DaMoude v. Strong

Filing 8

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER that Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed without prejudice. A separate judgment will be entered in accordance with this Memorandum and Order. Ordered by Chief Judge Laurie Smith Camp. (Copy mailed to pro se party) (JSF)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA
DOUGLAS DUANE DAMOUDE,
Plaintiff,
v.
SUSAN STRONG, Judge,
Defendant.

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4:14CV3020

MEMORANDUM
AND ORDER

Plaintiff filed his Complaint in this matter on January 24, 2014. (Filing No. 1.) The
court now conducts an initial review of the Complaint to determine whether summary
dismissal is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
I.

SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT
Plaintiff brings this action against Lancaster County Court Judge Susan Strong. The

precise nature of Plaintiff’s allegations is difficult to discern. As best as the court can tell,
Plaintiff alleges that Judge Strong ruled against him in some kind of property action
brought in the Lancaster County Court on January 14, 2014. (Id. at CM/ECF p. 1.) Plaintiff
alleges that Judge Strong ruled against him despite there being “NO evidence of an
affidavit on record or a competent witness to be cross examined.” (Id. at CM/ECF p. 5.)
Plaintiff further alleges that Judge Strong “should have known better.” He seeks an
unspecified amount of money damages. (Id. at CM/ECF p. 6.)
II.

APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS ON INITIAL REVIEW
The court is required to review prisoner and in forma pauperis complaints seeking

relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity to
determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The court
must dismiss a complaint or any portion thereof that states a frivolous or malicious claim,

that fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Pro se plaintiffs must set forth enough factual allegations to “nudge[] their claims
across the line from conceivable to plausible,” or “their complaint must be dismissed” for
failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 569-70 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) (“A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”).
Regardless of whether a plaintiff is represented or is appearing pro se, the plaintiff’s
complaint must allege specific facts sufficient to state a claim. See Martin v. Sargent, 780
F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985). However, a pro se plaintiff’s allegations must be
construed liberally. Burke v. North Dakota Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 294 F.3d 1043, 104344 (8th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).
III.

DISCUSSION OF CLAIMS
Judges are absolutely immune from suits for damages arising from acts, whether

or not erroneous, in their judicial capacities, as long as such actions were not taken in the
complete absence of all jurisdiction. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991). Judicial
immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from damages, and “is not overcome by
allegations of bad faith or malice, the existence of which ordinarily cannot be resolved
without engaging in discovery and eventual trial.”

Id. Moreover, “[a] judge will not be

deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error . . . or was in excess of his
authority.” Id. at 12. (quotation omitted). Absolute judicial immunity applies to monetary

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damages claims only and does not extend to suits requesting prospective injunctive relief.
Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 536-38 (1984).
Here, the actions of which Plaintiff complains were quintessential judicial acts taken
by Judge Strong in a court case, performing her traditional judicial function in her judicial
capacity. While Plaintiff alleges that Judge Strong had “no jurisdiction” over the subject
matter at issue, his allegations make it clear that he is asserting this belief based on Judge
Strong’s alleged failure to “follow[] statutory procedure.” (See Filing No. 1 at CM/ECF pp.
5-6.) These allegations are insufficient to establish a plausible claim that Judge Strong’s
acts were not a normal judicial function or that her actions were taken in complete absence
of all jurisdiction. Indeed, the only claim being brought against Judge Strong concerns a
judicial ruling. Accordingly, the Complaint against Judge Strong must be dismissed.

IT IS ORDERED:
1.

Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed without prejudice.

2.

A separate judgment will be entered in accordance with this Memorandum
and Order.

DATED this 27th day of May, 2014.
BY THE COURT:
s/Laurie Smith Camp
Chief United States District Judge

*This opinion may contain hyperlinks to other documents or Web sites. The U.S. District Court for the
District of Nebraska does not endorse, recommend, approve, or guarantee any third parties or the services
or products they provide on their Web sites. Likewise, the court has no agreements with any of these third
parties or their Web sites. The court accepts no responsibility for the availability or functionality of any
hyperlink. Thus, the fact that a hyperlink ceases to work or directs the user to some other site does not affect
the opinion of the court.

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