Margraves v. TA Operating LLC et al

Filing 61

AMENDED MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying 48 Defendant TA Operating LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Amended to correct filing number of Motion only.) Ordered by Magistrate Judge Cheryl R. Zwart. (JAB)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA
DEBRA MARGRAVES,
Plaintiff,

4:12CV3152

vs.
TA OPERATING, LLC; and C.R.
ENGLAND, INC.,

AMENDED MEMORANDUM AND
ORDER

Defendants.
This matter is before the court on the motion for summary judgment filed by
Defendant TA Operating LLC’s (“TA Operating). (Filing No. 48). For the reasons set
forth below, the motion is denied.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Debra Margraves (“Margraves”) was a student driver for Defendant C.R.
England, Inc. (“C.R. England”). (Filing No. 49, ¶ 3 at CM/ECF p. 2). At the time of the
events in question, Margraves was in the second phase of her training which required her
to complete approximately 15,000 miles of on-the-road training with her mentor, Amani
Clemons (“Clemons”). (Filing No. 58 at CM/ECF p. 2).

On February 4, 2012, as part of Margraves’ training, Margraves and Clemons
were driving through Nebraska in a semi-truck. (Filing No. 49, ¶ 7 at CM/ECF p. 3).
The driving conditions became difficult due to a snow and ice storm. (Filing No. 49, ¶ 8,
at CM/ECF p. 3). Margraves and Clemons determined it was unsafe to continue to drive,
exited the interstate, and pulled the truck into TA Operating’s truck stop at York,
Nebraska (the “Truck Stop”). (Filing No. 49, ¶ 8 at CM/ECF p. 3). The Truck Stop
complex covers 44 acres, contains multiple buildings and 250 parking spots for tractor
trailer rigs. (Filing No. 50-2, ¶5 at CM/ECF p. 1 & Filing No. 50-4 at CM/ECF p. 8).

Margraves and Clemons decided to park and wait out the storm at the Truck Stop.
Although they had some initial trouble finding a parking spot due to the high volume of
other trucks present, they were able to park at around 12:00 p.m. (Filing No. 58 at
CM/ECF p. 3).
After parking, Margraves and Clemons decided to eat lunch at the Truck Stop’s
main building. (Filing No. 50-5 at CM/ECF p. 10).

This required Margraves and

Clemons to cross the parking lot – which was covered with some degree of snow and ice.
(Id.). After eating, Margraves and Clemons returned to their truck and slept. (Filing No.
50-5 at CM/ECF p. 11). At about 10:00 p.m. Margraves again crossed the parking lot to
use the Truck Stop’s restroom. (Filing No. 50-5 at CM/ECF p. 11). She returned to her
truck and slept the rest of the night. (Filing No. 50-5 at CM/ECF p. 12).

At some point, a third-party company responsible for snow removal at the Truck
Stop sent a work crew to remove the snow and ice from the Truck Stop facility. These
services generally involve the work of on-site plowing and the application of salt and
other material to maintain the surfaces, with the assistance of employees of the Truck
Stop.

Margraves awoke at 6:00 a.m. the morning of February 5, 2012, and started her
truck so that the truck’s bunk heater could charge. (Filing No. 50-5 at CM/ECF p. 12).
She noticed it was no longer snowing outside, but she believed ice covered the Truck
Stop parking lot. (Id.). Around 8:00 a.m. she left the truck to use the restroom. (Id.).
On her return trip from the restroom, Margraves slipped and fell on the ice. (Filing No.
50-5 at CM/ECF p. 13). When she arrived back at her truck she informed Clemons that
she was injured. (Filing No. 50-5 at CM/ECF p. 14). Clemons called 9-1-1, and an
ambulance arrived shortly thereafter to transport Margraves to the local hospital for

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evaluation. (Id.) The examination revealed Margraves had a broken wrist. (Filing No.
50-5 at CM/ECF p. 15).

Margraves filed this action on July 25, 2012 and alleges her injury was due to TA
Operating’s negligent maintenance of the Truck Stop.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court
must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, giving that
party the benefit of all inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence. See
Dancy v. Hyster Co., 127 F.3d 649, 652-53 (8th Cir. 1997). It is not the court’s function
to weigh evidence in the summary judgment record to determine the truth of any factual
issue; the court merely determines whether there is evidence creating a genuine issue for
trial. See Bell v. Conopco, Inc., 186 F.3d 1099, 1101 (8th Cir. 1999).

The moving party bears the burden of showing there are no genuine issues of
material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). However, “a party
opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment ‘may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288 (1968))
(internal marks omitted).

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ANALYSIS
The parties agree the following elements must be proven to recover for injuries
arising from conditions existing on a defendant’s premises:
(1) the possessor defendant either created the condition, knew of the
condition, or by the exercise of reasonable care would have discovered the
condition; (2) the defendant should have realized the condition involved an
unreasonable risk of harm to the lawful visitor; (3) the defendant should
have expected that a lawful visitor such as the plaintiff either (a) would not
discover or realize the danger or (b) would fail to protect himself or herself
against the danger; (4) the defendant failed to use reasonable care to protect
the lawful visitor against the danger; and (5) the condition was a proximate
cause of damage to the plaintiff.
Range v. Abbott Sports Complex, 269 Neb. 281, 285-86, 691 N.W.2d 525, 529 (2005).

If a danger is open and obvious, a possessor of land is not liable to the invitee,
“unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge [by the invitee]
or obviousness.”

Tichenor v. Lohaus, 212 Neb. 218, 322 N.W.2d 629 (1982);

Restatement (Second) Torts § 343A (1965). Comment f of the Restatement (Second)
Torts §343A describes the exception as follows:
There are, however, cases in which the possessor of land can and should
anticipate that the dangerous condition will cause physical harm to the
invitee notwithstanding its known or obvious danger. In such cases the
possessor is not relieved of the duty of reasonable care which he owes to
the invitee for his protection. This duty may require him to warn the
invitee, or to take other reasonable steps to protect him, against the known
or obvious condition or activity, if the possessor has reason to expect that
the invitee will nevertheless suffer physical harm.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A (1965). As the Restatement further explains
through examples:
[A] reason to expect harm to the visitor from known or obvious dangers
may arise, for example, where the possessor has reason to expect that the
invitee's attention may be distracted, so that he will not discover what is
obvious, or will forget what he has discovered, or fail to protect himself
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against it. Such reason may also arise where the possessor has reason to
expect that the invitee will proceed to encounter the known or obvious
danger because to a reasonable man in his position the advantages of doing
so would outweigh the apparent risk. In such cases the fact that the danger
is known, or is obvious, is important in determining whether the invitee is
to be charged with contributory negligence, or assumption of risk. (See §§
466 and 496D.) It is not, however, conclusive in determining the duty of the
possessor, or whether he has acted reasonably under the circumstances.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A, cmt. f (1965).
Tichenor identified the exceptions discussed in comment f as the “momentary
distraction” exception and the “necessary use notwithstanding knowledge of the
condition” – i.e. “necessary use” exception. Margraves asserts these exceptions apply to
her claim against TA Operating.

1.

Whether TA Operating Should Have Anticipated the Harm.

The parties do not dispute the open and obvious nature of the risk associated with
crossing the icy parking lot. However, the parties differ on whether, notwithstanding the
open and obvious nature of the risk, TA Operating should have anticipated the harm
suffered by Margraves. That is, TA Operating argues neither the “necessary use” nor
“monetary distraction” exceptions apply.

Plaintiff argues her use of the Truck Stop parking lot and facilities were necessary
because the interstate was becoming treacherous and the Truck Stop was the first and
only available place for her to stop. (Filing No. 50-5 at CM/ECF p. 9). Likewise, she
argues that her use of the parking lot was necessary because it was the available path for
drivers to reach the restaurant and restroom facilities while they waited for travel
conditions to improve.

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TA Operating contends Margraves’ use of the Truck Stop, its parking lot and its
facilities was not “necessary” and thus it had no further duty to protect Margraves due to
the open and obvious nature of risks associated with a slick parking lot. In support of its
contention, TA Operating argues that because Margraves entered the premises to avoid
the snowy interstate, and not to buy gas or otherwise use the premises, she did not need to
walk from her truck to the parking lot.1 Further, TA Operating asserts Margraves could
have used several different routes to the buildings and that the use of her chosen path was
unnecessary and not predictable.

The court cannot find as a matter of law that Margraves’ use of the Truck Stop and
its parking lot was unnecessary. While it is true the cases relied upon generally involve
employees or others whose presence was required for work purposes, these cases do not
require a finding of an employee-employer relationship plaintiff and the defendant, or
that the plaintiff was performing job related-business for the defendant when it used the
defendant’s premises. Corbin v. Mann’s Int’l Meat Specialists, Inc., 214 Neb. 222, 225,
333 N.W.2d 668 (1983); Tichenor, 212 Neb. 218, 322 N.W.2d 629. See generally Hruby
v. Albertson’s, Inc., case no. 4:09cv3204, 2010 WL 5256353 at *6 (D. Neb. Dec. 15,
2010)(finder of fact could determine that a drug store should have expected one of its
customers to either not discover a danger or that she would fail to protect herself). The
parties clearly disagree as to whether Margarves’ use of the Truck Stop facilities
restaurant and restrooms was necessary and whether her chosen walking route was
necessary. The multiple issues of a fact surrounding these questions warrant a denial of
defendant’s summary judgment motion.

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TA Operating argues that it expected that many truckers would simply park and remain
in their cabs until the weather cleared. (Filing No. 49 at CM/ECF p. 16). But they do not allege
all of the truckers would be expected to remain in their cabs or that they could not reasonably
expect some of the truckers to use the restaurant, convenience store or bathroom facilities.

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Likewise, the court cannot find that the “momentary distraction” exception is
inapplicable as a matter of law. Defendant argues that there is no evidence “to suggest
that Ms. Margraves was distracted or otherwise reasonably excused from paying attention
to the open and obvious danger before her.” (Filing No. 59 at CM/ECF p. 8). However,
the question of whether Margraves was distracted as she traveled across a parking lot
and, if so, whether TA Operating could have anticipated any momentary distraction, is a
question of fact for the jury to address.

2.

Whether TA Operating Failed to Use Reasonable Care to Protect
Margraves.

Nebraska courts consider the following factors when determining whether a
defendant has used reasonable care in maintaining and repairing a premises:
(1) the foreseeability or possibility of harm; (2) the purpose for which the
entrant entered the premises; (3) the time, manner, and circumstances under
which the entrant entered the premises; (4) the use to which the premises
are put or are expected to be put; (5) the reasonableness of the inspection,
repair, or warning; (6) the opportunity and ease of repair or correction or
giving of the warning; and (7) the burden on the land occupier and/or
community in terms of inconvenience or cost in providing adequate
protection.
Aguallo v. City of Scottsbluff, 267 Neb. 801, 806, 678 N.W.2d 82, 89 (2004).

Margraves argues that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether
TA Operating failed to reasonably and efficiently remove the snow and ice from its
parking lot. TA Operating asks the court to find, as a matter of law, the steps it took in
removing the potential hazard – i.e., the snow and ice covered parking lot – were
reasonable.

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Margraves asserts that no ice-melt or salt were spread on the section of the parking
lot which she used to reach the buildings and restrooms at the Truck Stop. (Filing No. 505, at CM/ECF pp. 11 & 13). TA Operating provides evidence stating that one of its
employees did spread salt or other ice-melting substances in the area the plaintiff crossed
to enter the Truck Stop buildings. (Filing No. 50-1, ¶ 9 at CM/ECF p. 2). TA Operating
also describes, in detail, other steps taken to remove ice and snow around the clock and
asserts that not only did it take reasonable steps, but that it took “extraordinary” steps to
remove snow and ice. The parties’ respective arguments go directly to the question of
whether TA Operating used reasonable care in clearing its parking lot. As such, the facts
underlying those arguments create a genuine dispute of material fact for the jury to
address.

Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, (Filing No.
48), is denied.

Dated this 10th day of December, 2013.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Cheryl R. Zwart
United States Magistrate Judge

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