Packard v. Darveau, Jr. et al
Filing
139
ORDER denying 134 Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment Pursuant to Rule 54(b). Ordered by Senior Judge Warren K. Urbom. (EJL)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA
DIANE PACKARD, the Executrix of )
the Estate of Edward A. Packard,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
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v.
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STEVEN J. DARVEAU, JR., an
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Individual, FALLS CITY AREA
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JAYCEES, a Nebraska Non-Profit
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Corporation, CARICO FARMS,
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Incorporated, a Nebraska
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Corporation, and CORY SNETHEN, )
an individual,
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)
Defendants.
)
4:11CV3199
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO RULE
54(b)
Citing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), the plaintiff, Diane Packard,
moves for the entry of a final judgment in favor of Falls City Area Jaycees (FCJC),
Carico Farms Incorporated (Carico Farms), and Cory Snethen (Snethen). (ECF No.
134.) For the following reasons, the plaintiff’s motion will be denied.
I.
BACKGROUND
On July 17, 2012, the plaintiff filed a five-count third amended complaint
against Steven J. Darveau, Jr. (Darveau), FCJC, Carico Farms, and Snethen. (See
Third Am. Compl., ECF No. 68.) Count I, which is titled “Negligence,” alleges that
Darveau failed to exercise ordinary care while operating his pickup truck and thereby
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caused a collision between his truck and a motorcycle driven by Edward A. Packard.
(Id. ¶¶ 18-36.) The collision allegedly occurred at the intersection of U.S. Highway
73 and South 703 Loop in Richardson County, Nebraska. (Id. ¶¶ 18-22.) At the time
of the collision, Darveau was driving to the FCJC’s annual Demolition Derby and
Tractor Pull (the Event), which was being held on land that had been leased to
Snethen by Carico Farms. (Id. ¶¶ 12, 18-22.) The entrance gate to the Event was
located “on the South 703 Loop, off of U.S. Highway 73.” (Id. ¶ 14.) Darveau
attempted to turn left onto South 703 Loop from southbound U.S. Highway 73 when
he collided with Mr. Packard, who was traveling north on U.S. Highway 73. (Id. ¶¶
19-22.) Mr. Packard suffered fatal injuries in the collision. (Id. ¶ 22.)
Count II, which is titled “Negligence of [FCJC],” alleges that FCJC “owed a
duty of care to the public to keep the premises of the Event in a reasonably safe
condition for the persons attending the Event and passing in close proximity to the
Event and to create a safe entrance and exit to the Event.” (Id. ¶ 38.) It also alleges
that FCJC breached this duty by failing to “control, regulate, direct, guide, or warn
of the danger of traffic at or around” the intersection where the collision occurred.
(Id. ¶¶ 39.) In addition, it states, “As a direct and proximate result of [FCJC’s]
negligence in failing to keep the premises of the Event and the surrounding area and
entrance in a reasonably safe condition, failing to warn drivers of the risk of physical
harm at the Intersection and failing to direct and control traffic, [Mr. Packard] was
severely injured, [and] said injuries eventually result[ed] in his untimely death.” (Id.
¶ 41. See also id. ¶¶ 37-43.)
Count III, which is titled “Negligence of Carico Farms,” and Count IV, which
is titled “Negligence of Snethen,” are analogous to Count II. (See id. ¶¶ 44-58.)
Count V, which is titled “Wrongful Death,” alleges that due to their negligence, each
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of the defendants is liable to Mr. Packard and his survivors in accordance with
Revised Statutes of Nebraska sections 30-809, 30-810, and 25-1401. (Id. ¶¶ 59-69.)
On August 29, 2012, Snethen filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the
plaintiff’s claims, (ECF No. 91), and on September 26, 2012, FCJC moved for
judgment on the pleadings, (ECF No. 96). In their motions, Snethen and FCJC
argued that the plaintiff failed to state a claim against them upon which relief could
be granted because neither Snethen nor FCJC had a legal duty to control traffic on the
public roadway where the collision occurred. (See Snethen’s Br. at 4, ECF No. 92;
FCJC’s Br. at 10, ECF No. 97.) I found this argument to be persuasive, and on
December 6, 2012, I granted the defendants’ motions. (See generally Mem. & Order,
ECF No. 117. See also id. at 11 (finding that neither Snethen nor FCJC owed a “duty
to control, regulate, direct, guide, or warn of the danger of the traffic at the
Intersection where the collision occurred”).) Then on December 12, 2012, Carico
Farms filed its own motion for judgment on the pleadings. (ECF No. 118.) I granted
this motion, stating, “For the reasons set forth in the Memorandum and Order of
December 6, 2012, (ECF No. 117), I find that Carico Farms’ motion for judgment on
the pleadings must be granted.” (Mem. & Order on Def. Carico Farms, Inc.’s Mot.
for J. on the Pleadings at 4, ECF No. 131.)
As a result of these orders, all of the plaintiff’s claims against Snethen, FCJC,
and Carico Farms have been dismissed, and only the plaintiff’s claims against
Darveau remain viable.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Generally, “only orders that dispose of all claims [are considered] final and
appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.” Williams v. County of Dakota, Nebraska, 687
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F.3d 1064, 1067 (8th Cir. 2012) (alteration brackets and citation omitted). “Rule
54(b) creates a well-established exception to this rule by allowing a district court to
enter a final judgment on some but not all of the claims in a lawsuit.” Id. (quoting
Clark v. Baka, 593 F.3d 712, 714 (8th Cir. 2010)). “However, the district court may
enter final judgment under this rule ‘only if the court expressly determines that there
is no just reason for delay.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b)).
“When deciding whether to grant Rule 54(b) certification, the district court
must undertake a two-step analysis.” Williams, 687 F.3d at 1067. First, the court
must “determine that it is dealing with a final judgment . . . in the sense that it is an
ultimate disposition of an individual claim.” Id. (quoting Outdoor Central, Inc. v.
GreatLodge.com, Inc., 643 F.3d 1115, 1118 (8th Cir. 2011)).
“Second, ‘in
determining that there is no just reason for delay, the district court must consider both
the equities of the situation and judicial administrative interests, particularly the
interest in preventing piecemeal appeals.’” Id. (quoting Outdoor Central, Inc., 643
F.3d at 1118 (alteration brackets omitted)). “Certification should be granted only if
there exists some danger of hardship or injustice through delay which would be
alleviated by immediate appeal.” Id. at 1067-68 (quoting Hayden v. McDonald, 719
F.2d 266, 268 (8th Cir. 1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Conversely,
certification should not be granted merely because the resolved claims “‘are in some
sense separable from the remaining unresolved claims,’” or merely because there is
“the potential for multiple trials . . . and . . . inconsistent jury verdicts involving the
same incident.” Huggins v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., 566 F.3d 771, 774
(8th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). Put simply, interlocutory appeals are “generally
disfavored,” and “it is only the special case that warrants an immediate appeal from
a partial resolution of the lawsuit.” Williams, 687 F.3d at 1067 (quoting Clark, 593
4
F.3d at 714-15).
III.
ANALYSIS
Although the plaintiff’s negligence claim against Darveau remains pending, the
plaintiff asks that I enter final judgment in favor of Snethen, FCJC, and Carico Farms
so that she may immediately appeal my orders dismissing those defendants from this
action. (See generally Pl.’s Mot., ECF No. 134.)
The plaintiff’s motion implicates Rule 54(b), and therefore I must undertake
the two-step analysis described in Williams v. County of Dakota, Nebraska, 687 F.3d
1064, 1067-68 (8th Cir. 2012). The orders dismissing the plaintiff’s claims against
Snethen, FCJC, and Carico Farms are “ultimate disposition[s]” of those claims. Id.
at 1067. Thus, the first step of the Williams analysis is satisfied. After careful
consideration, however, I conclude that the entry of a final judgment should be
delayed until all of the plaintiff’s claims are resolved.
The plaintiff argues that there is no just reason to delay entry of final judgment
against Snethen, FCJC, and Carico Farms because the claims against these defendants
were each dismissed “based on [the] same factors and legal analysis.” (Pl.’s Mot. at
5, ECF No. 134.) She states, “Accordingly, equity would be best served by the Court
issuing final judgments against these Defendants since the basis of any appeals taken
by Plaintiff would be similar in nature and could be taken at the same time.” (Id. at
5-6.) She adds,
Judicial economy would also be effectuated by the entry of final
judgments . . . as to these Defendants, since, as set forth above, the
Court’s decisions were based upon the same legal analysis and common
set of facts. And as established by the case law of this circuit, there is
a great interest in preventing piecemeal appeals. Certifying the
judgments as to Defendants [FCJC], Carico [Farms] and Senthen . . . for
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immediate appeal would undoubtedly prevent any piecemeal appeals.
(Id. at 6.)
It is true that I dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against Snethen, FCJC, and
Carico Farms “based on [the] same . . . legal analysis.” (Id. at 5.) Moreover, the legal
analysis that led to the dismissal of those claims does not apply to the plaintiff’s
remaining claims against Darveau.1 Nevertheless, I shall not enter a final judgment
in favor of Snethen, FCJC, and Carico Farms merely because the plaintiff’s claims
against them “are in some sense separable from the remaining unresolved claims”
against Darveau. Huggins v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., 566 F.3d 771, 774
(8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Electric Co., 446 U.S. 1, 8
(1980)). Moreover, despite the existence of a legal issue that distinguishes the
pending claims from the resolved claims, all of the claims “are closely related and
stem from essentially the same factual allegations.” Id. at 775 (quoting Hayden v.
McDonald, 719 F.2d 266, 270 (8th Cir. 1983)). Under these circumstances, judicial
economy “will best be served by delaying appeal until all issues can be confronted
by [the Eighth Circuit] in a unified package.” Id. (quoting Hayden, 719 F2d at 270).
Also, I fail to see how “[c]ertifying the judgments as to Defendants [FCJC],
Carico [Farms] and Senthen . . . for immediate appeal would undoubtedly prevent any
piecemeal appeals.” (Pl.’s Br. at 6, ECF No. 134.) On the contrary, it seems to me
that the best way to reduce the risk of piecemeal appeals is to avoid certifying any
1
Although the plaintiff’s claims all sound in negligence, the plaintiff’s
claims against Darveau do not raise the issue of whether, given the facts alleged in
the third amended complaint, the duty of reasonable care can be extended to third
parties. (See, e.g., Mem. & Order at 6-15, ECF No. 117.)
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claims for interlocutory appeal.2
The plaintiff relies heavily on Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Electric Co.,
446 U.S. 1, 8 (1980), which states, “It was . . . proper for the District Judge here to
consider such factors as whether the claims under review were separable from the
others remaining to be adjudicated and whether the nature of the claims already
determined was such that no appellate court would have to decide the same issues
more than once even if there were subsequent appeals.” (Footnote omitted). (See,
e.g., Pl.’s Reply to Carico Farms’ Br. at 2-4, ECF No. 138.) The plaintiff states that
because her resolved claims are “separable” from her remaining claims and “no
appellate court would have to decide the same issues more than once” if she were
allowed to appeal the resolved claims immediately, the Curtiss-Wright factors are
satisfied and a final judgment should be entered on the resolved claims. (See, e.g.,
Pl.’s Reply to Carico Farms’ Br. at 2-4, ECF No. 138.)
Curtiss-Wright does not stand for the proposition that if the two factors
2
In her reply briefs, the plaintiff argues that “if the same analysis resulted in
the three decisions, how can it be considered piecemeal to enter a final appealable
judgment as to the same three decisions? If Plaintiff was asking for a final
judgment only as to one of the three Defendants and not the other two, then an
argument as to the possibility of multiple inconsistent appeals could certainly be
created. However, Plaintiff is requesting that the Court can certify all three of the
judgments of immediate appeal. Clearly, such an order will effectively ‘preserves
[sic] the historic federal policy against piecemeal appeals.’” (Pl.’s Reply to
Snethen’s Br. at 3, ECF No. 136 (footnote and citation omitted). See also Pl.’s
Reply to Carico Farms’ Br. at 4, ECF No. 138.) The plaintiff seems not to
recognize, however, that certifying the resolved claims for interlocutory appeal
creates the potential for “piecemeal appeals” because the pending claims will be
adjudicated and possibly appealed at some later time. Conversely, by delaying
final judgment until all of the claims against all of the defendants are adjudicated
(as is the general rule), piecemeal appeals can be avoided.
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emphasized by the plaintiff are satisfied, there is no just reason to deny an immediate
appeal. On the contrary, the Court stated specifically that “[n]ot all final judgments
on individual claims should be immediately appealable, even if they are in some sense
separable from the remaining unresolved claims.” 446 U.S. at 8. The Court also
noted that “[t]he question before the District Court [in Curtiss-Wright] . . . came down
to which of the parties should get the benefit of the difference between the
prejudgment and market rates of interest on debts admittedly owing and adjudged to
be due while unrelated claims were litigated.” Id. at 11. This was a significant issue
because “the debts in issue were litigated and large, and that absent Rule 54(b)
certification they would not be paid for ‘many months, if not years’ because the rest
of the litigation would be expected to continue for that period of time.” Id. See also
id. at 6, 11-13. The district court concluded that there was no just reason for delaying
entry of judgment on the resolved claims because Curtiss-Wright should have the
benefit of this difference in interest rates. See id. at 11-13. There are no comparable
facts in the instant case indicating that a delay would cause the plaintiff to suffer any
sort of hardship.
The plaintiff has failed to raise any considerations that distinguish this case
“from any [other] civil action where some, but not all, of the defendants are dismissed
before trial.” Huggins, 566 F.3d at 774. There is no indication that an immediate
appeal is necessary to alleviate some danger of hardship or injustice that would result
if the entry of final judgment is delayed until all claims have been adjudicated. See
Williams, 687 F.3d at 1067-68 (quoting Hayden, 719 F.2d at 268). In short, “This is
simply a case where a number of defendants were sued and some of them have
prevailed on a motion to dismiss.” Huggins, 566 F.3d at 775 (quoting Bullock v.
Baptist Memorial Hospital, 817 F.2d 58, 60 (8th Cir. 1987)).
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IT IS ORDERED that the plaintiff’s motion for the entry of a final judgment
in favor of FCJC, Carico Farms, and Snethen, ECF No. 134, is denied.
Dated April 1, 2013.
BY THE COURT
__________________________________________
Warren K. Urbom
United States Senior District Judge
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