Cavanaugh v. Hall County Department of Corrections

Filing 77

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Filing No. 55) is granted. Cavanaugh's claims for equitable and monetary relief against Defendants in their official capacities under § 1983 are dismissed with prejud ice. Cavanaugh's Motions seeking summary judgment (Filing No. 58), reconsideration of the court's prior order (Filing No. 70), and appointment of counsel (Filing No. 52) are denied. The clerk of the court is directed to update the cour t's records to reflect the full and correct spelling of Defendants' names: Fred Ruiz, Jimmy Vann, Darla Sparr, Carol Castleberry, Jason Conley, and Debb Rea. The court will enter judgment by a separate document. Ordered by Senior Judge Joseph F. Bataillon. (Copy mailed to pro se party)(ADB)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA
STEPHEN CAVANAUGH,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
HALL COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF )
CORRECTIONS, RUIZ, VAN, SPAR, )
CASTLEBERRY, CONNELLY, and )
REI,
)
)
Defendants.
)

4:14CV3062

MEMORANDUM
AND ORDER

Plaintiff Stephen Cavanaugh brings this case against Hall County, Nebraska (“Hall
County”),1 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his constitutional rights. The
operative pleadings are Cavanaugh’s Complaint (Filing No. 1) and Amended Complaint
(Filing No. 12). Cavanaugh argues in his pleadings that officials of the Hall County Jail
in Grand Island, Nebraska, repeatedly punished him for filing grievances by placing him
in segregation. In addition, he argues he was denied access to the jail’s grievance
system.
The court construes Cavanaugh’s suit as being against Hall County because
Cavanaugh sued the following county-employee defendants in their official capacities
only: Director Ruiz, Assistant Director Van, Sergeant Spar, Sergeant Castleberry,
Sergeant Connelly, and Sergeant Rei. A claim against an individual in his official
capacity is, in reality, a claim against the entity that employs the official, in this case,
Hall County. See Parrish v. Luckie, 963 F.2d 201, 203 n.1 (8th Cir. 1992) (“Suits
against persons in their official capacity are just another method of filing suit against the
entity. A plaintiff seeking damages in an official-capacity suit is seeking a judgment
against the entity.”) (internal citations omitted)).
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Defendants’ Answer (Filing No. 29) reflects the full and correct spellings of the
official-capacity defendants’ names are Fred Ruiz, Jimmy Vann, Darla Sparr, Carol
Castleberry, Jason Conley, and Debb Rea. The court will direct the clerk of the court to
update the court’s records to reflect Defendants’ full and correct names.

Cavanaugh and Hall County have filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
(Filing Nos. 55 and 58.) The court has considered the pleadings, briefs, and the parties’
evidence. For the reasons discussed below, the court finds Hall County is entitled to
summary judgment.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The movant bears the initial responsibility of informing the court
of the basis for the motion, and must identify those portions of the record that the movant
believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Torgerson v. City
of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc). If the movant does so, the
non-movant must respond by submitting evidentiary materials that set out specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id.
On a motion for summary judgment, facts must be viewed in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a genuine dispute as to those facts. Id.
Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate
inferences from the evidence are jury functions, not those of a judge. Id. In order to
show that disputed facts are material, the party opposing summary judgment must cite
to the relevant substantive law in identifying facts that might affect the outcome of the
suit. Quinn v. St. Louis Cnty., 653 F.3d 745, 751 (8th Cir. 2011). But where the record
taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party,
there is no genuine issue for trial. Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1042.
With these standards in mind, the court turns to consideration of the parties’ crossmotions for summary judgment.

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FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Cavanaugh was a pretrial detainee at the Hall County Jail from July 29, 2012, until
he was transferred to the custody of the State of Nebraska in September of 2013. (Filing
No. 12 at CM/ECF p. 1.) At all times relevant to this action, Ruiz was the jail director,
Vann was the assistant jail director, and Sparr, Castleberry, Conley, and Rea were jail
sergeants. (Filing No. 29.)
Analysis of this case requires an understanding of some of the jail’s polices and
procedures, and its systems for processing inmate requests and inmate grievances. The
jail maintains a Standard Operating Policy and Procedure Manual. The manual explicitly
states that any inmate or detainee is permitted to report and file a grievance, and that no
disciplinary sanction or adverse action may occur as a result of filing a grievance.
(Filing No. 25-3.) The jail also maintains an Inmate/Detainee Handbook. This
handbook explicitly states that no negative action or retaliation may be made against an
inmate or detainee for filing a grievance. But, if a grievance is frivolous, disrespectful,
contains threats, profanity, or vulgarity, it may be returned to the inmate or detainee
without a response. (Filing No. 25-2 at CM/ECF pp. 28-29.)
The handbook describes a distinction between “grievances” and “inmate
requests.” Specifically, grievances pertain to the violation of a “right” or a “privilege”
and are appealable. In contrast, inmate requests are used to pose questions about
inmates’ criminal sentences, charges, money, release dates, and access to jail
programming and services. They may be directed to jail staff and also other county and
local officials. (See generally Filing No. 25-2.) An inmate or detainee may face
sanctions for filing an inmate request that is disrespectful, or contains threats, profanity,
or vulgarity. (Filing No. 25-2 at CM/ECF p. 11.)
Both grievances and inmate requests may be submitted by general-population
inmates and detainees via kiosks located in the common areas of the jail. These kiosks
provide electronic transmission of inmate requests and grievances and other items of
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correspondence to individuals and departments within the jail, and also to certain
agencies outside the jail, such as the city police department and the clerk of the court.
(Filing No. 25-2 at CM/ECF p. 11; Filing No. 56-1 at CM/ECF p. 2.) These kiosks are
operated by inmates and detainees using fingerprint access. (Filing No. 56-1 at CM/ECF
p. 2.)
Turning now to the facts of this case, this case concerns incidents that occurred
between September 28, 2012, and September of 2013. Jail staff placed Cavanaugh in
segregation on seven separate occasions during this period of time.2 Cavanaugh claims
jail officials placed him in segregation as punishment for filing grievances and they were
acting in accordance with a policy or custom when they did so. The evidence shows the
following with respect to these seven incidents of segregation.
One: Jail officials held Cavanaugh in segregation from October 25, 2012, to
October 26, 2012. (Filing No. 56-2 at CM/ECF p. 1.) On October 25, 2012, hearing
officers found Cavanaugh guilty of second-degree disrespect based on allegations that
he had used the electronic communication system to transmit profane communication to
the Grand Island Police Department (e.g., “NOT CLOSED FUCKER. FUCKING
ANSWER ME” and “FUCK YOU”). (Filing No. 56-5 at CM/ECF pp. 2-5.)
Two: Jail officials held Cavanaugh in segregation from December 10, 2012, to
January 2, 2013. (Filing No. 56-2 at CM/ECF p. 1.) The evidence shows the following
chronology of events related to this instance of segregation:

Prior to September 28, 2012, Cavanaugh spent time in segregation on two
occasions. First, jail staff classified Cavanaugh as a maximum-security inmate and
assigned him to the segregation unit upon his arrival to the jail due to the seriousness of
the criminal charges pending against him. (Filing No. 56-1 at CM/ECF p. 3.)
Cavanaugh was released to non-segregation general population on August 22, 2012, but
returned to the segregation unit on September 24, 2012, at his own request. (Filing No.
56-1 at CM/ECF p. 4.) Cavanaugh returned to general population on September 28,
2012, also at his own request. (Filing No. 56-1 at CM/ECF p. 4.)
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•

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•

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•

December 3, 2012: Cavanaugh called a jailer a “micro-managing son of a bitch,”
and he later told a sergeant he was “trying to wrap [his] head around how retarded
[he was] being.” (Filing No. 56-5 at CM/ECF pp. 9-10.)
December 10, 2012: Vann ordered Cavanaugh placed in segregation pending his
disciplinary hearing after he discovered Cavanaugh had been using expletives and
was being disrespectful in his inmate requests. (Filing No. 56-5 at CM/ECF p.
11.)
December 11, 2012: Cavanaugh deliberately spilled food on his cell floor, refused
to clean it, and then refused to leave the cell so his cell could be cleaned. (Filing
No. 56-5 at CM/ECF pp. 12-24.)
December 12, 2012: Based on the above-mentioned events, jail officials issued a
notice of disciplinary hearing alleging Cavanaugh had committed the following
rule violations: (1) Refusing a Direct Order, First Degree; (2) Tampering with
Security Features or Equipment, (3) Obstruction of Corrections Operation, First
Degree, and (4) Failure to Maintain Sanitation. (Filing No. 56-5 at CM/ECF p.
8.)
December 14, 2012: Hearing officers found Cavanaugh guilty of all four rule
violations and sentenced Cavanaugh to 10 days of disciplinary segregation and 20
days of cell restriction. (Filing No. 56-5 at CM/ECF p. 25.)

Three: Jail officials held Cavanaugh in segregation from January 29, 2013, to
February 20, 2013. (Filing No. 56-2 at CM/ECF pp. 1-2.) This third instance of
segregation is the only one that specifically relates to Cavanaugh’s filing of a grievance.
The evidence shows the following chronology of events related to this instance of
segregation:
•

January 26, 2013: Cavanaugh sent the following inmate request to the jail’s
mental health staff: “MZ. PEREZ. WHILE YOU WERE ON YOUR MEDICAL
LEAVE MISS REBECCA WAS WORKING TO GET AHOLD [sic] OF TWO
FRIENDS OF MINE SO SHE COULD LET THEM KNOW WHERE I AM AND
GIVE THEM THE INFORMATION THEYD [sic] NEED TO WRITE ME. DO
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•

•

YOU KNOW IF SHE EVER FOUND THEM OR GOT ANY ADDRESSES I
CAN USE TO WRITE THEM?” (Filing No. 56-6 at CM/ECF p. 45.)
January 29, 2013: Vann responded to Cavanaugh’s inmate request, stating:
“Mental Health staff are not in place to contact friends of inmates for personal
writing issues.” (Filing No. 59 at CM/ECF p. 70.) Later on this same date,
Cavanaugh submitted a grievance, which read: “HIS WORSHIPFULLNESS MR
VAN MALICIOUSLY INTERCEPTED A MESSAGE INTENDED FOR A
MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONAL. THIS WAS OBVIOUSLY DONE OUT
OF SPITE AND IN RETALIATION. HE HAS NO RIGHT TO KEEP ME
FROM SPEAKING WITH MENTAL HEALTH DESPITE HIS CLAIMED
DIVINE STATUS.” (Filing No. 56-6 at CM/ECF p. 32.) Then, on this same
date, jail officials deemed Cavanaugh’s grievance “disrespectful” and rehoused
him to the segregation unit pending a disciplinary hearing. (Filing No. 56-5 at
CM/ECF p. 32.) While being escorted to segregation, Cavanaugh stated he was
“‘only in there because of piece of shit Vann.’” (Filing No. 56-5 at CM/ECF p.
33.) Based on these events, jail officials issued a notice of disciplinary hearing
alleging Cavanaugh had committed the following rule violations: (1) Disrespect,
Second Degree, (2) Obstruction of a Corrections Operation, Second Degree, and
(3) Refusing a Direct Order, Third Degree. (Filing No. 56-5 at CM/ECF p. 31.)
January 31, 2013, hearing officers found Cavanaugh guilty of the three rule
violations and sentenced him to remain in the segregation unit under
administrative segregation pending review from classification. (Filing No. 56-5
at CM/ECF p. 34.)

Four: Jail officials held Cavanaugh in segregation from February 28, 2013, to
March 26, 2013. (Filing No. 56-2 at CM/ECF p. 2.) On February 28, 2013, Cavanaugh
began serving a 46-hour cell restriction based on a jailer’s report that he made a
statement about the sexual orientation of the unit officer and used the emergency call
button in an non-emergency situation. (Filing No. 56-5 at CM/ECF p. 37.) While
serving this cell restriction, Cavanaugh dumped his food tray, refused orders, and
repeatedly pressed his emergency call button. (Filing No. 56-5 at CM/ECF pp. 39-43.)
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Based on these incidents, on March 6, 2013, hearing officers found Cavanaugh guilty of
the following: (1) Refusing a Direct Order, First Degree, (2) Tampering with Security
Features or Equipment, (3) Habitual Minor, (4) Obstruction of a Corrections Officer,
First Degree, (5) Refusing a Direct Order, Second Degree, and (6) Failure to Maintain
Sanitation. They sentenced him to 10 days of disciplinary segregation followed by 20
days of cell restriction. (Filing No. 56-5 at CM/ECF p. 44.)
Five: Jail officials held Cavanaugh in segregation from June 19, 2013, to July 12,
2013. (Filing No. 56-2 at CM/ECF p. 2.) On June 27, 2013, hearing officers found
Cavanaugh guilty of first-degree disrespect and first-degree obstruction of corrections
operations based on allegations that Cavanaugh had yelled “Fucking Faggots” toward
a group of jail staff. (Filing No. 56-5 at CM/ECF pp. 73-78.) They sentenced
Cavanaugh to five days of disciplinary segregation and 10 days of cell restriction.
(Filing No. 56-5 at CM/ECF p. 78.)
Six: Jail officials held Cavanaugh in segregation from July 16, 2013, to July 18,
2013. (Filing No. 56-2 at CM/ECF p. 2.) On July 18, 2013, hearing officers found
Cavanaugh guilty of third-degree assault based on allegations that he had assaulted
another inmate. They sentenced Cavanaugh to three days of disciplinary segregation
with credit for time served and a five-day loss of commissary. (Filing No. 56-5 at
CM/ECF p. 83.)
Seven: Jail officials held Cavanaugh in segregation from July 30, 2013, to August
2, 2013. (Filing No. 56-2 at CM/ECF p. 2.) On August 1, 2013, hearing officers found
Cavanaugh guilty of first-degree disrespect and second-degree refusing a direct order
based on allegations that he had commented about a female jailer’s physical appearance
and physical features and continued to do so after jail staff directed him to stop. (Filing
No. 56-5 at CM/ECF pp. 86-88.) They sentenced Cavanaugh to five days of cell
restriction. (Filing No. 56-5 at CM/ECF p. 88.)

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Before turning to a discussion of Cavanaugh’s claims, the court notes the
following fact is disputed in this case: Cavanaugh maintains that, on January 30, 2013,
Ruiz approached him in segregation and informed him he would remain in segregation
for the duration of his incarceration if he continued to file grievances. (Filing No. 59 at
CM/ECF p. 4.) Ruiz disputes having made this statement. (Filing No. 67-1 at CM/ECF
p. 2.) The evidence reflects Cavanaugh filed approximately 70 grievances prior to
January 30, 2013, and none after this date. (Filing No. 56-6 at CM/ECF pp. 15-33;
Filing No. 56-7.)
DISCUSSION
Cavanaugh claims Hall County officials placed him in segregation for filing
grievances, and he was denied access to the grievance system while incarcerated at the
Hall County Jail. (Filing No. 1; Filing No. 12.) Cavanaugh correctly argues that the
First Amendment right to petition for redress of grievances includes redress under
established prison grievance procedures, Sprouse v. Babcock, 870 F.2d 450, 451-52 (8th
Cir. 1989), and the filing of a disciplinary charge becomes actionable if done in
retaliation for an inmate’s filing of a grievance. Id. But, the question presented in this
case is whether Hall County may be held liable based on the incidents described in
Cavanaugh’s Complaint and Amended Complaint.
When a § 1983 claim is made against a municipality, the court must analyze two
distinct issues: (1) whether the plaintiff’s harm was caused by a constitutional violation;
and (2) if so, whether the municipality is responsible for that violation. Collins v. City of
Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 120. “[A] municipality cannot be held liable solely
because it employs a tortfeasor—or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable
under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Social
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). “[T]he touchstone of ‘official policy’ is designed ‘to
distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of employees of the municipality, and
thereby make clear that municipal liability is limited to action for which the municipality

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is actually responsible.’ City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 138 (1988)
(quoting Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479-480 (1986)) (emphasis in original).
A plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable under § 1983 must “identify a
municipal ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ that caused the plaintiff’s injury.” Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs
of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997). “Locating a ‘policy’ ensures that
a municipality is held liable only for those deprivations resulting from the decisions of
its duly constituted legislative body or of those officials whose acts may fairly be said
to be those of the municipality.” Id. at 403-04. “Similarly, an act performed pursuant to
a ‘custom’ that has not been formally approved by an appropriate decisionmaker may
fairly subject a municipality to liability on the theory that the relevant practice is so
widespread as to have the force of law.” Id. at 404.
The evidence does not support a conclusion that Hall County had a policy of
placing Cavanaugh in segregation in retaliation for, or in response to, filing grievances.
Indeed, jail policy on the issue is clear. Both the jail’s inmate handbook and the jail’s
written procedures explicitly state that no disciplinary sanction or adverse action may
occur as a result of filing a grievance. (Filing No. 25-2 and Filing No. 25-3.)
There is also no evidence that Hall County, through its officials, had a custom of
placing Cavanaugh in segregation in retaliation for filing grievances. The evidence
reflects Cavanagh was placed in segregation for a wide range of misbehavior on his part.
Of the numerous times Cavanaugh was placed in segregation, only one pertained to his
submission of an item submitted as “a grievance.” This grievance, like much of his other
verbal and written communication with staff, was mocking and disrespectful. Jail staff
placed Cavanaugh in segregation pending a hearing to address charges of disrespect and
other rule violations. This single instance does not suggest any widespread practice
within the municipality for which the municipality could be found liable.
Separately, even assuming Ruiz informed Cavanaugh that he would remain in
segregation for the duration of his incarceration if he continued to file grievances, the
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court cannot find Hall County liable for the statement alone. Where a plaintiff seeks to
hold a municipality liable for a “single decision by [a] municipal policymaker[],”
Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 480, the plaintiff must show that the official had final
policymaking power, see Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 123 (explaining that “only those
municipal officials who have ‘final policymaking authority’ may by their actions subject
the government to § 1983 liability”).
Here, the critical inquiry is not whether Ruiz, as jail director, had final
policymaking authority; rather, the inquiry is whether Ruiz was a final policymaker with
respect to the particular conduct challenged in this lawsuit. See Roe v. City of Waterbury,
542 F.3d 31, 37 (2nd Cir. 2008). Defendants argue he is not because Nebraska state law
cloaks the Hall County Board of Corrections with overall management of the jail and,
as director of the jail, Ruiz answers to this county board. (Filing No. 25-1 at CM/ECF
p. 3; Filing No. 25-2 at CM/ECF p. 3.) See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 23-2801 to 23-2086.
The jail’s policy explicitly prohibits disciplinary sanction or adverse action in
response to filing a grievance. Ruiz’s threat to Cavanaugh, if acted upon, would have
been in direct violation of this policy. In other words, Ruiz’s conduct was forbidden by
existing, applicable county policy. Ruiz’s alleged deliberate departure from municipal
policy cannot be imputed to the county itself under the facts presented in this case. See
Bernini v. City of St. Paul, 665 F.3d 997 (8th Cir. 2012) (actions of senior commander
of city policy department during mass arrest of protestors alleged to have been in
violation of First Amendment could not bind the city because commander was not the
final policymaker for the city, but only had discretion in the exercise of his particular
functions, with other layers of policymaking authority above his rank prescribed by city
ordinance.). In short, there is no evidence in this case that Hall County was the moving
force behind any of Cavanaugh’s alleged injuries. Thus, Cavanaugh’s claims against the
county fail and the county is entitled to summary judgment.
MOTION TO RECONSIDER

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Late in the progression of this case, Cavanaugh moved to amend his pleadings to
add individual-capacity claims against Ruiz, Vann, and official and individual capacity
claims against a new defendant. The court denied Cavanaugh’s request to amend
because Cavanaugh did not file a proposed amended complaint in accordance with this
court’s local rules. (Filing No. 64.) Cavanaugh now moves the court to reconsider its
denial of leave to amend. (Filing No. 71.) But, once again, Cavanaugh has filed no
proposed amended complaint. In addition, he has shown no manifest error in the court’s
prior ruling denying him leave to amend and denying him leave to conduct further
discovery. Therefore, the court will deny Cavanaugh’s Motion to Reconsider (Filing No.
70).

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
Plaintiff seeks the appointment of counsel. (Filing No. 52.) The court cannot
routinely appoint counsel in civil cases. In Davis v. Scott, 94 F.3d 444, 447 (8th Cir.
1996), the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals explained that “[i]ndigent civil litigants do
not have a constitutional or statutory right to appointed counsel. The trial court has
broad discretion to decide whether both the plaintiff and the court will benefit from the
appointment of counsel[.]” Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). No such
benefit is apparent here.
STATE-LAW CLAIMS
It is unclear to what extent Cavanaugh intended to raise claims under state law.
Regardless, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining
state law claims because it will dismiss all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:

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1.
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Filing No. 55) is granted.
Cavanaugh’s claims for equitable and monetary relief against Defendants in their official
capacities under § 1983 are dismissed with prejudice.
2.
Cavanaugh’s Motions seeking summary judgment (Filing No. 58),
reconsideration of the court’s prior order (Filing No. 70), and appointment of counsel
(Filing No. 52) are denied.
3.
The clerk of the court is directed to update the court’s records to reflect the
full and correct spelling of Defendants’ names: Fred Ruiz, Jimmy Vann, Darla Sparr,
Carol Castleberry, Jason Conley, and Debb Rea.
4.

The court will enter judgment by a separate document.

DATED this 19th day of October, 2015.
BY THE COURT:

s/ Joseph F. Bataillon
United States District Judge

*This opinion may contain hyperlinks to other documents or Web sites. The U.S.
District Court for the District of Nebraska does not endorse, recommend, approve, or
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Likewise, the court has no agreements with any of these third parties or their Web sites.
The court accepts no responsibility for the availability or functionality of any hyperlink.
Thus, the fact that a hyperlink ceases to work or directs the user to some other site does
not affect the opinion of the court.
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