¶ 30-36.) Telephone callers have threatened Villanueva that she “better be
keeping [her] mouth shut, we know where you are.” (Filing 20 ¶ 35.)

When

Villanueva tried to report these instances to police, “No action was taken regarding
the Plaintiff’s reports about herself and her family. The police had a policy of not
even recording that she had made reports regarding harassment of herself.” (Filing
20 ¶ 30.) Because Moreno allegedly directed that his police department not make
reports regarding the threats, harassment, and domestic violence reported by
Villanueva, her attempt to get harassment protection orders against her ex-husband in
June 2010 and against Moreno in May 2011 failed. (Filing 20 ¶¶ 40-41.)
On January 3, 2012, Villanueva was threatened that if she “did not drop her
lawsuit against Alex Moreno that she would not see her children grow up.” (Filing
20 ¶ 37.) On that date, the local police department told Villanueva to call the state
patrol about the threats since it involved the chief of police. Villanueva did so.
However, when she called the state patrol on January 14, 2012, after someone tried
to break into her home, Villanueva was then instructed to call the local police
department for a uniformed officer. When she did so, she was “placed on hold for six
minutes, thirty-seven seconds and then was hung up on. When she called back, she
was informed that it was shift change and an officer would come when they were done
with the shift change.” (Filing 20 ¶ 39.)
Villanueva alleges that she continues to be “harassed and threatened regarding
her affair with Defendant Moreno,” including “threats on her safety in public places
4

as well as at home,” and the “city police department takes no action regarding her
reports of harassment.” (Filing 20 ¶ 42.)
C. Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Claims
Plaintiff brings her equal protection and substantive due process claims under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and her claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress under
state law. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege a set of
facts which, if proven true, demonstrate that the defendants violated a right secured
by the Constitution and laws of the United States while acting under color of state law.
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Schmidt v. City of Bella Villa, 557 F.3d 564,
571 (8 th Cir. 2009).
1.

Equal Protection
“[A]n equal protection claim arises upon a showing that it is the policy or

custom of the police to provide less protection to victims of domestic violence than
to other victims of violence, and that discrimination against women was a motivating
factor behind this policy or custom.” Ricketts v. City of Columbia, 36 F.3d 775, 780
(8 th Cir. 1994) (internal quotations, citation & brackets omitted). See also Freeman
v. Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52, 55 (8 th Cir. 1990) (“the state may not ‘selectively deny its
protective services to certain disfavored minorities without violating the Equal
Protection Clause,’” [DeShaney v. Winnebago County DSS, 489 U.S. 189, 109 S. Ct.
998, 1004 n.3 (1989)]) (also citing Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696,
700-02 (9 th Cir. 1990), which allowed plaintiff to amend equal protection claim to
include specific claim that defendant’s conduct reflected discrimination based on
plaintiff’s status as a female victim of domestic violence)).
The plaintiff asserting such a claim must produce evidence from which a
reasonable jury could determine that the custom or policy “was motivated by an intent
to discriminate against women.” Ricketts, 36 F.3d at 781. “A discriminatory purpose
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is more than a mere awareness of the consequences. The law or custom must be found
to have been implemented at least in part because of, not merely in spite of, its adverse
effects upon an identifiable group.” Id. (internal quotations & citations omitted).
Besides proving a constitutional violation, the plaintiff must also establish that
“the constitutional violation was caused by a person acting under color of state
law”—that is, “that the unconstitutional municipal custom caused the plaintiffs’
injuries.” Ricketts, 36 F.3d at 779.
Citing specific examples of the City of Scottsbluff’s history of failing to
acknowledge or act upon Villanueva’s domestic-abuse and harassment complaints, but
attending to all of her neighborhood-watch complaints, Villanueva’s equal protection
claim alleges that the defendants “implement[ed] a policy of treating domestic assaults
differently than non-domestic assaults”; the “policy was motivated by an intent to
discriminate against women”; and the policy “discriminate[s] against women
(including the Plaintiff) because they are most often the victims of domestic violence.”
(Filing 20 ¶¶ 46, 47.) While the latter allegations are simply “[t]hreadbare recitals of
the elements of a cause of action,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, Villanueva has also made
“well-pleaded factual allegations” which “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to
relief.” Id. Accepting such factual allegations as true, I conclude that Villanueva has
stated an equal protection claim that is plausible on its face, and the defendants’
motion to dismiss this claim must be denied.
2.

Substantive Due Process
Substantive due process requires a state to protect (1) those in custody and (2)

those for whom the state created the danger to which the individual was subjected,
known as the “state-created-danger theory of liability.” Fields v. Abbott, 652 F.3d
886, 890 (8 th Cir. 2011) (§ 1983 action against county and its officials brought by
county jail employee who was injured by inmates and who alleged violations of
substantive due process rights).
6

“To establish a violation of substantive due process rights by an executive
official, a plaintiff must show (1) that the official violated one or more fundamental
constitutional rights, and (2) that the conduct of the executive official was shocking
to the contemporary conscience.”

Id. (internal quotations & citations omitted);

Schmidt, 557 F.3d at 574 (“The standard for evaluating a substantive due process
claim is whether the alleged ‘behavior of the governmental officer is so egregious, so
outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience.’”
(quoting Rogers v. City of Little Rock, 152 F.3d 790, 797 (8 th Cir. 1998))).
The constitutional concept of conscience shocking duplicates no
traditional category of common-law fault. Actionable substantive due
process claims involve a level of abuse of power so brutal and offensive
that they do not comport with traditional ideas of fair play and decency.
Under the state-created-danger theory, negligence and gross negligence
cannot support a § 1983 claim alleging a violation of substantive due
process rights. And proof of intent to harm is usually required, but in
some cases, proof of deliberate indifference, an intermediate level of
culpability, will satisfy this substantive due process threshold.
Fields, 652 F.3d at 891 (internal quotations, citations & brackets omitted).
To ultimately succeed on the state-created-danger theory, Villanueva must
prove:
(1) that she was a member of a limited, precisely definable group, (2)
that the municipality’s conduct put her at a significant risk of serious,
immediate, and proximate harm, (3) that the risk was obvious or known
to the municipality, (4) that the municipality acted recklessly in
conscious disregard of the risk, and (5) that in total, the municipality’s
conduct shocks the conscience.
Fields, 652 F.3d at 891 (internal quotations omitted).

7

Villanueva alleges that she is a woman and victim of domestic violence and that
defendant Moreno violated her rights to substantive due process by “engaging the
Plaintiff in a sexual relationship following the Plaintiff’s reports of Domestic
Violence, refusing to address the Plaintiff’s reports of Domestic Violence, and
harassing and threatening the Plaintiff.” (Filing 20 ¶ 62.) Citing numerous factual
examples, Villanueva alleges that she “has received specific threats of harm if she
does not dismiss her claims against Defendant”; that Moreno knew his actions created
a risk of harm to Villanueva; and that Moreno acted with “reckless, conscious
disregard of the risks of harm.” (Filing 20 ¶¶ 59-61.)
Accepting Villanueva’s factual allegations as true, I conclude that she has stated
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face for a violation of her right to substantive
due process.

Villanueva has alleged that Moreno—and his staff, at Moreno’s

direction—systematically failed to investigate, act upon, or keep records of her
complaints of domestic violence, resulting in the denial of her request for harassment
protection orders against her ex-husband. Villanueva has alleged that both Moreno’s
affirmative actions and inaction have caused constant fear and anxiety as she and her
family apparently continue to experience domestic abuse that Moreno and his
department will not acknowledge or investigate, as well as threats on their life and
safety due to the existence of this lawsuit.2 “[A]n official’s threat to employ deadly
force for no legitimate reason rises to a substantive due process violation.” Hawkins
v. Holloway, 316 F.3d 777, 787 (8 th Cir. 2003) (“the facts demonstrate that the sheriff
deliberately abused his power by threatening deadly force as a means of oppressing
those employed in his department, thus elevating his conduct to the arbitrary and
conscience shocking behavior prohibited by substantive due process”); see also Okin
v. Village of Dornwall-On-Hudson Police Dep’t, 577 F.3d 415, 429-30 (2 nd Cir. 2009)
(state actors may be liable under § 1983 if they affirmatively create or enhance danger

2

See Filing 20, Second Amended Complaint ¶ 37 (“On or about January 3,
2012, Plaintiff was specifically threatened that if the Plaintiff did not drop her lawsuit
against Alex Moreno that she would not see her children grow up.”).
8

of private violence; genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether police
department and officers implicitly, but affirmatively, encouraged domestic violence
by transmitting message that domestic violence would go unpunished).
Villanueva also suggests that Moreno physically invaded her bodily integrity
by engaging her in a sexual relationship after Moreno “became aware of the Plaintiff’s
vulnerable mental and emotional state as a result of their discussions about the
domestic abuse the Plaintiff suffered.”

(Filing 20 ¶ 14.)

The “nonconsensual

violation of intimate bodily integrity . . . is protected by substantive due process.”
Rogers, 152 F.3d at 796 (finding violation of substantive due process right in § 1983
action by woman who was raped by police officer following traffic stop and holding
that officer’s “egregious, nonconsensual entry into the body” was “an exercise of
power without any legitimate governmental objective”).

At this stage of the

proceedings, it is not clear (1) whether the sexual contact between Villanueva and
Moreno was consensual, (2) whether Villanueva felt compelled to cooperate with
Moreno’s alleged sexual demands because he was the chief of police who had the
power to affect her exposure to domestic violence, or (3) whether the proven facts will
establish that Moreno abused his power while carrying out the official duties entrusted
to him by the state—all questions that will be considered in deciding if the alleged
sexual contact was enough to support a constitutional violation of Villanueva’s bodily
integrity for purposes of her substantive due process claim or whether the sexual
contact constituted misconduct for which no constitutional remedy is available.
However, those questions are best sorted out on a motion for summary judgment.
Accordingly, to the extent the defendants’ motion to dismiss applies to
Villanueva’s substantive due process claim 3, the motion will be denied.

3

The defendants’ motion to dismiss only mentions Villanueva’s equal protection
claim and her claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. (Filing 21.)
However, as stated above, I have concluded that Villanueva’s second amended
complaint states a substantive due process claim as well.
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3.

Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
Villanueva’s claim under state law for negligent infliction of emotional distress

is asserted against defendant Moreno in his individual capacity only. (Filing 20 at
CM/ECF p. 11.) This theory of recovery “can be fairly described as mental or
emotional harm (such as fright or anxiety) that is caused by the negligence of another
and that is not directly brought about by a physical injury, but that may manifest itself
in physical symptoms.” Hamilton v. Nestor, 659 N.W.2d 321, 324-25 (Neb. 2003)
(negligent infliction of emotional distress is a separate theory of recovery or element
of damage) (internal quotation & citation omitted). A plaintiff whose “only injury is
an emotional one must show that their emotional distress is medically diagnosable and
significant and is so severe that no reasonable person could have expected to endure
it.” Catron v. Lewis, 712 N.W.2d 245, 249 (Neb. 2006). “‘It is only where [the
emotional distress] is extreme that the liability arises.’” Kant v. Altayar, 704 N.W.2d
537, 540 (Neb. 2005) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, comment j. at 77
(1965)).
The defendants assert that this claim must be dismissed because Villanueva has
not alleged compliance with the Nebraska Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (the
“Act”), Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-901 to 13-928, which provides that “no suit shall be
maintained against [a] political subdivision 4 or its officers, agents, or employees on
any tort claim except to the extent, and only to the extent, provided by the Political
Subdivisions Tort Claims Act.” Neb. Rev. Stat. § 13-902. “While not a jurisdictional
prerequisite, the filing or presentment of a claim to the appropriate political
subdivision is a condition precedent to commencement of a suit under the Tort Claims
Act.” Jessen v. Malhotra, 665 N.W.2d 586, 590 (Neb. 2003).

4

A “political subdivision” for purposes of the Act includes “cities of all
classes.” Neb. Rev. Stat. § 13-903(1).
10

The requirements of the Act apply “where an individual is sued in his or her
individual capacity, but is performing within the scope of employment.” Cole v.
Wilson, 627 N.W.2d 140, 144 (Neb. Ct. App. 2001) (citing Bohl v. Buffalo County,
557 N.W.2d 668 (Neb. 1997); Kuchar v. Krings, 540 N.W.2d 582 (Neb. 1995)). See
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 13-920 (“[n]o suit shall be commenced against any employee of a
political subdivision for money on account of . . . personal injury to or the death of
any person caused by any negligent or wrongful act or omission of the employee
while acting in the scope of his or her office or employment . . . unless a claim has
been submitted in writing to the governing body of the political subdivision within
one year after such claim accrued in accordance with section 13-905 5” (emphasis
added)).
From the face of Villanueva’s second amended complaint, the scope within
which defendant Moreno is alleged to have acted is unclear—that is, (1) outside the
scope of his employment such that the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act would
not apply and would therefore not serve as a basis upon which to dismiss Plaintiff’s
claims, Stagemeyer v. County of Dawson, 192 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1009 (D. Neb. 2002),
or (2) within the scope of his employment such that the requirements of the Act must
be met, including submission of a claim to the “governing body” in accordance with
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 13-905 prior to filing suit.

What is clear, however, is that

Villanueva has not alleged compliance with the Nebraska Political Subdivision Tort
Claims Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-901 to 13-928.
Therefore, to the extent Villanueva asserts her claim for negligent infliction of
emotional distress against Moreno individually for acts taken within the scope of his

5

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 13-905 provides, “All tort claims under the Political
Subdivisions Tort Claims Act . . . shall be filed with the clerk, secretary, or other
official whose duty it is to maintain the official records of the political subdivision,
or the governing body of a political subdivision may provide that such claims may be
filed with the duly constituted law department of such subdivision.”
11

employment, such claim shall be dismissed. See Hall v. County of Nemaha, No.
4:06CV3069, 2006 WL 1795279, at *5 (D. Neb. June 28, 2006) (Nebraska Tort
Claims Act applies when individual is sued in individual capacity, but acted within the
scope of employment; dismissing plaintiffs’ individual-capacity claims based upon
negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) because plaintiffs failed to allege that defendants acted outside scope of
employment or that claim was submitted to governing body specified in Nebraska
Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act).
Conversely, to the extent Villanueva asserts her claim for negligent infliction
of emotional distress against Moreno individually for acts taken outside the scope of
his employment, such claim shall not be dismissed at this time. See Stagemeyer, 192
F. Supp. 2d at 1009-10 (denying motion to dismiss malicious prosecution claim under
state law and stating, “The issue of whether Defendants acted within the scope of their
employment, and are therefore immune from suit under the State Tort Claims Act, and
whether Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity cannot be determined from the
face of the complaint. Plaintiffs have clearly indicated they are suing Defendants in
their individual capacities, and Plaintiffs have stated a valid claim for malicious
prosecution under Nebraska law. Under these circumstances, it is incumbent upon
Defendants to plead and prove immunity as an affirmative defense.”).
D. Motion to Strike/Dismiss Claim for Punitive Damages
Villanueva requests punitive damages against all defendants, apparently in
connection with both her federal and state claims.

(Filing 20 ¶¶ 64-68.)

The

defendants move to strike Villanueva’s claim for punitive damages against the City
of Scottsbluff and Alex Moreno in his official capacity for acts alleged to be in
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Villanueva’s claim for punitive damages against all

12

defendants for acts alleged to constitute negligent infliction of emotional distress
under Nebraska law.6 (Filing 23.)
Villanueva concedes that punitive damages are not recoverable on her section
1983 claim against the City of Scottsbluff and Alex Moreno in his official capacity.
Plaintiff also concedes that punitive damages are not recoverable in connection with
her state-law claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress.

(Filing 25 at

CM/ECF p. 1.) Therefore, the defendants’ motion (filing 23) shall be granted.
IT IS ORDERED:
1.

The defendants’ motion to dismiss (filing 21) the plaintiff’s equal

protection claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is denied;
2.

To the extent the defendants’ motion to dismiss (filing 21) pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is asserted against Villanueva’s substantive due process claim,
the motion is denied;
3.

To the extent Villanueva asserts a claim for negligent infliction of

emotional distress under state law against defendant Alex Moreno individually for
acts taken within the scope of his employment, Defendants’ motion to dismiss (filing
21) pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is granted. To the extent Villanueva asserts
a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress under state law against defendant
Alex Moreno individually for acts taken outside the scope of his employment,
Defendants’ motion to dismiss (filing 21) pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is
denied;

6

The defendants’ motion to strike does not encompass Villanueva’s claim for
punitive damages against Alex Moreno in his individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. §
1983.
13

4.

Defendants’ motion to strike (filing 23) is granted.

Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of
Scottsbluff and defendant Alex Moreno in his official capacity is stricken, and
Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages against all defendants for acts alleged to
constitute negligent infliction of emotional distress under Nebraska law is stricken.
DATED this 25 th day of June, 2012.
BY THE COURT:
Richard G. Kopf
Senior United States District Judge

*This opinion may contain hyperlinks to other documents or Web sites. The
U.S. District Court for the District of Nebraska does not endorse, recommend,
approve, or guarantee any third parties or the services or products they provide on
their Web sites. Likewise, the court has no agreements with any of these third parties
or their Web sites. The court accepts no responsibility for the availability or
functionality of any hyperlink. Thus, the fact that a hyperlink ceases to work or
directs the user to some other site does not affect the opinion of the court.
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