Wilson et al v. Fletcher et al

Filing 49

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - Plaintiffs Wilson and Sedlak shall respond in accordance with this Memorandum and Order within 21 days of the date of this order. No further action shall be taken in this case until the court receives such responses. Failu re to respond the court's order will result in dismissal of this matter without further notice and, as set forth above, may also result in the imposition of other sanctions. Ordered by Chief Judge Laurie Smith Camp. (Copy mailed to pro se party)(GJG)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA
HAROLD B. WILSON and
GRACY SEDLAK,
Plaintiffs,
v.
JOSEPH FLETCHER and
ORA THOMAS FLETCHER,
Defendants.

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4:12CV3061

MEMORANDUM
AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on its own motion. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
11(a) requires that all pro se parties to a case sign every pleading, written motion, and other
paper that they submit to the court. As this court has noted previously, Rule 11(a) helps to
ensure that pro se parties consent to the filing of documents on their behalf. See United
States v. Brenton, No. 8:04CR262, 2007 WL 3124539, at *1-2 (D. Neb. Oct. 23, 2007)
(discussing Johnson v. O’Donnell, No. 01-C-0257-C, 2001 WL 34372892 (W.D. Wis. Aug
24, 2001)). This court has also noted that it is improper for a non-lawyer to sign papers in
place of, or to otherwise represent, parties other than themselves. See id. at *1 (citing 5A
C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1333, at 513 & n.15 (2004)).
Furthermore, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b) states,
By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper–whether
by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating it–an attorney or
unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the person’s knowledge,
information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances:
(1)

it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass,
cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation;

(2)

the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or
reversing existing law or for establishing new law; [and]

(3)

the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so
identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery . . . .

“[A] basic factual contention in any complaint is that the plaintiff consents to the suit.”
5A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1333 (3d ed., updated April
2013) (discussing In re Deep Vein Thrombosis, No. 04-1606, 2008 WL 2568269 (N.D. Cal.
2008)). It is also fundamental that when a plaintiff names herself in an action, she
represents that (1) the action has been filed on her behalf for a proper purpose, and (2)
under existing law (or a nonfrivolous extension of existing law), she is entitled to recover on
the claims she states. In short, if a pro se party signs a pleading, written motion, or other
pleading on behalf of a second pro se party, not only are there no assurances that the
second party consents to the filing of the document, and not only has there been improper
practice of law by a non-attorney, but the signing party’s conduct implicates Rule 11(b).
Rule 11(c)(3) provides that a court may order a party “to show cause why conduct
specifically described in the order has not violated Rule 11(b).” If, after providing notice and
a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court concludes that Rule 11(b) has been violated,
the court may impose “an appropriate sanction” on the party that violated the rule. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 11(c)(1).
The court suspects that Plaintiff Harold B. Wilson has violated Rule 11(a) by placing
the signature of Plaintiff Gracy Sedlak on documents that the Plaintiffs have filed during the
course of this action. Plaintiffs Wilson and Sedlak are therefore ordered to submit evidence

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to this court to establish whether Gracy Sedlak has, in fact, been signing all of the Plaintiff’s
papers. This evidence must include, at minimum, a signed and notarized affidavit from
Gracy Sedlak stating whether she has signed the documents that have been submitted to
the court on her behalf. In addition, Plaintiffs Wilson and Sedlak are ordered to show cause
why sanctions should not be imposed on the ground that Wilson has been signing Sedlak’s
name to the documents.
Plaintiffs shall have 21 days from today’s date to comply with this order. Failure to
comply may result in the imposition of sanctions without further notice.

IT IS ORDERED:
1.

Plaintiffs Wilson and Sedlak shall respond in accordance with this

Memorandum and Order within 21 days of the date of this order.
2.

No further action shall be taken in this case until the court receives such

responses. Failure to respond the court’s order will result in dismissal of this matter
without further notice and, as set forth above, may also result in the imposition of
other sanctions.

*This opinion may contain hyperlinks to other documents or Web sites. The U.S.
District Court for the District of Nebraska does not endorse, recommend, approve, or
guarantee any third parties or the services or products they provide on their Web sites.
Likewise, the court has no agreements with any of these third parties or their Web sites.
The court accepts no responsibility for the availability or functionality of any hyperlink.
Thus, the fact that a hyperlink ceases to work or directs the user to some other site does not
affect the opinion of the court.
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DATED this 10th day of June, 2013.
BY THE COURT:
s/Laurie Smith Camp
Chief United States District Judge

*This opinion may contain hyperlinks to other documents or Web sites. The U.S. District Court for the
District of Nebraska does not endorse, recommend, approve, or guarantee any third parties or the services
or products they provide on their Web sites. Likewise, the court has no agreements with any of these third
parties or their Web sites. The court accepts no responsibility for the availability or functionality of any
hyperlink. Thus, the fact that a hyperlink ceases to work or directs the user to some other site does not affect
the opinion of the court.

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