Willsea v. Sabatka-Rine et al

Filing 9

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that: Plaintiff's Complaint (filing no. 1 ) is dismissed without prejudice. A separate Judgment will be entered in accordance with this Memorandum and Order. Ordered by Judge John M. Gerrard. (Copy mailed to pro se party)(TCL )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA
ALFRED GENE WILLSEA,
Plaintiff,
v.
SABATKA-RINE, CREWSHANK,
and SHAW
Defendants.

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4:12CV3209

MEMORANDUM
AND ORDER

Plaintiff Alfred Gene Willsea filed his Complaint in this matter on October 4,
2012. (Filing No. 1.) The court has given Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma
pauperis. (Filing No. 8.) The court now conducts an initial review of the Complaint
to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2) and 1915A.
I.

SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

Plaintiff named Warden Sabatka-Rine, Deputy Warden Crewshank, and Law
Librarian Shaw as Defendants in this matter. (Filing No. 1 at CM/ECF p. 1.) Plaintiff
alleges Defendants are all employed at the Nebraska State Penitentiary. (Id. at
CM/ECF p. 2.) Plaintiff was incarcerated at the Nebraska State Penitentiary when he
filed his Complaint. (Id.) Plaintiff now resides at the Lincoln Community
Corrections Center. (Filing No. 7.)
Many of Plaintiff’s allegations are illegible. The allegations the court can
decipher state that Defendants denied Plaintiff access to the law library at the
Nebraska State Penitentiary on 11 separate days in August and September of 2012.
(Filing No. 1.) Plaintiff alleges Defendants’ actions caused him “mental anguish
[and] frustration.” (Id. at CM/ECF p. 6.) As relief, Plaintiff asks that prison staff be

made to understand that they should not violate his constitutional rights, and that
Plaintiff be awarded the “maximum amount” possible. (Id. at CM/ECF p. 7.)
II.

APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS ON INITIAL REVIEW

The court is required to review in forma pauperis complaints to determine
whether summary dismissal is appropriate. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The court
must dismiss a complaint or any portion thereof that states a frivolous or malicious
claim, that fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B).
Pro se plaintiffs must set forth enough factual allegations to “nudge[] their
claims across the line from conceivable to plausible,” or “their complaint must be
dismissed” for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 70 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.”). Regardless of whether a plaintiff is represented or is
appearing pro se, the plaintiff’s complaint must allege specific facts sufficient to state
a claim. See Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985). However, a pro
se plaintiff’s allegations must be construed liberally. Burke v. North Dakota Dep’t
of Corr. & Rehab., 294 F.3d 1043, 1043-44 (8th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).
III.

DISCUSSION OF CLAIMS
A.

Claims for Monetary Relief

Plaintiff seeks monetary relief against Defendants. (Filing No. 1 at CM/ECF
p. 7.) The Eleventh Amendment bars claims for damages by private parties against
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a state, state instrumentalities and an employee of a state sued in the employee’s
official capacity. See, e.g., Egerdahl v. Hibbing Cmty. Coll., 72 F.3d 615, 619 (8th
Cir. 1995); Dover Elevator Co. v. Arkansas State Univ., 64 F.3d 442, 446-47 (8th Cir.
1995). Any award of retroactive monetary relief payable by the state, including for
back pay or damages, is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment absent a waiver of
immunity by the state or an override of immunity by Congress. See, e.g., Dover
Elevator Co., 64 F.3d at 444; Nevels v. Hanlon, 656 F.2d 372, 377-78 (8th Cir. 1981).
Sovereign immunity does not bar damages claims against state officials acting in their
personal capacities, nor does it bar claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 that
seek equitable relief from state-employee defendants acting in their official capacities.
In addition, where a plaintiff does not specify the capacity in which a defendant
is sued, it is presumed that a defendant is sued in his official capacity only. See, e.g.,
Johnson v. Outboard Marine Corp., 172 F.3d 531, 535 (8th Cir. 1999) (“This court
has held that, in order to sue a public official in his or her individual capacity, a
plaintiff must expressly and unambiguously state so in the pleadings, otherwise, it
will be assumed that the defendant is sued only in his or her official capacity.”). In
addition, a claim against an individual in his official capacity is, in reality, a claim
against the entity that employs the official. See Parrish v. Luckie, 963 F.2d 201, 203
n.1 (8th Cir. 1992) (“Suits against persons in their official capacity are just another
method of filing suit against the entity. A plaintiff seeking damages in an officialcapacity suit is seeking a judgment against the entity. Therefore, the appellants in this
case will collectively be referred to as the City.”) (internal citations omitted)). As
such, damages claims against individual state employees acting in their official
capacities are also barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Murphy v. State of Arkansas,
127 F.3d 750, 754 (8th Cir. 1997).
Here, Plaintiff does not specify the capacity in which Defendants are sued.
Therefore, the court presumes Plaintiff has sued them in their official capacities only.
As set forth above, Plaintiff may not sue state employees in their official capacities
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for monetary relief absent a waiver of immunity by the state or an override of
immunity by Congress. There is nothing in the record before the court showing that
the State of Nebraska waived, or that Congress overrode, sovereign immunity in this
matter. As such, Plaintiff’s claims for monetary relief are dismissed.
B.

Claims for Injunctive Relief

As relief, Plaintiff asks that prison staff “be made to understand” that they
should not violate his constitutional rights. (Filing No. 1 at CM/ECF p. 7.) The court
liberally construes Plaintiff’s request for relief to mean that he wants the court to
order Defendants to allow him access to the law library at the Nebraska State
Penitentiary. However, Plaintiff no longer resides at the Nebraska State Penitentiary.
(See Plaintiff’s Notice of Change of Address at Filing No. 7.)
“In general, a pending claim for injunctive relief becomes moot when the
challenged conduct ceases and there is no reasonable expectation that the wrong will
be repeated.” Beaulieu v. Ludeman, 690 F.3d 1017, 1024 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting
Roubideaux v. N.D. Dep’t. of Corr. & Rehab., 570 F.3d 966, 976 (8th Cir. 2009). A
court properly dismisses a claim as moot “if it has lost its character as a present, live
controversy of the kind that must exist if [the court is] to avoid advisory opinions on
abstract questions of law.” Beaulieu, 690 F.3d at 1024 (quotation omitted).
Here, Plaintiff no longer resides at the Nebraska State Penitentiary and there
is no suggestion that he might be returned. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive
relief pertaining to the law library at the Nebraska State Penitentiary is moot. See
Roubideaux, 570 F.3d at 976 (“All of the Female Inmates have been transferred out
of the NDSP, the James River CC, and the Missouri River CC, and there is no
suggestion that they might be returned. Their class certification is for injunctive relief,
and any equal protection claim arising out of their previous housing in those other
facilities is now moot.”); Gladson v. Iowa Dep’t of Corr., 551 F.3d 825, 835 (8th Cir.
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2009) (“[B]ecause Howrey is no longer incarcerated at the ISP and subject to the
allegedly offending policy, his claims are moot.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims for
injunctive relief are dismissed. Having dismissed Plaintiff’s claims for monetary and
injunctive relief, the court will dismiss this matter in its entirety.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:
1.

Plaintiff’s Complaint (filing no. 1) is dismissed without prejudice.

2.
A separate Judgment will be entered in accordance with this
Memorandum and Order.
DATED this 7th day of January, 2013.
BY THE COURT:
s/ John M. Gerrard
United States District Judge

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Court for the District of Nebraska does not endorse, recommend, approve, or guarantee any third
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the availability or functionality of any hyperlink. Thus, the fact that a hyperlink ceases to work or
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