Montin v. Gibson

Filing 9

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - Montin shall have until December 6, 2012, to amend his Complaint to clearly state a claim upon which relief may be granted against Defendant, in accordance with this Memorandum and Order. If Montin fails to file a suffici ent amended complaint, this matter will be dismissed without further notice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The Clerk of the court is directed to set a pro se case management deadline in this case using the followi ng text: Check for amended complaint on December 6, 2012, and dismiss if none filed. Plaintiff shall keep the court informed of his current address at all times while this case is pending. Failure to do so may result in dismissal without further notice. Ordered by Judge Joseph F. Bataillon. (Copy mailed to pro se party)(GJG)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA
JOHN MAXWELL MONTIN,
Plaintiff,
v.
BILL GIBSON, CEO,
Defendant.

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4:12CV3171

MEMORANDUM
AND ORDER

Plaintiff John Maxwell Montin (“Montin” or “Plaintiff”) filed his Complaint
in this matter on August 13, 2012. (Filing No. 1.) Montin has been given leave to
proceed in forma pauperis. (Filing No. 8.) Accordingly, the court now conducts an
initial review of his claims to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
I.

SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

Montin filed his Complaint against Bill Gibson, the chief executive officer of
the Lincoln Regional Center. Montin was committed to the Lincoln Regional Center
(“LRC”) in 1993 by order of the Hayes County District Court. His commitment
followed a jury’s finding that he was not responsible for two felonies by reason of
insanity. (Filing No. 1 at CM/ECF pp. 1-2.)
Montin alleges that, since his commitment to the LRC, doctors have
determined that he is not mentally ill. However, records of these findings have
disappeared from his medical records. As a result, Montin’s current treatment plan
is based on the false belief that Montin is mentally ill. (Id. at CM/ECF pp. 3-4.)
Montin alleges that Defendant and others have failed to protect Montin’s medical
records, and also refused to properly investigate their alteration. He alleges that
Defendant’s actions violate the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act

of 1996 (“HIPAA”). (Id. at CM/ECF pp. 7-8.)
For relief, Montin asks the court to find that the LRC (1) failed to protect the
viability of his medical records, (2) refused to investigate his complaints, and (3)
refused to remove false information from his medical records. (Id. at CM/ECF pp.
8-9.) He also seeks an injunction ordering, among other things, that all psychiatric
and psychological treatment of him be stopped. (Id. at CM/ECF p. 10.)
II.

APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS ON INITIAL REVIEW

The court is required to review in forma pauperis complaints to determine
whether summary dismissal is appropriate. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The court
must dismiss a complaint or any portion thereof that states a frivolous or malicious
claim, that fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B).
Pro se plaintiffs must set forth enough factual allegations to “nudge[] their
claims across the line from conceivable to plausible,” or “their complaint must be
dismissed” for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569-70 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.”). Regardless of whether a plaintiff is represented
or is appearing pro se, the plaintiff’s complaint must allege specific facts sufficient
to state a claim. See Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985).
However, a pro se plaintiff’s allegations must be construed liberally. Burke v. North
Dakota Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 294 F.3d 1043, 1043-44 (8th Cir. 2002) (citations
omitted).

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III.

DISCUSSION OF CLAIMS

A.

HIPAA

Montin alleges that Defendant violated his rights under HIPAA because he
failed to protect Montin’s medical records, and refused to properly investigate the
alteration of his medical records. (Filing No. 1 at CM/ECF pp. 7-8.) However,
HIPAA does not provide Montin with a private right of action. See Dodd v. Jones,
623 F.3d 563, 569 (8th Cir. 2010).
HIPAA, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d–1320d–9, governs a patient’s right to see, get a
copy of, and amend (correct) his own medical records. The Act does not create a
right for an individual to maintain a private law suit in his own name for an alleged
violation of HIPAA. Acara v. Banks, 470 F.3d 569, 571-72 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding
that “Congress did not intend for private enforcement of HIPAA,” and “[e]very
district court that has considered this issue is in agreement that the statute does not
support a private right of action”). Accordingly, Montin’s HIPAA claims against
Defendant must be dismissed.
B.

Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

Here, Montin has alleged violations of HIPAA against Defendant, but the crux
of Montin’s argument is that he should not be confined and treated at the LRC
because he is not mentally ill. The court cannot intervene in Montin’s dispute with
the state court.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits lower federal courts from exercising
appellate review of state court judgments. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S.
413, 416 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462,
482 (1983). Federal district courts do not have jurisdiction “over challenges to
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state-court decisions . . . even if those challenges allege that the state court’s action
was unconstitutional.” Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486 (emphasis added). In short, the
“Rooker-Feldman doctrine” bars this court from correcting or altering a state court
judgment, and no declaratory or injunctive relief is available in this court to do so.
Importantly, Rooker-Feldman bars “straightforward appeals” as well as “more
indirect attempts by federal plaintiffs to undermine state court decisions.” Lemonds
v. St. Louis Cnty., 222 F.3d 488, 492 (8th Cir. 2000). Thus, where a “federal claim
succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issue before it,”
the claim is barred by Rooker-Feldman because it is “inextricably intertwined with
specific claims already adjudicated in state court.” Id. at 492-93; see also Gisslen v.
City of Crystal, Minn., 345 F.3d 624, 627 (8th Cir. 2003) (“Where the district court
must hold that the state court was wrong in order to find in favor of the plaintiff, the
issues are inextricably intertwined.”) (internal quotation omitted).
The court cannot review the constitutionality of Montin’s continued
confinement without questioning the validity of the judgment of the Hayes County
District Court. Therefore, to the extent that Montin seeks to have the order of the
Hayes County District Court invalidated, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars
consideration of Montin’s claim.
C.

Leave to Amend

In several instances throughout Montin’s Complaint, he generally alleges that
Defendant’s conduct constituted “deliberate indifference.” (See, e.g., Filing No. 1 at
CM/ECF pp. 7-8.) The Eighth Amendment’s “deliberate indifference” standard is
used by courts to examine various conditions of confinement claims by prisoners.
Because Montin is civilly committed, and not a prisoner, the correct legal standard
is that of due process. See Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 874 (8th Cir. 2004).
Persons who are involuntarily civilly committed have liberty interests under the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment entitling them to safety, freedom from
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bodily restraint, and adequate care while in confinement. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457
U.S. 307 (1982).
In light of Montin’s references to “deliberate indifference,” he may have
intended to allege that Defendant’s conduct violated the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. However, this is unclear from the allegations of the
Complaint. Out of an abundance of caution, Montin will be allowed to amend his
Complaint to sufficiently allege a due process claim against Defendant upon which
relief may be granted. To prevail on such a claim, “a plaintiff must generally show
the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to a constitutional right in a manner
that shocks the conscience.” Revels, 382 F.3d at 875.
On its own motion, the court will permit Plaintiff 30 days in which to amend
his Complaint to sufficiently allege a due process claim against Defendant. If Montin
fails to file a sufficient amended complaint in accordance with this Memorandum and
Order, this matter will be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:
1.
Montin shall have until December 6, 2012, to amend his Complaint to
clearly state a claim upon which relief may be granted against Defendant, in
accordance with this Memorandum and Order. If Montin fails to file a sufficient
amended complaint, this matter will be dismissed without further notice for failure
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
2.
The Clerk of the court is directed to set a pro se case management
deadline in this case using the following text: Check for amended complaint on
December 6, 2012, and dismiss if none filed.

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3.
Plaintiff shall keep the court informed of his current address at all times
while this case is pending. Failure to do so may result in dismissal without further
notice.

DATED this 8th day of November, 2012.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Joseph F. Bataillon
United States District Judge

*This opinion may contain hyperlinks to other documents or Web sites. The
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