Campbell v. Nelson

Filing 9

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - Plaintiff's Complaint (Filing No. 1 ) is dismissed without prejudice. All pending Motions are denied as moot. A separate judgment will be entered in accordance with this Memorandum and Order. Ordered by Chief Judge Laurie Smith Camp. (Copy mailed to pro se party) (AOA)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA
HERBERT LEE CAMPBELL,
Plaintiff,
v.
JUDGE JODI L. NELSON,
Defendant.

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CASE NO. 4:12CV3057

MEMORANDUM
AND ORDER

Plaintiff filed his Complaint in this matter on March 28, 2012. (Filing No. 1.) Plaintiff
has previously been given leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Filing No. 8.) The court
now conducts an initial review of the Complaint to determine whether summary dismissal
is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A.
I.

SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT
Plaintiff filed his Complaint on March 28, 2012, against Nebraska District Court

Judge Jodi L. Nelson (“Judge Nelson”). (Filing No. 1 at CM/ECF pp. 1, 7, 10.) Plaintiff is
currently confined at the Tecumseh State Correctional Institution in Tecumseh, Nebraska.
(See Docket Sheet.)
Condensed and Summarized, Plaintiff alleges that Judge Nelson is trying to
“destroy” his Lancaster County, Nebraska, court case. (Filing No. 1 at CM/ECF pp. 2, 7.)
Plaintiff is displeased with Judge Nelson’s court orders and docket entries and asserts she
is discriminating against him. (Id. at CM/ECF pp. 4, 6-11.) Plaintiff seeks a “writ of
mandamus” because Judge Nelson is violating his Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights. (Id. at CM/ECF pp. 2, 4-5.)

II.

APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS ON INITIAL REVIEW
The court is required to review prisoner and in forma pauperis complaints seeking

relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity to
determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and
1915A. The court must dismiss a complaint or any portion thereof that states a frivolous
or malicious claim, that fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that
seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
A pro se plaintiff must set forth enough factual allegations to “nudge[] their claims
across the line from conceivable to plausible,” or “their complaint must be dismissed” for
failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 569-70 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009), (“A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”).
Regardless of whether a plaintiff is represented or is appearing pro se, the plaintiff’s
complaint must allege specific facts sufficient to state a claim. See Martin v. Sargent, 780
F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985). However, a pro se plaintiff’s allegations must be
construed liberally. Burke v. North Dakota Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 294 F.3d 1043, 104344 (8th Cir. 2002), (citations omitted).
III.

DISCUSSION OF CLAIMS
Liberally construed, Plaintiff asks this court to review his state court proceeding and

reverse Judge Nelson’s court orders and docket entries. (Filing No. 1 at CM/ECF pp. 4,
6-11.)

However, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits lower federal courts from

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exercising appellate review of state court judgments. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263
U.S. 413, 416 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482
(1983).

In fact, federal district courts do not have jurisdiction “over challenges to

state-court decisions . . . even if those challenges allege that the state court’s action was
unconstitutional.” Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486; see also Ballinger v. Culotta, 322 F.3d 546,
548-49 (8th Cir. 2003), (dismissing claims under Rooker-Feldman doctrine where the relief
requested in the complaint would effectively reverse or undermine the state court decision
or void its ruling and noting that “[f]ederal district courts thus may not ‘exercis[e] jurisdiction
over general constitutional claims that are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with specific claims
already adjudicated in state court” (citation omitted)). Put simply, a federal district court
does not possess authority in a civil rights case to review or alter final judgments of a state
court judicial proceeding.
To the extent Plaintiff’s state court proceeding is still ongoing, the court will abstain
from exercising jurisdiction. To promote comity between state and federal judicial bodies,
federal courts have developed a strong policy against exercising jurisdiction over
constitutional claims for injunctive and declaratory relief when a state court proceeding has
already been commenced. See Aaron v. Target Corp., 357 F.3d 768, 774 (8th Cir. 2004).
Courts use the doctrine developed in Younger v. Harris to carry out this policy. 401 U.S.
37 (1971). Under Younger, a federal court should abstain from jurisdiction “‘when (1) there
is an ongoing state judicial proceeding which (2) implicates important state interests, and
when (3) that proceeding affords an adequate opportunity to raise the federal questions
presented.’” Norwood v. Dickey, 409 F.3d 901, 903 (8th Cir. 2005), (quoting Fuller v.
Ulland, 76 F.3d 957, 959 (8th Cir.1996)). Plaintiff’s Complaint clearly indicates that a state

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court proceeding has been initiated, if not completed. (Filing No. 1 at CM/ECF p. 7.) To
the extent that this proceeding is still ongoing, Plaintiff has not alleged, nor demonstrated,
that it will not provide him with the opportunity to raise his federal claims. In light of this,
the court will dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint without prejudice. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Wells
Fargo Bank, 307 F. App’x 155, 158 (10th Cir. 2009), (finding plaintiff’s bias allegation
against a state court judge insufficient to circumvent Younger abstention because a state
judge’s actions are a matter of obvious state interest and best left, at least in the first
instance, for review by the state appellate courts); see also Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc.,
481 U.S. 1, 11 (1987), (noting that a state interest is “important” for purposes of Younger
abstention where the “exercise of the federal judicial power would disregard the comity
between the States and the National Government”).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:
1.

Plaintiff’s Complaint (Filing No. 1) is dismissed without prejudice;

2.

All pending Motions are denied as moot; and

3.

A separate judgment will be entered in accordance with this Memorandum
and Order.

DATED this 10th day of April, 2012.
BY THE COURT:

s/Laurie Smith Camp
Chief United States District Judge

*This opinion may contain hyperlinks to other documents or Web sites. The U.S.
District Court for the District of Nebraska does not endorse, recommend, approve, or
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Likewise, the court has no agreements with any of these third parties or their Web sites.
The court accepts no responsibility for the availability or functionality of any hyperlink.
Thus, the fact that a hyperlink ceases to work or directs the user to some other site
does not affect the opinion of the court.
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