Taylor v. Holtmeyer et al
Filing
67
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER that the plaintiff's Rule 56(d) motion (filing 54 ) is granted. The defendant's motion for summary judgment (filing 50 ) is denied without prejudice to reassertion after a reasonable time for the parties to conduct discovery. Ordered by Judge John M. Gerrard. (LAC)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA
DE-VAUNTE J. TAYLOR,
4:14-CV-3127
Plaintiff,
vs.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
JAMES E. HOLTMEYER,
Defendant.
This matter is before the Court on the defendant's motion for summary
judgment (filing 50) and the plaintiff's motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(d) (filing 54). For the following reasons, the Court will grant the plaintiff's
Rule 56(d) motion and deny the defendant's motion for summary judgment
without prejudice.
Under Rule 56(d), a court may defer considering a summary judgment
motion or allow time for discovery "[i]f a nonmovant shows by affidavit or
declaration that, for specific reasons, it cannot present facts essential to
justify its opposition." However, Rule 56 does not require trial courts to allow
parties to conduct discovery before entering summary judgment. Anzaldua v.
Ne. Ambulance & Fire Prot. Dist., 793 F.3d 822, 836 (8th Cir. 2015). Thus,
the Court possesses wide discretion in denying Rule 56(d) motions. Id. And
the Court's discretion is further restricted when a summary judgment motion
based on qualified immunity is at issue, reflecting the concern that
insubstantial claims against government officials be resolved prior to
discovery and on summary judgment if possible. Id.
The Court also recognizes that "the mere assertion that evidence
supporting a party's allegation is in the opposing party's hands is insufficient
to justify a denial of a summary judgment motion on Rule 56(d) grounds." Id.
(quoting Jones v. City & Cnty. of Denver, Colo., 854 F.2d 1206, 1211 (10th
Cir. 1988)). But the Court is satisfied that good cause exists to grant the
plaintiff's Rule 56(d) motion here. Counsel was appointed to represent the
plaintiff in this case on August 19, 2015. Filing 41. That fact alone is
sufficient to distinguish this case from one in which counsel had been in a
position to conduct discovery and gather evidence before filing suit, and
immediately after filing a complaint. The Court agrees with the plaintiff that
when the defendant's motion for summary judgment is premised primarily on
the defendant's own affidavit, see filing 52, the basic opportunity to depose
the defendant is essential in responding to the summary judgment motion,
see filing 56.
And the defendant does not really argue otherwise. Although the
defendant expressly assented only to an extension of the plaintiff's response
deadline, see filing 59, the defendant's response to the plaintiff's motion did
not raise any other opposition to it. The Court has carefully considered
whether to simply extend the plaintiff's response deadline, as agreed to by
the defendant. However, the Court finds that do so might affect the burdens
of production in a way that would disadvantage the defendant, or at the very
least complicate the Court's briefing schedule.
It is well understood that on a motion for summary judgment, it is the
movant's initial burden to show—that is, to point out to the Court—an
absence of evidence to support a nonmoving party's case; then, the
nonmoving party has an affirmative burden to designate specific facts
creating a triable controversy. See, Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325
(1986); Midwest Oilseeds, Inc. v. Limagrain Genetics Corp., 387 F.3d 705, 714
(8th Cir. 2004). But under these circumstances, the additional discovery to be
conducted before the plaintiff's response to the defendant's motion for
summary judgment will likely produce evidence useful to both sides. And
that, in turn, might permit the defendant to "sandbag" the plaintiff by
presenting argument or evidence in his reply that would more properly have
been brought in support of the motion initially.1 See Salerno v. Ridgewater
Coll., No. 06-1717, 2008 WL 509001, at *4 (D. Minn. Feb. 8, 2008) (citing
Edwards v. Honeywell, Inc., 960 F.2d 673, 674 (7th Cir. 1992)).
Rather than assume that risk, the Court would prefer to start fresh
after the parties have had a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery.
Accordingly, the Court will grant the plaintiff's Rule 56(d) motion and deny
the defendant's motion for summary judgment without prejudice.
IT IS ORDERED:
1.
The plaintiff's Rule 56(d) motion (filing 54) is granted.
2.
The defendant's motion for summary judgment (filing 50) is
denied without prejudice to reassertion after a reasonable
time for the parties to conduct discovery.
To be clear: the Court is not in any way accusing the defendant of anything improper. The
Court is concerned about unintended consequences, not deliberate manipulation of the
rules.
1
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Dated this 23rd day of November, 2015.
BY THE COURT:
John M. Gerrard
United States District Judge
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