Brown v. Nebr. Dept. of Correctional Svs.. et al

Filing 37

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Filing No. 33 ) is granted. This case is dismissed without prejudice. The court will enter judgment by a separate order. Ordered by Senior Judge Richard G. Kopf. (Copy mailed to pro se party)(GJG)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA
CORNELIUS BROWN,
Plaintiff,
v.
PAUL RODRIGUEZ,
Defendant.

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4:14CV3071

MEMORANDUM
AND ORDER

This matter is before the court on Defendant Paul Rodriguez’s Motion to Dismiss.
(Filing No. 33). For the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s motion will be granted.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Cornelius Brown was incarcerated at the Nebraska State Penitentiary
(“NSP”) from March 15, 2012, until November 8, 2014, after being convicted of a third
degree-sexual assault. Upon entering the NSP, Brown was evaluated and recommended
for the Inpatient Healthy Living Program (“IHeLP”), which is an inpatient treatment
program for sex offenders. Brown contacted the program placement coordinator,
Defendant Paul Rodriguez, to notify him of Brown’s desire to enter the program.
Rodriguez informed Brown he would not be incarcerated long enough to complete the
program and would not be accepted. (Filing Nos. 1 and 28.)
Brown filed this lawsuit on April 2, 2014, against multiple defendants within the
Nebraska Department of Corrections. (Filing No. 1). On July 2, 2015, this Court
dismissed all of Brown’s claims against Defendants with the sole exception of his claim
against Rodriguez in his individual capacity. (See Filing No. 29 at CM/ECF p. 1).
Brown’s remaining claim alleges Rodriguez violated his Fourth and Eighth Amendment
rights by denying his entry into the IHeLP program. (See Filing No. 28). He claims he
required treatment as a sex offender and Rodriguez’s denial of Brown’s requests to join
the program was an act of deliberate indifference to the “necessary rehabilitative
services needed.”

ANALYSIS
Pro se plaintiffs must set forth enough factual allegations to “nudge[] their claims
across the line from conceivable to plausible,” or “their complaint must be dismissed”
for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). Regardless of whether a plaintiff is represented or is appearing pro se, the
plaintiff’s complaint must allege specific facts sufficient to state a claim. See Martin v.
Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985). However, a pro se plaintiff’s allegations
must be construed liberally. Burke v. North Dakota Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 294 F.3d
1043, 1043-44 (8th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).
A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint,
however unartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However,
in order to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, Brown’s obligation to provide the grounds for his entitlement to relief
necessitates that the complaint contain “more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555.
Here, Brown alleged that Rodriguez was deliberately indifferent to his need for
rehabilitative treatment. To establish a § 1983 claim for deliberate indifference under
both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Brown must allege that he suffered from
an objectively serious medical need and Rodriguez actually knew of but deliberately
disregarded the need. Santiago v. Blair, 707 F.3d 984, 990 (8th Cir. 2013). “A serious
medical need is ‘one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment, or
one that is so obvious that even a layperson would easily recognize the necessity for a
doctor’s attention.’” Id. (internal citations omitted).
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Brown did not allege in his pleadings that he suffers from a serious medical need
or that he suffers from a serious mental disorder. See Hunt v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 194
Fed. Appx. 492, 495 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1204
(10th Cir.1996) (“[T]he mere fact that the plaintiffs are convicted sexual offenders does
not mean that they have psychological disorders or that they are in need of psychiatric
treatment.”)). In addition, Brown did not allege Rodriguez ignored any serious medical
condition. Rather, he takes issue with his inability to participate in an optional treatment
program. Brown’s allegations fall far short of stating a cognizable Eighth Amendment
claim. Therefore, Brown’s claim that Rodriguez was deliberately indifferent to his
rehabilitative needs will be dismissed without prejudice.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:
1.

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Filing No. 33) is granted.

2.

This case is dismissed without prejudice.

3.

The court will enter judgment by a separate order.

DATED this 13th day of January, 2016.
BY THE COURT:
Richard G. Kopf
Senior United States District Judge

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District Court for the District of Nebraska does not endorse, recommend, approve, or
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The court accepts no responsibility for the availability or functionality of any hyperlink.
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